JUDGMENT : Sahidullah Munshi, J. This is a suit for specific performance of an agreement being a draft deed of lease (Annexure 'B' to the plaint) purportedly agreed to be executed by and between the plaintiff and the defendant and for mandatory injunction directing the defendant to execute the lease deed in the form as mentioned in Annexure 'B' to the plaint and further for a declaration that the lease in respect of the subject property in favour of the plaintiff is valid till 31st March, 2068 and/or the same has stood renewed until 31st March, 2068. The plaintiff has also prayed for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his servants, agents and assigns from creating any disturbance and they are interfering with the peaceful enjoyment and occupation of the premises by the plaintiff as tenant at least till 31st March 2068. In this suit the plaintiff has also prayed for other consequential reliefs for injunction, receiver, attachment, cost and other reliefs, if entitled to. According to the plaint case, the plaintiff is a tenant under the defendant in respect of the suit property mentioned in the schedule to the plaint which was leased out for a period of 99 years under the deed of lease executed on 2nd February, 1909. The plaintiff tendered and defendant accepted rent for the said suit property by cheque on account of rent. With effect from April 2005, the plaintiff had been tendering rent to the defendant under cover of a letter sent under speed post. Such letters containing the enclosed cheques on account of rent, however, have been refused by the defendant. The indenture of lease dated 2nd February 1909 was for a period of 99 years commencing from 1st February 1909 and was due to expire on 31st January 2008. In the meantime, several subleases were executed by the original lessee. The plaintiff is an assignee in pursuance of one of such sub-lease which was to expire on 31st October, 2007. The indenture of lease dated 2nd February 1909 was for a period of 99 years commencing from 1st February 1909 and was due to expire on 31st January 2008. In the meantime, several subleases were executed by the original lessee. The plaintiff is an assignee in pursuance of one of such sub-lease which was to expire on 31st October, 2007. According to the plaintiff, the grandfather of the defendant being the original lessor under the deed of lease dated 2nd February, 1909 died on 29th June, 1993 and thereafter, in July, 1996 the defendant approached the plaintiff for funds and a meeting was held between the plaintiff and the defendant in presence of the father of the defendant Prasanta Kumar Roy and his mother Supriya Devi Roy when allegedly it was agreed that the plaintiff would enhance the rent payable under the deed of lease dated 2nd February, 1909 to a substantial amount to be agreed upon on consideration that the tenure of the lease would be extended by a further period of 61 years 5 months beginning from 1st November, 2007. On the basis of the alleged agreement reached in July, 1996, a draft lease deed was finalized by the plaintiff's learned Advocate and was forwarded to the defendant and his father Prasanta Kumar Roy. At the request of the defendant, the said draft lease was thereafter sent to his learned Advocate. The draft lease was corrected in the hand writing of Prasanta Kumar Roy on the advice and in presence of the defendant and the same was again returned and corrected by representatives of the plaintiff for the purpose of finalization and preparations of the final lease deed. The plaintiff, although prepared final lease deed and forwarded the same to the defendant together with Form No.34A under Section 230A of the Income Tax Act 1961 for his signature, the defendant delayed the matter with regard to obtaining necessary income tax clearance, as a result whereof, the final lease deed could not be executed. 2. According to the plaint case, on 20th November 2004 the final lease deed prepared in terms of the draft as contained in Annexure 'B' to the plaint, was presented to the defendant for execution but the defendant refused to execute and sign the said lease deed on the purported ground that further amendments had to be made in the said final lease deed. The defendant, therefore, acted in breach of an obligation by refusing to execute the lease deed and the plaintiff is compelled to seek specific performance of the said lease deed to compel the defendant to perform the said obligation. The plaintiff has averred in the plaint that it is still ready and willing to make payment of necessary amount as mentioned in draft lease deed contained in Annexure 'B' to the plaint immediately upon execution of the same and to perform his obligation thereunder. The defendants entered appearance and contested the suit by filing written statement and denied the plaint case. 3. In the written statement the defendant has made a categorical averment that being a lessee of the suit property covenanted specifically to bear, pay and discharge the existing and future rates and taxes and assessment duties imposition outgoing and burdens whatsoever assessed, charged or imposed upon the suit property or upon the owner or occupier in respect thereof or payable by either in respect thereof. The lease deed contained a provision to the effect that if any covenant on the tenant's part contained therein should not be performed or observed, it shall be lawful for the landlord at any time thereafter and without notice to the tenants to re-enter upon the demised premises and any part thereof and to take possession of the suit property. 4. According to the plaintiff, the defendant has committed breach of those covenants by not paying huge taxes, interest and penalty to the Kolkata Municipal Corporation despite being informed by letter issued by the landlord and finding no other alternative the defendant forfeited the said lease and instituted a suit being Title Suit No. 1384 of 2005 for recovery of possession, mesne profit and permanent injunction before the learned Judge, 7th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta. With regard to the plaintiff's claim of specific performance and the preparation of the draft lease deed, the defendant has categorically stated that the plaintiff company proposed the father of the defendant for obtaining a fresh lease before expiry thereof and, accordingly, the defendants father consulted the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Animesh Kanti Ghoshal for obtaining an opinion whether before the expiry of the said lease was it advisable to execute a fresh lease deed. Animesh Kanti Ghoshal for obtaining an opinion whether before the expiry of the said lease was it advisable to execute a fresh lease deed. The defendant never participated in the said discussion as he was not willing to extend any further period of the lease on any term. There was only a talk between the plaintiff's representatives and Mr. Prasanta Kumar Roy, the father of the defendant but there was no concluded contract between the plaintiff and the defendant and no consideration was passed on such alleged agreement. The plaintiff never negotiated with the defendant for the purpose of executing a further lease as alleged by the plaintiff and the defendant never intended to execute further lease deed in favour of the plaintiff as alleged. It has been stated by the defendant that plaintiff has no right to remain in possession over the suit property after expiry of the period of lease and in as much as the indenture of lease was executed on 2nd February 1909 and by efflux of time the lease has come to an end on 31st January 2008 in as much as the lease was for a limited period of 99 years. On the basis of the rival contentions of the parties following issues were framed by this Court on 13th August 2015:- (1) Did the defendant agree to execute any lease deed on the basis of the alleged draft lease deed being Annexure 'B' to the plaint on 16th October 2004 as alleged in paragraph 22 of the plaint or any other date? (2) Was any alleged final lease deed prepared in terms of the alleged draft being Annexure 'B' to the plaint presented to the defendant for execution on November 20, 2004 as alleged in Paragraph 23 of the plaint or any other date? (3) Whether the lease in respect of the subject property in favour of the plaintiff is valid till March 2068 and/or has stood renewed till 31st March, 2068 by conduct of the parties? (4) Whether the plaintiff has any right to enjoy peaceful and quiet possession of the subject property without any interference from the defendant or his agents or assigns? (4) Whether the plaintiff has any right to enjoy peaceful and quiet possession of the subject property without any interference from the defendant or his agents or assigns? (5) Whether the plaintiff at all material times was and still ready and willing to make payment of necessary amount as mentioned in the draft lease deed contained in the Annexure 'B' to the plaint, to the defendant immediately upon execution of the same by the defendant and to inform his obligation thereunder as alleged in paragraph 26 of the plaint? (6) Is the present suit barred by the laws of limitation? (7) Is the plaintiff entitled to get decree for specific performance of the agreement mentioned in the plaint and in terms of the draft deed of lease being Annexure 'B' to the plaint? (8) Is the plaintiff entitled to get decree for declaration that the lease in respect of the subject property in favour of the plaintiff is valid till 31st march 2068 and/or has stood renewed till 31st March 2068? (9) To what relief or reliefs the plaintiff is entitled to? 5. In order to prove its case the plaintiff tendered the following documents in evidence and those have been marked as Exhibit 'A' to 'S1'. The said documents are as follows:- Exhibit 'A' - Photocopy of Lease Deed dated 02.02.1909. Exhibit 'B' - Sub Lease Dated 18.03.1918 (Xerox Copy). Exhibit 'C' - Photocopy Deed dated 17.01.1922. Exhibit 'D' - Exhibit "D" Photocopy of Deed dated 12.09.1927. Exhibit 'E' - Photocopy of Deed dated 30.07.1928. Exhibit 'F' - Photocopy of decree dated 17.08.1931 in Suit No. 1844/1928. Exhibit 'G' - (Collectively) Letter dated 10.02.1967 from Regional Director of Govt. of India, Ministry of Law along with Fresh certificate of Incorporation consequent on charge of Name dated 18.03.67. Exhibit 'H' - Extract at the Meeting of the Directors dated 16.08.05. Exhibit 'I' - Extract of the Meeting of the Directors dated 08.08.05. Exhibit 'J'- Extract of the Meeting of the Directors dated 10.01.14. Exhibit 'K' - Rent receipt copy dated January, 2005 to March, 05. Exhibit 'L' - (Collectively) Original Bank Cheque dated 06.04.05 of Standard Charted Bank along with Rent receipt of April, 05 to June, 05. Exhibit 'M' - (Collectively) Letter dated 11.04.05 of Commercial Properties & Merchandise Ltd along with 6 EMS Postal Card, 7 nos. of original cheques. Exhibit 'K' - Rent receipt copy dated January, 2005 to March, 05. Exhibit 'L' - (Collectively) Original Bank Cheque dated 06.04.05 of Standard Charted Bank along with Rent receipt of April, 05 to June, 05. Exhibit 'M' - (Collectively) Letter dated 11.04.05 of Commercial Properties & Merchandise Ltd along with 6 EMS Postal Card, 7 nos. of original cheques. Exhibit 'N'- List of Envelops containing covering letter as per JBD. Exhibit 'O'- Letter dated 27.04.2005. Exhibit 'P'- (Collectively) Letter dated 02.08.2006. Exhibit 'Q' - (Collectively) Bunch of Letters in a Cover file. Exhibit 'R' - Letter dated 02.07.93. Exhibit 'S' - Letter dated 19.07.93. Exhibit 'S1' - Encircled Portion with Blue and Red ink in Exhibit 'S'. 6. Similarly defendants have also relied on the following documents being Exhibit nos. (Exhibit 1' to Exhibit 11'). 7. The said Exhibits are as follows" Exhibit 1' - Photocopy of the certified copy of the Judgment dated 27.09.06 passed in W.P. 90/2005. Exhibit 2' - Signed Xerox copy of Order dated 19.10.2006 passed by Indira Banerjee, J. and Biswanath Somadder, J. in T.- 469/06. T- 470/06, W.P.- 90/05. Exhibit 3' - Signed Xerox copy of Order dated 13.02.2007 passed by Kalyan Jyoti Sengupta, J. and Arun Kumar Bhattacharya, J. in GA No. 3204/06, APO No. 442/06 with WP No. 90/05. Exhibit 4' - Certified copy of Letter dated 20.05.2003 of Estate Pallab Roy (DD-4). Exhibit 5' - Certified copy of Letter dated 13.01.2005 of Chandramala Mukherjee, Advocate (DD-5). Exhibit 6' - (Collectively) Certified copy of Plaint & Written Statement being no. 1384/05 without annexure. Exhibit 7' - Certified copy of Will of Raja Kamara Ranjan Roy. Exhibit 8' - Letter of intimation dated 13.03.15 issued by K.M.C. Exhibit 9' - Certified copy of Order dated 15.12.07 in T.S. No. 1384/2005 before the Ld. IV Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta. Exhibit 10' - Written Statement on behalf of the Defendant. Exhibit 11' - Letter of Intimation dated 07.03.17 issued by K.M.C. 8. Since the issues are interrelated, all the issues are taken up together for decision. 9. Plaintiff produced one witness namely, Shiv Shankar Poddar, one of its Director who deposed that he was present in all the negotiations and discussions with the defendant and his father with regard to the execution of fresh lease being subject matter of the suit. Since the issues are interrelated, all the issues are taken up together for decision. 9. Plaintiff produced one witness namely, Shiv Shankar Poddar, one of its Director who deposed that he was present in all the negotiations and discussions with the defendant and his father with regard to the execution of fresh lease being subject matter of the suit. He has been cross-examined and the defendant himself was the sole witness on his behalf to put forward the case of the defendant. It is the admitted case that negotiations were going on between the father of the defendant and the plaintiff for execution of a fresh lease as would be apparent from the cross-examination by the learned Advocate for the defendant to Mr. Shiv Shankar Poddar (PW1). From such cross-examination it appears that although, it may not be a disputed case that defendant's father was present in the negotiations with regard to the extension of the lease but the defendant never gave any consent to such execution of a fresh lease nor was he a party to such negotiation. In question no.244, when the learned Advocate asked PW1 whether he had filed any document on record of the suit to show that the defendant had authorized his father to act on his behalf, the PW1 deposed "no", therefore, it is admitted by the plaintiff that at least defendant never authorized his father to go for any negotiation for the extension of the lease or to execute any lease deed or for that purpose any deed was prepared to which the defendant was under obligation to execute the same. Another question was raised in question no.246 whether Pallab Roy (defendant) was an absolute sole owner of the suit property and in reply thereto the PW Shiv Shankar Poddar deposed "yes". In the next question in reply to the defendant's question whether he filed anything on record of the suit to show that Pallab Roy directed the plaintiff to prepare a draft lease agreement, the PW deposed "No". In question no. 249 the PW was asked whether he filed any document on record to show that Mr. Animesh Kanti Ghoshal learned Advocate was authorized to act on behalf of the defendant, the PW deposed "No. There is no document. In question no. 249 the PW was asked whether he filed any document on record to show that Mr. Animesh Kanti Ghoshal learned Advocate was authorized to act on behalf of the defendant, the PW deposed "No. There is no document. Therefore, from these questions and answers it does not appear that at least the defendant had ever communicated his intention to execute a fresh lease deed or that he had authorized whether his father or the learned Advocate Mr. Ghoshal to do anything on his behalf for the preparation of the draft lease deed being Annexure 'B' to the plaint, the specific performance of which has been claimed by the plaintiff. More so, while cross-examination of the defendant Mr. Pallab Roy is taken into consideration it does not alter the situation any way. Answers given by the defendant to the questions raised to him by the learned advocate for the plaintiff clearly shows that the defendant never consented for any negotiations for execution of a fresh lease. 10. The plaintiff has made out a case all throughout that immediately after the demise of the defendant's grand-father, his family was in dire need of urgent funds and as a result whereof, they approached for funds from the plaintiff and the plaintiff and defendant negotiated with each other so that the plaintiff could disburse the required fund and the defendant in response executed a fresh deed of lease for a further period of 61 years. Various questions in cross have been put by the learned advocate for the plaintiff (question no. 155 to 255) but no effective question would have been thrown to prove the said foundation of the purported agreement for lease or draft lease deed which was allegedly agreed to be executed by the defendant. From the entire cross-examination of the defendant it does not appear that the plaintiff has taken any venture to establish the foundation of the plaintiff's case that defendant was a party to the agreement for extension of lease. From the entire cross-examination of the defendant it does not appear that the plaintiff has taken any venture to establish the foundation of the plaintiff's case that defendant was a party to the agreement for extension of lease. Most of the questions put to the defendant in cross-examination relates to payment of rates and taxes by the plaintiff in respect of the suit property and other correlated fact like the suit which is pending in the City Civil Court at Calcutta but I find, with surprise, that there is no direct question to the witness on the issue whether the defendant agreed to execute any lease deed on the basis of the alleged draft lease deed being Annexure 'B' to the plaint or that was there any discussion between the plaintiff, defendant's father and the defendant where the defendant agreed to execute such a lease deed in future. In question no. 239 the learned advocate asked the defendant in cross-examination whether his father had communicated a proposal for extension of deed made by the plaintiff to the defendant and whether he personally took part in any discussion after the proposal was communicated since 1996 with the plaintiff, the defendant replied "my father had informed me that there was a proposal for extension of lease but I have never participated in any discussion neither I agreed to go into an agreement." Next few questions are also important and is set out below: "240. I put it to you that it was only after the proposal had been accepted by you and your father that these documents being Exhibit CC, EE and X2 being draft deeds of modification were prepared?/I do not agree". "241. I further put it to you that it is the plaintiff's witnesses' specific evidence that you took part in the meetings held at your house with the plaintiff's representatives in October, 2004 along with your father and mother regarding the finalization of the said document?/I do not agree." "242. I further put it to you that plaintiffs were always ready and willing to have the lease extended by executing and registering a proper deed?/That is not correct". "243. I further suggest it to you that there was breach of the oral agreement for extension of lease as evinced by the said draft deeds?/There was no oral agreement". "244. I further put it to you that plaintiffs were always ready and willing to have the lease extended by executing and registering a proper deed?/That is not correct". "243. I further suggest it to you that there was breach of the oral agreement for extension of lease as evinced by the said draft deeds?/There was no oral agreement". "244. I further put it to you that you have issued a letter dated 13th January 2005 in breach of the agreement with the plaintiff?/That is not correct". "245. Are you standing by the letter of purported termination dated 13th January 2005?/Yes." 11. It is also important to quote some more questions from question no. 248 to 255 which are set out below:- "248. Do you know a gentleman by the name of Vishal Gagnita ?/There are so many Vishal Gagninatas. Please tell which one". "249. Do you know more than one Vishal Gagnita?/I know one but I do not know whether you are referring to the same one". "250. In what capacity do you know Vishal Gagnita that you are acquainted with?/I do not think that Vishal Gagnita that I know of has any relation with this case". "251. Was Mr. Vishal Gagnita present in any of the meetings that you have had with the representatives of the plaintiff?/There has been no meeting with me". "252. I put it to you that your answer that there was no meeting with the plaintiff's representatives regarding extension of lease is incorrect?/What I have said is correct". "253. I further put it to you that you have deliberately not identified your father's handwriting on the documents marked as Exhibit CC and EE?/That is not correct". "254. I further put it to you that you have deliberately not identified the handwriting of Mr. Animesh Ghoshal, Advocate on the document Exhibit EE despite being aware of his handwriting ?/That is not correct". "255. I further put it to you that you have wrongfully refused to execute the deed for extension of time of the lease and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance ?/That is not correct. I do not agree". 12. "255. I further put it to you that you have wrongfully refused to execute the deed for extension of time of the lease and the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance ?/That is not correct. I do not agree". 12. On a close scrutiny of these questions it does not appear that the defendant has, even unmindfully, agreed to any suggestion given to him in cross-examination with regard to the fact that the defendant ever participated in the discussion for extension of lease. It also does not appear that the defendant agreed to the proposal for extension of lease. He has categorically denied that there was any oral agreement to that effect. Therefore, record does not reveal that defendant either agreed to the extension of the lease beyond the year 2008 nor does it appear that he had agreed to the execution of a lease deed for extending the time period nor is it apparent from the record that even if any discussion was carried on by and between the plaintiff and the defendant's father, the defendant had any support to such discussion or any consent to the purported outcome of any discussion if had taken place. Nor is it borne out that the defendant ever authorized any Learned Advocate to correct the draft lease deed for the specific performance of which the plaintiff has filed the instant suit. Mr. Dhruba Ghosh Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the plaintiff has placed reliance on the following decisions in support of the plaint case, namely, Krishnan Kesavan & Ors. -Vs.- Kochukunju Karunakaran reported in, (1988) AIR Kerala 107; K. Nanjappa (Dead), by Legal Representatives -Vs.- R.A. Hameed @ Ameersab (Dead) by Legal Representatives & Anr. reported in, (2016) 1 SCC 762 ; Govind Rubber Ltd. -Vs.- Louis Dreyfus Commodities Asia Pvt. Ltd. reported in, (2015) 13 SCC 477 ; Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar - Vs.- Md. Haji Latif & Ors., (1968) AIR SC 1413; and Rajabu Fathima Buhari & Anr. -Vs.- S.V. Ramakrishna Mudaliar & Anr. reported in, (1973) AIR Madras 70. 13. Relying on the decision in Krishnan Kesavan Mr. Ghosh submits that even oral evidence alone is no ground to deny the relief of specific performance and an oral agreement even is not something prohibited by law to be specifically performed. He submits that even oral agreements can be enforced by the Court of law. 13. Relying on the decision in Krishnan Kesavan Mr. Ghosh submits that even oral evidence alone is no ground to deny the relief of specific performance and an oral agreement even is not something prohibited by law to be specifically performed. He submits that even oral agreements can be enforced by the Court of law. The ratio of the said decision has no bearing on the facts and circumstances of the present case. This is undisputed that an oral agreement is also an agreement and if it can be proved otherwise by cogent evidence that there has been an agreement, the same is enforceable in law. In the present case the plaintiff has not been able to prove the happening of a contract to the execution of a deed of lease by the defendant. 14. The decision in the case of K. Nanjappa has been referred to by Mr. Ghosh to show the same ratio as in the case of Krishna Keshavan. In this case there was an oral agreement for sale of immovable property. Court held that same is permissible subject to proof by the plaintiff and there must be consensus of ad idem between the parties for the concluded agreement for sale of immovable property. Here in the instant case the High Court granted decree for specific performance of agreement for sale of immovable property which is under challenge before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the High Court while granting decree for specific performance misguided itself in law having regard the entire facts of the case and the evidence of record. The Hon'ble apex Court held that each and every case of specific performance cannot be granted because such relief under section 20 of the Specific Relief Act for grant of specific performance is a discretionary relief and Court should be cautious in granting such relief. Unless situation demands and evidence supports, Court should refrain itself from granting decree for specific performance of contract. Like the case at hand where the plaintiff has failed to prove the minimum which was required for getting a decree for specific performance for contract that the defendant agreed to execute a deed of lease and on his consent draft lease deed was finalized. Like the case at hand where the plaintiff has failed to prove the minimum which was required for getting a decree for specific performance for contract that the defendant agreed to execute a deed of lease and on his consent draft lease deed was finalized. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of K Nanjappa held that the High Court is not correct in holding that there is no reason to disbelieve the execution of the document although it was executed on a quarter sheet of paper and not on proper stamp paper and also written in small letters. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that the High Court misdirected itself in law in holding that there was no need for the plaintiff to have sought for opinion of an expert regarding the execution of the document which was disputed by the defendant. 15. In Govind Rubber Limited the Hon'ble apex Court is categorical with regard to the signing of an agreement to be mandatory in a case for specific performance of contract. However, Court has made it clear that there has to be a contract between the parties and there must be meeting of minds between the parties which could create a binding contract between them. It is necessary for the court to find out from correspondence as to whether parties were ad idem to terms of contract. In the present case from the examination of the witnesses it is very much clear that the plaintiff has failed to make out any case for specific performance of contract. The plaintiff could not prove that there has been any meeting of minds between the parties with regard to execution of the deed farless to say that there was an agreement for execution of lease deed. However, the decision is based on Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Arbitration agreement even though in writing need not be signed by the parties if such agreement can be gathered from attending circumstances. This decision is distinguishable on fact and has no bearing in the fact situation of the present case. 16. In Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar the Hon'ble Apex Court discussed that even if the burden of proving does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts in issue. 16. In Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar the Hon'ble Apex Court discussed that even if the burden of proving does not lie on a party the Court may draw an adverse inference if he withholds important documents in his possession which can throw light on the facts in issue. The ratio of the decision is based on Section 114 of the Evidence Act which says that if a party who could have produced a better evidence, has not produced so, Court may draw adverse inference against him. Mr. Ghosh tried to argue that at the interlocutory stage he filed an application for appointment of a handwriting expert for an opinion as to the identity of hand writing appearing in Exhibit 'C' upon comparison of such hand writing and the hand writing appearing in Exhibit 'Y' and Exhibit 'YY1' and other sample of hand writing by Prasanta Kumar Roy, father of the defendant. The decision dated 7th June 2017 decided by me against Mr. Ghosh's client and I held that no expert should be appointed to prove whether the signature was of Mr. Prasanta Kumar Roy or not. Because even if it was proved that Mr. P. K Roy had signed the draft agreement that would not enable the plaintiff to get a decree for specific performance in as much as neither Prasanta Kumar Roy was a party to the suit nor is he the owner of the property, nor was he entrusted by the defendant to deal with the plaintiff on his behalf with regard to the execution of a fresh lease in respect of the suit property. In such circumstances I held that the attempt made by the plaintiff was only to delay the disposal of the suit. In this regard Mr. Ghosh argued that the defendant ought to have produced his father in Court to depose so that he could clarify the situation. The reason is very simple as to why the defendant did not ask his father to depose on his behalf and that is also not necessary for the present case in as much as he has no interest in the matter. He cannot have any interest in getting the plaintiff decree or refusing the decree in the suit. He has no interest either in the affirmative or negative in regard the suit being decreed or dismissed. No burden was lying upon the defendant to prove plaintiff's case. He cannot have any interest in getting the plaintiff decree or refusing the decree in the suit. He has no interest either in the affirmative or negative in regard the suit being decreed or dismissed. No burden was lying upon the defendant to prove plaintiff's case. Therefore, whatever argument is being made at this juncture by Mr. Ghosh that the defendant has withheld best evidence is not correct. It is not expected that the defendant will bring evidence to favour the case of the plaintiff. If the defendant has not produced his father courses were open in law for the plaintiff to take appropriate steps but he avoided to take the same. Section 114 helps the Court in deciding on whom is the burden of proof lies in certain situation and it is set out below:- "114. Court may presume existence of certain facts. -The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. Illustrations The Court may presume- (a) That a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession; (b) That an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars; (c) That a bill of exchange, accepted or endorsed, was accepted or endorsed for good consideration; (d) That a thing or state of things which has been shown to be in existence within a period shorter than that within which such things or state of things usually cease to exist, is still in existence; (e) That judicial and official acts have been regularly performed; (f) That the common course of business has been followed in particular cases; (g) That evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it; (h) That if a man refuses to answer a question which he is not compelled to answer by law, the answer, if given, would be unfavourable to him; (i) That when a document creating an obligation is in the hands of the obligor, the obligation has been discharged." 17. The presumption, in fact, is to be raised to assess the Court for determining as to the burden of proof in a set of circumstances. As the Court can draw certain inferences either on the basis of circumstances or of a single circumstance, it would be in a position to fix up the responsibility of one or the other party in the case with the burden to reverse such presumption. Under this section the Court can draw only inferences. It does not authorize the Court to legislate as to the manner in which human beings should conduct themselves in a given set of facts. This section is a permissive and not a mandatory section. Court may refuse to raise a presumption in a particular case, although, such a presumption might have been properly raised in other cases. This Section authorizes the Court to make certain presumption of fact. They are all presumptions which may naturally arise but the legislature, by the use of word 'may' instead of 'shall' both in the body of the Section and in the illustration, shows that the Court is not compelled to raise them but is to consider whether in all the circumstances of the particular case they should be raised. The expression 'may presume' indicates that it is not imperative for the Court to draw a presumption but the Court has the discretion to draw a presumption in the circumstances enumerated therein. Illustration (g) under Section 114 of the Evidence Act deals with withholding of evidence. This illustration deals with the presumptions arising from the conduct of the person withholding the evidence. The circumstances are that the evidence if produced, to operate against him if he has withheld it, should be used against him. This illustration enables the Court to draw an adverse inference, if the party does not produce the relevant evidence in his power and possession. Various other things are required to be proved before coming to a conclusion that the defendant has withheld such an evidence. It has also to be proved that the evidence is in his custody or in his possession or within his domain if those attending circumstances are not proved it cannot be argued that the Court has to take an adverse presumption against the defendant simply because the defendant has not produced the witness. It has also to be proved that the evidence is in his custody or in his possession or within his domain if those attending circumstances are not proved it cannot be argued that the Court has to take an adverse presumption against the defendant simply because the defendant has not produced the witness. Before taking such adverse inference the Court has to come to a finding that the defendant is under some obligation to produce his father in evidence. This Court is of the considered view that defendant is not saddled with any such obligation to produce his father in the witness box to prove the case of the plaintiff. In my view it is not obligatory but optional for the Court to draw a presumption under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act even though the defendant has not taken any steps to produce his father in Court in the witness box in the fact situation of the case. 18. Withholding best evidence available to a party and relying upon the abstract doctrine of onus of proof may result in drawing adverse inference against that party. In this case, in my view, the plaintiff has not discharged his onus and he, therefore, cannot invite the Court to draw adverse inference against the defendant. 19. In Rajabu Fathima Buhari the Single Bench of Madras High Court while dealing with the case relied on a passage from the Law of Vendor and Purchaser by Roy Milner Stonham which has been quoted in paragraph 19 of their Lordships' judgment. The said passage clarifies the position as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance. 20. Paragraph 19 of their Lordship judgment is set out below:- "Mere agreements, or promises, intended to create mere social, political, or family obligations or obligations of honour, or understood by both parties as jest, do not create a contract. There must be an intention to create obligations enforceable between the parties by legal sanctions. In other words, it must be intended to create jural relations. This intention is sometimes referred to as an animus contrahendi. Mere statements of intention, hope, anticipation, or expectation do not create enforceable obligations. An agreement intended to create moral obligations only, and not legal rights or obligations, does not create a contract. In other words, it must be intended to create jural relations. This intention is sometimes referred to as an animus contrahendi. Mere statements of intention, hope, anticipation, or expectation do not create enforceable obligations. An agreement intended to create moral obligations only, and not legal rights or obligations, does not create a contract. Also, the agreement may be subject to a third person's consent, or any other condition precedent to it becoming operative as an enforceable agreement. An agreement, though purporting to be made by one party without prejudice to his rights, will operate according to its tenor and effect the rights of each party accordingly. A stipulation whose enforcement against the party concerned rests upon his mere will has no contractual effect." 21. In the said decision, therefore, Their Lordships were of the opinion that the essential terms of contract relating to re-conveyance not having been specifically agreed to between the parties, suit for specific performance could not be enforced. This finding clearly goes against Mr. Ghosh's client. This is a case where the plaintiff has not been able to prove that there was any intention on the part of the defendant to go for further extension of the lease in question. That apart in order to cross the hurdle Mr. Ghosh's client has to come forward with a case that the agreement even if said to be an oral agreement is a valid agreement enforceable under law. From the evidence on record it has been found that the circumstances have been sought to be spelled out under which the father of the defendant might have agreed to such proposed extension but the defendant never consented thereto. In order to get decree for specific performance of contract the plaintiff has to show that there was a valid contract. From the evidence I do not find that there was any consideration for such a purported agreement alleged to have been agreed to by the defendant. Section 25 of the Indian Contract Act says that an agreement without consideration is a void agreement. And nowhere from the evidence the plaintiff could produce any iota of fact that there was some consideration for which the defendant as a reasonable man also being a man of ordinary prudence agreed to execute deed of lease for extension of the time period. And nowhere from the evidence the plaintiff could produce any iota of fact that there was some consideration for which the defendant as a reasonable man also being a man of ordinary prudence agreed to execute deed of lease for extension of the time period. Therefore, without going into other aspects on the validity of a contract I hold that this is not a case where the plaintiff can, at all, get a decree for specific performance. 22. Suit is, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the defendant is entitled to get a cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand) only, which the plaintiff is directed to put in the department within a period of one month after decree is drawn up. 23. Department is directed to draw up and complete the decree as expeditiously as possible. 24. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be delivered to the learned counsel for the parties, upon compliance of all usual formalities.