ORDER : Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeks to challenge the order of Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghatshila passed in Arbitration Case No.01/2015 on 19.07.2016, where under the learned Court has dismissed the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 of the applicant/writ petitioner on the point of maintainability holding that learned Court has no jurisdiction to entertain it. 3. The relevant factual matrix is delineated hereinafter. The agreement between the parties for execution of a project at Moubhandar, Ghatshila was entered on 09.04.1992 followed by work order dated 28.09.1993. The total price for consideration of the work was Rs.9,88,62,600/- excluding the escalation. Petitioner’s registered Head office is at Kolkata while the registered office of Respondent is at Chennai. The project was completed and handed over to the petitioner by the Respondent on 11.09.1996. The dispute arose in respect of the balance amount of Rs.1,22,55,402/- under the Arbitration Clause 3.67 contained in the work order quoted hereunder:- “3.67-ARBITRATON-All the disputes and difference arising out of or in any way touching or concerning this contract shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Hindustan Copper Limited or any officer nominated by him in this behalf. No objection shall be taken on the ground that the arbitrator so appointed is an employee of the company and that he has or had to deal with the matters to which the agreement or the reference relates or that in the course of his duty he had dealt with or expressed views on all or any of the matters covered by the reference. The award of the arbitrator shall be final conclusive and binding on all the parties to the contract. In the event of the arbitrator dying, neglecting or refusing to act or resigning or being unable to act for any reason or his award being set aside by the court for any reason, it shall be lawful for the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, HCL to appoint another arbitrator in the place of the outgoing arbitrator in the manner aforesaid. The arbitrator may from time to time with the consent of all the parties to the contract enlarge the time for making the Award. The arbitrator may from time to time with the consent of all the parties to the contract enlarge the time for making the Award. Upon every such reference the assessment of the costs incidental to the reference and award respectively shall be in the discretion of the arbitrator. Subject as aforesaid, the Arbitration Act, 1940 and the rules there under and any statutory modifications thereof for the time being in force shall be deemed to apply to the arbitration proceedings under this clause. The venue of the arbitration shall be the place as the arbitrator at his discretion may determine.” 4. Sri I. N. Banerjee, Retired General Manager (Projects) Hindustan Copper Limited, posted at the registered office of the petitioner at Kolkata, was appointed as sole Arbitrator by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director through letter dated 18.07.2000 to adjudicate the dispute. Learned Arbitrator entered into reference and during its pendency reached the age of superannuation in December, 2000. Thereafter, the C.M.D, Hindustan Copper Limited appointed Sri D. Dasgupta, Assistant General Manager (Mines Planning & Safety), posted at registered office at Kolkata as the sole Arbitrator in place of Sri I.N. Banerjee. An objection was raised by the Respondent on his appointment under Section 16(2) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1996) on 11.05.2002. 5. Learned Arbitral Tribunal heard the parties at length on several dates and by order dated 29.03.2003 allowed the plea in favour of the Respondent. The order is at Annexure-3 to the writ application. Learned Tribunal held that the erstwhile Arbitrator Mr. I.N. Banerjee continued to have mandate to adjudicate the dispute between the parties. The Respondent felt that the order dated 29.03.2003 was not being complied on the part of the petitioner. It filed Civil Revision Application before Hon’ble High Court at Kolkata for implementation of the said order dated 29.03.2003. However, it withdrew the said application for filing an appeal before the appropriate forum, which was allowed by order dated 18.02.2004 passed by learned Single Judge of Kolkata High Court. Thereafter it preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No. 91 of 2004 before the learned District Judge, at Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) for implementation of the order dated 29.03.2003 under Section 37(2)(a) of the Act of 1996 along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The delay was condoned by the learned Court by order dated 30.03.2003. Thereafter it preferred Miscellaneous Appeal No. 91 of 2004 before the learned District Judge, at Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) for implementation of the order dated 29.03.2003 under Section 37(2)(a) of the Act of 1996 along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The delay was condoned by the learned Court by order dated 30.03.2003. The appeal was heard by learned Additional District Judge, Alipore, 24-Parganas (South). By judgment dated 17.08.2009, the order dated 29.03.2003 passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal was confirmed. 6. Petitioner herein laid a challenge before the Kolkata High Court to the said order in Civil Revision Application No. 947 of 2010 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, but the same was disposed of as being devoid of merit. Arbitration proceedings resumed under Sri I.N. Banerjee and finally the Award was published on 14.05.2015. The entire proceedings undisputedly were held at registered office of petitioner at Ashutosh Chowdhury Avenue, Kolkata-700019, which fell under the territorial jurisdiction of Alipore Court 24-Parganas (South). Petitioner filed an application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before Learned Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghatshila on 14.08.2015. The case was admitted on 21.09.2015. Respondent had filed execution case before the learned Court at Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) on 06.10.2015. On receipt of notice in the execution case, the petitioner informed the Respondent herein about the pendency of the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before the learned Court of Civil Judge(Senior Division), Ghatshila. The Respondent initially raised a plea before the learned Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghatshila on the point of jurisdiction. Respondent thereafter approached this Court in W.P. (C) No. 5803 of 2015. The same was disposed of on the request made by learned counsel for the parties vide order dated 07.04.2016 with a liberty to the petitioner/respondent herein to raise the question of maintainability of Section 34 petition before the learned Court (Annexure-8). The impugned order has been passed thereafter on 19.07.2016 by the learned Court upholding the plea of maintainability raised by the Respondent. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order inter alia on the following grounds:- (i). The impugned order has been passed thereafter on 19.07.2016 by the learned Court upholding the plea of maintainability raised by the Respondent. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order inter alia on the following grounds:- (i). The applicant/writ petitioner herein had the option to avail of the remedies against the impugned award before both the Courts, one where the arbitration proceedings were held i.e. at Kolkata and the other before the learned Court of Civil Judge(Senior Division), Ghatshila where the project was executed. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the aforesaid submissions on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. reported in (2012) 9 SCC 552 , para 96 thereof. (ii). Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the Respondent cannot rely upon the provisions of section 42 of the Act of 1996 in view of the fact that the proceedings prosecuted before the learned Court of District Judge, Alipore, 24-Parganas(South) were in the nature of an appeal under Section 37(2) (a) of the Act of 1996. It is also evident from the order passed by the learned Court and did not fall within the meaning of application as finds place in Section 42 of the Act of 1996. He has relied upon a judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pandey & Co. Builders (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar, reported in (2007) 1 SCC 467 , Para 24 and 26 thereof. (iii). Learned counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance on a judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of A.B.C. Laminart (P) Ltd. v. A.P. Agencies reported in (1989) 2 SCC 163 , para 15. Relying upon the said decisions he submits that jurisdiction of the Court in the matter of contract would depend on the seat of the contract and cause of action arising through the connecting factors. The performance of a contract is part of cause of action and a suit in respect of the breach can always be filed at the place where the contract should have been performed or its performance completed. (iv). The performance of a contract is part of cause of action and a suit in respect of the breach can always be filed at the place where the contract should have been performed or its performance completed. (iv). It is further urged relying upon the case of State of W.B. v. Associated Contractors rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2015) 1 SCC 32 (para 12, 20, 25 thereof) that if a first application is made to a court which is neither a Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district or a High Court exercising original jurisdiction in a State, such application not being a court as defined would be outside Section 42. Also, an application made to a court without subject-matter jurisdiction would be outside Section 42. In the instant case the Respondent had approached the learned Court of District Judge at Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) by way of Miscellaneous Appeal and not through the application under Part-I of the Act. On this count also Section 42 would not come to the aid of the Respondent. (v). Learned counsel has also tried to expatiate on the scope and nature of an appeal. He has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers & others reported in (2003) 6 SCC 659 (Para 16) and submitted that the right of appeal is created only by a statute but it is essentially a necessary part of the procedure in an action where superior court’s jurisdiction is invoked to redress the error of the Court below. The appeal, strictly is directed to consider whether the order of the Court from which the appeal is brought was right on the materials which that court had before it. In that sense, the order accepting the plea of jurisdiction passed by the second Arbitrator Mr. D. Das Gupta was in favour of Respondent. Resort to the forum of the Appellate Court under Section 37(2) (a) on the part of the Respondent was itself misconceived. The appeal was, in fact, filed for implementation of the order passed in their own favour. 8. D. Das Gupta was in favour of Respondent. Resort to the forum of the Appellate Court under Section 37(2) (a) on the part of the Respondent was itself misconceived. The appeal was, in fact, filed for implementation of the order passed in their own favour. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has summarized his argument and submitted that the learned Court at Ghatshila clearly fell in error in upholding the plea of maintainability raised by the Respondent as to its lack of jurisdiction to decide the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. Learned Court in such circumstances did not even consider to pass consequential order to allow the petitioner to approach the competent court for availing of remedy under Section 34 of the Act. 9. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent has referred to the chronology of facts and the life cycle of the instant litigation as noted above and made the following submissions:- i. Learned District Judge, Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) is the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district before whom any such application or appeal in terms of Section 2(1)(e) of the Act of 1996 would lie under Part –I of the Act of 1996. ii. The Respondent had also preferred the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act along with the Miscellaneous Appeal No. 91 of 2004 before the Learned District Judge, Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) iii. By reference to Clause 3.67 containing the arbitration clause, it is submitted that the venue of arbitration was fixed with consent of the parties at Kolkata. There was no objection at any point of time on the part of the petitioner to the venue or seat of arbitration. Therefore, the learned Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction at Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) would have the jurisdiction to entertain any challenge to the Award made by learned Arbitrator. iv. Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent has also made reference to the provisions of Section 20 sub section (2) of the Act of 1996 in the context of the aforesaid submissions. v. Learned counsel has placed strong reliance on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited Vs. Datawind Innovations Private Limited & others reported in (2017) 7 SCC 678 . v. Learned counsel has placed strong reliance on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited Vs. Datawind Innovations Private Limited & others reported in (2017) 7 SCC 678 . He has placed various paragraphs of the judgment in support of the submission that when the parties have chosen the seat of arbitration, it is analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Any claim for remedy as to the validity of an existing interim or final Award is agreed to be made in the court of the place designated as seat of arbitration. The Apex Court has also dealt with the judgment rendered by it earlier in the case of Bharat Aluminum Company Vs. Kaiser Aluminum Technical Services Inc. with analogous cases reported in (2012) 9 SCC 552 and arrived at an opinion that the meaning of the expression “subject matter” as defined in Section 2(1) (e) is confined to Part-I and has a reference and connection with the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify the courts having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a Court which would essentially be a Court of the seat of the arbitration process. Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgments relied in their support before learned Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Ghatshila taken note of in the impugned order. It is further submitted that expression of court would also mean appellate court as held by the Apex Court in the case of Ct. A. Ct. Nachiappa Chettian and others vs. Cgt. A. Ct. Subramaniam Chettiar reported in AIR 1960 S.C 307 paragraph 35and 36 thereof. He submits that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. The case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logical follows from it. He has also placed reliance on Para-18 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case Ambica Quarry Works etc. Vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in AIR 1987 S.C 1073 . Based on these submissions the respondents have defended the impugned order, whereunder learned Court has declined to entertain the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 as being without jurisdiction. 10. Vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in AIR 1987 S.C 1073 . Based on these submissions the respondents have defended the impugned order, whereunder learned Court has declined to entertain the application under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 as being without jurisdiction. 10. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and taken note of the relevant material facts. I have also gone through the judgments relied upon by rival parties in support of their submissions. 11. Essentially, the controversy involved herein in the factual canvas of the case veers around the following issues: i. whether in the light of the Miscellaneous Appeal No. 91 of 2004 preferred before and decided by the learned Court of District Judge, Alipore, 24-Parganas (South) Kolkata, that court alone should have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceeding and all subsequent applications arising out of an agreement and the arbitral proceeding and to no other court? ii. Whether on account of the fact that the seat of arbitration proceeding was at Kolkata as fixed by learned arbitral tribunal with the consent of the parties, the claim for remedy as to the validity of the final award could be made only in the courts of place designated as seat of arbitration or not? iii. Whether in view of the fact that the project under the agreement was executed at Moubhandar, Ghatshila, cause of action to challenge the Award would lie both before learned Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Ghatshila and also before District Judge, Alipore, 24-Parganas(South) Kolkata, more so, in view of the fact that the entire arbitral proceeding had been conducted at Kolkata? 12. This Court would now proceed to answer each of the contentious issues in order to arrive at a proper resolution of controversy. Answer to the first question posed above can be found in the opinion of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Pandey & Co. Builders (P) Ltd. State of Bihar and others reported in (2007) 1 SCC 467 Paras- 24 & 26 which are quoted hereunder: “24. Section 42 of the 1996 Act, to which our attention has been drawn by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, in the instant case has no application. The said provision reads thus: “42. Builders (P) Ltd. State of Bihar and others reported in (2007) 1 SCC 467 Paras- 24 & 26 which are quoted hereunder: “24. Section 42 of the 1996 Act, to which our attention has been drawn by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, in the instant case has no application. The said provision reads thus: “42. Jurisdiction.—Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Part or in any other law for the time being in force, where with respect to an arbitration agreement any application under this Part has been made in a court, that court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement and the arbitral proceedings shall be made in that court and in no other court.” 26. Section 42 of the 1996 Act refers to applications and not to appeals.” 13. As held above Section 42 of Act of 1996 refers to an application and not to appeal. Not only going by nomenclature of the appeal but also the provisions under which the forum of learned court of Alipore was invoked, it would be evident that it was in the nature of an appeal under Section 37(2) (a) of the Act of 1996. Therefore, the contention of the respondent based on Section 42 of the Act that Alipore Court alone shall have jurisdiction over the arbitral proceeding and all subsequent applications arising out that agreement and arbitral proceeding does not merit acceptance. 14. In order to seek answer to the second question posed above in respect of which both the parties have placed reliance on one or the other judgments in their support, it would be relevant to refer to the arbitration clause 3.67 itself, quoted above, which inter alia also stipulates “venue of arbitration shall be the place as the Arbitrator at his discretion may determine”. The arbitration clause under the agreement between the parties evidently did not provide for seat of arbitration. It was left open for learned Arbitral Tribunal to determine the venue or seat of arbitration at his discretion. In that way, there was no agreement between the parties about the seat of arbitration at Kolkata as was the case in the Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited (Supra) where the relevant clause in the agreement provided for seat of arbitration at Mumbai. In that way, there was no agreement between the parties about the seat of arbitration at Kolkata as was the case in the Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited (Supra) where the relevant clause in the agreement provided for seat of arbitration at Mumbai. The Apex court upon consideration of the terms of arbitration clause, therefore, had held that the agreement as to the seat of arbitration was analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Any claim for remedy as to the validity of existing interim or final Award is agreed to be made only in the Courts of place designated as the seat of arbitration. In the present case, though the arbitration proceedings were held at Kolkata as determined by learned Tribunal with the consent of the parties, but arbitration clause in itself did not provide for specific seat of arbitration which could be read as an exclusive jurisdiction clause. The relevant paragraph of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case Indus Mobile Distribution Private Limited (Supra) is being quoted hereunder: 19. A conspectus of all the aforesaid provisions shows that the moment the seat is designated, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the seat of arbitration is Mumbai and Clause 19 further makes it clear that jurisdiction exclusively vests in the Mumbai courts. Under the Law of Arbitration, unlike the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to suits filed in courts, a reference to “seat” is a concept by which a neutral venue can be chosen by the parties to an arbitration clause. The neutral venue may not in the classical sense have jurisdiction — that is, no part of the cause of action may have arisen at the neutral venue and neither would any of the provisions of Sections 16 to 21 of CPC be attracted. In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment “seat” is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties. 15. In arbitration law however, as has been held above, the moment “seat” is determined, the fact that the seat is at Mumbai would vest Mumbai courts with exclusive jurisdiction for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between the parties. 15. The contention of the respondent that learned District Judge, Alipore, 24-Parganas(South) Kolkata being the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the district, alone would have had jurisdiction to entertain any challenge to the Award under Section 34 of the Act, therefore, also does not merit acceptance. 16. The answer to the third question is rather easy. The project was executed at Maubhandar, Ghatshila. Part of cause of action therefore arose at Ghatshila in the district of East Singhbhum, though the other transaction relating to payment etc. were made at Kolkata and that arbitration proceedings were also held at Kolkata. Reliance is placed upon the ratio rendered by Constitution Bench Judgment of Apex Court in the case of Bharat Aluminum Company (supra) reported in (2012) 9 SCC 552 , paragraphs 96 & 97 thereof is quoted hereunder: “96. Section 2(1)(e) of the Arbitration Act, 1996 reads as under: “2. Definitions.—(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires— (a)-(d) * * * (e) ‘Court’ means the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any civil court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any Court of Small Causes;” We are of the opinion, the term “subject-matter of the arbitration” cannot be confused with “subject-matter of the suit”. The term “subject-matter” in Section 2(1)(e) is confined to Part I. It has a reference and connection with the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify the courts having supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a court which would essentially be a court of the seat of the arbitration process. In our opinion, the provision in Section 2(1)(e) has to be construed keeping in view the provisions in Section 20 which give recognition to party autonomy. Accepting the narrow construction as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants would, in fact, render Section 20 nugatory. In our opinion, the provision in Section 2(1)(e) has to be construed keeping in view the provisions in Section 20 which give recognition to party autonomy. Accepting the narrow construction as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants would, in fact, render Section 20 nugatory. In our view, the legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is located and the courts where the arbitration takes place. This was necessary as on many occasions the agreement may provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. Therefore, the courts where the arbitration takes place would be required to exercise supervisory control over the arbitral process. For example, if the arbitration is held in Delhi, where neither of the parties are from Delhi, (Delhi having been chosen as a neutral place as between a party from Mumbai and the other from Kolkata) and the tribunal sitting in Delhi passes an interim order under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the appeal against such an interim order under Section 37 must lie to the courts of Delhi being the courts having supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration proceedings and the tribunal. This would be irrespective of the fact that the obligations to be performed under the contract were to be performed either at Mumbai or at Kolkata, and only arbitration is to take place in Delhi. In such circumstances, both the courts would have jurisdiction i.e. the court within whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the suit is situated and the courts within the jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution i.e. arbitration is located. 97. The definition of Section 2(1)(e) includes “subject-matter of the arbitration” to give jurisdiction to the courts where the arbitration takes place, which otherwise would not exist. On the other hand, Section 47 which is in Part II of the Arbitration Act, 1996 dealing with enforcement of certain foreign awards has defined the term “court” as a court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the award. This has a clear reference to a court within whose jurisdiction the asset/person is located, against which/whom the enforcement of the international arbitral award is sought. This has a clear reference to a court within whose jurisdiction the asset/person is located, against which/whom the enforcement of the international arbitral award is sought. The provisions contained in Section 2(1)(e) being purely jurisdictional in nature can have no relevance to the question whether Part I applies to arbitrations which take place outside India.” The Apex Court has referred to the provisions of Section 2(1) (e) of the Act of 1996 and observed that subject-matter of the arbitration cannot be confused with subject matter of the suit. The term subject matter in section 2(I) (e) is confined to Part I. It has reference and connection with the process of dispute resolution. Its purpose is to identify the courts having supervisory contract over the arbitration proceedings. Hence, It refers to a court which would essentially be a court of the seat of the arbitration process. In the opinion of Apex court, the provision in Section 2(1) (e) has to be construed keeping in view the provisions in Section 20 which give recognition to party autonomy. Accepting the narrow construction as projected by the learned counsel for the appellants would, in fact, render Section 20 nugatory. The Apex Court was of the view that the legislature has intentionally given jurisdiction to two courts i.e. the court which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is located and the courts where the arbitration takes place. This was necessary as on many occasions the agreement may provide for a seat of arbitration at a place which would be neutral to both the parties. Therefore, the courts where the arbitration takes place would be required to exercise supervisory control over the arbitral. Learned Apex Court at Para-96 finally observed that in the circumstances of that case both the courts would have jurisdiction i.e. the court within whose jurisdiction the subject-matter of the suit is situated and the courts within the jurisdiction of which the dispute resolution i.e. arbitration is located. 17. Considered thus, this Court is of the firm opinion that the learned court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Ghatshila committed a serious error of law going to the root of the matter in upholding the plea of maintainability raised by the respondent to the challenge made under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before the said Court. 17. Considered thus, this Court is of the firm opinion that the learned court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Ghatshila committed a serious error of law going to the root of the matter in upholding the plea of maintainability raised by the respondent to the challenge made under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 before the said Court. Learned court did not enter into the merits of the parties on being convinced of lack of jurisdiction. In substance, therefore, the adjudication was not on the merits of the challenge. Therefore the impugned order in no way amounted to interfering with the Award, whether to set aside or refuse to set it aside as may be susceptible to challenge in Appeal under Section 37 of the Act of 1996. Therefore, if such an issue relating to the jurisdiction of learned court was decided erroneously, the recourse taken by the petitioner to challenge the same under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India through the present writ petition is wholly maintainable. Consequently, the impugned order is set aside. Learned Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Ghatshila/competent court at Ghatsila would proceed to decide the challenge to the Award under Section 34 of the Act in accordance with law in an expeditious manner. Accordingly, writ petition stands allowed. Petition allowed.