JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri S.K.pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner and Smt. Archana Singh, learned counsel for the respondent bank. 2. This writ petition has a litigative history namely that the petitioner had earlier filed Writ C No. 16959 of 2014 that was dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh writ petition. 3. The petitioner filed a second writ petition being Writ C No. 21981 of 2014 which was disposed of with the clear observation that the petitioners will have to avail of the remedies under the SARFAESI Act 2002. The judgment dated 17.4.2014 is extracted hereinunder : “We have heard Sri Shashi Kumar Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and Sri Satish Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 and 4. This writ petition is directed against the auction notice dated 20.2.2014 and notice dated 12.3.2014 issued by the respondent No. 3 under the provisions of Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the SARFAESI Act). Learned counsel for the petitioners has mainly contended that in case the Bank gives them the statement of account after adjustment of amount already deposited by the petitioners, they will deposit the defaulted amount in case this Court grants the benefit of installments. Learned counsel for the respondent Bank has submitted that against the proceedings and measures taken under the SARFAESI Act, the Act itself provides the remedy to an aggrieved borrower and the petitioners having not availed such remedy as provided under the Act, cannot maintain this writ petition directly before this Court. We have considered the submission of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. Initially a notice was published in the newspaper for E-auction of the disputed property under the SARFAESI Act and 24.3.2014 was fixed for the auction. The petitioners appear to have assailed the said notice by means of Writ Petition No. 16959 of 2014-Arun Kumar Singh and another v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, wherein a statement was made by learned counsel for the respondent Bank that the auction scheduled to be held on 24.3.2014 did not take place. The petitioners on that statement withdrew their writ petition with liberty to file a fresh writ petition for the same cause of action. The petitioners on that statement withdrew their writ petition with liberty to file a fresh writ petition for the same cause of action. The Court granted them liberty and dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn by order dated 25.3.2014. The petitioners have now filed this writ petition against the said notices published in the newspaper. It is quite apparent from perusal of both the notices that the petitioners have defaulted in payment of the loan granted to them and the Bank has initially proceeded under the SARFAESI Act. By the impugned notice dated 12.3.2014, the Bank has invited the petitioners to come to the Bank alongwith all receipts of payment, if any, made by them and deposit the balance amount if any. The petitioners appear to have not availed the said benefit and earlier had filed the aforesaid writ petition. Even thereafter they have not responded to the Bank’s notice dated 12.3.2014. Under such circumstances, we find that the petitioners ought to have taken the remedies available under the SARFAESI Act and having not done so, cannot maintain this writ petition. However, it is made clear that the petitioners are always at liberty to avail the statutory remedy available to them and any observation made in this order would not prejudice their rights in any manner whatsoever. The writ petition is finally disposed of. No order is passed as to costs.” 4. The petitioners thereafter did avail of the remedy and the secutrization application filed by them was disposed of whereafter the petitioners have admittedly filed an appeal in terms of Section 18 SARFASEI Act 2002 being appeal No. 276 of 2015. 5. It is informed by the learned counsel for the respondent bank that the property in between has been sold and thereafter steps have been taken for taking possession under Section 14 of the Act. 6. At that stage the order of Section 14 of the Act again came to be challenged by the petitioners in Writ Petition No. 21671 of 2017. The said writ petition was allowed on the ground that the affidavit which has been filed in support of the application under Section 14 of the Act was defective. The judgment dated 6.7.2017 is extracted hereinunder : “Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and Smt. Archana Singh, learned counsel representing respondent No. 2. The said writ petition was allowed on the ground that the affidavit which has been filed in support of the application under Section 14 of the Act was defective. The judgment dated 6.7.2017 is extracted hereinunder : “Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and Smt. Archana Singh, learned counsel representing respondent No. 2. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed challenging the correctness of the order dated 12th February, 2016 passed by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar, whereby it allowed the application of the respondent-Bank under Section 14 of The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the Officer of the respondent-Bank had filed an affidavit containing incorrect facts and based upon those incorrect facts the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has passed the order in favour of the Bank. Time was granted to learned counsel for the respondent-Bank to obtain instructions in the matter. Today Smt. Archana Singh, learned counsel representing the respondent-Bank stated that affidavit in question contains additional line as paragraph-12 is in the hand-writing which was not of the Officer but may be apparently of the lawyer but whatever be the case the fact remains that paragraph-12 of the affidavit did not state the correct facts and in fact the matter was already pending before the DRT. In that view of the matter, we are of the view that the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate has been misled in passing the order dated 12th February, 2016. We accordingly set aside the order dated 12th February, 2016. The respondent-Bank shall also withdraw the affidavit in question dated 6.1.2016 filed before the Metropolitan Magistrate and may file fresh affidavit whereupon the Magistrate shall proceed to pass the fresh order in accordance with law. The writ petition stands allowed as above.” 7. On 17.1.2018 the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar has passed an order for taking possession. It is at this stage that the present writ petition has been filed assailing order dated 17.1.2018 the proceedings complaining of procedural defects right from the stage of Section 13(2) upto the stage of passing of the impugned order under Section 14 of the 2002 Act. 8. It is at this stage that the present writ petition has been filed assailing order dated 17.1.2018 the proceedings complaining of procedural defects right from the stage of Section 13(2) upto the stage of passing of the impugned order under Section 14 of the 2002 Act. 8. Sri Pandey submitted that in view of the Full Bench decision in the case of N.C.M.L. Industries Limited through Director and another v. Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad and others, 2018(3) ADJ 102 , decided on 6.2.2018 the petitioners remedy has been forestalled inasmuch as the application under Section 17 of the Act is likely to be held not maintainable even when the petitioners have availed of the said remedy and have thereafter filed an appeal under Section 18 of the Act. 9. We are unable to agree with any of the submissions raised firstly for the reason that the petitioners themselves had approached this Court and the writ petition was disposed of with liberty to the petitioners to approach the appropriate Forum under the SARFAESI Act, 2002. The said remedy has already been invoked and the matter is pending in appeal. It is something different that there are no interim orders in favour of the petitioners in the said appeal. It is in these circumstances that the possession was sought to be taken in terms of Section 14 of the Act. Sri Pandey submits that no notice or opportunity was given to the petitioners prior to the passing of the impugned order. We do not find any statutory provisions for providing an opportunity to the borrower at the stage of passing of an order under Section 14 of the Act nor any decision either of this Court or the Apex Court has been pointed out that may enable us to read such principles of administrative law in to the statutory provisions of Section 14 of the Act. Consequently the said argument does not hold water. 10. Coming to the last submission of Sri Pandey that he would be remedy less in view of the Full Bench decision in the case of N.C.M.L. Industries v. Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad and others (Supra). Consequently the said argument does not hold water. 10. Coming to the last submission of Sri Pandey that he would be remedy less in view of the Full Bench decision in the case of N.C.M.L. Industries v. Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad and others (Supra). In this regard that we have already delivered two judgments in Writ C No. 11706 of 2018 Dheerendra Kumar and another v. Authorised Officer Aadhar Housing Finance Ltd. and another, decided on 2.4.2018 and in Writ C No. 12111 of 2018 Green Land Fruits and Vegetables Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, decided on 11.4.2018. 11. Legislative intent in respect of the measures prescribed under Section 13(4) of the 2002 Act is clear that possession of a secured property can be taken under Clause (a) thereof. Prima facie the legislature has nowhere expressly intended to give a split meaning to the word possession by bifurcating it in two segments, one of symbolical possession and the other of actual physical possession. The legislature has not intended any dichotomy. The word possession, therefore includes both the methods without excluding each other. This includes taking steps upon a notice being pasted in the format of annexure-4 as prescribed in Rule 8 of the 2002 Rules. The prescription of law as intended by the legislature, prima facie therefore, is that the action taken under Section 13(4) with or without actual physical possession is not hedged with any inhibitions. Thus, if symbolical possession is also a prescription recognized in law, then the same can also be a measure intended under Section 13(4) of the 2002 Act. 12. When the borrower resists physical possession being actually taken over, the remedy to the secured creditor is also available by way of resort to Section 14 of the Act, which can be otherwise availed of even without attempting possession under Section 13(4). 13. The right to take possession therefore flows through Section 13(4) independently and also through Section 14 of the Act. This does not lead to any dichotomy of procedure but are two recognized methods prescribed under the law which need not to be amalgamated together so as to attribute only one meaning to the word possession and it denude of the other content. An Act of symbolical possession is also a measure of possession. This does not lead to any dichotomy of procedure but are two recognized methods prescribed under the law which need not to be amalgamated together so as to attribute only one meaning to the word possession and it denude of the other content. An Act of symbolical possession is also a measure of possession. The mode may be distinguishable, but it remains a measure as contemplated under sub-Section (4) of Section 13. 14. It is in this context, in our prima facie opinion that Section 17(2) clearly prescribes the availability of the remedy to the aggrieved person/borrower for assailing the action of taking over possession. An Act of symbolical possession is also a covert act recognized in law. It transfers interest including that of possession to the secured creditor bringing but to the knowledge of the borrower and is an expression of accrual of certain rights conferred under the Act in favour of the secured creditor. Once such rights accrue, the remedy follows, namely if resistance is offered the secured creditor can resort to Section 14 of the Act and the borrower or the aggrieved person can approach the Tribunal to get his rights protected in accordance with the provisions of the Act. This stage therefore crystallizes the rights and remedies under the Act that are available both the secured creditor and borrower. A right of appeal/application under Section 13(4) of the Act is a substantive right. 15. The intention of the legislature to provide such a remedy would also serve the purpose of the Act namely it would avoid any complications in relation to the transfer of interest upon an adjudication by the Tribunal at that very stage. To prolong the stage after actual physical possession is taken prima facie does not appear to be intended by the legislature. The amendments that have been brought about in the Act of 2002 are for this very purpose to ensure that the secured interest is transferred free from all encumbrances. This would be a harmonious interpretation of the provisions in question that clearly sub-serve the intent and purpose of the Act. It also does not lead to any absurdity or unworkable situation and therefore, such an interpretation if adopted would be clearly in consonance with the intention of the legislature and not contrary to it. 16. This would be a harmonious interpretation of the provisions in question that clearly sub-serve the intent and purpose of the Act. It also does not lead to any absurdity or unworkable situation and therefore, such an interpretation if adopted would be clearly in consonance with the intention of the legislature and not contrary to it. 16. In view of the aforesaid position of law the provisions of Section 17 of the Act having been invoked and an appeal having been filed under Section 18 of the Act by the petitioners we see no reason of any apprehension on behalf of the petitioners to be deprived of any such relief which they are entitled to claim under the provisions of the 2002 Act. Our observations in this writ petition will however be subject to the outcome of S.L.P. No. 5895 of 2018 in the case of M/s Hindon Forge Pvt. Ltd. and another (Supra) pending before the Apex Court where the judgment in the case of N.C.M.L. Industries Limited through Director and another v. Debt Recovery Tribunal, Allahabad and others (Supra) is under challenge. Accordingly for all the reasons hereinabove and after having heard Smt. Archana Singh learned counsel for the State Bank of India we see no reason to entertain the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed.