ORDER : Learned SPPII accepts notice for the respondent - State. Even though the matter is listed for admission, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the matter is heard for final disposal. This petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., seeking to quash the complaint, FIR and the charge sheet in Crime No.58/2016 of Barke Police Station pending on the file of JMFC (III Court), Mangalore, for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 3(1), 4, 5 and 8 of Immoral Traffic Prevention Ac, 1956 along with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code in so far as the same relates to the petitioner/accused No.2. 2. The facts of the case are as follows: The respondent herein filed a complaint in Crime No.58/2016 in the Barke Police Station, alleging that on receiving a credible information on 09.06.2016, the respondent police conducted a raid on a massage centre by name Palm Touch Ayurvedic Centre, Near KSRTC Bus Stop, Mangalore, wherein some illegal activities were taking place and arrested 7 women and the accused persons involved in prostitution. 3. On the basis of the above information, FIR came to be registered against the accused persons for the offences punishable under Sections 3(1), 4, 5 and 8 of Immoral Traffic Prevention Act, 1956 (for short “ITP Act, 1956”) and Section 34 of IPC. 4. In the course of the argument, in addition to the grounds urged in the petition, it is argued, that the investigation into the alleged incident and the preparation of the panchanama before registration of the FIR is bad in law. In support of the argument, learned counsel has referred to the orders passed by this Court in W.P.No.54250/2017 wherein this Court while dealing with similar situation has referred to the decisions in Crl.P.No.7110/2011, Crl.P.No.7056/2014, Crl.P.No. 9682/2016, Crl.P.No.5808/2016, W.P.No.56504/2015, Crl.P.No.1959/2017 and also the decision rendered by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Goenka Sajan Kumar vs. State Of Andhra Pradesh reported in 2015 (3) Crimes 281 (A.P.). 5. I have perused the FIR and the orders relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The sole ground on which the petitioner herein is arrayed as the accused in the above crime is that he was present at the spot during the raid. The provisions of the ITP Act, 1956 invoked by the respondent do not get attracted to the facts alleged against the petitioner. The sole ground on which the petitioner herein is arrayed as the accused in the above crime is that he was present at the spot during the raid. The provisions of the ITP Act, 1956 invoked by the respondent do not get attracted to the facts alleged against the petitioner. Section 3 of the ITP Act, 1956 deal with the punishment for keeping a brothel or allowing premises to be used as a brothel. Section 4 of the ITP Act, 1956 pertains to punishment for living on the earnings of prostitution. Section 5 of the ITP Act, 1956 refers to the procuring, inducing or taking (person) for the sake of prostitution. Section 6 of the ITP Act, 1956 deals about detaining a person in the premises where prostitution is carried out. Section 7 deals with prostitution in or in the vicinity of public places. A person who visits brothel house only as a customer is not covered by any of the above provisions or any other provision of the ITP Act, 1956. In the decisions referred above, in similar fact situation, the proceedings have been quashed solely on that score. 6. The allegations made against the petitioner and the material collected against the petitioner do not show the commission of any of the offences alleged against him in the FIR. The proceedings initiated against the petitioner are contrary to the decision in GIRISHCHANDRA VS. STATE BY LOKAYUKTHA POLICE reported in ILR 2013 Karnataka 983, and the law laid down in the case of LALITHA KUMARI vs. GOVERNMENT OF U.P. reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 . For both these reasons, the proceedings are liable to be quashed. 7. Accordingly, the criminal petition is allowed. The FIR in Crime No.58/2016 on the file of JMFC (III Court), Mangalore, is quashed only insofar the petitioner is concerned.