JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. Heard Mr. Dave, learned advocate for petitioner and Mr. Sharma, learned advocate for respondent. 2. In present petition, the petitioner has prayed, inter alia, that:- "11(A)This Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the proceedings of Reference (LCA) Nos. 256/2016 to 269/2016 filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 14 (Annexure-A Colly.) which are pending before the Labour Court at Ahmedabad, respondent No.15 herein" 3. The petitioner is aggrieved by the proceedings (Reference Cases) instituted by present respondent Nos. 1 to 14. 3.1 The said proceedings (Reference Cases) have been instituted by respondent Nos. 1 to 14 by invoking provisions under Section 2(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 3.2 The said proceedings are challenged, inter alia, on the ground of gross delay of more than 15 years and also on the ground that the said respondents (original claimants in the Reference Case Nos. 256/2016 to 269/2016) had entered into full and final settlement and accepted the amount paid by present petitioner to the said claimants in accordance with and under the said full and final settlement (arrived at between the parties in January, 2000) and after almost 15 years they have raised the dispute in disregard to and by invoking terms of the settlement. 4. Learned advocates for petitioner and respondents have argued the petition for final decision and with an understanding that the petition may be heard and decided finally at this stage. Therefore, though formal order admitting the petition is not passed, the petition is heard for final order at admission stage, at the request of and with consent of both sides/the contesting parties. 5. So as to consider the petitioner's objection against the said Reference cases, it is necessary to take into account certain relevant facts which lie in the background of the dispute raised in present petition. 5.1 From rival submission and material available on record it has emerged that according to petitioner Company, it was running an industrial establishment in the name and style of Aarath Electro-Chemical Ltd. 5.2 The said industrial undertaking discontinued its activities in October, 1997. 5.1 From rival submission and material available on record it has emerged that according to petitioner Company, it was running an industrial establishment in the name and style of Aarath Electro-Chemical Ltd. 5.2 The said industrial undertaking discontinued its activities in October, 1997. 5.3 The petitioner claims that the said undertaking had, upon payment of amounts payable towards closure compensation and other legal dues, including unpaid wages, wages for notice period, etc., discontinued the manufacturing activities and relieved the workmen. It is also claimed that name of said industrial undertaking (i.e. Aarath Electro-chemical Pvt. Ltd.) was, subsequently changed to Gurukrupa Procons Pvt. Ltd. 5.4 It is further claimed that after the Company discontinued its production in October, 1997, a settlement came to be arrived at between the Company and its workmen (who were represented by Gujarat Audhyogik Kamdar Mahamandal) and by virtue of the said settlement the workmen accepted mutually agreed amount as and by way of full and final payments/settlement of their claims, terminal dues and other benefits. 5.5 Under the said settlement, the workmen/Union also accepted that the manufacturing activities of the Company are closed down since October, 1997 and that all workmen (who had signed the settlement) are relieved from the Company and their service has come to end in view of the said settlement and upon payment of their terminal dues. The amount payable to the workmen (who accepted the settlement) were mentioned in the Annexure attached to the settlement. 5.6 The said settlement came to be entered into and executed/signed by the representative of the Company as well as the representative of the workmen and even individually by workmen of the Company (by about 92 workmen of the company). 5.7 The said settlement was arrived at under provision of Section 2(P) of the Industrial Disputes Act between the Company and the 92 workmen. 5.8 The petitioner has claimed that the Company paid the agreed/specified amount to each of the said 92 workmen, in compliance of the terms of the settlement and thereupon the settlement was fully executed and implemented. The said settlement is placed on record of present petition at Annexure-C (page-87 to 116). 5.8 The petitioner has claimed that the Company paid the agreed/specified amount to each of the said 92 workmen, in compliance of the terms of the settlement and thereupon the settlement was fully executed and implemented. The said settlement is placed on record of present petition at Annexure-C (page-87 to 116). 5.9 It appears that after the said settlement was signed and executed on 24.1.2001 it came to be acted upon by and between the parties, suddenly after about 15 years - 14 workmen, out of 92 workmen who accepted and individually signed (i.e. put signature or thumb impression) the settlement, raised industrial dispute with the allegation that the Company illegally terminated their service in October, 1997 and that therefore they should be reinstated in service with all benefits. 5.10 The said 14 workmen raised dispute in 2016 (almost 18 years after the closure of understanding and almost 15 years after the settlement) and by invoking provisions under Section 2(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act they directly approached the Labour Court with their individual Reference Cases (and not by way of raising industrial dispute under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act). 5.11 The said Reference cases came to be registered as Reference (LCA) No.256/16 to 269/16 wherein said 14 claimants (out of 92 workmen who signed the settlement) have filed almost identical statements of claim with similar allegation and prayed for similar relief. In paragraph No. 2,3,5, 7 and 8 claimants repeatedly alleged that their service came to be terminated in October 1997 and that the said termination of their service in October, 1997 is illegal and by victimization. Thereafter in paragraph No. 11 of the statement of claim the claimants prayed that the company's action of terminating their services in October 1997 should be declared illegal and malafide and company should be directed to reinstate them with consequential benefits. The said statements of claim came to be filed before Labour Court in June 2016. 5.12 Undisputedly, in the statement of claim filed by each workman, there is no reference or mention about the settlement dated 24.1.2000 and/ or about the fact that they are signatory to settlement of 24.01.2000. The said statements of claim came to be filed before Labour Court in June 2016. 5.12 Undisputedly, in the statement of claim filed by each workman, there is no reference or mention about the settlement dated 24.1.2000 and/ or about the fact that they are signatory to settlement of 24.01.2000. 5.13 At this stage, it is relevant and necessary to mention that the petitioner has placed on record a copy of the settlement (at Annexure B page-85) wherein the petitioner has mentioned summary of the details about the amount paid to the claimants under said settlement and the Serial Number at which their names appear in the settlement dated 24.1.2000. 5.14 From the text of the said settlement it comes out that the concerned claimants (who are party to the settlement) admitted that the company had stopped manufacturing activity since October 1997 and that in light of the facts and circumstances as well as for the reasons mentioned in the settlement they agreed to accept the amount, (which was mutually agreed upon between the parties) by way of full and final settlement of all disputes and claim. 5.15 The petitioner company felt aggrieved by initiation of the said proceedings by 14 claimants, on the premise that (a) the said claimants had entered into and signed the settlement in January 2000 and (b) they also accepted the amount paid under the settlement and (c) almost 15 years had passed; and (d) they raised such dispute after having entered into the settlement and after having accepted all benefits under the settlement. 5.16 According to the company besides said 14 claimants out of total 92 employees who entered into said settlement dated 24.1.2000 other 6 claimants also raised similar dispute in 2016 and they filed almost similar statements of claim. It is further claimed by the petitioner company that in respect of the said other reference cases No. 526 of 2016 to 531 of 2016 the petitioner company filed similar petition i.e. SCA No. 4520 of 2017 and challenged the proceeding of reference no. 526 of 2016 to 531 of 2016 and that this Court (Coram:- Honourable Mr. Justice A.J. Shastri) heard and decided the said petition vide decision dated 5.4.2018. 5.17 It is claimed that during the proceedings of SCA no. 526 of 2016 to 531 of 2016 and that this Court (Coram:- Honourable Mr. Justice A.J. Shastri) heard and decided the said petition vide decision dated 5.4.2018. 5.17 It is claimed that during the proceedings of SCA no. 4520 of 2017 the claimants/workmen raised contentions similar to the contentions raised in present petition and the company opposed said 6 reference cases on the grounds similar to the contentions raised in present petition and very same issue, very same grievance and very same contentions (which form part of the present petition) have been considered and decided by the Court vide decision dated 5.4.2018. 6. According to the company present petition involves and raises similar issues and that therefore the matter is covered by the decision in SCA No. 4520 of 2017 and present petition also may be disposed of accordingly. 6.1 However, learned advocate for the respondent, without disputing the fact that similar contentions and grievance by both sides against almost identical proceedings instituted by the similarly placed claimants, are decided by this Court in SCA No. 4520 of 2017 submitted that he would contest present petition with the request to decide the objection against present petition. Therefore, though similar contentions have been considered by this Court in decision dated 4.5.2018, present order is passed so as to deal with objections by the respondent. 7. Mr. Dave, learned advocate for the petitioner company reiterated factual backdrop and submitted that the claimants who have instituted reference cases i.e. reference case no. 256 of 2016 to 269 of 2016 are similarly placed as the claimants in reference No. 526 of 2016 to 531 of 2016 and the reference cases filed by them are already quashed by this Court vide order dated 5.4.2018. He further submitted that there is no ground or reason to take view different from the said decision because the facts involved in present cases and the subject matter of the said reference cases as well as reference cases involved in present petition and the allegation and statement of claim before learned Labour Court are almost identical. He further submitted that there is no ground or reason to take view different from the said decision because the facts involved in present cases and the subject matter of the said reference cases as well as reference cases involved in present petition and the allegation and statement of claim before learned Labour Court are almost identical. He further submitted that the claimants concerned in proceedings of reference No. 256 of 2016 to 269 of 2016 are parties to and signatories of the settlement dated 24.1.2000 and that therefore they are not entitled to and they are estopped from raising disputes with regard to closure of manufacturing activity of the company in October 1997 and discontinuation of their service pursuant to the cessation of manufacturing activity by the company. It is also claimed that after having accepted, bay way of full and final settlement, the claimants cannot raise dispute and claim that their service have been illegally terminated. It is also claimed that in any case action and conduct of the claimants to raise dispute after inordinate and gross delay of more than 15 years is not justified and the learned court cannot entertain the dispute which is raised after such gross delay of more than 15 years. It is also claimed that the claim raised by the claimants is hit by the settlement dated 24.1.2007 and that the said reference cases are abuse of Courts process. It is also claimed that the activities of the company are closed since October 1997. Almost all assets of the company are sold and that therefore even otherwise, any question of considering the relief prayed for by the claimants in the said reference cases does not survive. Learned advocate for the petitioner on such premise would submit that the reference proceedings deserve to be quashed at its threshold. 7.1 Learned advocate for the respondent has opposed the submissions. He opposed the submission that the reference proceedings are bad in law and untenable because the dispute raised after gross delay of about 15 years, on the premise that the Act does not prescribe period of limitation and that therefore there is no bar against raising dispute at any time. It is also submitted that when any period of limitation is not prescribed, the reference cannot be rejected on ground of limitation of delay. It is also submitted that when any period of limitation is not prescribed, the reference cannot be rejected on ground of limitation of delay. It is also claimed that at the time when the company discontinued the activities, the procedure prescribed under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for closure or retrenchment was not followed and that therefore termination is ab initio void. Learned Counsel for workmen also raised allegation against the settlement and he alleged that workman did not know the terms of settlement. It is claimed that closure of manufacturing activity/undertaking without following procedure prescribed under Chapter 5A of 5B renders the closure/retrenchment illegal. He also opposed the submission that initiation of said reference cases amounts to abuse of process of Court proceedings. 7.2 The learned Counsel, however, could not offer any explanation or reply to the querry as to why any action was not taken or complaint was not filed against the company/settlement for almost 15 years. During his submission learned Counsel for the claimants reiterated all contentions which came to be considered and decided by this Court in SCA No. 4520 of 2017 and the contentions raised for opposing present petition have been decided by the Court vide order dated 5.4.2018. 8. I have considered rival submission and material available on record. 8.1 At the outset it is necessary and relevant to mention that at any point of time and in any proceedings, above mentioned settlement dated 24.1.2000 is not challenged. 8.2 This factual aspect is, not disputed even by learned advocate for the respondent. 8.3 Even in the statement of claim which are filed by concerned 14 claimants before the learned Labour Court in above mentioned reference no. 256 to 269 of 2016, any grievance with regard to said settlement dated 24.1.2000 and/or any challenge against said settlement is not raised. 8.4 It is pertinent that though the settlement is not challenged during last about 15 years and though in the statements of claim filed in said reference cases also the settlement is not challenged and even allegations against the settlement are not raised/found int eh statements of claim, the allegations with reference to settlement are raised for the first time by learned advocate in reply to the petitioner's objection against reference cases. 8.5 Such facts based allegations, which do not have foundation in statement of claim and which were not raised until the settlement was implemented and for almost 15 years after accepting the benefits of the settlement, cannot be permitted at this stage and thy do not deserve to be entertained at this stage. 8.6 Further, the allegations are raised after accepting the benefits under the settlement. Therefore also the afterthought to go to Labour Court with dead dispute does not deserve to be entertained. 8.7 Neither at the time when the workmen put their signatures/thumb impressions on the settlement nor when they accepted the benefits thereof nor thereafter and for almost 15 years thereafter never raised objection and/or filed complaint against the company or the settlement. The said allegations are afterthoughts and raised for the first time in reply to this petition. These facts go to show that the said allegations lack bonafides and have been raised with ulterior intention. 8.8 It is relevant and necessary to also note that the issue and contention raised by learned advocate for the respondent against present petition and against submission by learned advocate for the petitioner have been considered by this Court (Coram:- Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.J. Shastri) in almost identical petition i.e. SCA No. 4520 of 2017. Actually it is claimed by the petitioner that besides 14 employees concerned in present petition, certain other employees who were similarly placed, filed similar reference cases before learned Labour Court which came to be registered as Reference Case No. 526 of 2016 to 531 of 2016 and with regard to the said reference cases the petitioner filed SCA No. 4520 of 2017 which, as mentioned above, is decided by this Court vide order dated 5.4.2018. 8.9 Despite the fact that in almost identical petition in respect of similarly placed employee, this Court has heard, considered and dealt with all identical contentions raised by both sides, learned advocate for the respondent insisted that the respondent in present petition may be heard at length and allowed to repeat all the contentions which have been considered and decided by the Court in SCA No. 4520 of 2017. 8.10 In view of the said submission and insistence by learned advocate for the respondent, this Court has heard learned advocate for the respondent at length. 9. 8.10 In view of the said submission and insistence by learned advocate for the respondent, this Court has heard learned advocate for the respondent at length. 9. As mentioned above, somewhere in May/June 2016 the respondents herein raised dispute with reference to alleged termination of their service on 1.10.1997. 9.1 So as to get the said dispute adjudicated the claimants approached learned Labour Court by invoking provision under Section 2A of the I.D. Act and they filed reference cases. The said reference came to be registered by learned Labour Court as Reference (LCA) No. 256 of 2016 to 269 of 2016. 9.2 In the said reference cases all 14 claimants filed almost identical statement of claim wherein the claimants challenged and assailed alleged termination of their service before almost 18 years i.e. October 1997. 9.3 The averments in paragraph Nos. 2,3,5,7 and 8 of the statement of claim demonstrate that the claimants have, repeatedly, mentioned and alleged that their service came to be terminated in October 1997. 9.4 Thereupon in paragraph No. 11 of the statement of claim the claimants prayed that the action of the employer terminating their service in October 1997 may be quashed and set aside. 9.5 Such dispute came to be raised and such demand came to be made by the claimants in May/June 2016. Thus, the dispute is raised after almost 18 years. 9.6 According to the petitioner the dispute is raised after inordinate delay and almost 18 years therefore proceedings should not be maintained and should be dismissed at its threshold and that said proceedings amount to abuse of process of law and abuse of Court proceedings. 10. Learned advocate for the respondent opposed the submissions on the ground that the Act does not prescribe period of limitation and therefore the claimants can raise dispute at any time. 10.1 The respondents overlook and ignore that merely because the Act does not prescribe any period of limitation it does not give license to the claimant to raise dispute at any time and after inordinate and gross delay. 10.1 The respondents overlook and ignore that merely because the Act does not prescribe any period of limitation it does not give license to the claimant to raise dispute at any time and after inordinate and gross delay. 10.2 If dispute is not raised within reasonable time after cause for action arose and if claimant does not offer satisfactory explanation for inordinate delay then in such circumstances there would be justified presumption that so called dispute is a dead dispute and the claim raised by the claimant is stale claim, which do not deserve to be entertained. 10.3 On reading the statement of claim filed by each claimant, it emerges that there is not even whisper about any explanation or justification with regard to passage of almost 18 years and with reference to inordinate and gross delay. 10.4 The claimants have not offered any explanation to even prima facie satisfy the Court about reason or circumstances on account of which the claimants did not raise dispute and did not challenge illegal termination effected in October 1997. 10.5 The said gross delay and absence of any explanation coupled with other facts and circumstances also establish that the proceedings are abuse of process of Court and the said delay and absence of any explanation justify the conclusion that stale claim and dead dispute are raised by present respondents and that they are not acting bonafide. 11. This aspect is evident from said fact/conduct and from surrounding and connected facts. In this context it is relevant to note that:- (a) the activities and the establishment came to be closed in October 1997. (b) for almost 3 years after said closure of the activities of the establishment, the concerned 14 claimants did not challenge the closure and did not raise dispute with regard to closure and/or termination of their service. (c) about 3 years after said closure of the activities and the establishment, almost 92 workmen of the establishment including present 14 claimants entered into and signed a settlement (d) the said settlement was arrived at under Section 2(p) of I.D. Act. (e) under the settlement 92 workmen including present 14 claimants accepted and that the establishment and the activities are closed (f) having accepted and acknowledge said fact 92 workmen and the union representatives arrive at agreement to receive mutually agreed amount toward full and final settlement was arrived at in January 2000. (e) under the settlement 92 workmen including present 14 claimants accepted and that the establishment and the activities are closed (f) having accepted and acknowledge said fact 92 workmen and the union representatives arrive at agreement to receive mutually agreed amount toward full and final settlement was arrived at in January 2000. (g) the petitioner paid the amount in full and final settlement of all claims, disputes, demands and rights (h) said 92 workmen including 14 claimants accepted said amounts/benefits flowing from the settlement. (i) after signing the settlement and after accepting the benefits/amounts under the settlement the claimants never raised dispute/allegations about the settlement and/or did not file any complaint against the company or against the settlement on any ground. (j) the dispute is raised 18 years after the closure of activities/establishment. (k) any explanation for not raising any dispute during past 18 years is not offered. (l) statements of claim are silent with regard to issue of gross delay. (m) It is also pertinent that even at this stage, in the said reference cases, the settlement is not challenged/disputed. 12. The said settlement and acceptance of all benefits/amounts under the settlement and passage of almost 15 years after the settlement (18 years after the closure of the establishment and its activities) without raising dispute/complaint cumulatively establish that the so-called dispute against termination is a dead dispute and the claim/demand is stale claim and raised as afterthought and with ulterior motive and after accepting the settlement and the benefits thereunder. 12.1 These facts and details establish that the said proceedings do not deserve to be maintained and entertained. 13. As mentioned above settlement was arrived at and executed between the company and about 92 employees and under the said settlement certain amount including amount payable towards retiral benefits viz. leave encashment, gratuity are also paid to the claimants. It is also asserted by the petitioner that the claimants accepted the said amount and accordingly the parties acted upon the settlement dated 24.1.2000. 14. At this stage it would not be out of place to take into account the details mentioned by the petitioner with reference to settlement dated 24.1.2000. The said details read thus:- STATEMENT GIVING PERTICULARS OF WORKMEN (1) BALVANTGIR SOMGIR GOSAI - Ref.( (LCA)) No. 256/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr. The said details read thus:- STATEMENT GIVING PERTICULARS OF WORKMEN (1) BALVANTGIR SOMGIR GOSAI - Ref.( (LCA)) No. 256/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr. No. 18 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement (Sr.21) Rs. Amount 29,080 1,295 29,080 15,508 Ch. No. 968196 968559 488018 982771 Date 09/10/1997 09/10/1997 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (2) RAMESHGIR SOMGIR GOSWAMI Ref. (LCA) No. 257/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr. No. 53 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr.61) 15,115 1,048 15,115 8,061 Ch. No. 968511 968588 488053 497011 Date 09/10/1997 09/10/1997 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (3) DAHYABHAI FULGIRI GOSWAMI Ref. (LCA) No. 258/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr. No. 26 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr.30) 21,900 - 21,900 11,680 Ch. No. 968330 - 488026 982780 Date 09/10/1997 - 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (4) UMEDGIR PUNJGIR GOSAI Ref. (LCA) No. 259/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr. No. 40 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr. 47) 22,200 6,611 22,200 11,840 Ch. No. 968347 968577 488040 982797 Date 09/10/1997 09/10/1997 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (5) KAILASHGIR SOMGIR GOSAI Ref. (LCA) No. 260/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr.No.60 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr.68) 15,260 2,028 15,260 8,139 Ch. No. 968518 988591 488060 497018 Date 09/10/1997 09/10/1997 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (6) BABUBHAI CHANDUBHAI MALIWAD Ref. (LCA) No. 261/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr.No. 24 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr. 28) 20,362 - 20,362 10,860 Ch. No. 968328 - 488024 982778 Date 09/10/1997 - 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (7) BHEMABHAI DHUDABHAI MALIWAD Ref. (LCA) No. 262/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr.No.61 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr. 70) 15,087 - 15,087 8,046 Ch. No. 968520 - 488061 497020 Date 09/10/1997 - 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (8) BHURABHAI RUPABHAI DAMOR Ref. (LCA) No. 263/2016 Details of Cheque no. (LCA) No. 262/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr.No.61 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr. 70) 15,087 - 15,087 8,046 Ch. No. 968520 - 488061 497020 Date 09/10/1997 - 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (8) BHURABHAI RUPABHAI DAMOR Ref. (LCA) No. 263/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr.No. 34 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr. 41) 21,525 1,339 21,525 11,480 Ch. No. 968341 968573 488034 982791 Date 09/10/1997 09/10/1997 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (9) JOITABHAI KALABHAI VALAND Ref. (LCA) No. 264/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr.No. 30 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr. 37) 21,187 1,036 21,187 11,300 Ch. No. 968337 968569 488030 982787 Date 09/10/1997 09/10/1997 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (10) RAMANGIR LAXMANGIR GOSWAMI Ref. (LCA) No. 265/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr.No. 27 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr. 31) 21,675 - 21,675 11,580 Ch. No. 968331 - 488027 982781 Date 09/10/1997 - 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (11) GANGAPARI PARSHOTTAM GOSAI - Ref.( (LCA)) No. 266/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr.No. 22 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement (Sr.26) Rs. 25,788 1,987 25,788 13,754 Ch. No. 968326 968563 488022 982776 Date 09/10/1997 09/10/1997 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (12) GALABHAI JESHINGBHAI Ref.( (LCA)) No. 267/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr.No. 23 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr. 27) 21,112 1,126 21,112 11,260 Ch. No. 968327 968564 488023 982777 Date 09/10/1997 09/10/1997 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (13) SOMABHAI JETHABHAI DAMOR Ref. (LCA) No. 268/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr.No. 54 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr. 62) 13,933 - 13,933 7,431 Ch. No. 968512 - 488054 497012 Date 09/10/1997 - 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (14) KAILASHGIR PUNJGIR GOSAI Ref. (LCA) No. 269/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr.No. 51 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr. 62) 13,933 - 13,933 7,431 Ch. No. 968512 - 488054 497012 Date 09/10/1997 - 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 (14) KAILASHGIR PUNJGIR GOSAI Ref. (LCA) No. 269/2016 Details of Cheque no. of Dena Bank & Date Closure Compensation Rs. Leave Encashment Rs. Gratuity (Sr.No. 51 in Gratuity Register) Ex-Gratia as per S. 2(p) Agreement Rs. (Sr. 59) 15,433 1,694 15,433 8,231 Ch. No. 968509 968587 488051 497009 Date 09/10/1997 09/10/1997 20/04/1998 24/01/2000 15. It can be seen from the said statement that the petitioner has categorically mentioned the amounts which are paid to the persons who accepted the settlement (including present respondent No. 1 to 14), the cheque number under which the amount towards closure compensation, leave encashment, gratuity and ex gratia amount as per settlement came to be paid and the dates of the cheques under which the said amount came to be paid. 15.1 In this backdrop, it is claimed that the proceedings instituted by claimants by way of above mentioned reference cases are not only hit by inordinate and gross delay but are also hit by said settlement and the conduct of the claimants (i.e. that they have signed settlement and they have accepted the amount paid by the company under and in pursuance of the said agreement dated 24.1.2000). 15.2 The Court repeatedly asked learned advocate for the respondents that (a) whether the claimants have, individually, denied at any point of time, the factum of payment of the amounts mentioned in the statement (annexure-B, at pages 85 and 86 of the petition); (b) whether the said amounts have not been paid to/received by concerned workman. 16. Learned advocate for the petitioners avoided the said simple reply. Instead learned advocate submitted that he could offer explanation to the extent he received instruction from the union and the deponent of the reply affidavit dated 23.4.2018. 17. From the material it is noticed that the concerned claimants have not filed affidavit declaring that the amounts (mentioned at page 85 in the statement prepared by the bank) were not paid to them and are not received by them. Of course, one Mr. G.K. Parmar, (who claims to be President of the respondent Union) the deponent of affidavit dated 23.4.2018 has mentioned that:- "10. Of course, one Mr. G.K. Parmar, (who claims to be President of the respondent Union) the deponent of affidavit dated 23.4.2018 has mentioned that:- "10. The deponent say and submits that the petitioner company relying upon the agreement dated 24-01-2000 the workmen are not aware about the said agreement and even the said agreement is not been signed, the said agreement is not been notarized, even all the transaction and amount which is saying to be paid by the company is above 5000/- five thousand no revenue stamps is been affixed on the same, the thumb impression of the workmen's are not identified by the any union representatives, even the present workmen sent the letter dated 1-03-2017 to 24.3.2017 the petitioner company and the advocate of the company to give certified copy of 24-01-2000 agreement is not given to the workmen. 11. Deponent further say and submits that and admit that workmen's only received three months salary i.e. July, Aug, and Sept, 1997 and where same day given notice under section 25 (N) of the ID. Act but same was never complied, had never approached to the petitioner company, it is said and submitted that petitioner company and union has entered and signed the 2p settlement in the year 1993, at that time the signatures and thumb impressions on the blank papers were taken by the earlier union of the present respondent workmen's and other workmen's it is the submitted that 2p settlement was never signed and thumb impressions were given by the present workmen in the 2p settlement dated 24.1.2000 even in the oral evidence in issue no 8 of the award which is at Annexure no." 17.1 Before proceeding further it is necessary to mention that (a) anyone (out of total 14 claimants) has individually and categorically not denied receipt/acceptance of settlement/amount under the settlement (b) the said union (which claims that it represents said 14 claimants) was not even in picture at relevant time (c) the said deponent was also not in picture and has no personal knowledge of facts (d) said deponent has not made affidavit with his personal knowledge (e) said deponent has made allegation without personal knowledge inasmuch as he was not party to the settlement nor he or the union was in picture at relevant time (f) thus, the affidavit is mere hearsay. 18. 18. At this stage, it is relevant to mention that almost all issues were raised before Hon'ble Court during hearing of SCA No. 4520 of 2017. The contentions raised by learned advocate for the petitioner in respect of SCA No. 4520 of 2017 are recorded by the Court (Coram: Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.J. Shastri) in order dated 5.4.2018. In paragraph No. 5, the respondents submission with regard to the settlement is recorded and the Court has addressed said issue in paragraph Nos. 6, 6.1 and 6.2. The said discussion and conclusion by the Court in above mentioned paras read thus:- "6. Having heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the details of the particulars which are produced on the file of the petition, the following circumstance are not possible to be ignored while taking the ultimate decision. 6.1. The main plank of the submissions of learned advocate Mr. Dave that upon introduction of the new Union after almost a period of 19 years, once having settled the issue, the workers have made an attempt to raise a dispute which is nothing, but abuse of process. In that context the relevant documents which have been produced on record by the petitioner indicate that earlier with effect from 01.10.1997, the respondent workmen were discontinued from the service but then on perusal of 2(P) settlement, at page 46 if to be looked into, a specific settlement has taken place with 'Gujarat Audyogik Kamdar Maha Mandal' an erstwhile Union to which undisputedly the workers were the members. Thus, 2(P) settlement which took place on 24.01.2000 has clearly indicated the signatures of the office bearers of the said Union and also the signatures of all the workers are also reflecting at Annexure C under 2(P) settlement is the list of the workers and the payment payable to them. The unlisted contents of this 2P settlement is that a fresh deliberation took place in which exgratia payment is rightly been accepted by these workmen and it has been also mentioned clearly that in case in future the new business is developed or continue the original one, then also these workers will not have any right exists and in para 7 it has been assured that this settlement is accepted and binding. 6.2. 6.2. An attempt is made to divulge attention by referring to the document at page 103 dated 09.10.1997, in which, the same assurance has been given by the Management to pay the payment of bonus and gratuity and thereafter full and final settlement will take place. Now these documents which are tried to be pressed into service reflect the dated 09.10.1997 and the 2P Settlement has taken place between the Management and the workers with the intervention of the respective Union is dated 24.01.2000 and in this 2P Settlement which took place in July, 2000, exgratia payment is also figuring, not only that, but there is a clear reference on page 48 that the Management has already paid gratuity with closure compensation, salary, bonus etc., and, therefore, it appears that an attempt is made to mislead the authority below and the petitioner as well. Relying upon this document, when an attempt is made that there is some justification in bringing the reference proceedings after a period of 19 years is an attempt in futility as is reflecting from the proceedings. Yet another submission is made by the respondent on the premise that the company at the relevant point of time was not closed down as has been projected, but has continued thereafter and some of the workers who have raised the industrial dispute whose reference proceedings were also entertained and one of such reference award is produced at page 86. If the facts are to be looked into of that reference, there was a scuffle appears to have taken place somewhere in the year 1994, and in which, the workers were discontinued from the services with effect from 25.09.1994 and as such, this grievance is of September, 1994 which was later on adjudicated in the reference proceedings of 1995. May be that the award has been passed by the learned Presiding Officer, in the year 2001, but that would not be of any assistance to the respondent to take aid of this reference and to contend that any legitimate right exists in their favour. May be that the award has been passed by the learned Presiding Officer, in the year 2001, but that would not be of any assistance to the respondent to take aid of this reference and to contend that any legitimate right exists in their favour. In fact, in the opinion of this Court, this circumstances which have been tried to be pressed into service is of no assistance to the respondents and when a pointed query was put to the learned advocate for the respondent whether this amount which has been mentioned in settlement is accepted by them or not, there was no answer with him and the present reference proceedings are generated with the aid and assistance of the new Union which came in existence in the year 2016 to which the respondent workmen became the member and as such simply because another Union has raised a dispute, the binding effect of 2P Settlement cannot be ignored." 19. As mentioned above the respondents have not claimed and not demonstrated that at the relevant time, they had filed any complaint with regard to the settlement and none has categorically mentioned that amounts mentioned in the summary/statement prepared by the petitioner are not received by him/them. The claimants have, personally and individually, not denied the factum of settlement and/or the fact that the company paid the amounts in accordance with the settlement and /or that they did not accept the amount under the settlement. 19.1 It is also relevant to note that out of 92 employees who are signatories to the settlement, about 20 employees have, after about 17 years, for first time come out with the dispute against alleged termination and in the interregnum at any point of time, any complaint with regard to the settlement and/or alleged nonpayment of the amounts under the settlement have not been filed. 19.2 In absence of any affidavit by concerned 14 claimants, in absence of any complaint during past about 15 years, either before labour Commissioner or before police, with regard to the settlement and/or alleged nonpayment of the amount under the said settlement and in light of or on the basis of vague allegation made by President of a Union which was not in picture and did not represent the concerned claimants at the relevant point of time (i.e. when the settlement was arrived at and amount under the settlement were paid to 92 workmen including present claimants) the dispute which is carried before learned Labour Court does not deserve to be entertained and such dispute is not maintainable. There is no material on record (except above referred 2 paragraphs) in said affidavit (which is made by a deponent who was not in picture at relevant time) to support the allegation and to satisfy the Court that the settlement was never arrived at and concerned about 92 employees did not sign/execute the settlement and company did not pay amounts in accordance with settlement and the amounts mentioned in the statement are not paid to and received by concerned claimants. 20. The claimants have entered into settlement and thereafter both sides have acted in pursuance of the settlement and the settlement has been implemented and benefits under the settlement have been accepted by the claimants. Therefore the dispute which is raised after almost 15 years, is not maintainable and cannot be entertained. 20.1 Such long passage of time i.e. lapse of almost 15 to 17 years, is sufficient to justify that there is no existing and live dispute. The dispute (i.e. dead dispute) and the monetary claim raised by 20 claimants out of 92 claimants is afterthought and stale claim. When the dispute is raised after such lapse of time, the Court would be justified in not entertaining such dispute on the ground that the dispute raised by 14 claimants is dead dispute and stale claim. On this premise the reference cases deserve to be rejected without further adjudication. 20.2 In present case the reference cases and the said dispute are not only hit by gross delay and laches but the said dispute is also hit by principle analogus to estoppel by conduct. 21. On this premise the reference cases deserve to be rejected without further adjudication. 20.2 In present case the reference cases and the said dispute are not only hit by gross delay and laches but the said dispute is also hit by principle analogus to estoppel by conduct. 21. The respondents' reply to counter petitioner's contention on ground of delay that any time limit is not prescribed under the Act and therefore, the dispute can be raised any time, is unsustainable. 22. It is pertinent to note that even the said contention was raised before the Court in SCA No. 4520 of 2017 and the said contention is considered and rejected by the Court vide order dated 5.4.2018. Learned advocate for the respondents placed reliance on the decision in case of Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryan, (2014) 10 SCC 301 . In SCA No. 4520 of 2017 the Court considered and decided submission after taking into account submissions by considering the decision in case of Raghubir Singh. 23. Despite this position learned advocate for the respondents, reiterated same contentions in respect of present petition as well. 24. The Court has dealt with and considered said issue in paragraph Nos. 5 and 5.1 of the decision dated 5.4.2018. The said paragraphs No. 5 and 5.1 read thus: "5. To meet with the stand taken by learned advocate Mr. Dave, learned advocate Mr. Prashant Sharma appearing for respondents nos. 1 to 6 has vehemently contended that there is no time limit prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act to raise any industrial dispute and to bring the references. In fact, in absence of any limitation being prescribed, the respondents can approach the Court at any time and therefore, simply because passage of 19 years have passed, it is not open for the petitioner to challenge the reference proceedings on the ground of limitation. Apart from that learned advocate Mr. Sharma has stated that the learned Commissioner at the time when the conciliation proceedings were deliberated, the delay issue was not raised by the petitioner Company. On the contrary, the petitioner Company never appeared and cooperated before the Assistant Labour Commissioner though adequate opportunity was given. Apart from that learned advocate Mr. Sharma has stated that the learned Commissioner at the time when the conciliation proceedings were deliberated, the delay issue was not raised by the petitioner Company. On the contrary, the petitioner Company never appeared and cooperated before the Assistant Labour Commissioner though adequate opportunity was given. As a result of this, now since, the conciliation proceedings after failure report have been submitted to the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ahmedabad, for adjudication, the petitioner Company cannot contend their right to raise the issue of limitation. 5.1. Learned advocate Mr. Sharma has further contended that at the time when the termination took place, no mandatory procedure as required under Chapter V(B) of the Industrial Disputes Act has been observed. On the contrary, it was revealed in another reference proceedings raised by other workmen in which it has been found that the petitioner Company while discontinuing has not followed the procedure and similar is the case with respect to the respondents as well. It has been contended that the petitioner Company by virtue of effect of Section 25(o) of the Industrial Disputes Act is expected to follow the procedure prescribed for closure of the Company and so long as closure proceedings are not observed or followed by the Company, the time could have been treated as continuous and for effecting termination of the respondents, the Company is expected to follow the procedure. Learned advocate Mr. Sharma has further submitted that 2(P) settlement no doubt has taken place, but by virtue of that, these illiterate persons who must have put their thumb impression on blank paper cannot be blamed for such writing. On the contrary, the respondents belonging to Aadivasi community and as they just put their thumb impression and therefore, simply because long lapse time has elapsed, the petitioner Company cannot take disadvantage of the situation of the illiteracy of the respondents. In fact, with respect to other employees, not only the references were allowed, but the respective workmen were directed to be reinstated to their original post with 40% back wages and that has been dealt with by the Court in a petition being Special Civil Application No. 14250 of 2016 which is pending for consideration. All legal dues as per the say of learned advocate Mr. Sharma are pending and the benefits are not paid to the respondent workmen. All legal dues as per the say of learned advocate Mr. Sharma are pending and the benefits are not paid to the respondent workmen. Resultantly, the action of non payment of legal dues including the payment of gratuity, provident fund etc., is nothing but clearly an example of arbitrary act on the part of the petitioner Company. Learned advocate Mr. Sharma has pointed out that the respondent workmen have been duped by the petitioner Company under the impression of Company getting closed, the discontinuance has taken place, whereas in fact, in reality the Company had continue till May, 2014 and the date of closure which is registered under Rule 113 is on 31.05.2014 and therefore in reality, the Company has been closed only in the year 2014. As a result of this, so long as the legal dues are not paid and the formality of mandatory procedure is not observed, the discontinuance is nonest in the eye of law which has constrained the respondent workmen to raise an industrial dispute. Therefore, it cannot be stated in any way that there is any abuse of process of law by the respondent workmen. For the purpose of substantiating an issue of limitation a reference is made to one of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Raghubir Singh v. General Manager, Haryana Roadways reported in, (2014) 143 FLR 469 in which the observations made in para 11 and para 14 are clearly indicating that there is no question of limitation in raising an industrial dispute. The appropriate government can refer an industrial dispute for adjudication at any point of time and this decision has been passed in the year 2014 after the amendment which has taken place in Section 2(A) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Resultantly, the reference is initiated and it is not open for the petitioner to challenge the reference proceedings. Ultimately, all these issues can be agitated by the petitioner in adjudicating the process of references and so at this stage to entertain the petition would be intercepting the reference proceedings which otherwise is permissible in law. Hence, the petition being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed. No other submissions have been made." 25. The contention which is already decided by this Court vide order dated 5.4.2018 does not deserve reconsideration. Hence, the petition being devoid of merits deserves to be dismissed. No other submissions have been made." 25. The contention which is already decided by this Court vide order dated 5.4.2018 does not deserve reconsideration. Any justification or new ground or additional justification, to convince this Court to take view different from the view taken by the Court in the decision dated 5.4.2018, is not made out. Any additional or new material which was not before the Court on the ground of SCA No. 4520 of 2017 and/or which was not considered by the Court while deciding the said case, is not brought to the notice of the Court/on record of present petition. 26. However, at this stage a profitable reference can be had to the decision by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Prabhakar vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department, (2015) 15 SCC 1, which is rendered subsequent to the decision in case of Raghubir Singh and after considering the decision in case of Raghubir Singh, Hon'ble Apex Court observed that:- "8. From the facts narrated above, it becomes clear that for a period of fourteen years no grievance was made by the petitioner qua his alleged termination. Though it was averted that the petitioner had approached the Management time and again and was given assurance that he would be taken back in service there is nothing on record to substantiate this. No notice was served upon the Management. There is no assurance given in writing by the Management at any point of time. Such assertions are clearly self-serving. Pertinently even the Labour Court has not accepted the aforesaid explanation anywhere and has gone by the fact that the dispute was raised after a delay of fourteen years. Therefore, keeping in mind the aforesaid facts, we would decide the issue which has arisen, namely, whether reference of such a belated claim was appropriate. 9. It may be stated that the question is of utmost importance as it is seen that many times. as in the instant case, the workers raise dispute after a number of years of the cause of action. Whether the dispute can still be treated as surviving? Or whether it can be said that the dispute does not exist when the workmen concerned after their say termination kept quiet for a number of years and thus acquiesced into the action? 20. Whether the dispute can still be treated as surviving? Or whether it can be said that the dispute does not exist when the workmen concerned after their say termination kept quiet for a number of years and thus acquiesced into the action? 20. At this stage, it may be pointed out that admittedly the law of limitation does not apply to industrial disputes. The Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and under the Industrial Disputes Act no period of limitation is prescribed. This is now well settled by a series of judgments of this Court. 21. On the reading of these judgments, which are discussed hereinafter, it can be discerned that in some decisions where the reference was made after a lapse of considerable period, the Court did not set aside the reference but moulded the relief by either granting reinstatement but denying back wages, fully or partially, or else granted compensation, denying reinstatement. On the other hand, in some of the decisions, the Court held that even when there was no time prescribed to exercise power under Section 10 of the Act, such a power could not be exercised at any point of time to revive matters which had since been settled or had to become stale. We would like to refer to these judgments at this juncture. 24. Again in Vazir Sultan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. State of AR the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that reference made nearly six years after in: dispute amounted to being inordinate, unreasonable and unjustifiable. 25. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd. v. KP. Madhavankuttyl4 the Court cautioned that power of reference should be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner and not in a mechanical fashion. It was specifically observed the power to make reference cannot be exercised to revive settled matters or to refer stale disputes in spite of absence of statutory limitation period. The Court not only reiterated that the courts had power of judicial review though to limited extent, but also made the following pertinent observations on delay: (SCC pp. 460-61. Paras 6-8) "6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. 460-61. Paras 6-8) "6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central Government has exercised powers in this case after a lapse of about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent from service. At the time reference was made no industrial dispute existed or could be even said to have been apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. When the matter has become final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that the reference be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no dispute pending at the time when the reference in question was made. The only ground advanced by the respondent was that two other employees who were dismissed from service were reinstated. Under what circumstances they were dismissed and subsequently reinstated is nowhere mentioned. Demand raised by the respondent for raising an industrial dispute was ex facie bad and incompetent. 7. In the present appeal it is not the case of the respondent that the disciplinary proceedings, which resulted in his dismissal, were in any way illegal or there was even any irregularity. He availed his remedy of appeal under the rules governing his conditions of service. It could not be said that in the circumstances an industrial dispute did arise or was even apprehended after a lapse of about seven years of the dismissal of the respondent. Whenever a workman raises some dispute it does not become an industrial dispute and the appropriate Government cannot in a mechanical fashion make the reference of the alleged dispute terming it as an industrial dispute. The Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under Section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The Central Government lacked power to make reference both on the ground of delay in invoking the power under Section 10 of the Act and there being no industrial dispute existing or even apprehended. The purpose of reference is to keep industrial peace in an establishment. The present reference is destructive to the industrial peace and defeats the very object and purpose of the Act. The Bank was justified in thus moving the High Court seeking an order to quash the reference in question. 8. It was submitted by the respondent that once a reference has been made under Section 10 of the Act a Labour Court has to decide the same and the High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot interfere in the proceedings of the Labour Court. That is not a correct proposition to state. An administrative order which does not take into consideration statutory requirements or travels outside that is certainly subject to judicial review, limited though it might be. The High Court can exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to consider the question of the very jurisdiction of the Labour Court, In National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan" this Court observed: (SCC 13. 393, para 24) "24. It will be thus seen that the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition when there is an allegation that there is no industrial dispute and none apprehended which could be the subject matter of reference for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal under Section 10 of the Act, Here it is a question of jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, which could be examined by the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. It is the existence of the Industrial Tribunal (sic dispute) which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference and the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate it. If there is no industrial dispute in existence or apprehended the appropriate Government lacks power to make any reference" 29. If one examines the judgments in the aforesaid perspective, it would be easy to reconcile all the judgments. At the same time, in some cases the Court did not hold the reference to be bad in law and the delay on the part of the workman in raising the dispute became the cause for moulding the relief only. If one examines the judgments in the aforesaid perspective, it would be easy to reconcile all the judgments. At the same time, in some cases the Court did not hold the reference to be bad in law and the delay on the part of the workman in raising the dispute became the cause for moulding the relief only. On the other hand, in some other decisions, this Court specifically held that if the matter raised is belated or stale that would be a relevant consideration on which the reference should be refused. Which parameters are to be kept in mind while taking one or the other approach needs to be discussed with some elaboration, which would include discussion on certain aspects that would be kept in mind by the courts for taking a particular view. We, thus, intend to embark on the said discussion keeping in mind the central aspect which should be the forefront, namely, whether the dispute existed at the time when the appropriate Government had to decide whether to make a reference or not or the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal to decide the same issue coming before it. 34. To understand the meaning of the word "dispute", it would be appropriate to start with the grammatical or dictionary meaning of the term; "Dispute'. to argue about, to contend for, to oppose by argument, to call in question - to argue or debate (with, about or over) -a contest with words; an argument; a debate; a quarrel;" 35. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edn., p. 424 defines "dispute" as under: "Dispute-A conflict or controversy; a conflict of claims or rights; an assertion of a right, claim, or demand on one side, met by contrary claims or allegations on the other. The subject of litigation; the matter for which a suit is brought and upon which issue is joined, and in relation to which jurors are called and witnesses examined." 36. Thus, a dispute or difference arises when demand is made by one side (i.e. workmen) and rejected by the other side (i.e. the employer) and vice versa. Hence an "industrial dispute" cannot be said to exist until and unless the demand is made by the workmen and it has been rejected by the employer. How such demand should be raised and at what stage may also be relevant but we are not concerned with this aspect in the instant case. Hence an "industrial dispute" cannot be said to exist until and unless the demand is made by the workmen and it has been rejected by the employer. How such demand should be raised and at what stage may also be relevant but we are not concerned with this aspect in the instant case. Therefore, what would happen if no demand is made at all at the time when the cause of action arises? In other words, like in the instant case, what would be the consequence if after the termination of the services of the petitioner on 1-4-1985, the petitioner does not dispute his termination as wrongful and does not make any demand for reinstatement for a number of years? Can it still be said that there is a dispute? Or can it be said that workmen can make such demand after a lapse of several years and on making such demand dispute would come into existence at that time. It can always be pleaded by the employer in such a case that after the termination of the services when the workman did not raise any protest and did not demand his reinstatement, the employer presumed that the workman has accepted his termination and, therefore, he did not raise any dispute about his termination. It can be said that workman, in such a case, acquiesced into the act of the employer in terminating his services and, therefore, accepted his termination. He cannot after a lapse of several years make a demand and then convert it into a "dispute" what had otherwise become a buried issue. 37. Let us examine the matter from another aspect viz. laches and delays and acquiescence. 38. It is now a well-recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation Period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases Courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity "delay defeats equities". 39. This principle is applied in those cases where discretionary orders of the court are claimed, such as specific performance, permanent or temporary injunction appointment of Receiver, etc. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity "delay defeats equities". 39. This principle is applied in those cases where discretionary orders of the court are claimed, such as specific performance, permanent or temporary injunction appointment of Receiver, etc. These principles are also applied in the wit petitions tiled under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India In such cases, courts can still refuse relief where the delay on the petitioners part has prejudiced the respondent even though the petitioner might have 3 Come to court within the period preset abide by the Limitation Act. 40. Likewise, it a patty having a tight stands by and sees another acting in a manner inconsistent with that right and makes no objection while the ac is in progress he cannot afterwards complain This principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that In such a case the party who did not make any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and, therefore, has no right to complain against that alleged wrong. 41. Thus, in those cases where period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period the aggrieved party loses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over. Likewise, in other c cases even where no limitation is prescribed, but for a long period the aggrieved party does not approach the machinery provided under the law for redressal of his grievance, it can be presumed that relief can be denied on the ground of unexplained delay and laches and/or on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced into the act of other. As mentioned above, these principles as part of equity are based on principles relatable to d sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such a right is non-existent. 42. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise the legal position as under: 42.1. An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2-A of the Act. 42. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise the legal position as under: 42.1. An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2-A of the Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that "any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended". The words "industrial dispute exists" are of paramount importance, unless there is an existence of an f industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. 42.2. Dispute or difference arises when one party makes a demand and the other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in a number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary Precondition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful elimination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the game after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exists. 42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? 42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances disclose that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. 42.4. Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the Labour Authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the remedy under Section 2-A of the Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and thereafter he sleeps over the matter for a number of years, it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the said rejection. 42.5. Take another example. 42.5. Take another example. A workman approaches the civil court by tiling a suit against his termination which was pending for a number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that the civil court did not have Jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any Reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that the dispute is still alive as the workman had not accepted the termination but was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. 42.6. in contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the Workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and, therefore, at the time a when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an "existing dispute". In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse try make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted. 43. We may hasten to clarify that in those cases where the court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still open for the court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. We are of the Opinion that the law on this issue has to be 0 applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters. 44. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the "appropriate Government" to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words "at any time" used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not d applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. The words "at any time" used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not d applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers' financial e arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry." 27. From the facts of present case, more particularly passage of almost 15 to 17 years coupled with the fact about the settlement and also the fact that the company has paid amount under the settlement to the claimants and that the said amount has been received by the claimants, and any evidence contrary to said facts is not placed on record of this petition, it becomes clear that the dispute raised by the claimants is in fact, an afterthought and the attempt to raise such dispute after more than 15 years after an overall full and final settlement dated 24.1.2000 such proceedings are not maintainable and do not deserve to be entertained. 28. It has emerged that the subject matter of present petition stands decided and covered by the decision dated 5.4.2018 in SCA No. 4520 of 2017. This Court is not convinced and not inclined to take different view. 29. Besides this, from foregoing discussion and in light of facts of present case and on independent and separate consideration of rival contentions and facts of present case this Court has, for reasons mentioned above and in light of foregoing discussion, found that the proceedings of said reference cases amount to abuse of Court's process. The petitioner has established that the dispute raised and proceedings instituted by present respondents are hit by the settlement as well as gross delay and they are in nature of dead dispute and therefore not maintainable. 30. Therefore, this Court is convinced that this petition should also meet with the same fate as SCA No. 4520 of 2017. Therefore, following order is passed:- The petition is allowed in terms of paragraph No. 11A. The proceedings of Reference Cases Nos. 30. Therefore, this Court is convinced that this petition should also meet with the same fate as SCA No. 4520 of 2017. Therefore, following order is passed:- The petition is allowed in terms of paragraph No. 11A. The proceedings of Reference Cases Nos. 256 of 2016 to 269 of 2016 pending before learned Labour Court at Ahmedabad are declared untenable and therefore the proceedings of said reference cases are quashed. Accordingly the petition stands disposed of. Orders accordingly.