JUDGMENT : Sahidullah Munshi, J. In this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged a Memo being No. T4/18-C/97-XX dated 3rd June, 1998 and lso another Memo being No.T4/XX/18-C/97/SCN/1258 (P), dated 6th July, 2016, issued by the Assistant Director for Special Directorate (E.R.), Directorate of Enforcement, whereby the petitioner was sought to be informed that final opportunity was being extended to him to take complete inspection of the relied upon documents once again on 11th July, 2016 at 11:30 a.m. before the Assistant Director (Adjudication). It was indicated in the said Memo that inspection would be a allowed to the persons who will be authorized by the Government. If the inspection process was not completed by the given date, the case would be decided ex parte on its merit as the matter was getting delayed for a long time. The writ petitioner is aggrieved by the reopening of an issue which was closed long back for no fault on the part of the petitioner. It is the contention of the petitioner that, although, the petitioner rendered all co-operation at all stages, but the authority delayed the proceeding unnecessarily and after a lapse of 20 years they wanted to reopen the same once again when the petitioners never thought it fit to preserve the documents and the evidence which were available might have been destroyed and/or not available at the present moment. On such consideration, when the matter was initially moved, an interim protection was granted by an order dated 16th August, 2016 and while passing the interim order, this Court elaborately discussed the necessity of granting interim protection. The said interim order was never challenged by the authority. Direction was issued to file affidavit-in-opposition. Affidavit-in-opposition has been filed. Now, the matter has been taken up for final consideration on affidavits. To better understand the case, following dates are to be taken note of : LIST OF DATES 3rd June, 1998 Shri M.C. Joshi, Special Director of the Enforcement Directorate, issued Show Cause Memorandum No. T4/18-C/97-XX dated 3rd June, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as SCM XX) to the Petitioner No.1. 11th June, 1998 The petitioner No.1 received SCM XX at its aforesaid office at Kolkata. 11th June, 1998 The petitioner No.1 received SCM XX at its aforesaid office at Kolkata. 12th June, 1998 By a letter dated 12th June, 1998, the Petitioner No.1 wrote to the Respondents denying the allegations in SCM-XX and stating that your Petitioner No.1 would be approaching the office of the Respondents at Kolkata for production of the originals of the documents sought to be relied upon by the Respondents and for inspection of the same by the Petitioner No.1. 1998-2001 The respondents allowed inspection of the Relied Upon Documents (hereinafter referred as the RUDs in SCMXX in a piecemeal manner. At no point of time did they produce all the originals of the RUDs, or give inspection of the same. 2001 In 2001, the Respondents abruptly stopped the process of production of originals and inspection of documents, before the same could be completed. 7th January, 2002 By a letter dated 7th January, 2002, the Petitioner No.1 complained about suspension of the process of giving inspection of documents in August, 2001 and requested the then Special Director of the Enforcement Directorate to allow the Petitioner No.1 to resume inspection of records. 27th May, 2002 The Petitioner No.1 filed an Interim Reply dated 27th May, 2002 to SCM-XX. 3rd July, 2004 Shri G.K.P. Reddy, on whose statement SCM-XX is heavily reliant, passed away. 13th January, 2015 The respondents issued Call Notice T-4/18-C/97-SCNXX/275 dated 13th January, 2015 to the Petitioner No.1, fixing for the first time a date i.e., 6th February, 2015 for personal hearing of SCN-XX. 19th January, 2015 The Petitioner No.1 received the call notice dated 13th January, 2015. 30th January, 2015 By a consolidated reply dated 30th January, 2015, the Petitioner No.1 requested that the adjudication proceedings in respect of 7 Show Cause Memoranda, including SCM-XX, be adjourned till the completion of 2 other Memoranda which were scheduled to be heard on 3rd February, 2015. 17th December, 2015 By a letter dated 17th December, 2015, the Petitioner No.1 asked for production of the originals of all the RUDs and sought inspection of the same. 3rd June, 2016 By a letter dated 3rd June, 2016, the Second Respondent asked the Petitioner No.1 to visit the office of the Respondents and inspect the RUDs on 15th June, 2016 15th June, 2016 The Petitioner No.1 was given, for inspection, documents purporting to be RUDs appearing at Serial Nos. 3rd June, 2016 By a letter dated 3rd June, 2016, the Second Respondent asked the Petitioner No.1 to visit the office of the Respondents and inspect the RUDs on 15th June, 2016 15th June, 2016 The Petitioner No.1 was given, for inspection, documents purporting to be RUDs appearing at Serial Nos. 2-11 of Annexure C of SCM-XX. However, the originals of the documents appearing at Serial Nos. 2-10 of Annexure C of SCM-XX were not available. 24th June, 2016 The Petitioner No.1 was given, for the purpose of inspection, some of the documents appearing at Serial No. 41 of Annexure C of SCM-XX. The originals of some of these documents so given were not available. The next date of inspection was fixed as 11th July, 2016. 6th July, 2016 By a letter dated 6th July, 2016, the Respondents informed the Petitioner No.1 that the Petitioner No.1 was being extended a final opportunity to complete inspection of all the RUDs on 11th July, 2016, and that if the inspection process is not completed by the said date, the case will be decided ex parte. 11th July, 2016 The Petitioner No.1 resumed the process of taking inspection of the RUDs. The Petitioner No.1 could only take inspection of statements appearing at Serial Nos. 22-27 of Annexure C of SCM-XX, running into about 150 pages, before the process was stopped by the Respondents. 13th July, 2016 By way of its letter dated 13th July, 2016, the Petitioner No.1 informed the First Respondent that the process of inspection of RUDs was incomplete. 14th July, 2016 The Petitioner No.1 received a letter, being Letter No. T4/XX/18-C/97/SCN/1326 dated 11th July, 2016, from the Second Respondent, wherein the Second Respondent falsely insisted that it had provided all the RUDs to representatives of the Petitioner No.1 on 11th July, 2016, and that such inspection had been completed. 18th July, 2016 The Petitioner No.1 replied to the aforementioned being Letter No. T-4/XX/18-C/SCN/1326 dated 11th July, 2016 denying the contentions of the Second Respondent and reiterating that the continuation of adjudication proceedings in respect of SCM-XX is barred by law and is not permissible, being incompetent and without jurisdiction. 18th July, 2016 The Petitioner No.1 replied to the aforementioned being Letter No. T-4/XX/18-C/SCN/1326 dated 11th July, 2016 denying the contentions of the Second Respondent and reiterating that the continuation of adjudication proceedings in respect of SCM-XX is barred by law and is not permissible, being incompetent and without jurisdiction. 26th July, 2016 The Petitioner No.1 received a notice from the Respondents dated 22nd July, 2016 delivered through messenger by hand, fixing 1st August, 2016 as the date of personal hearing in respect of SCM-XX, and stating that if the Petitioner No.1 failed to appear, the Adjudicating Authority may proceed with the enquiry ex parte. 2. The petitioner in this writ petition has contended that a show-cause emorandum No.T-4/18-C/97-SCN-XX, dated 3rd June, 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the 'SCM-XX') was issued under Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'FERA'), now repealed. It is contended that reply to show-cause was duly submitted and no further objection was raised thereafter. It is the grievance of the petitioner that all on a sudden, after a lapse of 18 years (the writ petition was filed on 1st August, 2016), the said SCM-XX issued the impugned letter dated 6th July, 2016, mentioned hereinbefore being Annexure P-9 to this writ petition. The petitioner challenged the said Memo, inter alia, on the grounds that the respondents are not authorized to reopen the case after such a long period particularly when the evidence those were available at that material point of time, cannot be collected and/or evidence those were sought to be furnished, have been destroyed by a lapse of time. The petitioner is also aggrieved by the attempt made by the authority asking personal hearing and continuation of the adjudication proceedings which by now have been vitiated by inordinate delay. It is also the contention that such personal hearing and continuation of the adjudication proceedings are specifically barred by Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as 'FEMA'). It is also the grievance of the petitioner that such personal hearing and continuation of the adjudication proceedings are now being sought to be held even without the production of the originals of the documents sought to be relied upon by the respondents. According to the petitioners, the transactions which are subject matter of SCM-XX took place during the period 1990-96, more than 20-25 years back. 3. According to the petitioners, the transactions which are subject matter of SCM-XX took place during the period 1990-96, more than 20-25 years back. 3. Against the purported attempt of the respondents by their letter No. T4/XX/18-C/97/SCN 1258(P) dated 6th July, 2016, planning to proceed with the proposed adjudication, although, the petitioner no.1 had repeatedly pointed out that originals of a large number of RUDs were not available with the respondents. Against such purported attempt the petitioner filed this writ petition before this Hon'ble Court and relied on various decisions at the interim stage and submitted before the Court that the authority cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter. In view of the ratio decided in those decisions an interim order was passed on 16.08.2016 against which reportedly no appeal has been preferred by the said authority. Mr. Roy appearing for the respondents submitted that no such appeal has been preferred. Therefore, the petitioner has prayed for an order of mandamus commanding the respondents and each of them, their servants, agents, not to proceed any further with the adjudication of SCM-XX dated 3rd June, 1998 and to stop the said proceeding forthwith and consequentially to rescind and/or quash and/or cancel the same SCM-XX dated 3rd June, 1998. Since the letters dated 6th July, 2016, 11th July, 2016 and 22nd July, 2016, all arose from the impugned SCM-XX dated 3rd June, 1998 as a consequential prayer, the petitioner has also prayed for quashing of the said notices dated 6th July, 2016, 11th July, 2016 and 22nd July, 2016. In support of his case the Mr. Choudhuri, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioners, has relied on the following decisions : Bhagwandas S. Tolani Vs. B.C. Aggarwal & Ors. reported in, (1983) 12 ELT 44 (Bom.); State of Punjab & Ors. - Vs. Bhatinda District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. reported in, (2007) 11 SCC 363 ; Delhi Development Authority Vs. Ram Prakash reported in, (2011) 4 SCC 180 ; R.M. Mehrotra Vs. Enforcement Directorate reported in, (2009) 246 ELT 141(Del.); and Mohan Alwani Vs. Director, Enforcement Directorate & Anr. reported in, (2015) 150 DRJ 243 . 4. Mr. Roy, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, has submitted that the interim order which was passed by this Court is still in force. However, his client has filed an affidavit-in-opposition to which the petitioners have also filed reply. Director, Enforcement Directorate & Anr. reported in, (2015) 150 DRJ 243 . 4. Mr. Roy, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, has submitted that the interim order which was passed by this Court is still in force. However, his client has filed an affidavit-in-opposition to which the petitioners have also filed reply. Nothing substantial has been mentioned in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondents on the question of reopening of the issue after a period of 18 years. The respondents, however, denied each and every allegation in the writ petition but the moot question is whether their stand to reopen the hearing can at all proceed or not in the context of the decisions referred to by Mr. Choudhuri, learned Senior Advocate, has not been met at all. The decisions which Mr. Choudhuri has referred to, are on the same line to show that the authority cannot proceed with the matter at such a belated stage according to its whims and caprices. At the initial hearing, when this Court passed an interim order restraining the authorities from proceeding any further on the basis of the impugned notice, this Court had occasion to deal with the aforesaid judgments. 5. In the decision of Bhagwandas S. Tolani (supra), a very short point was involved with regard to proceedings reopened after a long period of time where the Court held that the department is not entitled to re-open adjudication proceedings after a long time because it would cause serious detriment and prejudice to the petitioner. In paragraph 7, the Hon'ble Court held : "7. In my view, even without considering the case that adjudication proceedings had in fact been held, I am of the opinion that this is otherwise also a stale matter which cannot be allowed to be reopened, since to allow it to be reopened, would cause serious detriment and prejudice to the petitioner. The fact that the petitioner is not able to produce the formal order is immaterial; that there were earlier adjudication proceedings may be reasonably borne out by the fact that the department did nothing for 11 years. The department has failed to clarify the position as regards the directions given to the Reserve Bank of India and an adverse inference is required to be drawn from such failure even otherwise in respect of such stale matter. The department has failed to clarify the position as regards the directions given to the Reserve Bank of India and an adverse inference is required to be drawn from such failure even otherwise in respect of such stale matter. In my opinion, the department is not entitled to take up old matters is this manner. If the department's contentions as to limitation were to be accepted, it would mean that the department can commence adjudication proceedings 10 years, 15 years or 20 years after the original show cause notice which cannot be permitted. The position might have been different if there had been any default on the part of the petitioner or any act of omission or commission on his part which had resulted in this long period of delay. Then in such case, the petitioner could not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. This is not the department's case in the present matter." 6. In the decision of State of Punjab & Ors. (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held "It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors." 7. On considering the fact involved in this case the delay could not be justified by the authority in their affidavit-in-opposition. No reasonable explanation has been offered. Therefore, there is no hesitation for this Court to prevent the authority from taking such a belated action against the petitioner proposing to proceed with the proceeding which was initiated 18 years back. 8. In Delhi Development Authority (supra) the Hon'ble Apex Court held "Ultimately, on a question of limitation being raised in respect of the demand of misuse charges, the Division Bench observed tat where no period of limitation is prescribed, action has to be taken by the authorities within a reasonable period of time, but by no stretch of imagination, could it be said that after a lapse of almost 25 years DDA had not acted arbitrarily or at least unfairly insofar as the respondent is concerned. In addition, the respondent was never informed by DDA that he was required to pay any misuse charges. In addition, the respondent was never informed by DDA that he was required to pay any misuse charges. On the basis of such reasoning, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the learned Single Judge." 9. In R.M. Mehrotra (supra), the Hon'ble Court has dealt with a similar case concerning show-cause notice after a lapse of 14 years in respect of FERA, 1973. In the said case, the Hon'ble Court held "It is no doubt true public interest dictates that economic offences are curbed and offenders duly prosecuted. The show cause notice in the present case was issued in 1994 much before the FERA was repealed. The notice of hearing is a mere continuation of the process, and therefore, it cannot be argued that action is time-barred. However, the revival of proceedings after a time gap of ten years, without the notice of hearing disclosing any reason for the delay, is not a mere matter of impropriety; the respondents were under a duty to disclose what compulsions held up the adjudicatory process for so long. Absent such explanation, revival of the proceedings would be unlawful and arbitrary. The duty to give reason is a sine qua non of any executive action, without which the action is liable to be struck down." 10. In Mohan Alwani (supra), the Hon'ble Court has dealt with the provisions of Sections 9(1)(b), 9(1)(d) and 37 of the FERA, 1973. In a petition praying for quashing of the criminal prosecution, the Hon'ble Court held "7. As is evident from the facts and circumstances delineated above, the petitioner seeks quashing of the adjudication proceedings on the ground of inordinate delay in conclusion of the proceedings. Therefore, first and foremost, one would have to establish as to whether courts have, in the past, taken recourse to the powers under Article 226 to quash adjudication proceedings under various economic laws, which have penal consequences. The genesis of such a plea is based on the judgments of the Supreme Court and various High Courts in respect of delay in prosecution of criminal cases. 7.1. The Supreme Court has time and again ruled that inbuilt in the fundamental right conferred under Article 21 is a right of the accused to expect that the State would prosecute and try his case with speed and expedition. 7.1. The Supreme Court has time and again ruled that inbuilt in the fundamental right conferred under Article 21 is a right of the accused to expect that the State would prosecute and try his case with speed and expedition. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Hussainara Khatoon Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81 and Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R.S. Nayak, (1991) 6 JT 431 SC, clearly establish this principle. As a matter of fact, the Supreme court in Abdul Rehman Antulay's case formulated eleven propositions which inter alia stated that the right to speedy trial flows from Article 21 of the Constitution, and this right, encompasses all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, enquiry, trial, appeal, revision and re-trial. The court went on to say that while, examining the plea of delay the concerns of the accused have to be examined, which would include factors such as the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance caused to his vocation as a result of unduly prolonged investigation, enquiry or trial; and furthermore - whether undue delay results in impairment of ability of the accused to defend himself on account of death, dis-appearance or non-availability of witnesses. The court also factored in caveats such as : determination to answers, as to who was responsible for the delay; as every delay, does not necessarily prejudice the accused. What is important is the two observations of the court. First, that "proceedings taken by either party in good faith to vindicate their rights and interests as perceived by them, cannot be treated as delaying tactics nor can the time taken in pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay..". Second, "inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice..". 7.2. It goes without saying as was also observed by the court that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken out to merely delay the day of reckoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken in good faith, and that, mere fact on an application or petition, a stay is granted by a superior court is no ground to construe that the proceedings are not frivolous as very often such orders are obtained on ex parte representation. In effect, it was observed by the court that while it may not be advisable or practicable to fix time limit for trial of offences, the courts while ascertaining whether undue delay has occurred must have regard to all attendant circumstances including the nature of offence, number of accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing local conditions, i.e., that which is termed as "systemic delays". In sum, the guideline formulated is to balance and weigh all relevant factors. 7.3. These and other guidelines formulated by the Supreme Court in Abdul Rehan Antulay's case continue to hold good. As a matter of fact, a seven-judges bench of the Supreme Court in the case of P.Ramachandra Rao was called to rule as to whether courts could prescribe a period of limitation which if crossed would lead to termination of legal proceedings. The Seven Judges Bench of the Supreme Court reiterated the ratio of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay's case and in particular, ruled in line with the said judgment that it was neither advisable nor practicable to provide for a period of limitation. 7.4. Therefore, Mr. Jasmeet Singh, in my view, is right in his contention that if, no limitation can be prescribed for investigation, enquiry and trial of a criminal matter, it cannot be prescribed even for adjudication, under a statute, providing for penal consequences. 7.5. Having said so, what needs to be noticed is that the guidelines formulated in Abdul Rehman Antulay's case have not only been reiterated qua criminal cases by courts in later judgments (for example see Lokesh Kumar Jain's case) but also qua adjudication under economic laws. 7.6. There are two judgments on this aspect of the matter. The first judgment is of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Smita A. Patel where a Division Bench quashed adjudication proceedings under FERA due to a colossal delay of 16 years. The Division Bench ruled that such delay resulted in mental and physical and harassment to the petitioner, in that case. The proceedings were quashed and costs in the sum of Rs.15,000/- were awarded to the petitioner. 7.7. A similar view was taken by yet another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shrish Harshavadan Shah's case. The Division Bench ruled that such delay resulted in mental and physical and harassment to the petitioner, in that case. The proceedings were quashed and costs in the sum of Rs.15,000/- were awarded to the petitioner. 7.7. A similar view was taken by yet another Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shrish Harshavadan Shah's case. In this case, once again, the court quashed proceedings and while doing so, made the following apposite observations :- "..9. Having heard rival parties, it is not in dispute that the respondent No.1, by the impugned action is seeking to adjudicate upon the matters which took place in the year 1980-82 and for the first time, the notices were issued after lapse of more than 12 years. 10. It is no doubt true that no period of limitation in the Statute to complete the adjudication proceeding is prescribed. But the Apex Court in the case of Government of India Vs. The Citedal Fine Pharmaceuticals Madras and Ors, (1989) 42 ELT 515 (S.C.) = AIR 1989 SC 1771 was pleased to rule that in absence of any period of limitation, it is settled that every Authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period. What would be reasonable period would depend upon the facts of each case. No hard and fast rules can be laid down in this regard as the determination of the question will depend upon the facts of each case. 11. Having taken survey of the law holding the field, the factual matrix of the case in hand, unequivocally go to show that the impugned action is sought to be taken after lapse of period of more than 12 years to adjudicate upon acts and omissions alleged to have been committed in the year 1982. No justification is placed on record to justify inaction for such a long period of 12 years for which petitioner is definitely not responsible.." 7.8. A single judge of our court in the case of R.P. Nanda has based on the judgments of the Supreme Court quashed the disciplinary proceedings at the charge-sheet stage in exercise of power under Article 226, on account of unexplained delay. 7.9. As a matter of fact, in the case of Eskay Electronics (I) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. Vs. A single judge of our court in the case of R.P. Nanda has based on the judgments of the Supreme Court quashed the disciplinary proceedings at the charge-sheet stage in exercise of power under Article 226, on account of unexplained delay. 7.9. As a matter of fact, in the case of Eskay Electronics (I) Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. Vs. P.K. Khera, Superintendent, Central Excise, Preventive, Delhi dealing with prosecution under the Central Excise Act, I had an occasion to examine, various judgments of the Supreme Court, to which, I have already made a reference above. 9. In the present case, what emerges from the record is clearly this, that the respondents from very inception have procrastinated in prosecuting the case unmindful of the detriment that it would cause to the petitioner. 9.1. In this context, the following periods of delay, which are not denied, are easily captured. (i). Though the raid and search on the Minto Road premises was conducted on 18.05.1995, the SCN dated 14.11.1995, was served on the petitioner, only on, 17.07.1997. (ii). Concededly, the SCN was not accompanied with, the relied upon documents. Despite several requests made by the petitioner, vide letters dated 13.08.1997, 24.01.1998 and 23.10.1998, the relied upon documents were not supplied. While, the respondents have taken the stand that they did not receive, at their end, the letter dated 24.01.1998, there is a reference to the said letter in the reply sent on behalf of the petitioner, on 23.10.1998. The petitioner has placed on record the copies of the postal receipts. (iii). The respondents instead of supplying the relied upon documents straightaway to the petitioner vide communication dated 19.11.1998 asked him to collect the same from their Zonal Office at Delhi. (iv). The petitioner's request that he be intimated the amount to be sent in that behalf and the person in whose favour the draft had to be drawn, went unheeded. (v). Admittedly, the relied upon documents were supplied by the respondents only on 17.03.2004. From the date of search, by this time, nine (9) years had elapsed. (vi). According to the respondents, upon receipt of the petitioner's reply dated 27.07.2004, effective proceedings were held for the first time on 17.10.2005; which was a decade after the occurrence of the alleged infraction of the law by the petitioner. (vii). From the date of search, by this time, nine (9) years had elapsed. (vi). According to the respondents, upon receipt of the petitioner's reply dated 27.07.2004, effective proceedings were held for the first time on 17.10.2005; which was a decade after the occurrence of the alleged infraction of the law by the petitioner. (vii). On the request of the petitioner, opportunity was granted to cross-examine only the official witnesses, that too, after 14 months i.e., 20.12.2006. (viii). From there on, till 15.10.2013, which is a period of nearly 7 years, the respondents, in a manner of speech, went into a state of comatose. The proceedings were resurrected, which led to a spate of correspondence, to which I have made a reference above. 10. In this circumstances, can it be said that the petitioner was responsible for delay in conclusion of the adjudicatory process. In my view, the answer has to be in the negative. The petitioner, was entitled in law to seek copies of the relied upon documents. The fact that respondents admittedly kept them back till March 2004 clearly shows that either they lacked, for whatever reasons, the interest to prosecute the petitioner or, they had no actionable case against the petitioner. 10.1. The events post 2004 only re-emphasised this aspect of the matter. The petitioner, in the meanwhile, has not only advanced in his age (he is, as per the affidavit 68 years of age) but has also lost, as claimed, crucial evidence to prove his innocence. 10.2. Despite, repeated requests made on behalf of the petitioner to summon panch witnesses, the said request was declined by the respondents. This request attains significance as SCN proceeds on the basis as if the petitioner was the owner of the Minto Road premises. The premises, (since then demolished) was, concededly, a Government accommodation. The reason why the petitioner happened to visit the Minto Road premises would have, perhaps, come to light if, an opportunity was given to the petitioner to cross-examine the panch witnesses, who accompanied the official witnesses at the time of search. 10.3. Similarly, the production of co-noticees who allegedly received moneys distributed by the petitioner was equally important from the point of view of the petitioner. 10.3. Similarly, the production of co-noticees who allegedly received moneys distributed by the petitioner was equally important from the point of view of the petitioner. These persons have not been produced for cross-examination at least since 2004; despite a categorical request made in this behalf in the communication dated 27.07.2004 addressed by the petitioner's counsel to the respondents. 10.4. There were no answers forthcoming on behalf of the respondents on these aspects of the matter. There are no answers supplied in the counter affidavit as well. The reason for the same perhaps is, that these witnesses have either died or are not traceable. Either way, the dis-appearance of evidence which could be crucial to the petitioner's case has occurred on account of the delay on the part of the respondents in concluding the adjudicatory process with due expedition. 11. In these circumstances, I have no hesitation in reaching the conclusion that the adjudication cannot proceed any further on account of undue and unexplained delay in concluding the proceedings. Accordingly, the adjudication proceedings, which commenced vide memorandum dated 14.11.1995, are quashed. The necessary consequences of this would be that the respondents will have to release the sum of Rs.7 lakhs seized from the petitioner, as it cannot be confiscated sans adjudication. It is ordered accordingly. 11.1. The prayer for interest on the seized amount is, however, declined, on the ground that there was no demand made in respect of the same at any stage of the proceedings." It appears that the Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the memorandum by which the adjudication proceeding was initiated for the reason of unexplained delay. Therefore, I have got no hesitation to allow the writ petitioners' prayer and to quash the said Memo of 3rd June, 1998 and all Memorandums issued subsequently on the basis thereof. The petitioner, at the end of the hearing, has also referred to two other decisions of this Court arising out of similar fact situation (1) An order dated 14.11.2018, passed by an Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court in W.P. 25524(W) of 2016 with three other writ petitions (ITC Limited & Anr. Vs. Special Director, Eastern Region, Enforcement Directorate & Anr.), and (2) Judgment and order dated 3rd May, 2018, passed by a Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court in W.P. 322 of 2015 (Surendralal Girdharilal Mehta Vs. Union of India & Ors.). Vs. Special Director, Eastern Region, Enforcement Directorate & Anr.), and (2) Judgment and order dated 3rd May, 2018, passed by a Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court in W.P. 322 of 2015 (Surendralal Girdharilal Mehta Vs. Union of India & Ors.). In both the above-referred decisions this Court has held the same view which I have taken in this case. Therefore, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned notice dated 3rd June, 1998 under Memorandum No. T-4/18-C/97/SCN-XX and all other subsequent notices arose therefrom in particular the notices dated 6th July, 2016, 11th July, 2016 and 22nd July, 2016 are also quashed and set aside. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will, however, be no order as to costs. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be delivered to the learned counsel for the respective parties upon compliance of all usual formalities.