JUDGMENT : Akil Kureshi, J. The sole ground pressed in these appeals by the appellant-ONGC is of the date from which the claimants would receive interest under Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("the Act" for short) on the enhanced compensation. No other issue is argued or pressed before us by the learned counsel for the appellant-ONGC. They, however, clarify that this concession would not bind them in any other land acquisition proceedings. In other words, question of market rate of the acquired land is kept open. We would, therefore, confine our discussion in this judgment on this single legal issue. 2. The facts necessary to decide this question are as under; 3. The appellant-ONGC, as is well known, is engaged in oil extraction and refining. This necessarily includes the activity of oil exploration. Not every exploration succeeds in yielding positive results. In other words, often times, even after initial possibility of oil being found, after prolonged efforts, the ONGC may find that oil or at any rate, sufficient supply of oil is not available and therefore, would abandon further exploration. For such purposes, the ONGC is required to occupy private lands, often times, initially, on temporary basis. In many cases, such temporary occupation may convert into final acquisition of land under the said Act and in some cases, it may not. In the present group of cases, we are concerned with a situation where, after initial occupation of land on temporary basis, the ONGC ended up acquiring the lands under the said Act. 4. On 01.01.1989 the ONGC temporarily occupied lands bearing Block/Survey No.404/1, 360, 404/2 and 403 of Village Pachot, District Mehasana in terms of Section 35 of the Act. This temporary occupation of the lands continued uninterruptedly. The land owners would receive periodic rent. Finally, many years later, the ONGC decided to acquire such lands. A preliminary Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was issued on 18.12.1996 followed by the Notification under Section 6 of the Act on 18.09.1997. The Land Acquisition Officer published his award under Section 11 of the Act on 13.03.1999 granting compensation to the land owners at the rate of Rs. 13.50 per square meters. 5. Aggrieved by the rate of compensation, the claimants preferred reference before the Civil Court. The reference Court, by its award dated 25.10.2017, granted additional compensation at the rate of Rs. 65 per square meters.
13.50 per square meters. 5. Aggrieved by the rate of compensation, the claimants preferred reference before the Civil Court. The reference Court, by its award dated 25.10.2017, granted additional compensation at the rate of Rs. 65 per square meters. The reference Court also awarded interest on the additional compensation, including solatium and additional 12% under Section 23(1A) of the Act. In the context of the date from which such interest would be computed, the reference Court referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Baldevji Shakraji Thakor v. Group General Manager, ONGC & Another dated 23.01.2017 passed in Civil Appeal No(s).834-835 of 2017. Relying on the observations made in the said judgment, the reference Court directed that interest at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year and 15% per annum thereafter would be payable on such compensation from the date of taking possession or from the date of publication of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, whichever is earlier. 6. This award, the ONGC has challenged in these appeals. 7. The sole contention of the appellant is that in terms of the provisions contained in the said Act, interest on the enhanced compensation can be granted only from the date of taking possession of the land under Section 16 of the Act or at any rate from the date of passing of the award by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant-ONGC had taken us extensively through the provisions contained in the said Act and argued that the concept of grant of interest under Section 28 of the Act cannot be applied to the instances of temporary occupation under Section 35 of the Act. All throughout the temporary occupation of land by ONGC, the land owners received rent. No grievance was raised about the rate of payment of rent. The land owners cannot seek interest for a period interior to the commencement of the acquisition, as, in the present case, several years earlier.
All throughout the temporary occupation of land by ONGC, the land owners received rent. No grievance was raised about the rate of payment of rent. The land owners cannot seek interest for a period interior to the commencement of the acquisition, as, in the present case, several years earlier. Referring to various earlier judgments of the Supreme Court, it was argued before us that the Supreme Court in case of Baldevji Shakraji Thakor did not lay down a proposition that in case of temporary occupation of private lands, interest would be payable from the date of taking over such possession, even prior to the commencement of acquisition proceedings under the said Act. Learned Senior Counsel relied on several judgments, reference to which would be made at appropriate stage. 8. On the other hand, learned advocates appearing for the claimants opposed this contention of the ONGC. They would, of course, place heavy reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Baldevji Shakraji Thakor and seek to point out that in a similar situation, the land owners were granted interest from the date of taking over possession of land by the ONGC. Same principle should be applied in the present case. 9. The controversy needs to be resolved on the basis of the provisions contained in the said Act and the judicial pronouncements on such provisions. In order to amend the law for acquisition of land for public purposes and for companies, the said Act was enacted. Part-II of the Act pertains to acquisition. As is well known, under subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Act, the appropriate Government is authorized to declare its intention of acquisition of land by issuing a Notification if it is of the opinion that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose or for a company. Section 5A of the Act pertains to hearing of objections and recognizes the right of a person interested in land, which has been notified u/s.4(1) of the Act, to object to such acquisition. As per subsection (2) of Section 5A of the Act, such objections would be made to the Collector in writing, upon which, the Collector would give the objector or any authorized person or a pleader, an opportunity of being heard and thereafter, pass appropriate order on such objections.
As per subsection (2) of Section 5A of the Act, such objections would be made to the Collector in writing, upon which, the Collector would give the objector or any authorized person or a pleader, an opportunity of being heard and thereafter, pass appropriate order on such objections. Under subsection (1) of Section 6 of the Act, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any particular land is needed for any public purpose or for a company, it would make a declaration to that effect. Under Section 11 of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer would pass an award determining true area of land, the compensation which should be awarded for such land and the apportionment of such compensation amongst the person interested in the land. This exercise, however, would be preceded by a Notice under Section 9 to the persons interested and the hearing of persons interested on the relevant issues. 10. As per Section 16, when the Collector has made an award, he may take possession of the land which would then rest in the Government absolutely. Section 17 of the Act pertains to special powers in cases of urgency. Essentially, under the said provision, the appropriate Government could take possession of any land needed for public purpose even before the passing of the award by the Special Land Acquisition Officer in cases of urgency. 11. Part-III of the Act pertains to reference to Court and the procedure thereon. Section 18 contained therein pertains to reference to Court. Under subsection (1) of Section 18 of the Act, any person interested, who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred to the Court for determination on the question of measurement of land, the amount of compensation, the persons to whom it is payable or the apportionment of compensation among the persons interested. Section 23 of the Act pertains to matters to be considered for determining compensation. Subsection (1) thereof lays down the facts which the Court shall take into consideration while determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under the Act.
Section 23 of the Act pertains to matters to be considered for determining compensation. Subsection (1) thereof lays down the facts which the Court shall take into consideration while determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for the land acquired under the Act. Subsection (1A) inserted with effect from 24.09.1984 provides that in addition to the market value of land, the Court shall, in every case, award an amount calculated @ 12% per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of publication of the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act to the date of award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. Subsection (2) of Section 23 provides for payment of 30% solatium on the market value determined by the Court in consideration of the compulsory nature of acquisition. 12. Section 28 of the Act pertains to interest on excess compensation and reads as under; "28. Collector may be directed to pay interest on excess compensation. If the sum which, in the opinion of the Court, the Collector ought to have awarded as compensation is in excess of the sum which the Collector did award as compensation, the award of the Court may direct that the Collector shall pay interest on such excess at the rate of nine per cent per annum from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of such excess into Court : Provided that the award of the Court may also direct that where such excess or any part thereof is paid into Court after the date of expiry of a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of such excess or part thereof which has not been paid into Court before the date of such expiry. 13. Part-V of the Act pertains to payment.
13. Part-V of the Act pertains to payment. Under subsection (1) of Section 31 contained in the said Part, on making an award under Section 11 of the Act, the Collector would tender payment of compensation awarded by him to the persons interested and entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay the same unless prevented by one or more of the contingencies mentioned in subsection (2). Section 34 of the Act contained in the same Part provides that when the amount of compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land, the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon @ 9% per annum from the time of so taking over possession till it is paid or deposited. As per the proviso to Section 34, if such payment or part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year, interest @ 15% per annum would be payable from the date of expiry of such period of one year. 14. Part-VI of the Act pertains to temporary acquisition of land. Section 35 contained in the said Part reads as under; "35. Temporary occupation of waste or arable land, procedure when difference as to compensation exists. (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that the temporary occupation and use of any waste or arable land are needed for any public purpose, or for a company, the appropriate Government may direct the Collector to procure the occupation and use of the same for such terms as it shall think fit, not exceeding three years from commencement of such occupation. (2) The Collector shall thereupon give in writing to the persons interested in such land of the purpose for which the same is needed, and shall, for the occupation and use thereof, for such term as aforesaid, and for the materials (if any) to be taken therefrom, pay to them such compensation, either in a gross sum of money, or by monthly or other periodical payments, as shall be agreed upon in writing between him and such persons respectively. (3) In case the Collector and the persons interested differ as to the sufficiency of the compensation or appointment thereof, the Collector shall refer such difference to the decision of the Court." 15.
(3) In case the Collector and the persons interested differ as to the sufficiency of the compensation or appointment thereof, the Collector shall refer such difference to the decision of the Court." 15. Under subsection (1) of Section 36 of the Act, on payment of compensation or on executing the agreement or on making the reference under Section 35 of the Act, the Collector may enter upon and take possession of the land and use or permit the use thereof in accordance with the terms of the notice. Subsection (2) of Section 36 provides that on expiration of the term, the Collector shall make or tender to the persons interested compensation for the damage, if any, done to the land and not provided for by the agreement and shall restore the land to the persons interested therein. The proviso to sub section (2) of Section 36 provides that if the land has become permanently unable to be used for the purposes for which it was used immediately before the commencement of such term and if the persons interested shall so require, the appropriate Government shall proceed to acquire the land as if it was needed permanently for a public purpose or for a Company. Section 37 of the Act provides that in case the Collector and persons interested differ as to the condition of land at the expiration of the term or as to any matter connected with the said agreement, the Collector shall refer such difference to the decision of the Court. 16. Perusal of these statutory provisions would show that the proceedings for acquisition of land under the said Act would commence only upon the preliminary Notification of acquisition being published by the appropriate Government under subsection (1) of Section 4 of the Act and would culminate into final acquisition upon publication of the award under Section 11 of the Act and taking possession of the land under Section 16 pursuant to such award. All these provisions are contained in Part-II of the Act. Part-III of the Act contains provisions for determination of compensation upon a reference at the instance of a person who is not satisfied with the award of the Land Acquisition Officer. Part-IV contains provisions for apportionment of such compensation. Part-V contains provisions for payment or deposit of such compensation.
All these provisions are contained in Part-II of the Act. Part-III of the Act contains provisions for determination of compensation upon a reference at the instance of a person who is not satisfied with the award of the Land Acquisition Officer. Part-IV contains provisions for apportionment of such compensation. Part-V contains provisions for payment or deposit of such compensation. All these provisions contained in Part-II to Part-V of the Act are is connection with permanent acquisition of land. In juxtaposition to these provisions, Chapter-VI makes special provisions for temporary occupation of land. Sections 35 to 37 of the Act refer to the expression "temporary occupation" and not "acquisition". Thus, clearly, the concept of acquisition of land under the said Act and temporary occupation of private land for public purpose are two entirely different concepts. Often times, instances come to sight where the acquisition of land under the Act is preceded by taking over of such land by the Government, either temporarily, as envisaged in Chapter-VI or otherwise. The question of granting compensation for the damage caused on account of such occupation and also the interest on compensation that may be awarded on ultimate acquisition of such lands have been considered by the Supreme Court in the past. We may refer to the relevant decisions. 17. In the case of Brij Behari Sahai v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in, (1986) 3 SCC 564 , the facts were that one Brij Behari Sahai owned 42 acres of land at Allahabad near confluence of rivers Ganga and Yamuna. For the purpose of Kumbh Mela, possession of the land was taken from November 1953 to March 1954. After the Land Acquisition Officer and the reference Court decided the compensation for such temporary occupation, the State of U.P. and the land owner filed appeal and cross appeal before the High Court. The High Court enhanced the compensation but refused to grant solatium on the compensation. This question was considered by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held and observed as under; "4. It is a fact that the High Court referred to Section 23(2) of the Act while fixing the quantum of compensation. We are of the view that Part VI of the Land Acquisition Act contains a complete code by itself so far as temporary occupation is concerned and provisions of Section 23 are not attracted.
It is a fact that the High Court referred to Section 23(2) of the Act while fixing the quantum of compensation. We are of the view that Part VI of the Land Acquisition Act contains a complete code by itself so far as temporary occupation is concerned and provisions of Section 23 are not attracted. Parts III, IV and V of the Act are connected with acquisition covered by Part II. Part VI on the other hand deals with temporary occupation of the land. In acquisition in exercise of the right of eminent domain title of the owner is extinguished and the property vests in the State. On the other hand, when temporary occupation is taken under Part VI of the Act the title remains untouched. It is the possession of the property which alone is taken over. Reference may he made to the proviso in Section 36(2) of the Act which contemplates that in a case where possession alone has been taken under Section 35 but the land becomes permanently unfit to be used for the purposes for which it was used immediately before possession was taken, it is open to the owner of the property to require the appropriate Government to take steps for acquisition of the land. This itself is indicative of the position that when possession had been taken under Section 35 of the Act it was not a case of acquisition under Part II thereof. 5. We agree with the view indicated in Tan Bug Taim v. Collector of Bombay, (1946) AIR Bombay 216, that temporary occupation of land provided in Part VI is distinct from, and is not included in, acquisition of land. We have already pointed out that clause 'secondly' in Section 23(1) of the Act is not applicable to temporary occupation covered by Section 35 of the Act. Statutory solatium as provided in Section 23(2) of the Act does not apply to a case of damage covered by clause 'secondly' in Section 23(1) itself. 'Market value' occurs in the first clause of Section 23(1) of the Act and subsection (2) of Section 23 refers to market value. Solatium has reference to market value and the mandate to pay solatium is only in respect of market value.
'Market value' occurs in the first clause of Section 23(1) of the Act and subsection (2) of Section 23 refers to market value. Solatium has reference to market value and the mandate to pay solatium is only in respect of market value. Compensation under Section 35 of the Act has no reference to market value and the actual loss sustained by the persons interested in the land is intended to be compensated. In that view of the matter, to a case of compensation under Section 35 of the Act the provisions of Section 23(2) of the Act cannot be applied. The claimant is thus not entitled to any solatium on the compensation determined by the High Court in this case. The net result is that both the appeals are dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout." 18. In case of Union of India v. Budh Singh and Others reported in, (1995) 6 SCC 233 , the facts were that possession of land of the owners was taken over by the Punjab Armed Police on 15.03.1963 for construction of its Headquarters. Initially, an amount of Rs. 14,719/- was paid as compensation on 09.03.1965, as determined by the revenue authorities. Later on, the land owners filed a suit before the Civil Court for recovery of possession of land on the ground that the same was not acquired under the said Act and the possession was, therefore, taken illegally. The suit was decreed. The State carried the matter in appeal, which was dismissed, so also the second appeal. The State, thereafter, initiated process for acquisition of the said land, for which Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published on 15.11.1994. Later on, the award was also passed. The award achieved finality. During the course of execution of such award, the High Court directed that compensation be paid within the stipulated time failing which interest at the rate of 18% per annum would be payable from the date of taking possession. The matter, therefore, reached the Supreme Court, where the issue was whether the land owner was entitled to interest at the rate of 18% per annum from 15.03.1963, i.e. the date on which the possession was initially taken or from 15.11.1994, which is the date on which the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published.
The matter, therefore, reached the Supreme Court, where the issue was whether the land owner was entitled to interest at the rate of 18% per annum from 15.03.1963, i.e. the date on which the possession was initially taken or from 15.11.1994, which is the date on which the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was published. The Supreme Court, referred to Sections 28 and 34 of the Act pertaining to interest and observed as under; "5. The other provision relevant for this purpose is Section 28 of the Act, which empowers the reference court or the High Court for awarding interest on the enhanced compensation from the date of taking possession till date of payment as referred to hereinbefore. Thus, it could be seen that the statute covers the entire field of operation of the liability of the State to make payment of interest and entitlement thereof by the owner when land has been taken over and possession in consequence thereof, the land owner was deprived of the enjoyment thereof, the land owner was deprived of the enjoyment thereof. Thus, it could be seen that the Court has no power to impose any condition to pay interest in excess of the rate and manner prescribed by the statute as well as for a period anterior to the publication of Section 4(1) notification under the Act. The parameter for initiation of the proceedings is the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the State Gazette or in an appropriate cases in District Gazette as per the local amendments. But the condition precedent is publication of the notification under s. 4(1) in the appropriate gazette. That would give legitimacy to the State to take possession of the land in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Any possession otherwise would not be considered to be possession taken under the Act. In fact, a situation has been envisaged under s. 48(2) of the Act, namely, that when proceedings under the Act were initiated and in the mid stream the proceedings were dropped, the owner who has been deprived of the enjoyment of the property, the statute prescribes the remedy of determination of the amount of compensation due to the owner for the damages suffered by the owner in consequence of the notice of the proceedings under the Act.
The statute also imposes liability on the state to reimburse the costs incurred by the owner to defend the proceedings under the Act. The Act is a self contained code and common law principles of justice, equity and good conscience cannot be extended in awarding interest, contrary to the provisions of the statute." 19. In case of Lila Ghosh (Dead) Through Lr. v. The State of West Bengal reported in, (2004) 9 SCC 337 , the facts were that on the concerned premises, there was a film studio. The owner of the land had obtained a decree of eviction, which had become final. Execution for eviction was filed. At that stage, in order to help the studio, the State Government requisitioned the property and took possession on 24.12.1979. This requisition was challenged in a writ petition. During the pendency of the petition, on 28.02.1980, a settlement was arrived at between the State Government and the owner, in which, the State Government agreed to acquire the property. A sum of Rs. 11.00 Lakhs was paid in advance towards acquisition. The Notification under Section 4 was issued in July 1982 and published on 05.08.1983. Eventually, the award was passed on 16.09.1986. The owner filed a reference under Section 18 of the Act. Against the award of the reference Court, the claimants filed an appeal before the High Court. The High Court, in addition to determining the market value of land, directed that interest was payable from 08.12.1986. On a further appeal before the Supreme Court, the claimants argued that possession was taken on 24.12.1979 and that, therefore, interest should be paid from the date of taking possession. Reliance was placed on the decision in the case of Shree Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills Ltd. v. State of Gujarat reported in, (1991) 1 SCC 262 . The Supreme Court rejected such contention by making the following observations; "Even though the authority in Shree Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills Ltd appears to support the claimants, it is to be seen that apart from mentioning Sections 28 & 34, no reasons have been given to justify the award of interest from a date prior to commencement of acquisition proceedings. A plain reading of Section 34 shows that interest is payable only if the compensation, which is payable, is not paid or deposited before taking possession.
A plain reading of Section 34 shows that interest is payable only if the compensation, which is payable, is not paid or deposited before taking possession. The question of payment or deposit of compensation will not arise if there is no acquisition proceeding. In case where possession is taken prior to acquisition proceedings a party may have a right to claim compensation or interest. But such a claim would not be either under Section 34 or Section 28. In our view interest under these Sections can only start running from the date the compensation is payable. Normally, this would be from the date of the award. Of course, there may be cases under Section 17 where by invoking urgency clause possession has been taken before the acquisition proceedings are initiated. In such cases, compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, would be payable by virtue of the provisions of Section 17. As in cases under Section 17 compensation is payable interest may run from the date possession was taken. However, this case does not fall into this category. In view of the above, we hold that the valuation would be a sum of Rs. 21,957/- per cottah. The claimants would also be entitled to solatium at the rate of 30% and further entitled to additional compensation at the rate of 12% from 05.08.1983 to 16.09.1986. If after giving credit for the amounts paid or deposited, it is found that compensation payable has not been paid or deposited then interest thereon, either u/s.28 or 34 will be payable from that date of the award i.e. 16.09.1986, till payment." 20. The judgment of the Supreme Court in case of R.L. Jain (D) by LRS v. DDA and Others reported in, (2004) 4 SCC 79 was rendered in view of the conflict of opinion in the decisions in the cases of Shree Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills and Budh Singh. The question considered was whether, in a given case, where possession is taken before issuance of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, the claimant is entitled to interest for such anterior period in accordance with Section 34 of the Act. There was a chequered history to the said litigation.
The question considered was whether, in a given case, where possession is taken before issuance of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, the claimant is entitled to interest for such anterior period in accordance with Section 34 of the Act. There was a chequered history to the said litigation. However, to summarize, pursuant to the Notification issued under the said Act, the possession of the land was taken over by the Collector on 10.11.1961 and handed over to the DDA, which commenced the construction on such land. On a suit filed by the land owner, the DDA was directed to demolish the construction and handover the possession to the land owner. The appropriate Government issued fresh Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act for acquisition of the same land on 09.09.1992. The award was passed on 11.06.1994, in which, the Collector also granted interest from the date of taking possession till the date of award. This award was challenged by DDA by filing a writ petition. The High Court held that the direction for payment of interest for the earlier period was without authority. The Supreme Court took note of the earlier pronouncements in case of Shree Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills and Budh Singh and held and observed as under in Para 12; "12. The expression "the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of nine per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited" should not be read in isolation divorced from its context. The words "such compensation" and "so taking possession" are important and have to be given meaning in the light of other provisions of the Act. "Such compensation" would mean the compensation determined in accordance with other provisions of the Act, namely, Sections 11 and 15 of the Act which by virtue of Section 23(1) mean market value of the land on the date of notification under Section 4(1) and other amounts like statutory sum under subsection (1A) and solatium under subsection (2) of Section 23. The heading of Part II of the Act is "Acquisition" and there is a subheading "Taking Possession" which contains in Sections 16 and 17 of the Act. These are the only two sections in the Act which specifically deal with the subject of taking possession of the acquired land.
The heading of Part II of the Act is "Acquisition" and there is a subheading "Taking Possession" which contains in Sections 16 and 17 of the Act. These are the only two sections in the Act which specifically deal with the subject of taking possession of the acquired land. Clearly, the stage for taking possession under the aforesaid provisions would be reached only after publication of the notification under Sections 4(1) and 9(1) of the Act. If possession is taken prior to the issuance of the notification under Section 4(1) it would not be in accordance with Section 16 or 17 and will be without any authority of law and consequently cannot be recognised for the purposes of the Act. For parity of reasons the words "from the date on which he tool possession of the land" occurring in Section 28 of the Act would also mean lawful taking of possession in accordance with Section 16 or 17 of the Act. The words "so taking possession" can under no circumstances mean such dispossession of the owner of the land which has been done prior to publication of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act which is dehors the provisions of the Act." 20.1 The decision in case of Shree Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills was explained as under; "14. In Shree Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills the precise question raised herein, namely, whether in a case where the possession is taken prior to the issuance of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, interest can be awarded in accordance with Section 28 or 34 of the Act was not examined and the only issue examined was whether in an appeal which has been preferred by the State Government challenging the quantum of compensation awarded by the District Judge it is open to the High Court to award interest to the claimant even though he had not preferred any appeal or cross-objection for the said purpose. It is well settled that a decision is an authority for what is actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made therein.
It is well settled that a decision is an authority for what is actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made therein. Shree Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills is therefore not an authority for the proposition that where possession is taken before issuance of notification under Section 4(1), interest on the compensation amount could be awarded in accordance with Section 34 of the Act with effect from the date of taking of possession." 20.2 In the conclusion, it was observed as under; "18. In a case where the landowner is dispossessed prior to the issuance of preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the Act the Government merely takes possession of the land but the title thereof continues to vest with the landowner. It is fully open for the landowner to recover the possession of his land by taking appropriate legal proceedings. He is therefore only entitled to get rent or damages for use and occupation for the period the Government retains possession of the property. Where possession is taken prior to the issuance of the preliminary notification, in our opinion, it will be just and equitable that the Collector may also determine the rent or damages for use of the property to which the landowner is entitled while determining the compensation amount payable to the landowner for the acquisition of the property. The provisions of Section 48 of the Act lend support to such a course of action. For delayed payment of such amount appropriate interest at prevailing bank rate may be awarded." 21. In the judgment in case of Revenue Divisional Officer, Kurnool District v. M. Ramakrishna Reddy (D) by LRS. dated 08.12.2010 passed in Civil Appeal No.10362 of 2010, while referring to the decision in R.L. Jain in some what similar situation, the Supreme Court observed and held in Paras - 9 & 10 as under; "9. This appeal raises yet another issue. The reference Court has awarded interest under Section 28 of the Act from the date of possession, that is 8.6.1988, and not from the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. The High Court has not interfered with the award of such interest. The appellant relied upon decisions of this Court in R.L. Jain(D) by LRs. Vs.
The reference Court has awarded interest under Section 28 of the Act from the date of possession, that is 8.6.1988, and not from the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. The High Court has not interfered with the award of such interest. The appellant relied upon decisions of this Court in R.L. Jain(D) by LRs. Vs. DDA and Others, (2004) 4 SCC 79 and in Special Land Acquisition Officer Vs. Karigowda and Others, (2010) 5 SCR 164, to contend that interest could be awarded only from the date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, even where possession had been taken on a date prior to the date of preliminary notification. We, therefore, hold that interest under Section 28 of the Act could have been awarded only from the date of preliminary notification, even if possession was taken prior to the date of the preliminary notification. 10. Though respondents are not entitled to interest under Section 28 of the Act, from a date prior to the date of preliminary notification, they are entitle to damages for wrongful use and damages of the lands from the date of possession till date of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. In R.L. Jain, this court held:...." 22. From the above judicial pronouncements, it clearly emerges that interest payable u/s.28 or 34 of the Act, as the case may be, emanates from the proceedings instituted for acquisition of the land under the said Act. Interest would not be payable for possession of land which was taken over dehors the provisions of the Act concerning acquisition. This would include the instances of either unauthorized possession or possession taken over pursuant to an agreement between the parties or even taken temporarily in terms of Chapter-VI of the Act. The decision in case of Shree Vijay Cotton & Oil Mills was explained by the Larger Bench in case of R.L. Jain by observing that the expression "so taking possession" used in the provisions contained in Part-II of the Act would mean taking possession in accordance with Section 16 or 17 of the Act. These are the only two Sections in the Act which specifically deal with the subject of taking possession of the acquired lands. The stage for taking possession would be reached only after publication of Notification under Section 4(1) and 9(1) of the Act.
These are the only two Sections in the Act which specifically deal with the subject of taking possession of the acquired lands. The stage for taking possession would be reached only after publication of Notification under Section 4(1) and 9(1) of the Act. If the possession is taken prior to the issuance of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, it would not be in accordance with Section 16 or 17 and will be without any authority of law and consequently, cannot be recognized for the purposes of the Act. Likewise, the words "from the date on which he took possession of the land" occurring in Section 28 of the Act would also mean lawful taking of possession in accordance with Section 16 or 17 of the Act. The words "so taking possession" can, under no circumstances, mean such dispossession of the owner of the land, which has been done prior to the publication of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. 23. The question of paying solatium on the compensation for temporary possession of land in terms of Section 35 of the Act, was also considered by the Supreme Court in case of Brij Behari Sahai. It was observed that Parts - III, IV and V of the Act are connected with acquisition covered by Part II. On the other hand, Part-VI deals with temporary occupation of the land. In acquisition, the title of the owner is extinguished and the property vests in the State. In case of temporary occupation, the title remains untouched. It is the possession of the property, which alone is taken over. It was further observed that compensation under Section 35 of the Act has no reference to market value and the actual loss sustained by the persons interested in the land is intended to be compensated. Therefore, to a case of compensation under Section 35 of the Act, the provisions of Section 23(2) of the Act cannot be applied. 24. The judgments noted above, in clear terms, hold that no interest can be awarded either under Section 28 or 34 of the Act prior to publication of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. If the possession of the land is taken over without authority of law, it would be open for the land owner to seek damages or compensation through ordinary civil remedy.
If the possession of the land is taken over without authority of law, it would be open for the land owner to seek damages or compensation through ordinary civil remedy. If the possession is taken over under Section 35 of the Act for a temporary period, provisions have been made for compensating such temporary dispossession of the land owner. 25. As noted above, subsection (1) of Section 35 of the Act authorizes the appropriate Government to take possession of private land for temporary occupation for a period not exceeding three years. Subsection (2) of Section 35 of the Act requires determination and payment of compensation for such temporary occupation. Under subsection (2) of Section 36 of the Act, upon expiry of such term, the Collector would restore the land to the persons interested and also tender compensation for damage done to the land. As per the proviso to subsection (2), if the land becomes permanently unfit to be used for the purpose for which it was used immediately before the commencement of such term and if the persons interested so require, the appropriate Government would be compelled to acquire the land as if it was needed permanently for a public purpose. 26. In the present cases, by following the procedure noted above, the ONGC took possession of the land for temporary occupation. It is possible to argue that upon completion of the period of three years of such occupation, the ONGC did not have authority under Section 35 of the Act to continue to hold on to such possession. However, the land owners or the persons interested in the land have not raised any grievance about such continued occupation of the land by ONGC. We are informed that all throughout such occupation, rent was paid at the determined rate. Even if, therefore, subsection (1) of Section 35 of the Act envisages a maximum period of three years of temporary occupation, the occupation of ONGC of such land beyond such period can be seen as an act of volition on the part of the land owners. The possession of ONGC would, therefore, be on mutual agreement and on permissive user basis.
The possession of ONGC would, therefore, be on mutual agreement and on permissive user basis. In any case, the land owners cannot seek interest on the enhanced compensation under Section 28 of the Act or for that matter, under Section 34 of the Act for a period prior to the date of publication of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. 27. The issue can be looked from a slightly different angle. Market value of the land is determined as on the date of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. Payment of 12% under Section 23(1A) of the Act and interest under Sections 28 and 34 are in the nature of adjustment of compensation computed on the basis of determination of market value for the passage of time in awarding or paying the compensation. Date of publication of Notification under Section 4 is, thus, the crucial date. It would be incongruent to award interest for a period exterior to such date on the determination of compensation on the basis of market value prevailing as on such date. 28. We are not oblivion to the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Baldevji Shakraji Thakor. It was a case in which the reference Court had awarded interest under Section 34 of the Act from the date of taking possession by the ONGC after adjusting the rent which might have been paid for the interregnum period. The reference Court issued direction making interest payable from the date of publication of Notification under Section 4 of the Act. The High Court modified this direction regarding interest. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court restored the award of the reference Court in this respect. In case of Baldevji Shakraji Thakor, the judgment of the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in case of R.L. Jain was not cited. At any rate, we do not discern the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in case of Baldevji Shakraji Thakor that upon temporary occupation of the land under Section 35 of the Act by the ONGC, which, later on culminated into acquisition under Section 11 of the Act, interest would be payable on the enhanced compensation from the date of possession. 29.
29. We notice, that later on, the Supreme Court in case of Ratibhai Shambhubhai Patel Through POA Holder v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. & Another in order dated 18.04.2018 passed in Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.37719-37720 of 2016 provided that there shall be no interest prior to issuance of Notification under Section 4 of the Act even if the possession had been taken earlier. It was left open to the land owners to claim damages in appropriate proceedings. 30. This was also a case of acquisition of land by an Oil Company where possession of the land was taken prior to the date of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. We, thus, have two judgments of the Supreme Court; one, awarding interest prior to the date of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and another, deciding such interest. In neither case, earlier judgments of the Supreme Court have been sited nor any ratio has been laid down. We have, therefore, considered the issue on the basis of all judgments sited before us and which have a vital bearing on the issue. 31. It may be possible to argue that liability to pay interest would arise only from the date of publication of award under Section 11 of the Act since on determination of the market value, as on the date of publication of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, the land owners would be getting additional compensation at the rate of 12% per annum for the period between the publication of such Notification and passing of the award. Learned advocate for the appellant, therefore, contended that it will be incongruent to award interest for a period anterior to the period during which such additional compensation at the rate of 12% per annum would inure. However, the concept of not paying interest prior to the commencement of proceedings under the said Act, even though the possession is found to be wholly unauthorized, emanates from the fact that it is the commencement of the acquisition proceedings with declaration of intention under Section 4(1) of the Act, which triggers the liabilities arising under the Act. Consistently, in various judgments of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court, the date of commencement of liability of paying interest has been pegged back to the date of publication of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. 32.
Consistently, in various judgments of the Supreme Court as well as of this Court, the date of commencement of liability of paying interest has been pegged back to the date of publication of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act. 32. We, therefore, hold that in the present cases, the reference Court committed an error in awarding interest under Section 28 of the Act from the date of taking possession. Such liability would arise only from the date of publication of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act and not from any period prior thereto. The impugned awards are modified to this extent. The amount of rent, if any, paid for the period between the date of publication of Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act till the passing of the award under Section 11 of the Act would be adjusted against such interest liability of the ONGC. The appeals are allowed in part and disposed of accordingly. The Civil Applications also stand disposed of. Records and proceedings, if lying with this Court, be sent back to the trial Court concerned forthwith.