JUDGMENT : V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J. 1. This writ appeal filed by the State of Andhra Pradesh, arises out of an order passed by the learned Judge, dismissing a writ petition filed by the State challenging an order of the Estate Abolition Tribunal. 2. We have heard the learned Government Pleader for Revenue for the State of Andhra Pradesh and Smt. Neeraja Reddy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Sri S.V. Sundararajan, learned counsel for respondents 3 to 11. Prelude: 3. Like Pilate, who was compelled by the force of circumstances, to order the crucifixion of Jesus, but who took a bowl of water and washed his hands before declaring in front of the crowd “I am innocent of this man’s blood”, the learned Judge, in the order impugned in the writ petition, felt forced, albeit in agony and disgust, to dismiss the writ petition of the State of Andhra Pradesh and confirm the order of the Settlement Tahsildar as confirmed by the Estate Abolition Tribunal granting patta in favour of the respondents 3 to 11, in respect of a land which was a confirmed water body. 4. The pain undergone by the learned judge in being unable to do anything about the gross abuse of power by the Settlement Officer and the Estate Abolition Tribunal, is reflected in the very opening paragraph of the impugned judgment of the learned Judge. It may be useful to extract the first paragraph of the impugned judgment as follows: “This is the story of a tank killed by the system. An avaricious person claimed it as his own. The then Tahsildar assented by non contest. The Settlement Officer, notorious for his misdeeds granted patta to the person. The Appellate Tribunal confirmed. The tank was thus killed and the killers brought it before this Court as saviours. The legal luminaries embalmed it. The story unfolds like this.” Background facts: 5. The 2nd respondent herein, who is now no more and whose legal representatives are impleaded as respondents 6 to 11, filed a petition under Section 15 (1) of the Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 way back in May, 1978. The petition was filed before the Settlement Officer, Nellore, for the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of the land of an extent of Ac.12.20 cents in Survey No.2. 6. The petition was filed before the Settlement Officer, Nellore, for the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of the land of an extent of Ac.12.20 cents in Survey No.2. 6. It appears that the Tahsildar, Madanapalle, who was put on notice, filed a counter contending that the petition was time barred and that when suo motu enquiries were conducted many years before, the claimant should have sought patta. The Tahsildar also took a plea that the original claim of the 2nd respondent and his co-applicant, was only in respect of land of an extent of Ac.5.00 cents in Survey No.2/2, as seen from a writ petition filed by them in W.P.No.2376 of 1971 and that therefore, the claim for ryotwari patta for an extent of Acres 12.20 was unfounded. 7. Interestingly, after filing a counter, the Tahsildar abdicated his responsibility and remained absent, paving the way for an unscrupulous Settlement Officer to pass an order dated 28-01-1980, under Section 13 (b) (iii) of the Act, directing the grant of ryotwari patta for the land in Survey No.2 of an extent of Ac.12.20 cents. 8. Challenging the order of the Settlement Officer, the State filed an appeal before the Estate Abolition Tribunal under Section 15 (2) of the Act. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal by an order dated 13-03-1984. 9. At about the same time, ryotwari pattas were granted by the very same Settlement Officer by name Sri A.D.V. Reddy, to innumerable persons, in respect of lands that included a river course, river beds, water bodies etc. In fact, in the Revenue department’s terminology there are different kinds of pattas such as ryotwari patta, assignment patta etc. The then Settlement Officer Sri A.D.V. Reddy and the pattas issued by him left, right and centre, both immediately before his retirement and thereafter became so notorious that a new terminology by name “ADV Reddy Patta” got added to the glossary. Therefore, the Government of Andhra Pradesh issued an order in Memorandum No.486/J2/64-6, dated 25-04-1984, which reads as follows: “It has been brought to the notice of the Government by some of the Collectors and also by number of Legislators that Sri A.D.V. Reddy Retired Settlement Officer, Nellore has issued bogus settlement pattas before and after his retirement. This has also been specifically brought to the notice of the Government by the Collectors Chittoor and Prakasam. This has also been specifically brought to the notice of the Government by the Collectors Chittoor and Prakasam. The Director of Settlement and also reported that bogus pattas were issued by A.D.V. Reddy also brought to the notice of him. The Commissioner of Survey and Settlement, Land Records is requested to bring to the notice of the Collectors about the bogus pattas issued by Sri A.D.V. Reddy, Retired Settlement Officer, Nellore and issue necessary instructions to them not to implement the settlement orders in the village accounts. He may also issue necessary instructions to the Disrectors of Settlements in this regard to get all bogus pattas cancelled at once and benami land holders having such bogus pattas do not derive benefit out it.” 10. Though the Government took note of the bogus pattas issued by the said officer by name Sri A.D.V.Reddy, way back in 1984, the Government was lulled into a sense of false security, as though the Government order itself was sufficient to safeguard their interest and hence, the Government did not challenge the order of the Estate Abolition Tribunal before any court for a long time. 11. Eventually, the State woke up to the reality that the officials in the lower rung of the Revenue department failed even to follow up with the Government Pleaders to challenge the orders of the Settlement Officer. After waking up from their slumber, the State filed a writ petition in W.P.No.18806 of 2003. It was this writ petition that was dismissed by the learned single Judge, by the order impugned in the writ petition. Hence, the present intra court appeal. Reasons given by the learned Judge for dismissing the writ petition: 12. The learned Judge dismissed the writ petition primarily for two reasons namely a) that the writ petition was filed after more than 16 long years of the order of the Estate Abolition Tribunal; and b) that during this interregnum, the 2nd respondent filed a suit in O.S.No.102 of 1985 seeking a declaration of title and permanent injunction, which was decreed by the trial Court and the decree confirmed on a first appeal filed by the State. The learned Judge pointed out that the decree of declaration and injunction having attained finality, there was nothing that he could do in a writ petition. 13. The learned Judge pointed out that the decree of declaration and injunction having attained finality, there was nothing that he could do in a writ petition. 13. As we have pointed out earlier, throughout his order, the learned Judge expressed his anguish that he was left with no alternative except to put his seal of approval on the illegalities perpetrated by the revenue officials. In fact, in one portion, the learned Judge observed as follows: “This Court could only do postmortem. It could not give life to the dead tank. The cause of death is known. The killers are left scot free. The beneficiaries have the last laugh.” 14. The learned Judge felt that in exercise of the extraordinary original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, he cannot set at naught the decree of a civil court, passed after contest by the State, especially after it had attained finality. Grounds of Appeal: 14. The State has come up with a challenge to the order of the learned Judge on the ground that when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of the substantial justice should be preferred; that the land in question is undoubtedly a water body, used by the public at large, that even the adangal entries clearly established that the land was a tank bed; that even in the earliest writ petition filed by the 2nd respondent, in W.P.No.2376 of 1971, his claim was only in respect of Ac.5.00 cents, but he got patta from the Settlement Officer to the extent of Ac.12.20 cents; that the whole proceedings before the Settlement Officer and the Estate Abolition Tribunal were completely fraudulent and farcical and hence, all the proceedings are vitiated; that even the correlation of paimash No.14 to Survey No.2 was wrongly done by the Settlement Officer by perpetrating a fraud upon the department; that the decree obtained by the 2nd respondent was wholly based upon the order of the Settlement Officer and hence, the challenge to the order of the Settlement Officer, cannot depend upon the judgment of the Civil Court and that therefore, the order of the learned Judge is liable to be set aside. Contentions of the unofficial respondents: 15. Contentions of the unofficial respondents: 15. Smt. Neeraja Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the unofficial respondents contended that the order of the Estate Abolition Tribunal passed in the year 1984 was sought to be challenged by the State, only in the year 2003, without any acceptable explanation for the delay; that the land in question was purchased by the 2nd respondent’s father under a registered sale deed of the year 1919; that even the Karanam of the village recorded that the 2nd respondent and his forefathers were in possession and enjoyment of the land; that even as per the evidence of the Karanam, there was no water body and that therefore, the order of the learned Judge does not call for any interference. Discussion and Analysis: 16. Primarily, the learned Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the State on two grounds viz., (i) that the writ petition was filed nearly after two decades of the impugned order of the Estate Abolition Tribunal and (ii) that the decree passed by the Civil Court in O.S.No.102 of 1985 in favour of the 2nd respondent had already attained finality, which cannot be set at naught by this Court in a writ petition. 17. Insofar as the question of delay is concerned, it should be pointed out that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, do not per se apply to writ proceedings. However, the Constitutional Courts had always invoked the doctrine of delay and laches for throwing out writ petitions filed beyond a reasonable period of time. This is primarily on the basis that persons who slept over their rights, thereby creating or conceding valuable rights in favour of third parties, are not entitled to the discretionary relief of issuance of a writ. The fundamental distinction between the question of limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963 or the limitation prescribed by Special Enactments and the question of delay and laches is that the period to be reckoned in respect of the former is statutorily fixed, while the period to be reckoned in respect of the latter, depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. 18. 18. In Smt. Sudama Devi v. Commissioner (1983) 2 SCC 1 ), the Supreme Court pointed out that it is in fact doubtful whether any period of limitation can be prescribed for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that the question whether a person is guilty of laches, has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court also pointed out that there may be cases where even a short delay may be fatal while there may be cases where even a long delay may not be evidence of the laches on the part of the petitioner. 19. Keeping the above principle in mind, let us now turn to the principles of law laid down by the Apex Court in dealing with the question of delay and laches or limitation, with particular reference to the proceedings brought by Government. In G.Ramegowda v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142 ), the Supreme Court pointed out that in litigations to which Government is a party, there is one aspect which cannot be ignored. The Court held that if appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The decisions of the Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. After clarifying that the law of limitation is no doubt, the same for a private citizen as well as for Government Authorities, the Court went on to make a crucial observation, which in our opinion, is applicable squarely to the case on hand. The observation goes as follows: “But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it.” 20. The above observations of the Supreme Court apply in all fours to the case on hand. At every stage, the officers of the Government who have dealt with this file, have worked at cross-purposes. The above observations of the Supreme Court apply in all fours to the case on hand. At every stage, the officers of the Government who have dealt with this file, have worked at cross-purposes. The pain and agony that the learned Judge underwent in being left with no alternative except to dismiss the writ petition of the Government, clearly show the collusion between the officials of the Government at various stages. In fact, the learned Judge rightly observed that the very filing of the writ petition appears to have been done with a view to get it dismissed, thereby getting a seal of approval for an order passed by the Settlement Officer by fraudulent means. 21. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Shiba Shankar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa (2010) 12 SCC 471 ), the Court normally refuses to exercise the extraordinary powers under Article 226, in favour of persons who standby and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put-forth stale claims or to unsettle settled matters. 22. In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (2013) 1 SCC 353 ), the Supreme Court pointed out that delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction. But the Court held that it is not an absolute impediment. In fact, the Court went on to hold that “if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion”. In yet another passage, the Supreme Court held that there may be cases where the demand for justice is so compelling that the High Court would be inclined to interfere inspite of delay. One of the important observations made in the said decision is as follows: “When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay”. 23. One of the important observations made in the said decision is as follows: “When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non-deliberate delay”. 23. If we look at the facts of the case on hand, keeping at the back of our mind, the principles of law as propounded by the Supreme Court, it can be seen – (i) that patta was sought to be granted in respect of a tank-bed, on the basis of the oral testimony of the Village Karnam, (ii) that the justification for the grant of patta, in respect of the land of an extent of Ac.12-20, was traced by the Settlement Officer to an order passed in a writ petition W.P.No.2376 of 1971, when in fact the prayer made in the writ petition was only for the land of an extent of Ac.5-00, (iii) that the Settlement Officer attained notoriety, by issuing pattas left, right and centre, both before and after his retirement, but escaped the consequences of his criminal action (iv) that the entire Revenue Department became mute spectators, with the concerned Tahsildar remaining absent in most of the enquiries conducted by the Settlement Officer and the other officials of the Revenue Department not taking prompt action against the orders of the Settlement Officer and (v) that the land in question is actually a water body as per the revenue records. 24. Therefore, it is clear that the situation on hand is a product of the apathy of the officials of the Government. Unfortunately, the Courts themselves, tend to overlook at times, the dichotomy to be maintained between Government and Government officials. If public interest is allowed to be sacrificed on the altar of justice, on account of the default on the part of the Government officials, it would only encourage those in service to resort to such methods as would lawfully confer an unlawful gain upon third parties. In civil cases between 2 individuals, by refusing to condone the delay, the courts seek to punish the person who slept over his rights. In cases of this nature, it is not the Government, which slept over its rights. In civil cases between 2 individuals, by refusing to condone the delay, the courts seek to punish the person who slept over his rights. In cases of this nature, it is not the Government, which slept over its rights. It is the Government servants, who either slept over the rights of the Government or deliberately postponed the performance of their legitimate duties. If ultimately the Government loses the battle, it is not the Government servants who are punished, but only the Government and public interest, which are punished. Therefore, we do not think that on the ground of delay and laches, the learned Judge should have felt constrained to grant a relief. 25. Coming to the second ground, the civil suit in which the 2nd respondent obtained a decree, which according to the respondents, had attained finality, in our considered opinion, would be of no help to the respondents. The 2nd respondent succeeded in the civil suit purely on the basis of the order of the Settlement Officer dated 28.01.1980 and the order of the Estates Abolition Tribunal dated 13.03.1984. Therefore, once the order of the Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal are set at naught, the basis on which the 2nd respondent obtained a decree of declaration would go. 26. As a matter of fact, the civil suit filed by the 2nd respondent and three others, was primarily directed against the private parties. There were 24 defendants in all, in the civil suit, out of whom defendants 1 to 20 and 24 were private parties. The 21st defendant was the State of Andhra Pradesh represented by the District Collector, Chittoor. The 22nd defendant was the Special Collector, Madanapalli. The 23rd defendant was the Mandal Revenue Officer, Madanapalli. The reliefs sought in the suit were – 1) a declaration of the plaintiffs’ title; 2) a perpetual injunction restraining the defendants 1 to 20 and 24 from interfering with the plaintiffs’ peaceful possession and enjoyment; and 3) restraining the defendants 21 to 23 from issuing any orders adverse to the plaintiffs. 27. In fact, the issues framed for trial in the suit were also primarily directed against the defendants 1 to 20 and 24. The issues framed were as follows: 1. Whether the proceedings of the Estates Abolition Tribunal, as well as the High court writ petition judgment dated 21.09.1973 bind the defendants 1 to 20 and 24? 2. 27. In fact, the issues framed for trial in the suit were also primarily directed against the defendants 1 to 20 and 24. The issues framed were as follows: 1. Whether the proceedings of the Estates Abolition Tribunal, as well as the High court writ petition judgment dated 21.09.1973 bind the defendants 1 to 20 and 24? 2. Whether the ryotwari patta obtained by the plaintiffs is vitiated by fraud and misrepresentation and whether it binds the defendants 1 to 20 and 24? 3. Whether the ryotwari patta is liable to be set aside and whether the settlement officer is empowered to grant the same in favour of the plaintiffs? 4. Whether the plaintiffs at any time had been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property? 5. Whether the defendants 1 to 20 and 24 and their ancestors are in continuous possession and enjoyment in respect of the suit lands and they have perfected their title to the same over by adverse possession? 6. Whether the plaintiffs have played fraud against the defendants in O.S.No.764/72 on the file of the I Additional District Munsif Madanapalle? 7. Whether the Government is not the paramount and absolute owner of the suit property? 8. Whether the suit as framed is maintainable in the absence of proper prayer for possession? 9. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of title to the properties, if so which of the plaintiffs and to what extent of the property? 10. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of perpetual injunction? 11. To what relief? 28. The very first issue framed by the civil Court would disclose that the civil Court was concerned mainly with the binding nature of the order of the Estates Abolition Tribunal on the defendants 1 to 20 and 24 and not on the Government. Though an issue of fraud and misrepresentation was also raised, the same was addressed by the civil Court, at the instance of third parties and not at the instance of the Government. At the time when the civil Court decided the suit, the civil Court thought that the Government had no quarrel about the issue of ryotwari patta in favour of the 2nd respondent herein, since the order of the Settlement Officer and that of the Estates Abolition Tribunal were not challenged by the Government at that time. At the time when the civil Court decided the suit, the civil Court thought that the Government had no quarrel about the issue of ryotwari patta in favour of the 2nd respondent herein, since the order of the Settlement Officer and that of the Estates Abolition Tribunal were not challenged by the Government at that time. The rights of the 2nd respondent herein vis-à-vis the Government, was not the focus of the litigation in O.S.No.102 of 1985. Therefore, the judgment and decree of the civil Court is not a ground for this Court to refuse to entertain a challenge to the order of the Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal. 29. As we have pointed out earlier, the very order of the Settlement Officer is vitiated by fraud and collusion. A direction is obtained by the 2nd respondent in a writ petition of the year 1971, in respect of the land of the extent of Ac.5.00. On the strength of the said order, the Settlement Officer proceeds to grant patta in respect of the land of the extent of Ac.12.20. The Tahsildar conveniently remains absent and the Village Karanam deposes in favour of the 2nd respondent. Therefore, the whole thing is completely vitiated by fraud. 30. It is too late in the day to cite any authority for the proposition that fraud vitiates all solemn acts. Even if the Court at some point of time had granted its seal of approval to the fraud, the same cannot cloth the fraud with any legality. 31. As observed by Justice Edward Coke 3 centuries ago, which was quoted by the Supreme Court in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal. In the same decision, the Supreme Court pointed out that fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. 32. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Meghmala v. G.Narasimha Reddy, fraud and justice will never dwell together. 33. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. T.Suryachandra Rao7, the Supreme Court highlighted that the present day concept of fraud has veered around abuse of power or mala fide exercise of power. 32. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Meghmala v. G.Narasimha Reddy, fraud and justice will never dwell together. 33. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. T.Suryachandra Rao7, the Supreme Court highlighted that the present day concept of fraud has veered around abuse of power or mala fide exercise of power. The colour of fraud in public law or administrative law assumes different shades, one of which strikes at the root of the jurisdiction exercised by an authority, on the basis of incorrect facts deliberately posted before him”. 34. In fact, in a recent decision in Nidhi Kaim v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Supreme Court stated in paragraph-81 of the report as follows: “However, stated simply, nothing … … … nothing … … … and nothing, obtained by fraud, can be sustained, as fraud unravels everything.” 35. Therefore, in a writ petition under Article 226 we will not close our eyes to such a fraudulent act and allow a person to take away a public land and that too a water body. Constitutional Courts now have a duty more than at any point of time in the past, to protect water bodies. It is the disappearance of water bodies and the conversion of water bodies by man into residential colonies that has resulted in residential colonies being converted by nature into water bodies during floods in several States. When these things are so obvious, a Constitutional Court cannot turn a blind eye and plead helplessness. Courts exist to go to the rescue of the people, who are helpless. Therefore, Courts cannot plead helplessness. 36. In view of the above, the writ appeal is allowed, the impugned order of the learned Judge is set aside and the writ petition of the State is allowed. The orders of the Settlement Officer and the Estates Abolition Tribunal are set aside. The State is directed to restore the water body to its original state and take appropriate measures to protect the same from any encroachment. There shall be no order as to costs. 37. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall stand closed.