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2018 DIGILAW 911 (GAU)

NIBEDITA BARUAH v. SURENDRA NATH TAMULI

2018-06-07

MIR ALFAZ ALI

body2018
JUDGMENT/ORDER : Mir Alfaz Ali, J. None appeared for the petitioner. Heard Mr. D. Das, learned Addl. P.P. for the State. 2. This revision is directed against the judgment and order dated 31-08-2010 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Kamrup, Guwahati in G.R. Case No. 4859/2003. 3. The criminal law was Set into motion through an FIR lodged by PW 1, Mr. Nivedita Baruah (victim) alleging therein, that since their marriage in the month of November, 1989, she was subjected to physical and mental torture by her petitioner/husband. Initially she was tortured for demand of dowry and later on she was subjected to torture for business partnership. On the basis of the said FIR, police registered a case and after usual investigation, having found the allegation against the petitioner not proved, submitted final report. However, learned Judicial Magistrate did not accept the final report and took cognizance against the petitioner. Eventually, the petitioner stood trial for offence under section 498-A IPC. 4. In course of trial, charge under section 498- A IPC was framed against the petitioner, to which he pleaded not guilty. One witness, being the informant herself, was examined in the instant case and on appreciation of evidence, learned Judicial Magistrate, having found the charge against the petitioner not proved, acquitted him. 5. Aggrieved by the order of acquittal, the informant preferred the instant revision petition. 6. The informant, in her evidence stated, that since after 5 days of her marriage in the year 1989, she was subjected to physical and mental torture by her husband and consequently, she lodged the FIR. During cross-examination, it was revealed that she was doing her own business and her husband helped her and even stood as a guarantor for obtaining loan for her business. It appears from the record that no other witness was examined, except the PW 1, the informant. The statement of the father of the victim was recorded under section 164 CrPC, 1973 which was proved as Ex. A, through the PW 1 herself, and such statement of the father of the PW 1, raised a big question mark, about the veracity of the prosecution case sought to be projected by the PW 1. 7. Apparently, besides, making some omnibus statement of physical and mental torture, nothing was stated by the PW 1, before the court to attract the provision of Section 498-A IPC. The Ex. 7. Apparently, besides, making some omnibus statement of physical and mental torture, nothing was stated by the PW 1, before the court to attract the provision of Section 498-A IPC. The Ex. A, the statement recorded under section 164 CrPC, 1973 though, not an evidence, while PW 1 was confronted with the statement of her father, during cross, she admitted that the statement was given by her father. The admission of PW 1, that she was doing her own business and the petitioner stood guarantor to enable her to obtain loan, rendered her testimony, that the petitioner tortured her for money totally unworthy of trust. On the basis of the above evidence, learned Judicial Magistrate recorded acquittal of the petitioner as no other evidence was brought on record to substantiate the charge under section 498-A IPC. 8. It is the settled position, that the power of the revisional court against any order of acquittal is extremely narrow. Unless the judgment suffers from any glaring mistake causing miscarriage of justice or the judgment is found to be perverse or against the evidence brought on record, the revisional court is not supposed to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Even if two views are possible, on appreciation of evidence, the revisional court cannot re-appreciate the evidence to replace the view of the trial court by its own view. The Apex Court in Venkatesan v. Rani reported in (2013) 14 SCC 207 dealing with the scope of interference with an order of acquittal by the revisional court observed as under :- "The above consideration would go to show that the revisional jurisdiction of the High Courts while examining an order of acquittal is extremely narrow and ought to be exercised only in cases where the Trial Court had committed a manifest error of law or procedure or had overlooked and ignored relevant and material evidence thereby causing miscarriage of justice. Re-appreciation of evidence is an exercise that the High Court must refrain from while examining an order of acquittal in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the Code. Needless to say, if within the limited parameters, interference of the High Court is justified the only course of action that can be adopted is to order a re-trial after setting aside the acquittal. Needless to say, if within the limited parameters, interference of the High Court is justified the only course of action that can be adopted is to order a re-trial after setting aside the acquittal. As the language of Section 401 of the Code makes it amply clear there is no power vested in the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction." 9. Be that as it may, the sole testimony of the PW 1 in the instant case makes it abundantly clear, that no ingredient of the offence under section 498- A IPC could be made out, and as such, the finding of the learned trial court acquitting the petitioner cannot be faulted, inasmuch as, the order of acquittal further strengthened the presumption of innocence of the accused. 10. Being of the above view, I find the revision petition to be devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed. 11. Send back the LCR.