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2018 DIGILAW 915 (JHR)

Panchdeo Singh v. Bharat Cocking Coal Limited

2018-04-24

PRAMATH PATNAIK

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JUDGMENT Pramath Patnaik, J. - In the captioned writ application, the petitioner has inter alia prayed for quashing the identification certificate dated 27.03.2006, wherein the date of birth of the present petitioner is mentioned as 25.03.1948 and also for quashing order of superannuation dated 20.12.2006 considering the date of birth of the petitioner as 25.03.1948. Further prayer has been made for payment of his salary from April, 2008 to October, 2010 after taking into consideration the date of birth of the petitioner as 19.10.1950 and further prayer has been made for direction upon the respondents to compute the pension and other retiral benefits in terms of the last pay that was supposed to be drawn by the petitioner. 2. The facts, as delineated in the writ application, in brief is that the petitioner was appointed on 25.03.1973 as an employee of BCCL, where after his service book was opened mentioning his date of birth as 19.10.1950. Basing on such entry, in other service excerpts, the date of birth of the petitioner was mentioned as 19.10.1950. But surprisingly, the date of birth of the petitioner was mentioned in Identification Certificate dated 27.08.2006 as "25.03.1948" and thereafter the respondents-authorities erroneously passed order of superannuation dated 20.12.2006 considering his wrong date of birth i.e. 25.03.1948. 3. Heard Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned counsel being assisted by Mr. Atul Rai, learned counsel for the respondents-BCCL. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondents-authorities have tempered the documents so far the date of birth of the petitioner is concerned and have illegally changed the date of birth from 19.10.1950 to 25.03.1948 with a sole purpose to superannuate the petitioner at an earlier date. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that it is service book/record of the employee, which is conclusive to decide the date of birth of the petitioner, besides in many other service excerpts the date of birth of the petitioner has been mentioned as 19.10.1950; hence the petitioner be extended the benefit of continuity in service treating his date of birth as 19.10.1950. 5. As against this, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that initially the petitioner was appointed on 25.03.1973 at West Mudidih Colliery under Katras Area of M/s BCCL. 5. As against this, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that initially the petitioner was appointed on 25.03.1973 at West Mudidih Colliery under Katras Area of M/s BCCL. At that time, in the Form B register in age column, his age was recorded as 25 years, accordingly his date of birth comes to 25.03.1948. While continuing as such, once the petitioner was dismissed from services, however, after reinstatement in service while issuing LPC his date of birth was wrongly mentioned as 19.10.1950 in From B of P.B. Colliery. But when it came to knowledge of the authorities, the same was corrected as 25.03.1948. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that when the petitioner was again transferred from P.B. Area to Angarpathara Colliery under Katras Area on 03.04.2006, again Form B Register was opened where his date of birth was recorded as 25.03.1948, wherein the petitioner put his signature in token of acceptance of date of birth as mentioned in Form B register. Hence, at the fag end of service and on the strength of some wrong entry, which was even later on corrected, the petitioner cannot claim modification/rectification of date of birth. 6. After bestowing my anxious consideration to the rival contentions raised by learned the parties and on perusal of the documents available on record, I am of the considered view that the petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference for the following facts, reason and judicial pronouncements: (i).From the pleadings available on record, it appears that the petitioner was appointed on 25.03.1973 and at that time, in the Statutory Form B register, his age was mentioned as 25 years and his date of birth was treated as 25.03.1948. Furthermore, from perusal of Form B, the Statutory Form, annexed as Annexure C to supplementary counter affidavit dated 26.02.2018, as well as Original Form B register, it appears that the date of birth of the petitioner has been mentioned as 25 years as on 25.03.1973 and in token of acceptance the petitioner has put his signature. (ii).So far some wrong entry made after reinstatement of petitioner is concerned, which was though later on corrected, would not give any indefeasible right to claim his date of birth i.e. 19.10.1950. (ii).So far some wrong entry made after reinstatement of petitioner is concerned, which was though later on corrected, would not give any indefeasible right to claim his date of birth i.e. 19.10.1950. Moreover, it is no more res integra that the disputed question of facts regarding veracity or genuineness of the certificate pertaining to date of birth cannot be effectually adjudicated by the Writ Court. The Hon''ble Apex Court in the case of G.M. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. Shib Kumar Dushad & Ors , (2001) AIR SC 72, has unequivocally held that the High Court in writ petition cannot make an enquiry into such disputed questions of fact. (iii).Furthermore, in the case at hand, the petitioner has raised the disputed question of facts relating to his date of birth at the fag end of service, which cannot be adjudicated in view of the decision rendered in the case of Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Dinabandhu Majumdar & Anr , (1995) AIR SC 1499, wherein the Hon''ble Apex Court in unequivocal terms has enunciated that writ petition for correction of date of birth at the fag end of service with object of continuing in service ordinarily should not be entertained. Therefore, the reliefs sought for in the writ application is thoroughly misconceived and unsustainable. (iv).Apart from the factual assertions made by the respondents, documentary evidences lean in favour of the respondents so as to nullify the claim of the petitioner. 7. As a logical sequitur to the facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, no relief can be granted to the petitioner. Hence, the writ petition being devoid of any merit is dismissed.