JUDGMENT : 1. The oft quoted Rule which, over the years has come to occupy an exulted position, of not entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India when an alternative efficacious remedy is available, is a Rule of self restraint and circumspection rather than a rule of law even though generally there are no limits on the jurisdiction of this Court while it acts under writ jurisdiction. 2. When an alternative efficacious remedy is shown, under which the processes or orders impugned can be tested, it is generally a rule of prudence and discipline that the parties are relegated to such remedies, rather than being continued under the umbra of the provisions of Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. The normal exception to this rule is when manifest injustice, resulting from grave and material legal infirmity, patent on the face and plainly discernible, without requiring deep probe into the contextual facts, are established. However, Courts have always been cautious that the extraordinary power, vested constitutionally on superior Courts, is not used to set right all errors but only when such errors cause substantial injustice or flagrant violation of law or irremediable miscarriage; and solely to prevent perpetration of the legal fraud and to promote good faith and equity. 4. I have begun this judgment with this prelude because the petitioners fervently pray that, notwithstanding the alternative remedy available under the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act ('the SARFAESI Act' for brevity), this original petition be construed as being maintainable and that this Court enter into an adjudication of the merits of the contents of the impugned orders. The submissions made before me on behalf of the petitioners are, in its essence, that the impugned orders of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Kerala (the 'DRT' for brevity), namely Exhibits P26 and P27, are in flagrant violation of law and not merely being vitiated by errors of opinion and judgment and therefore, that it is non est in the eyes of law, thus empowering this Court to consider it on its merits under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. 5. Before I endevour into an assessment of the submissions of the petitioners, I deem it appropriate to remind myself the limits of jurisdiction of this Court, while acting under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, when an alternative efficacious remedy is demonstrated and established. 6. In the judgment in Union of India v. T.R.Varma ( AIR 1957 SC 882 ), His Lordship Justice Venkatarama Ayyar speaking for the Court said as under : “It is well settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ; but as observed by this Court in Rashid Ahmed V. Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1950 SC 163 , ' the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. 'Vide also K.S.Rashid and sons V. The Income-tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207 . And where such remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Art. 226, unless there are good grounds therefor.” 7. These principles were subsequently restated with approval by Chief Justice S.R.Das in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh ( AIR 1958 SC 86 ) which, for its sheer mastery, deserves to be read in full and is therefore extracted as under: “.......It must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statue. The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies.” 8. In the year 1961, a Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.V.Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani ( AIR 1961 SC 1506 ) accepted the principles in the afore judgments and in paragraph 10 of the said judgment, has spoken as under: “The passages in the judgments of this court we have extracted would indicate(1) that the two exceptions which the learned Solicitor-General formulated to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy were by no means exhaustive, and (2) that even beyond them a discretion vested in the High Court to have entertained the petition and granted the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. We need only add that the broad lines of the general principles on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the court, and that in a matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the Court.” 9. Over the years, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held steadfast to these principles, as is discernible from the subsequent judgments, one of which is M.P.State Agro Industries Development Corporation and another v. Jahan Khan ( AIR 2007 SC 3153 ), wherein their Lordships declared that a writ court may still exercise discretionary jurisdiction of judicial review, even in the case of availability of an alternative remedy, in at least three contingencies, namely, “(i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.” 10. In Satwati Deswal v. State of Haryana and others ( (2010) 1 SCC 126 ) these judgments were again considered and granted full imprimatur. 11. Later, in T.P.Vishnu Kumar v. Canara Bank, P.N.Road, Tiruppur and others ( (2013) 10 SCC 652 ), the rule of propriety in such matters was emphatically re-stated in paragraph 10 of the said judgment which is as under: “10. Powers of the High Court under Article 226 cannot be invoked in the matter of recovery of dues under the Act, unless there is any statutory violation resulting in prejudice to the party or where such proceedings or action is wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and unfair. When the Act itself provides for a mechanism, by an appeal under Section 20 of the Act, in our view, the High Court is not justified in invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to examine that the rejection of the applications by the Tribunal was correct or not. The petitioner and the contesting respondents have no case that either the Bank or the Tribunal had violated any statutory provisions by rejecting their applications.” 12. A distillation of all the principles evolved over the years as afore was then recorded in Commissioner of Income Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal ( (2014) 1 SCC 603 ), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court declared, leaving no cause for doubt, in paragraph 15, as below: “Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titaghur Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.” 13. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.” 13. The position of law being so, the Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed that in spite of the alternative remedy available under the SARFAESI Act, the High Courts across the country were entertaining writ petitions, either under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India and therefore, delivered a path breaking judgment in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and Others ( (2010) 8 SCC 110 ), wherein all High Courts were strictly told to keep off their hands from the area which are covered by an effective alternative remedy and it was declared luculently that the intrusion into the statutorily bounded areas under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act would be beyond the domain of the High Courts, acting under writ jurisdiction, particularly because these statutory alternative remedies would provide the litigant more effective remedies, since factual factors and evidence would also be available for being considered, assessed and evaluated by the competent Appellate Authority. 14. However, even after Satyawati Tondon (supra), since High Courts appeared to be still foraying into the prohibited realms, in virtual exasperation, the Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered judgment in Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and Another v. Mathew K.C. ( 2018 (1) KHC 786 ), wherein, in paragraph 6, the following inviolable directions were issued: “We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. Normally this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Art.136 of the Constitution is loathe to interfere with an interim order passed in a pending proceeding before the High Court, except in special circumstances, to prevent manifest injustice or abuse of the process of the Court. In the present case, the facts are not in dispute. The discretionary jurisdiction under Art-226 is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in the given facts of a case and in accordance with law. The normal rule is that a writ petition under Art.226 of the Constitution ought not to be entertained if alternate statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well defined exceptions as observed in Commissioner of Income Tax and Others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, 2013 KHC 4619 : 2014 (1) SCC 603 : 2013 (357) ITR 357 , as follows: “15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titaghur Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the Statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.” 15. As is, therefore, obvious from a combined reading of the afore narrated judgments and the inescapable ratio decided therein, except in certain specific enumerated contingencies, which are more particularly available in the judgment in Chhabil Dass Agarwal (supra), normally this Court will not enter into an area which are governed by an alternative remedy and the jurisdiction of this Court, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, would stand proscribed to that extent. 16. Now coming to the facts of this case, the petitioners are the owners of certain extents of properties, which concededly are secured assets offered by them while availing of a loan by a Proprietary concern of the first petitioner, in which they were partners, from the Union Bank of India and they further admit that certain documents up to the year 2002, had been executed by them. When the loan turned heavily out of order, it appears that the Bank initiated action under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, which initially persuaded the petitioners to approach this Court by filing W.P.(C)No.24839/2006, which was disposed of by a judgment dated 20.09.2006, permitting the petitioners to pay off certain amounts out of the total outstanding in instalments and further granting them liberty to approach the Bank for a One Time Settlement. Eight days after this judgment, the petitioners, instead of availing the afore liberty granted to them, filed a Securitisation Application, numbered as S.A.No.66/2006 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal-I, Kochi, which was thereafter transferred to the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Kochi-II, Kochi and re-numbered as T.S.A.No.10/2016. Pertinently, however, in spite of having thus filed a Securitisation Application, the petitioners challenged the judgment in W.P.(C)No.24839/2006 by filing W.A.No.1802/2006, which was also dismissed; against which a review petition, numbered as R.P.No.90/2007, was attempted, however, ending to their discomfiture. 17. As matters stood so, W.P.(C)No.4635/2007 was filed by the Bank before this Court seeking directions to the District Magistrate to take possession of the secured assets under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act. This writ petition was allowed and the petitioners herein filed W.A.No.1250/2007 against it, which was disposed of by a Division Bench by judgment dated 07.03.2008. I deem it appropriate to extract the appellate judgment in its full as under, since most of the dialectical contentions of the parties in this original petition revolve around the manner in which these directions ought to be construed: “This writ SA is directed against the orders passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.4635/2007 dated 16th March, 2007. (2). The Union Bank of India, Kollam Branch, Kollam was the petitioner in W.P.(C)No.4635/2007. The prayers sought for by the petitioner Bank was to direct the District Collector, Collectorate, Kollam to evict respondents 2 to 5 and other occupants, if any, under them from the secured asset namely 71.25 cents of land with residential building in Resurvey No.48/2 at Kollam West Village and hand over the said property to the petitioner so as to enable the petitioner to issue sale certificate to the auction purchasers namely respondents 6 to 8 and also to put them in possession of the property. (3). The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties to thelis by his order dated 16th March, 2007 has granted the reliefs sought for by the petitioner in the writ petition. (4). Aggrieved by the said order, respondents 3 and 5 are before us in this SA. (5). Sri..A.S.P.Kurup, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent, on instruction, would submit that, pursuant to the directions issued by this Court while disposing of the writ petition, the District Collector has implemented the orders passed by this Court. (4). Aggrieved by the said order, respondents 3 and 5 are before us in this SA. (5). Sri..A.S.P.Kurup, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent, on instruction, would submit that, pursuant to the directions issued by this Court while disposing of the writ petition, the District Collector has implemented the orders passed by this Court. It is further stated that, the Bank, after taking possession of the property that was sought for in the writ petition, has already handed over the same to the auction purchasers, namely, respondents 6 to 8 in the writ petition. (6). Aggrieved by the proceedings taken by the Bank in exercise of its powers under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, respondents 2 to 5 in the writ petition have filed SA before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the same is pending for consideration. (7). In the writ petition filed, the only relief that was sought for by the Bank was to direct the District Collector to take possession of the property mentioned in the prayer portion of the writ petition. That prayer was granted by the learned Single Judge and before we could entertain the writ SA, the Bank has already taken possession of the property and then has handed over the same to the auction purchasers. Aggrieved by those proceedings, the affected parties have already moved appropriate Forum. In view of these developments, in our opinion, at this stage, nothing survives in this SA for our consideration and decision. (8). However, Sri.Abraham Vakkanal, learned counsel appearing for the appellants/respondents 3 and 5 would submit that, in the guise of implementing the orders passed by this Court, the Bank has taken some other portion of the property which were not even mortgaged to the Bank. If that is so, in our opinion, the appellants/respondents 3 and 5 have to question that action of the Bank in appropriate proceedings by filing appropriate applications. That cannot be agitated over in the present writ SA. Therefore, while disposing of the writ SA as having become unnecessary, we reserve liberty to the appellants/respondents 3 and 5 to question the action of the Bank in taking excess portion of the property other than what is mentioned in the prayer portion of the writ petition, before appropriate Forum. (9). With these observations and directions the writ SA is disposed of. (10). (9). With these observations and directions the writ SA is disposed of. (10). Consequently, all pending interlocutory applications are closed. Ordered accordingly.” 18. It appears that the Securitisation Application ('SA' for brevity) was thereafter heard by the DRT, which, however, took the view that in the light of the afore directions in W.A.No.1250/2007, it is prohibited from entering into consideration of the validity of the same and therefore, dismissed the SA concluding that it had no jurisdiction to consider it. This order is available on record as Exhibit P20. 19. The pleadings on record show that Exhibit P20 was thereafter challenged by the petitioner by filing O.P.(DRT)No. 120/2016, which culminated in Exhibit P21 judgment dated 16.10.2017 of a learned Single Judge of this Court. In this judgment, the learned Judge found that the conclusions of the DRT in Exhibit P20 order, that it was not entitled to consider the validity of the SA because the properties had been taken possession of and handed over to the auction purchasers under the directions of this Court in W.A.No.1250/2007, to be not tenable or legally correct and therefore, directed the DRT to consider the SA on its merits, taking note of the specific contentions of the petitioner; as also the interim application filed by the auction purchasers of the secured asset asserting the SA not to be maintainable, with which I will deal in greater detail later in this judgment. It is thus that the DRT has issued Exhibits P26 and P27 orders finding the SA to be not maintainable and consequently rejecting the SA itself. 20. At this juncture, I must also record two other facts which are relevant. 21. As I have already noticed above, S.A.No.66/2006, which was re-numbered as T.S.A.No.10/2016, was filed primarily challenging the notice issued by the Bank under Rule 8(1) of the SARFAESI Rules and alleging that the possession taken, as well as the sale notice issued thereafter, as being illegal and unlawful for various reasons. I do not propose to go into those reasons in detail except to record that the issues relating to the publication of the notice, affixture, valuation, etc. were also impelled. However, pending the SA the secured asset was sold on 05.10.2006 and in the meanwhile the petitioner was pursuing the litigations as afore narrated. I do not propose to go into those reasons in detail except to record that the issues relating to the publication of the notice, affixture, valuation, etc. were also impelled. However, pending the SA the secured asset was sold on 05.10.2006 and in the meanwhile the petitioner was pursuing the litigations as afore narrated. The records before the DRT would, however, show that the auction purchasers were impleaded on 17.06.2017, namely twelve days after the sale, but that the DRT had refused to grant any further orders to the petitioner. 22. The litigations as afore narrated went on during this period but in the year 2010, i.e. nearly 3½ years after the sale, the petitioners moved I.A.No.1411/2010 before the DRT to amend the SA and this was allowed on 19.03.2013. Pertinently, the petitioners did not choose to challenge the sale by this amendment but they only sought to bring certain additional averments and grounds in support of their earlier challenge to the taking over of possession of the secured assets as well as the sale notice. Obviously, the petitioners must have been under the advice that if they are able to win the SA, thereby to mean that taking over of possession and the sale notice of the secured assets being declared invalid, then the subsequent sale, which is edificed on this, would also fall. I also notice that another reason perhaps that weighed with the petitioners in choosing not to challenge the sale was because the DRT had passed an order on 03.04.2007 in the SA declaring that the validity of the sale will also be considered at the time when the SA is finally disposed of. 23. While so, I see that the auction purchasers moved a new application before the DRT, namely I.A.No.1301/2014, challenging the amendments made by the petitioners to the SA as also I.A.No.179/2016 challenging the maintainability of the SA itself. I further notice that when Exhibit P21 judgment was delivered, these facts were brought to the notice of the learned Judge and it is obviously therefore, that directions had been given to the DRT in the said judgment to consider the SA as well as the applications filed by the auction purchasers, notwithstanding the above extracted observations contained in W.A. No.1250/2007. 24. Be that as it may, the DRT has now issued Exhibits P26 and P27 orders which are impugned in this writ petition. 24. Be that as it may, the DRT has now issued Exhibits P26 and P27 orders which are impugned in this writ petition. The petitioners challenge them in this original petition under filed Article 226 of the Constitution of India, asserting that they are null and void and therefore, that they are not obligated to invoke the alternative remedy, concededly available to them under the SARFAESI Act. 25. I have heard Sri.S.Easwaran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri.G.Sreekumar, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Sri.Rishikesh Shenoy, learned counsel appearing for respondents 3 and 4 and Sri.Sadchith Kurup, learned Standing Counsel for the Union Bank of India. 26. Sri.S.Easwaran, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, commenced his submissions vehemently asserting that Exhibits P26 and P27 orders are nonest, null and void in law. According to him, these orders have been issued in gross violation of the directions contained in Exhibit P21 judgment and that though Exhibits P26 and P27 are verbose, they literally say the same thing as was recorded in Exhibit P20 order, which has been set aside by this Court through Exhibit P21 judgment. According to him, while setting aside Exhibit P20 order earlier delivered by the DRT, this Court has concluded that the DRT had virtually abdicated its jurisdiction to consider the SA on its merits, based on a misapprehension or misdirection that the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.1250/2007 prohibits such consideration. He says that since Exhibit P21 judgment made it very clear that notwithstanding the directions in W.A. No.1250/2007, the DRT was bound to consider the merits of the SA, it has now acted egregiously in defiance of the judgment in dismissing the SA again on the ground that it has no jurisdiction to do so. It is on these lines lines that the learned counsel submits that the impugned orders are nonest and therefore, that they cannot be even treated as being valid orders in law, so as to compel the petitioners to the alternative remedy. 27. It is on these lines lines that the learned counsel submits that the impugned orders are nonest and therefore, that they cannot be even treated as being valid orders in law, so as to compel the petitioners to the alternative remedy. 27. Sri.G.Sreekumar, learned Senior Counsel, contrario sensu submits that Exhibits P26 and P27 orders can never be seen to be non estor void in law, as has been contended by the petitioners, because the DRT has not found that it lacks jurisdiction to consider the SA on account of the judgment of this Court in W.A.No.1250/2007; but that it has concluded correctly on facts and law that challenge to the possession notice and the sale notice, as impelled in the SA, became infructuous once the sale had taken place. The learned Senior Counsel, referring extensively to Exhibit P26 and P27, submits that the view of the DRT, as recorded therein, is that once the sale took place, the earlier challenge to the possession notice and the sale notice is rendered redundant and therefore, that it thus became unnecessary for the SA to be considered on its merits. He further points out that, as is clear from Exhibit P26, the maintainability of the SA was considered in great detail in consonance with the directions in Exhibit P21 judgment and it was found by the DRT to be not maintainable, not because of the judgment in W.A.No.1250/2007 but because it has concluded that once the sale took place, the SA itself lost its feet to stand on. He, therefore, says that this is a case where, at the best, the petitioners can possibility contend that the findings in Exhibits P26 and P27 are erroneous but not that the said orders are nonestin law. 28. Sri.Sadchith Kurup, learned Standing Counsel for the Bank submits virtually affirming the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel and adds that the attempt of the petitioners is only to delay the prosecution of the proceedings before the DRT and according to him, the Bank is entitled to recover the debt from them under the SARFAESI Act, since they are statutorily empowered under it to do so even without recourse to a judicial process. He further says that the secured assets were validly sold in auction and were purchased by the auction purchasers by making full payment of the sale consideration and therefore, that the petitioner cannot be allowed to keep the litigative ball rolling ad infinitum through one process or the other, challenging the original possession notice and the sale notice. He reiterates that the remedy, if any, of the petitioners is not to approach this Court but to invoke the alternative remedy available under the SARFAESI Act. 29. On a consideration of the afore submissions and on an evaluation of the expansive materials on record, the essential issue that presents for my consideration is whether the impugned orders, namely Exhibits P26 and P27, have been issued by the DRT in a manner so as to bring it under the exceptions declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chhabil Dass Agarwal (supra). If the petitioners are to succeed in establishing that this original petition is maintainable and that they do not have to invoke alternative statutory remedy before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, then they will have to demonstrate either that the said orders have been issued in violation of the provisions of the applicable Statute; or that it is in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; or that it has been issued based on provisions which are repealed; or that it has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice; or that it has been issued by the DRT without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. 30. As far as the facts of the present case are concerned, there is no doubt that the DRT has issued Exhibits P26 and P27 orders virtually holding that the SA is infructuous and therefore, that it need not be considered on its merits. When we juxtapose these conclusions in the impugned orders with the findings of the DRT in Exhibit P20 order, which has been set aside by Exhibit P21 judgment, it becomes ineluctable that while the earlier view of the DRT was that it was estopped from considering the merits of the contentions in the SA because of the judgment in W.A.No.1250/2007; in Exhibits P26 and P27, the findings are essentially to the effect that the SA itself has become infructuous on account of the sale that happened after it was filed. Therefore, I cannot countenance the submission of the petitioners that Exhibits P26 and P27 is merely a re-invention of Exhibit P20 order and that it has been issued in gross defiance of the directions in Exhibit P21 judgment. 31. The above being said, there is no doubt that in Exhibit P21 judgment, this Court had directed the DRT to consider the SA on its merits de hors the judgment in W.A.No.1250/2007; but it had not directed the DRT to act in a particular manner, which, in any event, this Court could not have done. Therefore, once the matter was remitted to the DRT through Exhibit P21 judgment, it was then left to it to consider the modus of disposal of the SA on its merits. 32. Since, as noticed by me earlier, there was also an application before the DRT, namely I.A.No.179/2016, raising the question of maintainability of the SA at the instance of the auction purchasers, which was also directed to be considered by it in Exhibit P21 judgment, the DRT, after an apparently exhaustive examination of all the materials on record, concluded in Exhibit P26 order that the amendments earlier allowed to the SA were unnecessary and time barred and therefore, that it cannot look into it. It then proceeded effectively to hold that the SA itself has become infructuous on account of the subsequent sale of the secured assets and consequently that the SA has been rendered not maintainable. After concluding so, the DRT went on to dispose of the SA through Exhibit P27 order, holding, interalia, that since the petitioners themselves had conceded in an interim application filed in W.A.No.1250/2007, that on the happening of the sale, the SA would become infructuous; they cannot be thereafter allowed to aprobate and reprobate or to resile from their earlier admissions and resultantly dismissed the SA as having become infructuous, though the merits of the grounds in the SA were also touched upon in Exhibit P27 order. 33. 33. Even though I am striding very cautiously in the choice of words employed by me in this judgment, primarily because I do not want anything in this judgment to fetter or trammel any rights or remedies that may be available to the parties and in particular on account of the manner in which I propose to dispose of this writ petition, I must say, at least prima-facie, that I have reasons to think that the DRT ought to have concluded upon the contentions of the parties on its legal merits, rather than merely on the question of maintainability of the SA. However, this by itself does not persuade me to consider the validity of these orders under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution until I am convinced that these orders are noneston account of the reasons that are enumerated in the various judgments referred earlier. I am not convinced to such an opinion and I am of the firm view that even though, prima-facie, I feel that many of the observations and holdings in Exhibits P26 and P27 orders require further evaluation, it still does not guide me to the forensic impression that these orders are without jurisdiction, or to be nonestor void in law. 34. In the afore circumstances and since I have no doubt that Exhibits P26 and P27 orders are deserving of being tested properly, I am of the certain opinion that the petitioners should be advised to invoke the alternative remedy available to them under the SARFAESI Act, so that all the factual and legal disputations between the parties can be canvassed and agitated under a proper procedure in law. In summation and in the result, I dispose of this original petition without delving into the merits of the impugned orders and without entering into an evaluation of the dialectical contentions between the parties, leaving liberty to the petitioners to invoke the alternative remedy before the DRAT. I am adscitiously persuaded to this course because by doing so, not merely does the petitioners suffer no prejudice but they would be in a better position than in this Court to enforce their remedies as per law. I am adscitiously persuaded to this course because by doing so, not merely does the petitioners suffer no prejudice but they would be in a better position than in this Court to enforce their remedies as per law. Though I had a doubt initially, on account of the large delay occasioned during when this writ petition has been pending before this Court, whether the petitioners would loose the opportunity to avail the alternative remedy, I find gratis in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Baleshwar Dayal Jaiswal v. Bank of India and Others (2015 KHC 4502), which declares that the delay in filing an SA can be condoned by the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal under proviso to Section 23 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 read with Section 18(2) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002. Obviously, therefore, the petitioners would not be denied of such a remedy merely on account of delay. I, therefore, permit the petitioners to approach the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal with properly constituted appeal/s against Exhibits P26 and P27 orders of the DRT within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The learned Appellate Tribunal will consider the same, if it is so filed, as per the applicable procedural mandate and strictly in terms of the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in these matters.