ORDER : The present revision is filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 [for brevity ‘the Code’] challenging the legality and validity of the order dated 7-9-2018 passed by learned IX Additional District Judge, Jabalpur in M.C.A. No.33/2016 affirming the order 16-10-2015 passed by the learned VIII Civil Judge, Class-2, Jabalpur in M.J.C. No.46/2014. By the impugned orders the application filed under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act along with an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC for setting aside the ex parte decree, has been rejected and the aforesaid order has been affirmed in the appeal. 2. The factual expose adumbrated in a nutshell, is that the non-applicant/plaintiff filed a civil suit for eviction of the present applicant from the suit premises under Section 12(a)(c)(f) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’] on 12-9-2011. On receipt of the notice the applicant appeared before the Court and filed his written statement on 10-01-2012. He was proceeded ex parte on 10-7-2012. The suit thereafter further proceeded, and on 28-9-2012 an ex parte judgment and decree against the applicant was passed for eviction and also for payment of arrears of rent at the rate of Rs.2700/-per month. It is stated that counsel for the applicant informed him on 14-9-2014 and advised for filing an application for setting aside ex parte judgment and decree, dated 28-9-2012. 3. The application was filed along with an application for condonation of delay on 17-9-2014. It is stated that prior to 14-9-2014 no intimation was given to him and the applicant was not aware of passing of the judgment and decree dated 20-9-2012. He was not having any knowledge of obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and decree by his duly engaged counsel. However, by order dated 16-10-2015 the trial Court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and consequently the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC was also dismissed. 4. Thereafter, the applicant preferred an appeal on 4-4-2015. During the pendency of the appeal he filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC for taking affidavit of counsel on record stating that due to confusion he did not appear in the case. 4. Thereafter, the applicant preferred an appeal on 4-4-2015. During the pendency of the appeal he filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC for taking affidavit of counsel on record stating that due to confusion he did not appear in the case. The appellate Court after hearing both the parties by the impugned order dated 7-9-2018 dismissed the appeal affirming the order of the trial Court. Thus, the decree for eviction against the present applicant/tenant has been passed. 5. Learned senior counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant is more than 70 years of age and he was not keeping well. He was completely dependant upon his counsel for prosecuting both the civil suits and, therefore, he was not visiting the courts on each date of hearing. In order to substantiate his contention he relied upon the judgment passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Hari Shankar Dubey vs. Charuchandra Dwivedi and others, 2001 (1) MPJR 266. He argued that the word “sufficient cause” is to be given a liberal consideration and, therefore, the application ought to have been allowed. At the most, the respondent-plaintiff could have been compensated by costs etc. 6. Per contra, learned counsel for the non-applicant submitted that both the courts have recorded the findings that the counsel for the applicant obtained the certified copy of the judgment and decree on 30-12-2012 and the applicant had refused to accept the notice even in the execution case No.13-A/2012. It is submitted by him that the applicant was very much aware of the judgment and decree passed on 28-9-2012. It is only when coercive action was taken in execution of eviction decree against the applicant/tenant, he filed the application. He also argued that no affidavit of the counsel was filed along with the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. Though, the said application was filed by the same counsel who was representing him in the civil suit. The affidavit has been filed only after rejecting the application for setting aside the appeal at the appellate stage to overcome the reasons ascribed by the trial Court while rejecting the application. Thus, the explanation of excuse offered through affidavit is nothing but an afterthought and concocted. He also denied that there was any bonafide mistake or any confusion because of filing of the other suit. Thus, the explanation of excuse offered through affidavit is nothing but an afterthought and concocted. He also denied that there was any bonafide mistake or any confusion because of filing of the other suit. It is stated that other suit was also decreed against him on 19-9-2014. It was deliberate in not participating the proceedings in the present suit. He stated that the applicant cannot be permitted to disown the acts of his duly engaged advocate. To bolster his submission, he referred to the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Salil Dutta vs. T.M. and M.C. Private Limited, (1993) 2 SCC 185 . He also referred to the judgment passed in Panna Lal vs. Murari Lal (dead) by his LRs, AIR 1967 SC 1384 on the point of knowledge of decree. 7. Regard being had to the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties and bestowing anxious consideration on the facts of the present case, I do not find any illegally or perversity of approach in the impugned orders passed by the Courts below warranting any interference of this Court in revisional jurisdiction. 8. Though the affidavit filed by Shri Pranay Verma, Advocate, was not taken on record but even for the sake of arguments if it is perused, there is no specific averments in the said affidavit regarding the communication of the judgment and decree, dated 28-9-2012. He has not stated that after receiving the certified copy of the judgment and decree on 30-12-2012 the same was not communicated to the present applicant. The trial Court and the appellate Court have dismissed the application under Order 39 Rule 13 of the CPC on the ground the ex parte judgment and decree was passed on 28-9-2012 and certified copy thereof, was received by the counsel on 30-12-2012. There is no cogent and plausible evidence that the present applicant was not having any knowledge of the said judgment and decree. 9. In the case of Hari Shankar Dubey (supra) the applicant was an old and infirm person who had engaged his relative as a counsel, who had assured him that he would inform him about the progress of the case, when it would be necessary then only he should come to the Court. The counsel stopped going to the Court subsequently without any communication to the applicant in the said case. The counsel stopped going to the Court subsequently without any communication to the applicant in the said case. That apart, in the said case the dispute was in respect of proprietary rights of the parties and the counsel was a relative of the applicant. The Court held that the old litigant was dependant on the counsel who was his relative and, therefore, the dependency of the applicant of the said case on the counsel was considered as sufficient cause for non-appearance. 10. The present case is between a tenant and landlord. The applicant proceeded ex parte on 10-7-2012 and the judgment and decree was passed on 28-9-2012. There was another suit as stated by the parties, where Smt. Shantibai and Smt. Dhannobai, who were the original owners of the suit premises and after their death the plaintiff and the respondent were claiming their ownership by virtue of a Will executed in their favour. In respect of the property adjoining to the suit premises another suit was filed by Smt. Chitra Saroj for eviction of the applicant on 4-2-2012. Merely because another suit was filed subsequent to the present suit, it cannot be held to be a bona fide belief on the part of the applicant that he would not be required to contest the present case. The affidavit which has been filed at the appellate stage was not filed along with an application for setting aside the ex parte decree. When the application was rejected on 16-10-2015 by the trial Court then the affidavit was filed in the appeal on 19-11-2015. The affidavit filed by the same counsel at the appellate stage supports the submission of the counsel for the non-applicant that it was an afterthought to overcome the findings of the trial Court. 11. I do not find any illegality in rejecting the said affidavit and not taking the same on record, because no explanation has been given either in the affidavit or in the present revision petition for not filing the affidavit of the counsel along with the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. Even in the affidavit there is no categorical statement that after receiving certified copy of the ex parte judgment and decree, the applicant was not communicated by his duly engaged counsel. 12. Even in the affidavit there is no categorical statement that after receiving certified copy of the ex parte judgment and decree, the applicant was not communicated by his duly engaged counsel. 12. In the case of Salil Dutta (supra) the Apex Court has taken into consideration the liability of a litigant for the action of an advocate and held thus: “8. The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engaged him. It is true that in certain situations, the court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an exparte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognized. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq vs. Munshilal, AIR 1981 SC 1400 must be understood in the facts and circumstances of that case and cannot be understood as an absolute proposition.” 13. Thus, in absence of specific pleadings and evidence to dislodge the fact of the knowledge of the decree, it cannot be accepted that the applicant was not having any knowledge of the judgment and decree dated 20-9-2012 when certified copy was already received by the counsel on 30-12-2012. The expression “knowledge of the decree” has been considered by the Apex Court in the case of Panna Lal (supra) as under: “4. In Pundlick Rowji v. Vasant rao Madhavrao, (1909) 11 Bom LR 1296, Davar, J., held that the expression "knowledge of the decree in art' 164 means knowledge not of a decree but of the particular decree which is sought to be set aside, a certain and clear perception of the fact that the particular decree had been passed against him. In Pundlick Rowji v. Vasant rao Madhavrao, (1909) 11 Bom LR 1296, Davar, J., held that the expression "knowledge of the decree in art' 164 means knowledge not of a decree but of the particular decree which is sought to be set aside, a certain and clear perception of the fact that the particular decree had been passed against him. On the facts of that case, Davar, J., held that a notice to the defendant that a decree had been passed against him in the High Court Suit No. 411 of 1909 in' favour of one Pundlick Rowji with whom he had no dealings was not sufficient to impute to him clear knowledge of the decree in the absence of any information that the decree had been passed in favour of Pundlick Rowji as the assignee of a promissory note which he had executed in favour, of another party. This case was followed by the Calcutta' High Court in Kumud Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Jotindra Nath Chowdhury. In Bapurao Sitaram Karmarkar v. Sadbu Bhiva, Gholap, the Bombay High Court held that the evidence of two, persons who had been asked by the plaintiff to tell the defendant' about the decree and to settle the matter was not sufficient to impose knowledge of the decree on the defendant within the meaning of Art. 164. Macleod C.J. said : ‘We think the words of 'the article mean something more than mere knowledge that a decree had been passed in some suit in some Court against the applicant. We think it means that the applicant must have knowledge not merely that a decree has been passed by some Court against, him, but that a particular decree has been passed 'against 'him in a particular Court in favour of a particular person for a particular sum. A judgment-debtor is not in such a favourable position as he used to be when he had thirty days from the time when execution was levied against him. But we do not think that the Legislature meant to go to the other extreme by laying down that time began to run from the time the judgment-debtor might have received some vague information that a decree had been passed against him." 14. But we do not think that the Legislature meant to go to the other extreme by laying down that time began to run from the time the judgment-debtor might have received some vague information that a decree had been passed against him." 14. The reasoning which has been ascribed by both the courts below that the present applicant was having knowledge of the judgment and decree and he had refused to take notice issued in the execution case No.13-A/2012 on 30-8-2012 is based on consideration of the entire record, which is extracted hereunder: ^^15- ewy O;ogkj okn dzekad 13,@2012 ds voyksdu ls ;g Li"V gS fd vihykFkhZ@vkosnd ewy O;ogkj okn esa mifLFkr gqvk vkSj mlds fo:) fnukad 10-07-2012 dks mlds vuqifLFkr jgus ij O;ogkj okn esa ,di{kh; dk;Zokgh dh xbZA ;g vfookfnr gS fd ewy O;ogkj okn dzekad 13,@2012 esa fnukad 28-09-2012 dks ,di{kh; fu.kZ; ,oa vkKkfIr ikfjr dh xbZ] ftls vikLr djus gsrq fnukad 17-09-2014 dks vihykFkhZ@vkosnd dh vksj ls ,e-ts-lh- dzekad 46@14 izLrqr dh xbZ] ftls vkyksP; vkns’k ds }kjk fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ds }kjk fujLr fd;k x;kA vihykFkhZ dh vksj ls ;|fi ;g dgk x;k gS fd ,di{kh; fu.kZ; ,oa vkKkfIr dh tkudkjh izFke ckj fnukad 14-09-2014 dks mlds iwoZ vf/koDrk }kjk fn, tkus ij mls gqbZ Fkh] mlds rRdky i’pkr mlds }kjk ,di{kh; fu.kZ; ,oa vkKkfIr dks vikLr djus gsrq vkosnu] foyac dks {kek djus ds vkosnu lfgr mlds }kjk izLrqr fd;k x;k] fdarq vihykFkhZ vf/koDrk dk mDr rdZ ekU; ugha fd;k tk ldrk gS] D;ksafd vfHkys[k ds voyksdu ls ;g Li"V gS fd vihykFkhZ dks ,di{kh; fu.kZ; ,oa vkKkfIr fnukad 28-09-2012 dh izekf.kr izfrfyfi fnukad 30-10-2012 dks gh izkIr gks xbZ FkhA ;gka ;g Hkh mYys[kuh; gS fd vihykFkhZ ds fo:) yafcr fu"iknu izdj.k dzekad 13,@2012 esa Hkh fnukad 30-10-2012 dks mls uksfVl tkjh fd;k x;k FkkA vihykFkhZ }kjk uksfVl ysus ls badkj dj fn, tkus ij i’pkrorhZ izdze ij fu"iknu izdj.k esa U;k;ky; }kjk fnukad 17-02-14 dks dCtk okjaV tkjh fd;k x;k] ftldh rkehyh ds le; vihykFkhZ@vkosnd ;|fi ekSds ij ekStwn feyk] fdarq dCtk okjaV dh rkehyh ugha gks ikbZ FkhA blls Hkh ;g Li"V gS fd vihykFkhZ@vkosnd dks ,di{kh; fu.kZ; ,oa vkKkfIr dh tkudkjh iwoZ esa gh gks pqdh Fkh] fdarq mlds }kjk dksbZ dk;Zokgh ugha dh xbZA vihykFkhZ@vkosnd ds vfHkHkk"kd dk ;g rdZ ekU; ugha fd;k tk ldrk fd fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky;] fu"iknu izdj.k dh dk;Zokgh dks vkns’k ikfjr djrs le; fopkj esa ugha ys ldrk FkkA** 15. The argument of the counsel for the applicant cannot be accepted that the said finding was recorded without calling for the record of the execution. Burden lies on the applicant to prove that he was not having the knowledge of the judgment and decree and he had not refused the summons issued in the execution case. The word “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has been held to be construed liberally but a Court cannot become oblivious of the fact that a successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of judgment and decree under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of the litigation. 16. In the present case, suit for eviction on the ground of bonafide need is filed by the non-applicant/plaintiff under the provisions of the Act and the applicant admittedly is a tenant and, therefore, in the facts of the present case the bonafide and sufficient ground on the part of the present applicant has not been established. On the contrary, it shows his negligence in prosecuting the case. 17. In the case of Maniben Deveraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 the Apex Court considering the word “sufficient cause” ruled thus: “23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” 18. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” 18. In the case of S. Madhuri Gond vs. Damodar Reddy while considering the application for setting an ex parte judgment and decree along with an application for condonation of delay, the Court declined to interfere on the ground of delay of 1236 days in filing the appeal against the ex parte judgment and decree on the ground that where there is negligence in prosecution of the proceedings, “sufficient cause” would not have been established. In the said case the judgment passed in Moniben Devraj (supra) was referred to. 19. In the case of Vijay Singh vs. Shanti Devi and another, 2018 (2) MPLJ (SC) 18 = (2017) 8 SCC 837 while dealing with Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC, the Court ruled thus: “14. The aforesaid provisions lays down the procedure for setting aside a decree passed ex parte. The Court can set aside an ex parte decree only on two grounds – firstly that the summons was not duly served; and secondly that the defendant was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called out. Once an ex parte decree is set aside, it basically means that the parties are relegated to the same position on which they stood before the passing of the ex parte decree.” 20. Both the courts have recorded the categorical findings regarding knowledge of the judgment and decree to the applicant. The scope of interference in revisional jurisdiction is no longer res integra as it has been held that Court should not interfere in the revisional jurisdiction unless there is jurisdictional error or material irregularity. Reference may be made to the case of Masjid Kacha Tank vs. Tuffail Mohammed, AIR 1991 SC 455 ; State of Madhya Pradesh and others vs. Dr. Sumedha Gajendrakar (Mrs.) and another, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 667; and Mudigonda Chandra Mouli Sastri vs. Bhimanepali Bikshalu, AIR 1999 SC 3095 . 21. In view of the preceding analysis and enunciation of law, I do not find that a case is made out for interference in revisional jurisdiction. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs.