JUDGMENT : P.K. Lohra, J. Accused-Petitioner, presently lodged at Special Juvenile Home, Magra Punjla, Jodhpur, has laid this revision petition under Section 102 of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 2000 r/w Section 397/401 Cr.P.C., imploring annulment of judgment dated 27th of February 2018, passed by Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Barmer (for short, 'learned appellate Court') , as well as judgment dated 7th of June 2013, passed by Juvenile Justice Board (for short, 'learned Board'). 2. The facts, in brief, giving rise to this revision petition are that a report was lodged against petitioner on 6th of July 2001 at Police Station Siwana, Barmer, which was registered as FIR No.96/2001, wherein he was charged for offence punishable under Sections 307, 447, 333, 324, 326 IPC and Section 4/25 of the Arms Act. Being juvenile at the time of incident, upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet for the aforesaid offences was submitted against the petitioner before learned Board. The learned Board, upon completion of trial, by its judgment dated 7th of June, 2013, convicted him for the charged offences and handed down sentences of different durations. The Board directed to lodge the petitioner in Special Juvenile Home. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment of learned Board, petitioner approached learned appellate Court and the learned appellate Court by its judgment dated 27th of February, 2018 upheld the verdict of learned Board. 3. Mr. Rajesh Joshi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has argued only one point that during trial before the learned Board, petitioner attained majority by afflux of time, and therefore, keeping him in confinement at Special Juvenile Home solely on the basis of date of his delinquency is contrary to the Act of 2000. It is further submitted by learned counsel that he is not questioning the conviction of petitioner for the charged offences but his limited prayer is to release him from Special Juvenile Home as by allux of time he has attained majority and now not being a child in conflict with law, keeping him in Special Juvenile Home is wholly uncalled for and against the basic tenets of the Act of 2000. 4. I have learned Senior Counsel, learned Public Prosecutor and perused the impugned judgments and thoroughly scanned the record of the case. 5. 4. I have learned Senior Counsel, learned Public Prosecutor and perused the impugned judgments and thoroughly scanned the record of the case. 5. At the outset, it may be observed that learned Senior Counsel has abandoned challenge to the conviction of petitioner and has confined his arguments to a limited prayer of releasing him from Special Juvenile Home, therefore, it would be appropriate to examine the afflictions of the petitioner in light of the provisions of Act of 2000. While it is true that learned Board has convicted the petitioner for serious offences and the learned appellate Court has affirmed the verdict of learned Board but then a very vital fact, that at the time of commission of offences petitioner was a child in conflict with law, cannot lose sight of the Court. In that background, would it be appropriate to keep the petitioner in Special Juvenile Home after he has crossed the age of juvenility, even if his conviction is upheld. 6. This vital question arose before the Supreme Court in Bhoop Ram Vs. State of U.P., (1989) 3 SCC 1 . The Court, while considering the U.P. Children Act, 1951, sustained conviction of a child within the meaning of Section 2(4) of the said Act, but upon his attaining the age of 18 years, quashed the sentence to facilitate his release forthwith. The Court held: 8. Since the appellant is now aged more than 28 years of age, there is no question of the appellant now being sent to an approved school under the U.P. Children Act for being detained there. In a somewhat similar situation, this Court held in Jayendra v. State of U.P. that where an accused had been wrongly sentenced to imprisonment instead of being treated as a "child" under Section 2(4) of the U.P. Children Act and sent to an approved school and the accused had crossed the maximum age of detention in an approved school viz. 18 years, the course to be followed is to sustain the conviction but however quash the sentence imposed on the accused and direct his release forthwith. Accordingly, in this case also, we sustain the conviction of the appellant under all the charges framed against him but however quash the sentence awarded to him and direct his release forthwith. The appeal is therefore partly allowed insofar as the sentence imposed upon the appellant are quashed. 7. Accordingly, in this case also, we sustain the conviction of the appellant under all the charges framed against him but however quash the sentence awarded to him and direct his release forthwith. The appeal is therefore partly allowed insofar as the sentence imposed upon the appellant are quashed. 7. The said view is also reiterated by this Court in case of Rashid @ Rasshid @ Rashidiya Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2012) CrLR 1786 (Raj) and in a later judgment: Sattu Ram @ Satiya & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2016) CrLR 588 (Raj.). In Sattu Ram @ Satiya & Anr., the Court, after discussing the precise object of the Act, while relying on the judgment of Supreme Court, held: "In view of the above settled proposition of law, the petitioners, having crossed the age of 18 years cannot be confined in a Special Juvenile Home/fit institution. The orders passed by the Juvenile Justice Board and the Appellate Court in this regard are in total conflict with the specific provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act and the interpretation thereof as done by the Courts in the above referred judgments and thus, cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the revisions deserve to be and are allowed. While upholding the conviction of the petitioners as recorded by the Juvenile Justice Board and affirmed by the appellate court, the directions given by the courts below to send them to Special Juvenile Home/fit institution for three years is hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioners are presently confined at the Special Juvenile Home, Jodhpur. They shall be set at liberty forthwith if not wanted in any other case." 8. There remains no quarrel that at the time of commission of offence, petitioner was juvenile as his date of birth is 25th October 1985. Therefore, during trial before the learned Board, which concluded in the year 2013, he crossed the age of juvenility. This being the position, at the time of conclusion of trial by the learned Board and final hearing of appeal, undeniably, petitioner was major having crossed the age of juvenility. Thus, taking the date of birth of petitioner as 25.10.1985, by now he has crossed the age of 30 years and therefore looking to his age also it would not be congenial to keep him in Special Juvenile Home with other juveniles. Thus, taking the date of birth of petitioner as 25.10.1985, by now he has crossed the age of 30 years and therefore looking to his age also it would not be congenial to keep him in Special Juvenile Home with other juveniles. In view of foregoing discussion and relying on the above legal precedents, the instant revision petition is allowed in part and while upholding conviction of the petitioner for the charged offences, as recorded by learned Board and affirmed by the learned appellate Court, it is hereby ordered that the petitioner, presently lodged with Special Juvenile Home, be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case.