JUDGMENT : Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. The present revisional application arises from a judgment delivered in an appeal under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act of 1971"), whereby the Appellate Court affirmed a composite order of the Estate Officer, granting eviction of the present petitioner under Section 5(1) of the Act of 1971 as well as recovery of damages under Section 7(2) of the said Act. 2. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that both the fora below acted without jurisdiction in passing such composite order of eviction and damages since the ground for eviction was primarily non-payment of enhanced licence fees whereas the petitioner had all along been paying licence fees at the rate as contemplated in the original licence agreement, including the enhancement stipulated therein, that is, at the rate of 35 percent. 3. Moreover, it is argued, the rate at which the opposite party sought enhancement was arbitrary and de hors the law. 4. It is argued that despite the original licence fee being Rs.7,000/- per month, the opposite party gave a notice to the petitioner to enhance the monthly licence fees to Rs.27,000/-, which was not only exorbitant but without following any yardstick whatsoever. 5. It is further argued on behalf of the petitioner that the enhancement, if at all, ought to have been in consonance with the provisions of the local rent control law, that is, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, in the absence of any provision for adjudicating fair rent in the Act of 1971. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner cites in this context a judgment reported at Jamshed Hormusji Wadia vs. Board of Trustees, (2004) 3 SCC 214 Port of Mumbai and another] for the proposition that a balance has to be struck by the State-landlord, between the two extremes of following the requirements of Article 14 of the Constitution of India on the one hand and ensuring fair competition and non-discrimination on the other. Despite the State and its instrumentalities being entitled to augment their resources, the object of serving the public cause in consonance with fair and reasonable methods could not be overlooked. 7. Despite the State and its instrumentalities being entitled to augment their resources, the object of serving the public cause in consonance with fair and reasonable methods could not be overlooked. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner next cites a judgment reported at Banatwala and Company vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another, (2011) 13 SCC 446 for the proposition that although premises covered by the Act of 1971 were excluded from the Rent Control Acts, the jurisdiction of the Courts to fix standard rent under the Rent Acts was not ousted. Since the Act of 1971 does not speak about fixation of standard rent or maintenance of essential services and provides no remedy therefor, the pari materia provisions of the Rent Control Act could be used as guidelines for fixation of standard rent. 8. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the revision of the licence fee should have been rational, following the principles as laid down in the cited judgments, if necessary resorting to the principles contained in the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, even if the said act was not applicable in terms, since no such provisions are available in the Act of 1971. 9. It is further submitted by the petitioner that, as recorded in the order of the Estate Officer himself, the petitioner had been tendering the amount of Rs. 7,000/- month by month during the relevant period, which was being accepted by the present opposite party as well. Although the opposite party, by its own choice, had been depositing such amounts in its 'suspense account', such unilateral act on the part of the opposite party could not take away anything from the fact that the opposite party is now estopped from evicting the petitioner on the ground of non-payment of licence fees, in view of acceptance of the amounts. 10. By the same logic, it is argued, the amount awarded as damages was also directed without jurisdiction. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that it was observed by the Estate Officer himself, that it was appropriate that the total amount held by the present opposite party in deposit against the concerned tenancy code, or rather the remainder thereof subsisting after adjustment towards the petitioner's rent shown as in arrears for May, 2013, be utilized to cause proportionate reduction of the present petitioner's gross liability towards damages. 11. 11. However, such observation did not find a corresponding rider in the ordering portion either of the order of the Estate Officer or the Appellate Forum, which directed the entire amount to be paid by the petitioner as damages. In fact, since the Estate Officer, as affirmed by the Appellate Forum, declined the grant of interest in view of the deposits having been accepted by the opposite party in lieu of rent/licence fee, the fora below acted without jurisdiction in directing the petitioner to be evicted on the ground of non-payment of rent/licence fees as well as to pay damages for amount already paid by the petitioner. 12. The petitioner, it is argued, could not be labelled as an unauthorized occupant, deserving eviction under the Act of 1971. 13. It is further argued on behalf of the petitioner that, even if the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 is not applicable in terms to the parties in view of operation of the Act of 1971, the concept of fair rent can be borrowed from the 1997 Act, since no such provision is existent in the Act of 1971. In view of the void in that regard in the Act of 1971, the State Rent Control Act ought to prevail. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submits that since the monthly amount which was being paid by the petitioner was in lieu of occupation charges/licence fee, the same could not be termed as 'rent' as envisaged by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997. As such, the provision of Section 3(e) of the 1997 Act, which excludes premises carrying monthly rent of more than Rs. 6,500/- from the operation of the 1997 Act, is not applicable at all, as the term 'monthly rent' in the said provision does not apply to the petitioner. 14. In such view of the matter, in any event, there is no bar for the application of the concept of fair rent as contemplated in the 1997 Act, to the present premises. 15. In controverting the submissions of the petitioner, learned counsel for the opposite party argues that the five-yearly agreements of licence/lease entered into between the parties provided for revision of rent not less than at the rate 35 percent of the existing rent after the end of such five years. 15. In controverting the submissions of the petitioner, learned counsel for the opposite party argues that the five-yearly agreements of licence/lease entered into between the parties provided for revision of rent not less than at the rate 35 percent of the existing rent after the end of such five years. As such, the argument of the petitioner as to the petitioner having paid rent at the enhanced rate of 35 percent after each such tenure, is based on the fallacy that the upper limit of such enhancement was restricted to 35 percent. In fact, in terms of the agreement between the parties, 35 percent was the minimum rate at which the rent could be increased. 16. As such, since the opposite party sought to enhance the occupation charges for the premises in tune with the prevailing market rates and in consonance with its own policy, which is uniform vis-a-vis the location and other such agreements, such enhancement could not be faulted by the petitioner. 17. It is further argued that since the operation of the Act of 1971 categorically excludes the Rent Control Act, that is, the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 as well as the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the provisions of the said Act of 1997 cannot be imported through the back door by way of application of the provisions of fair rent as provided in the 1997 Act. 18. The concept of fair rent is totally alien to the Act of 1997 and as such, could not have any bearing on the enhancement of the occupation charges for the premises-in-question. 19. A decision on the present lis necessarily involves a consideration of the definition of "unauthorized occupation" as stipulated in Section 2(g) of the Act of 1971, which is as follows: "Section 2(g): "unauthorised occupation", in relation to any public premises, means the occupation by any person of the public premises without authority for such occupation, and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever." 20. It is seen from the said provision that the applicant in a proceeding under Section 5 of the Act of 1971 could issue a notice under Section 4 of the said Act in case of unauthorized occupation. Such occupation, even if previously legal and governed by an agreement or other mode of transfer, could be determined "for any reason whatsoever". Although the nature of reasons have not been specified in the Act of 1971, merely due to such omission, the grounds envisaged in the Act of 1997 could not be imported for such purpose. 21. Although, as held in Jamshed Hormusji Wadia (supra), a balance has to be struck between profiteering and non-discrimination befitting the State or its instrumentality, the veracity of the reason for determination of jural relationship could not be gone into in detail while taking up an application under Section 5 of the Act of 1971. 22. The moment an occupant is declared to be unauthorized on cogent reasons, the operation of the Act of 1971 takes over and governs the eviction process, thereby excluding the Rent Control Law. 23. Moreover, in the present case, the successive agreements between the parties contemplated enhancement at the rate "not less than 35 percent", which sets the said percentage as the lower limit. Hence, the argument of the petitioner, as to enhancement above 35 percent being de hors the agreement, is not sustainable. 24. In view of the Estate Officer as well the Appellate Court having considered the basis of such enhancement on a factual yardstick, this Court is not inclined to re-appreciate the evidence to upset such findings as far as the rate of enhancement is concerned. In view thereof, the notice of eviction declaring the petitioner to be an unauthorized occupant is sustained and consequentially the order of eviction passed under Section 5 of the Act of 1971 has to be upheld. 25. As far as the damages are concerned, the fora below acted well within jurisdiction to direct the petitioner to pay the amounts as adjudicated in the impugned judgments. 26. However, there is substance in the contention of the petitioner that in view of the findings of the Estate Officer himself, as affirmed by the Appellate Forum, the amount already deposited by the petitioner with the opposite party, kept in the 'suspense account' of the opposite party, should be deducted from the damages awarded. 27. 26. However, there is substance in the contention of the petitioner that in view of the findings of the Estate Officer himself, as affirmed by the Appellate Forum, the amount already deposited by the petitioner with the opposite party, kept in the 'suspense account' of the opposite party, should be deducted from the damages awarded. 27. Accordingly, C.O. No. 3006 of 2018 is disposed of by modifying the impugned order only to the extent that the Appellate Forum will re-assess the amount payable by the petitioner in lieu of damages by deducting the amount already paid by the petitioner and kept in the suspense account of the opposite party from the amount of Rs.2,67,897/- (Rupees Two Lakh Sixty Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety Seven), which has been awarded as damages. 28. Such re-assessment will be done by the Appellate Forum within one working month from the date of communication of this order to the Appellate Forum. It is made clear that the rest of the order impugned herein are affirmed. The petitioner will vacate the premises-in-question within three months from this date, in default the opposite party will be at liberty to take appropriate steps for execution of the eviction order. It is left open for the Appellate Court to grant appropriate time to the petitioner to pay the re-assessed damages. 29. There will be no order as to costs. 30. Urgent certified website copies of this order, if applied for, be made available to the parties upon compliance with requisite formalities.