JUDGMENT : Pramath Patnaik, J. The petitioner has prayed for following reliefs: “(a) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order (s)/direction(s) or a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the office order having reference no.BCCL/EE/X/5/(2)/96-633 dated 3.9.2005 (Annexure-7) issued by the Chairman Cum Managing Director, B.C.C.L by which the penalty of recovery of Rs.4,50,000/- has been imposed upon the petitioner pursuant to the departmental proceeding enquiry under the conduct, discipline and Appeal Rule, 1978. AND (b) The petitioner further prays for issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order (s)/direction(s) or a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the office order having reference no. CIL/Vig./Appeal/A.K.Singh/1839 dated 10.01.2007 issued by the Chairman cum Managing Director and Appellate Authority by which the order passed by the disciplinary authority has been confirmed by the appellate authority without considering the fact that the appellate authority should not have entertained the appeal preferred by the petitioner as because Mr. Partho S. Bhattacharya being the disciplinary authority has also exercised the power of appellate authority on account of his appointment as Chairman, Coal India Limited. AND (c) The petitioner further prays for issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order (s)/direction(s) or a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the office order no.3403-04 dated 9.3.2006 by which the respondents informed the petitioner that the total payable amount on account of E.L. as well as H.P.L. encashment is Rs.4,55,427/- and the amount recovered is Rs.4,86,427/- therefore the said amount has been adjusted to pay the outstanding amount of Rs.31,000/- AND (d) The petitioner further prays for issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order (s)/direction(s) or a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding upon the respondents restraining them to implement the order for recovery of Rs.4,50,000/- from the terminal benefits of the petitioner since no notice was given to the petitioner while determining the liability for any loss to the company/respondent, considering the fact that the Enquiry Officer has only established the charge of negligence against the petitioner and no charge of theft/forge/dishonesty has been established against the petitioner, and moreover while issuing 2nd show cause notice, there was no statement relating to the realization of money, since the same was not also the charge against the petitioner, and therefore, without any determination of the same, no liability can be flashcard upon the petitioner. AND (e) The petitioner further prays for issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order (s)/direction(s) or a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding upon the respondents; to pay immediately the gratuity, leave encashment as well as the other retiral benefits for which the petitioner is entitled, as because the petitioner is entitled for the gratuity under the payment of gratuity Act as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India with regard to Mr. Jaswant Sing Gill Vrs. B.C.C.L. and others and he is also entitled for his leave encashment which could not be deducted under the conduct, discipline and appeal rule, 1978.” 2. Before adverting to the merit of the matter, learned counsel for the petitioner has confined his submission by assailing the order passed by the appellate authority, on the ground that the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority is one and the same and the appellate authority ought not to have entertained the appeal preferred by the petitioner. It is further submitted that the Disciplinary authority has exercised the power of the appellate authority which is not permissible in the eye of law and against all canons of justice and fair play. A man cannot be judge of his own cause. Therefore, it is not liable to be entertained in view of the settled principles of law as reported in (2002) 2 SCC 290 (Amar Nath Chowdhury vs. Braithwaite and Co. Ltd. and Ors.), wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, at paragraph-6, has held as under: “6. One of the principles of natural justice is that no person shall be a judge in his own cause or the adjudicating authority must be impartial and must act without any kind of bias. The said rule against bias has its origin from the maxim known as “nemo debet esse judex in propria causa,” which is based on the principle that justice not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. This could be possible only when a Judge or an adjudicating authority decides the matter impartially and without carrying any kind of bias. Bias may be of different kinds and forms. It may be pecuniary, personal or there may be bias as to the subject-matter etc. In the present case, we are not concerned with any of the aforesaid forms of bias. Bias may be of different kinds and forms. It may be pecuniary, personal or there may be bias as to the subject-matter etc. In the present case, we are not concerned with any of the aforesaid forms of bias. What we are concerned with in the present case is whether an authority can sit in appeal against its own order passed in the capacity of disciplinary authority. In Financial Commr. (Taxation) Punjab v. Harbhajan Singh it was held that the Settlement Officer has no jurisdiction to sit over the order passed by him as an Appellate Authority. In the present case, the subject-matter of appeal before the Board was whether the order of removal passed by the disciplinary authority was in conformity with law. It is not disputed that Shri S. Krishnaswami, the then Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company acted as a disciplinary authority as well as an Appellate Authority when he presided over and participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board while deciding the appeal of the appellant. Such a dual function is not permissible on account of established rule against bias. In a situation where such a dual function is discharged by one and the same authority, unless permitted by an act of legislation or statutory provision, the same would be contrary to rule against bias. Where an authority earlier had taken a decision, he is disqualified to sit in appeal against his own decision, as he already prejudged the matter otherwise such an appeal would be termed an appeal from Caesar to Caesar and filing of an appeal would be an exercise in futility. In that view of the matter, in the present case fair play demanded that Shri Krishnaswami, the then Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the Company ought not to have participated in the deliberations of the meeting of the Board when the Board heard and decided the appeal of the appellant.” 3. As against the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the respondent-BCCL also does not raise serious dispute so far as legal proposition of law is concerned. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and on perusal of the impugned order passed by the appellate authority vide Annexures-9, I find that the appellate authority being the disciplinary authority has passed the impugned order vide Annexure-9 which is liable to be set aside. 5. 4. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and on perusal of the impugned order passed by the appellate authority vide Annexures-9, I find that the appellate authority being the disciplinary authority has passed the impugned order vide Annexure-9 which is liable to be set aside. 5. Without delving into the order of the disciplinary authority, I deem it appropriate to quash the impugned order vide Annexure-9 to the writ application and the same is quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted to the appellate authority, Chairman, Coal India Limited-respondent no.2 to decide the matter afresh, after giving opportunity to the petitioner and pass appropriate order as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of 8 weeks from the date of receipt/communication of the order. 6. With the aforesaid direction, the writ petition stands disposed of.