ORDER : The legality and correctness of the order dated 16.12.2016 passed by the Tahsildar, Bengaluru North Taluk(respondent no.2) in No.MAG(107) CR:392/13-14,(Annexure-M) is assailed in this petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 2. By the said order, Respondent no.2 has appointed the District Health Officer, Bengaluru District as Technical Receiver and Sri H. Sreenivas, Spl. Tahsildar (in-charge) as Administrative Receiver of Padmabhushana Dr. M.C. Modi Public Trust. 3. The brief facts leading to the present petition are that Padmabhushana Dr. M.C. Modi, an eminent Eye Surgeon had founded a Trust by name “Padmabhushana Dr. M.C. Modi Public Trust” (hereinafter referred to as “Trust”), for carrying on several philanthropic activities. The said Trust was registered on 20.9.1965. He was the author of the Trust. He passed away on 11.11.2005. On his demise, Dr. Suvarana Modi and Dr. Amaranath Modi continued as Trustees. Dr. Suvarana Modi passed away on 26.08.2012 and Dr.Amaranath Modi died on 28.01.2014. After his death, certain persons filed O.S.No.837/2014 before the City Civil Court seeking appointment of Trustees. A Complaint was also lodged before respondent No.1/Mahalakshimpuram Police Station, in Cr.No.41/2014 against one Nanjundappa and others including the petitioner herein. In the said complaint, Tahsildar, Bengaluru North Taluk, appointed the Spl. Tahsildar, Bengaluru North Taluk, as Receiver of the Trust by order dated 31.05.2014(Annexure-‘D’). In the meanwhile, certain other proceedings were initiated in Small Cause No.1458/2011 before the Chief Judge of Small Causes Court, Bengaluru. The aforesaid Najundappa filed a memo therein claiming that he was the Administrator. The Small Causes Judge, passed an order dated 08.08.2014 holding that said Mr. Nanjundappa had no authority to manage the Trust property. 4. In the year 2016, one H.M. Oswal made a petition to the Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga, for appointment of Trustee/s to the Trust. The Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga District, issued an endorsement informing him that after the formation of Davanagere District, the Deputy Commissioner, Davanagere, may be approached for doing the needful. Mr. Oswal, approached the Deputy Commissioner, Davanagere, requesting to exercise his power as per Clause-10 of the Trust Deed, dated 20.09.1965 to appoint Trustee/s. The Deputy Commissioner, Davanagere appointed the petitioner herein as a sole trustee in terms of clause 10 of the Trust Deed dated 20.09.1965 as per order dated 24.06.2016. Mr. Oswal, approached the Deputy Commissioner, Davanagere, requesting to exercise his power as per Clause-10 of the Trust Deed, dated 20.09.1965 to appoint Trustee/s. The Deputy Commissioner, Davanagere appointed the petitioner herein as a sole trustee in terms of clause 10 of the Trust Deed dated 20.09.1965 as per order dated 24.06.2016. In view of the appointment of the petitioner as a sole Trustee, the Tahisldar, Bengaluru North Taluk/respondent no.2, who had earlier appointed the Special Tahsildar as Receiver by his order dated 31.05.2014, withdrew the said appointment vide Annexure-‘G’ dated 18.07.2016. In the meanwhile, a writ petition came to be filed by Smt. Leeladevi R Prasad and others in W.P.No.39158-161/2016, before the High Court of Karnataka challenging the appointment of the petitioner as a Sole Trustee. After hearing the parties, this Court passed an order dated 19.07.2016 directing the parties to maintain status-quo. 5. Even though, the Special Tahsildar had ceased to be the Receiver with effect from 18.07.2016 by virtue of the order dated 18.07.2016, he failed to hand over the charge to the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner made series of complaints to the police and several authorities and left with no other alternative, petitioner filed O.S.No.8028/2016, wherein he moved an application seeking to restrain the Spl. Tahsildar from acting as Receiver of the Trust, in view of the withdrawal of his appointment. At that stage, the Deputy Commissioner of Bengaluru North Taluk (respondent no.5), addressed a letter to the Tahsildar, Bengaluru North Taluk (respondent No.2) to take action to appoint the District Health Officer, Bengaluru District as Technical Receiver and Spl. Tahsildar, Bengaluru North Taluk, as Administrative Receiver in view of the impending superannuation of Sri. K. Gopalaswamy, Spl. Tahsildar. Based on this letter, respondent no.2/Tahsildar passed the impugned order appointing the District Health Officer, Bengaluru District, as Technical Receiver and Sri. H Srinivas, the Special Tahsildar (in-charge), as Administrative Receiver of the Trust, which is challenged in this petition. 6. Initially, the petition was filed only against respondent nos.1 to 5. Later, respondent nos.6 and 7 got themselves impleaded and have filed a detailed statement of objections opposing the petition, inter alia, denying the various assertions made by the petitioner. The other applicants including the employees of the various institutions and hospitals run by the Trust have also filed I.A.nos.6/18, 8/18, 9/18 and 1/18 seeking to implead them in this petition. 7. The other applicants including the employees of the various institutions and hospitals run by the Trust have also filed I.A.nos.6/18, 8/18, 9/18 and 1/18 seeking to implead them in this petition. 7. I have heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri.K Subba Rao, on behalf of Sri K Anandarama, appearing for the petitioner; Smt. Pramila Nesargi, learned Senior Counsel for Ajay Kumar, M., appearing for respondents No.6 and 7; Sri V Vishwanath, learned counsel for B.J. Nanjundaradhya, appearing for proposed respondents no. 8 to 16; Sri. T.N. Raghupaathy, learned counsel for proposed respondents no.16 and 17; Sri. R.B. Sadasivappa, learned counsel for proposed respondents no.18 to 23; and Sri. M.I. Arun for H.R. Narayana Rao, appearing for the proposed respondents no.24 and 25. 8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner has raised the following contentions: (i) The proceedings initiated by the Tahsildar under Section 145 Cr.P.C. in Cr.No.41/2014 was closed on 18.07.2016. As a result, no proceedings were pending on the date of passing the impugned order. Therefore, respondent No.2 had no jurisdiction to exercise power under Section 146 of Cr.P.C. Hence, the impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction. (ii) Respondent no.2 has failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Section 146 of Cr.P.C. in appointing Receivers to the Trust in question. (iii) In the absence of any grounds for his satisfaction, that there was likelihood of breach of peace, respondent no.2 could not have assumed jurisdiction to appoint Receivers. It is one of the mandatory requirement under Section 145(1) and 146(1) of Cr.P.C., that the authority, who passes the order should apply his mind to the material placed before him and arrive at a conclusion that there was breach of peace in respect of the dispute relating to the property. The impugned order suffers from non-application of mind and non-disclosure of the grounds on which the Magistrate has passed the impugned order. (iv) Attachment of the subject of dispute is condition precedent to appoint a Receiver under Section 146(2) of Cr.P.C. The impugned order has been made without first attaching the subject property, which has rendered the appointment illegal without jurisdiction. (v) As per the provisions of Section 146 of the Code, discretion to appoint the receiver is vested only with the Magistrate. He is required to take independent decision based on the material produced by the police. (v) As per the provisions of Section 146 of the Code, discretion to appoint the receiver is vested only with the Magistrate. He is required to take independent decision based on the material produced by the police. Impugned order is passed solely on the basis of the directions issued by the Deputy Commissioner. Respondent no.2 has merely carried out the directions of the Deputy Commissioner and has acted at his dictates; as a result, the entire proceedings are vitiated. (vi) The Deputy Commissioner and the Tahsildar have proceeded on the erroneous assumption that the Special Tahsildar appointed by order dated 31.05.2014, Sri K. Gopalaswamy continued to act as Receiver till the date of his superannuation. Both the authorities have failed to note that the appointment of Sri K Goapalaswamy was cancelled by the subsequent order dated 18.07.2016. Therefore, there was no basis for the Tahsildar to appoint the incumbent officers as Receivers to the Trust in question. (vii) Even otherwise, the superannuation of the erstwhile Receiver could not have furnished a ground for respondent no.2 to appoint a fresh Receiver. Respondent no.2, has acted in contravention of the provisions of Section 145 and 146 of the Code. Hence, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the appointment made by him are liable to be quashed. 9. In support of his argument, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on the following decisions: (i) 1991 CRI. L.J. 1556= ILR 1985 KAR 4038 Bomma Kom Narayan Naik Vs. Vomma Kom Narayan Naik (ii) 1989(2) SCC 505 State of U.P. Vs. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh. (iii) 1969(1) SCC 308 The Purtabpore C. Ltd., Vs. Cane Commissioner of Bihar & others. (iv) AIR 1952 SC 16 Commissioner of Police, Bombay Vs Gordhandas Bhanji. (v) (1978) 1 Supreme Court Cases, 210, Chandu Naik And Others Vs. Sitram B Naik and Another. (vi) (1979) 4 Supreme Court Cases, 665, Mathuralal Vs. Bhanwarlal & another. 10. Refuting the above contentions, Smt. Pramila Nesargi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for contesting respondents no.6 and 7 would contend that the impugned order is only a continuation of the earlier order passed by respondent no.2, whereby Sri. K Gopalaswamy, Spl. Tahisldar was appointed as Receiver. The said order has not been challenged either by the petitioner or any other interested persons. Therefore, the petitioner is estopped from questioning the appointment made by respondent no.2. 11. K Gopalaswamy, Spl. Tahisldar was appointed as Receiver. The said order has not been challenged either by the petitioner or any other interested persons. Therefore, the petitioner is estopped from questioning the appointment made by respondent no.2. 11. Secondly, she contends that the impugned order does not suffer from any error or infirmity as sought to be made out by the petitioner. The impugned order clearly reflects application of mind. The grounds giving rise to the invocation of power under Section 146(1) of Cr.P.C. are spelt out in the order. The order refers to series of litigations between the parties and the pendency of the suit as well as the writ petition and the likelihood of breach of the peace. The “Padmabhushana Dr. M.C. Modi Public Trust” is a public Trust. The persons appointed by respondent no.2 are the officials of the Revenue Department, who do not have any private interest in the activities of the Trust. The action initiated by respondent no.2 is in the interest of the Trust and therefore, cannot be faulted with on the purported contentions urged by the petitioner. 12. Learned counsels appearing for the proposed parties have argued in line with the learned counsel for respondent nos.6 and 7 and have sought for dismissal of the petition contending that respondent no.2 has lawfully exercised jurisdiction vested in him under Section 145 and 146 of Cr.P.C.(for short hereinafter referred to as “Code”) and the impugned order does not suffer from any error or illegality as sought to be made out by the petitioner. 13. I have bestowed my anxious consideration to the rival contentions urged by the parties and have carefully perused the elaborate pleadings and documents produced by the respective parties. 14. In the light of the contentions urged by the parties, the point that arise for consideration is : “Whether the appointment of the District Health Officer, Bengaluru as Technical Receiver and the Spl. Tahsildar (in charge), Bengaluru North Taluk as Administrative Receiver of Padmabhushana Dr. M.C. Modi Public Trust is in accordance with Section 146 of Cr.P.C.? 15. Section 146 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows: “146. Tahsildar (in charge), Bengaluru North Taluk as Administrative Receiver of Padmabhushana Dr. M.C. Modi Public Trust is in accordance with Section 146 of Cr.P.C.? 15. Section 146 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows: “146. Power to attach subject of dispute and to appoint receiver -(1) If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under sub-section (1) of section 145 considers the case to be one of emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was then in such possession as is referred to in section 145, or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach the subject of dispute until a competent Court has determined the rights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof: Provided that such Magistrate may withdraw the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no longer any likelihood of breach of the peach with regard to the subject of dispute. (2) When the Magistrate attaches the subject of dispute, he may, if no receiver in relation to such subject of dispute has been appointed by any Civil Court, make such arrangements as he considers proper for looking after the property or if he thinks fit, appoint a receiver thereof, who shall have, subject to the control of the Magistrate, all the powers of a receiver appointed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908): Provided that in the event of a receiver being subsequently appointed in relation to the subject of dispute by any Civil Court, the Magistrate- (a) shall order the receiver appointed by him to hand over the possession of the subject of dispute to the receiver appointed by the Civil Court and shall thereafter discharge the receiver appointed by him; (b) may make such other incidental or consequential orders as may be just. 16. Interpreting the scope and purport of Section 146(1) of the Code, in the light of Section 145 of Cr.P.C., this Court in Bomma Kom Narayan Naik V. Bomma Kom Narayana Naik, ILR 1985, Kant 4038, in para No.12, has held as under: “12. 16. Interpreting the scope and purport of Section 146(1) of the Code, in the light of Section 145 of Cr.P.C., this Court in Bomma Kom Narayan Naik V. Bomma Kom Narayana Naik, ILR 1985, Kant 4038, in para No.12, has held as under: “12. … Thus, a close analysis of sub-section (1) of Section 146 in the light of the provisions contained in Section 145, shows that the Magistrate could attach the subject of dispute in the case of emergency during the pendency of the enquiry before him after a preliminary order under sub-section (1) of Section 145 was passed and before the enquiry is completed whereas attachment of the property under the second and third grounds could be made at the conclusion of the enquiry under Section 145. However, the fact remains that the power of the Magistrate to attach the subject of dispute under Section 146 is subject to the existence of grounds stipulated in sub-section (1) and unless such ground exists he has no power to attach the subject of dispute. Necessarily it follows that the Magistrate shall state the ground for attachment of the subject of dispute, in his order. 17. If the impugned order is analyzed in the light of the principles enunciated in the above decision and the provisions contained in Sections 145 and 146 of the Code, it is apparent that respondent no.2 has neither ordered for attachment of property nor has he made even a slightest attempt to satisfy himself as to the existence of the grounds warranting exercise of power to appoint a Receiver to the aforesaid Trust. 18. No doubt, respondent no.2 has made reference to the events leading to the impugned order, but that by itself do not satisfy the requirement of the Section. Mere narration of the events cannot be construed as application of mind or arriving at a satisfaction about the existence of the grounds so as to attach the subject of dispute or to appoint a Receive thereto. 19. From the reading of Section 146 of the Code, it is clear that under the said provision, Magistrate is empowered to appoint Receiver only after attachment of the subject matter of dispute. The very heading of Section 146 of the Code reads “power to attach subject of dispute and to appoint receiver”. 19. From the reading of Section 146 of the Code, it is clear that under the said provision, Magistrate is empowered to appoint Receiver only after attachment of the subject matter of dispute. The very heading of Section 146 of the Code reads “power to attach subject of dispute and to appoint receiver”. It is true that once the property is attached, it does not automatically follow that in all cases, receiver should be appointed for looking after the property. In view of Section 146(2) of the Code, the Magistrate has discretion either to appoint a Receiver or to make some other arrangements for the preservation of the property in dispute. But in no case, the Magistrate has power to appoint Receiver without first attaching the subject of dispute. As laid down by this Court in the case of Bomma Kom Narayan Naik supra, attachment of the subject Code is a condition precedent to appoint a Receiver under sub- Section(2). 20. A close reading of Section 145 and 146 of the Code makes it evident that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to attach the subject of dispute arises under three circumstances, viz., in case of emergency; (ii) when none of the rival parties are found in possession of subject of dispute; (iii) when it is not possible to take decision as to the possession of the disputed property. Therefore, it is necessarily follows that without the existence of these grounds, the Magistrate cannot assume jurisdiction either to attach the subject of dispute or to appoint a Receiver under Section 146 of the Code. 21. In order to better understand the scope of the enquiry and the extent of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under the above provisions, it may be useful to refer to the elucidation of the law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Mathuralal Vs. Bhanwarlal and Another, reported in (1979) 4 SCC, 665. Para no.4 of the said judgment reads as follows: “4. Quite, obviously, Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code together constitute a scheme for the resolution of a situation where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace because of a dispute concerning any land or water or their boundaries. Para no.4 of the said judgment reads as follows: “4. Quite, obviously, Sections 145 and 146 of the Criminal Procedure Code together constitute a scheme for the resolution of a situation where there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace because of a dispute concerning any land or water or their boundaries. If Section 146 is torn out of its setting and read independently of Section 145, it is capable of being construed to mean that once an attachment is effected in any of the three situations mentioned therein, the dispute can only be resolved by a competent Court and not by the Magistrate effecting the attachment. But Section 146 cannot be so separated from Section 145. It can only be read in the context of Section 145. Contextual construction must surely prevail over isolationist construction. Otherwise, it may mislead. That is one of the first principles of construction. Let us therefore, look at Section 145 and consider Section146 in that context. Section 145 contemplates, first, the satisfaction of the Magistrate that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water or their boundaries, and, next, the issuance of an order, known to lawyers practising in the criminal courts as a preliminary order, stating the grounds of his satisfaction and requiring the parties concerned to attend his Court and to put in written statements of their respective claims as regards the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute. A preliminary order is considered so basic to a proceeding under Section 145 that a failure to draw up a preliminary order has been held by several High Courts to vitiate all the subsequent proceedings. It is by making a preliminary order that the Magistrate assumes jurisdiction to proceed under Sections 145 and 146….” 22. The manner in which the Magistrate is required to proceed for disposing of the proceedings under Section 145 and 146 of the Code has been succinctly elucidated by the Apex Court in Chandu Naik & Others Vs. Sitaram B Naik and Another, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 210 . In para no.7 thereof it is held that : “7. The Magistrate, in the first instance, will try to conclude the proceeding in accordance with the various provisions of Section 145 of the Code. Sitaram B Naik and Another, reported in (1978) 1 SCC 210 . In para no.7 thereof it is held that : “7. The Magistrate, in the first instance, will try to conclude the proceeding in accordance with the various provisions of Section 145 of the Code. If he is able to declare the possession of either party on consideration of the evidence adduced or to be adduced before him he would do so. In that event the other party will be forbidden from creating any disturbance of the possession (including the deemed possession, in case the application of the proviso to sub-section (4) is found necessary) of the party declared in possession. The Magistrate, then, will have to withdraw the attachment in accordance with the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 146, because, as per his order declaring a party in possession there would be no longer any likelihood of the breach of the peace with regard to the subject of dispute. The party not found in possession by the Magistrate will have to seek the redress of his grievance, if any, elsewhere. If, however, the Magistrate decides that none of the parties was in possession of the disputed property on the date of the order made under sub-section (1) of Section 145 or if he is unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in possession of the subject of dispute he need not lift the attachment until a competent Court had determined the rights of the parties as provided for in Section 146(1). In such a situation recourse, if necessary, may be taken to sub-section (2) of Section 146 of the Code either by the Magistrate or a Civil Court, as the case may be.” 23. The above exposition makes it abundantly clear that the provisions of Section 145 and 146 of the Code constitute a scheme by themselves and both these provisions are required to be read together when the jurisdiction of the authorities is invoked for resolution of the situation where there is likelihood of breach of peace because of a dispute concerning any land or water or their boundaries. 24. 24. As per the above provisions, Magistrate is first required to arrive at a satisfaction that the dispute likely to cause breach of peace concerning any land or water or their dispute and next he is required to pass preliminary order, stating the grounds of his satisfaction and calling upon the parties to attend his Court and to put in written statements of the respective claims. The preliminary order is the basis to a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code. It is only after making the order under sub-Section(1) of Section 145 of the Code, if the Magistrate considers the case is one of emergency, and if he is unable to satisfy as to which of the rival claimants are in possession of subject of dispute, he may attach the subject of dispute. 25. In view of he above provisions, the order of attachment passed under sub-Section(1) of Section 146 of the Code would continue until a competent Court has determined the rights of the parties to the subject property. Form No.26 of the Code provides for the format of the warrant of attachment in case of dispute as to the possession of land etc., But in view of the above provision and the exposition of law made in the above decision, without an order of attachment under Section 146 of the Code, the Tahsildar does not derive jurisdiction to take possession of the subject of dispute. A fortori, without taking possession of the subject property, he cannot put the Receiver in possession of the subject of dispute. The effect of order of attachment is to place the property in custodia legis. By virtue of the attachment, the Magistrate holds the property for and on behalf of the party, who will ultimately succeed, even though the legal possession continues with the lawful owner. Therefore, without there being an attachment in force, the Receiver cannot enter into the property and take administration thereof. There being the position of law, the order of appointment of Receiver without first effecting the attachment of the properties would obviously is opposed to the scheme provided under Section 145 and 146 of the Code, thereby rendering the whole exercise invalid and illegal. 26. There being the position of law, the order of appointment of Receiver without first effecting the attachment of the properties would obviously is opposed to the scheme provided under Section 145 and 146 of the Code, thereby rendering the whole exercise invalid and illegal. 26. If the impugned order is analysed in the light of the above principles, the only conclusion that be drawn is that it does not satisfy any of the procedural and legal requirements prescribed in Section145 and 146 of the Code. The operative portion of the impugned order reads as follows : xxx xxxx 27. A bare perusal of the impugned order reveals that the learned Magistrate has proceeded to appoint the District Health Officer as Technical Receiver and Special Tashildar(in-charge) as Administrative Receiver solely on the basis of the direction issued by the Deputy Commissioner Davanagere. There is nothing in the impugned order to indicate that the police officer has placed any material before respondent no.2 so as to arrive at a prima facie satisfaction that the grounds contemplated under Section 145 and 146 of Cr.P.C. existed either to attach the subject dispute or to appoint a Receiver thereto. Respondent no.2 has failed to hold any enquiry and to pass preliminary order as contemplated under Section 145(1) of the Code, so as to proceed with appointment of Receiver under Section 146(2) of the Code. On the other hand, respondent no.2 appears to have surrendered his discretion to the dictates of the Deputy Commissioner, Davanagere and has merely carried out the directions issued by him without following any of the procedural requirements laid down in Sections 145 and 146 of the Code. 28. The Tahsildar as well as the Deputy Commissioner, Davanagere have proceeded on the erroneous assumption that Sri. K Gopalaswamy, Receiver appointed as per order No.MAG/107 CR:392/13-14 dated 16.12.2016 continued to act as a Receiver till the date of his Superannuation. The records produced before this Court clearly disclose that by the subsequent order passed by the Tashildar on 18.07.2016, the appointment of Sri. K. Gopalaswamy, as Receiver was revoked and cancelled. K Gopalaswamy, Receiver appointed as per order No.MAG/107 CR:392/13-14 dated 16.12.2016 continued to act as a Receiver till the date of his Superannuation. The records produced before this Court clearly disclose that by the subsequent order passed by the Tashildar on 18.07.2016, the appointment of Sri. K. Gopalaswamy, as Receiver was revoked and cancelled. As a result, there was no basis for the Deputy Commissioner to direct the Tahsildar to appoint a successor to the erstwhile Receiver nor was there any basis for respondent no.2 to proceed with the appointment of District Health Officer and in-charge Tahsildar as Receiver to the Trust in place of the aforesaid Sri K Gopalaswamy. Even otherwise, the superannuation of the Receiver cannot be as a ground for appointment of Receiver to the subject of dispute. 29. Thus on over all consideration of the above facts and circumstances and the position of law enunciated in the authorities referred above, I hold that respondent no.2 has failed to follow the requirements of Sections 145 and 146 of the Cr.P.C. The impugned order does not disclose the grounds to attach the subject of dispute. Respondent no.2 has not arrived at any satisfaction as to the existence of any emergency or such other grounds to assume jurisdiction into the matter. Respondent no.2 has committed a grave error in appointing the Receiver without first effecting attachment of subject of dispute. As a result, the action taken by respondent no.2 being contrary to the provisions of Sections 145 and 146 of the Code cannot be sustained. The impugned order is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The impugned order bearing no.MAG(107)CR:392/2013-14 dated 16.12.2016 passed by respondent no.2 vide Annexure-‘M’ is set aside and the matter is remitted to Respondent no.2 to proceed in the matter strictly in accordance with Sections 145 and 146 of the Code in the light of the observations made in this order. In the event, respondent no.2 finds it necessary to make any arrangement either by way of attachment or by way of appointment of a Receiver, he shall do so in accordance with the provisions of Sections 145 and 146 of the Cr.P.C., within 30 days from the date of this order. Until then for a period of 30 days from today, by way of interim arrangement, the Spl. Until then for a period of 30 days from today, by way of interim arrangement, the Spl. Tahsildar, Bengaluru North Taluk, shall act as the Receiver of ‘Padmabhushana Dr.M.C. Modi Public Trust’. In view of disposal of the petition, I.A.No.1/17 & 3/17 and I.A.Nos.5/17,7/17 and I.A.No.10/17 do not survive for consideration and the same are dismissed. I.A.Nos.6/17,8/17,9/17 and I.A.No.1/18 filed by the proposed respondents stand disposed of in terms of the above order.