JUDGMENT : P.V. ASHA, J. The issue arising in this case is whether the recommendation in Justice Shetty Commission Report to grant advance increments to candidates having Post Graduation in Law applies to the District Judges also and whether the order passed by Government on 23.11.2013 as modified on 17.11.2017 to the extent it limits the advance increments only to those District Judges who were in service on 22.11.2013 and denies the same with effect from 01.07.1996 is discriminatory. 2. The petitioner who commenced his service as a District Judge on 18.08.1995, on direct recruitment, was elevated as a Judge of this High Court on 18.01.2012 and demitted office on 24.11.2015. At the time of his recruitment as District Judge in the Kerala State Higher Judicial Service, he was holding LLM Degree from the University of Kerala. The Government of India had constituted the First National Judicial Pay Commission under the Chairmanship of Justice K.J. Shetty and the Commission had submitted its Report on 11.11.1999. Several recommendations were made in the Report with respect to the qualifications, process of recruitment, scale of pay etc. of Judicial Officers. In paragraph 8.46 of the report, the Commission deliberated the provisions for granting additional benefits to candidates selected for appointment as Civil Judges (Jr. Division) possessing higher qualification, observing that Delhi Administration and the State of Rajastan alone were providing additional benefits to candidates with higher qualifications. In paragraph 8.48, the Commission recommended that candidates with Post Graduation in Law be granted three advance increments as allowed by the Delhi Administration, pointing out that Post Graduation in Law is a difficult course. In Ext.P1 judgment dated 21.3.2002 in All India Judges Association (3) and Others V. Union of India and others : (2002)4 SCC 247 most of the recommendations in Justice Shetty Commission Report were accepted and certain recommendations were accepted with certain modifications. However with respect to the recommendation regarding advance increments, there was no modification. The apex court directed implementation of Justice Shetty Commission Report with effect from 01.07.1996. On the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the Government of Kerala issued Ext.P3 order on 28.03.2007 sanctioning three advance increments to the candidates selected for appointment to the post of Munsiff-Magistrates having Post Graduation in Law. The apex court directed implementation of Justice Shetty Commission Report with effect from 01.07.1996. On the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court, the Government of Kerala issued Ext.P3 order on 28.03.2007 sanctioning three advance increments to the candidates selected for appointment to the post of Munsiff-Magistrates having Post Graduation in Law. Even though the benefit of that order was initially confined to those appointed after the date of that order, on the basis of Ext.P4 judgment in WP(C) No. 34846 of 2008, the Government issued Ext.P6 order dated 20.9.2012 extending the benefit of advance increment to all Munsiff-Magistrates recruited with Post Graduation in Law who were in service on 01.07.1996 and to the Munsiff-Magistrates recruited thereafter with Post Graduation in Law. 3. The petitioner submits that the High Court of Kerala had by Ext.P7 letter dated 17.07.2013 addressed the Government requesting to extend the benefit of advance increments to the District Judges holding Post Graduate Degree also, who were appointed by direct recruitment. In the letter it was pointed out that advance increments are liable to be sanctioned to the District Judges also in the true spirit of the Shetty Commission Report, considering the fact that higher qualifications were really beneficial in the discharge of duties of District Judges. Pointing out that denial of advance increments to the District Judges with Post Graduation in Law was discriminatory, it was requested to extend the benefit to the District Judges who were in service on 01.07.1996 and those recruited thereafter having Post Graduate Degree in Law. Thereafter Government issued Ext.P8 order dated 22.11.2013 according sanction to grant three advance increments to the District Judges appointed by direct recruitment from the Bar and having Post Graduation in Law at the time of recruitment with prospective effect. The High Court again addressed the Government with Ext.P9 representation on 09.12.2013 requesting to extend the benefit to all the District Judges recruited with Post Graduation in Law and were in service as on 01.07.1996 and recruited thereafter, pointing out that it was discriminatory to deny the benefit with effect from 01.07.1996 as the recommendations of the Shetty Commission Report were to be implemented with effect from 01.07.1996. Thereupon by Ext.P10 letter dated 12.05.2014 Government informed the High Court that the grant of advance increments to the District Judges appointed by direct recruitment from the Bar was not as a matter of right but a leniency from the part of Government. It was stated that neither the Shetty Commission nor the Padmanabhan Commission had recommended advance increments to those in the higher judiciary. It was also stated that giving retrospective effect to the benefit would have far reaching implications and therefore it was informed that advance increments cannot be granted with retrospective effect from 01.07.1996. Government was addressed again as per Ext.P11 order pointing out the discrimination. Again Government rejected the representation as per Ext.P12 letter reiterating that the grant of advance increments to District Judges was only a lenient action and if retrospective effect is granted it would have far reaching financial implications. Thereupon in Ext.P13 letter High Court again addressed the Government pointing out that if at all the retrospective effect is granted the number of District Judges who would be eligible for the same would be only 7, furnishing the details of 7 persons and pointing out that there would not be any far reaching consequences. Again Government informed that District Judges were not granted advance increments based on the recommendation of Justice Shetty Commission and that the said recommendation is confined to the judicial officers of Junior Division in the Judicial Service in order to attract better talents and Government had already sanctioned the benefit to all the Munsiff-Magistrates recruited with Post Graduation in Law from 01.07.1996 onwards. Petitioner filed this writ petition in the above circumstances challenging the orders Exts.P8, P10, P12 and P14. 4. During the pendency of the writ petition, Government issued another order Ext.P15 on 17.11.2017, extending the benefit of three advance increments to all the District Judges directly recruited from the Bar and having Post Graduation in Law, at the time of entry in service with effect from 22.11.2013. 5. Ext.P15 order was issued in implementation of the judgment dated 10.03.2017 in WP(C) No.23252 of 2016. In WP(C) No.23252 of 2016 the petitioner therein challenged the order granting advance increment to the District Judges to the extent the benefit was confined to those appointed subsequent to 22.11.2013. 5. Ext.P15 order was issued in implementation of the judgment dated 10.03.2017 in WP(C) No.23252 of 2016. In WP(C) No.23252 of 2016 the petitioner therein challenged the order granting advance increment to the District Judges to the extent the benefit was confined to those appointed subsequent to 22.11.2013. In Ext.R1(a) judgment produced along with the counter affidavit, this Court found that the intention of the order Ext.P8 was only to grant increments to all the Judges directly recruited from the Bar with Post Graduation in Law but with prospective effect and the benefit would be granted with effect from the date of the order and that it cannot be confined to the officers appointed after that date. Ext.P15 order was passed thereafter extending the benefit of advance increments to all District Judges directly recruited from the Bar and having Post Graduation in Law at the time of entry in service, with effect from 22.11.2013. 6. Petitioner thereupon amended the writ petition incorporating the challenge against Ext.P15 order to the extent it denies the benefit with effect from 01.07.1996 i.e. to all the District Judges who were having LLM from 01.07.1996 onwards. It is alleged that an artificial cut off date 22.11.2013 is fixed arbitrarily. Petitioner claims that the benefit is liable to be extended to all judicial officers similarly situated with effect from 01.07.1996 or the date of acquisition of Post Graduate Degree in Law. It is also alleged that the classification of District Judges for the purpose of grant of advance increments on the basis of the dates of their appointment does not have any rationale and is therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. According to the petitioner, the view adopted by the Government that the grant of advance increments is only by way of leniency and not on the basis of the recommendations of Justice Shetty commission is unsustainable. 7. The 1st respondent filed a counter affidavit on 18.9.2018 and additional counter affidavit on 23.10.2018. According to the respondent the recommendation of the Shetty Commission was to grant three advance increments only to the Judicial Officers in the Junior Division for attracting better talents to the Judicial Service and there is no recommendation for giving the same benefit to Judicial Officers in Higher Judicial Service. According to the respondent the recommendation of the Shetty Commission was to grant three advance increments only to the Judicial Officers in the Junior Division for attracting better talents to the Judicial Service and there is no recommendation for giving the same benefit to Judicial Officers in Higher Judicial Service. It is stated that neither the Shetty Commission or the Padmanabahn Commission recommended advance increment to those having Post Graduation in Law in the Higher Judiciary. The Government extended the benefit of three advance increments to the District Judges appointed by direct recruitment from the Bar and having Post Graduation at the time of recruitment with prospective effect from 22.11.2013. It was only as a matter of leniency and not as a matter of right and it was not issued on the basis of recommendation of any Commission. It is stated that in WP(C) No.23252 of 2016, the prospective operation extended in Ext.P8 order was under challenge as all the District Judges who were qualified for the same were not extended the benefit. It is also pointed out that even in the judgment Ext.R1(a) it was observed that recommendations were confined to the Subordinate Judiciary referring to the Junior Division of Judicial Service. In that case the extension of benefit to those who were appointed after the date of order was directed to be reconsidered. Therefore it is stated that only those District Judges who were in service as on the date of the order Ext.P8 would be eligible for the benefit. Ext.R1(b) order was passed thereafter based on the direction in Ext.R1(a) judgment. The petitioner who was elevated as an additional Judge of the High Court on 18.01.2012 well before Ext.R1(b) order was issued is therefore not eligible for the benefit of Ext.P8 order. In the additional counter affidavit filed, the 1st respondent produced the relevant portion of the Shetty Commission Report and stated that the recommendation to grant advance increments was only to the Junior Division Judicial Officers and not to District Judges. 8. Sri. In the additional counter affidavit filed, the 1st respondent produced the relevant portion of the Shetty Commission Report and stated that the recommendation to grant advance increments was only to the Junior Division Judicial Officers and not to District Judges. 8. Sri. V.V. Asokan, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner pointed out that the benefit was granted to Judicial Officers in the State of Gujarat and in the judgment dated 01.04.2014 of the Supreme Court in W.P.(C) No.19 of 2012 filed by one Bharatkumar Shantilal Thakkar, it was directed to extend the benefit of advance increments to those acquired higher qualification on or before 01.11.1999, with effect from 01.07.1996, instead of the decision of the Government to grant it to those acquired on or after 01.11.1999. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also relied on the judgment of the Allahabad High Court where an order dated 13.05.2009 of UP State granting the benefit of advance increments to the Judicial Officers with Post Graduate Degree in Law with effect from 21.03.2002 was challenged by those who acquired the higher qualification after joining service. It was held that the denial of benefit to those officers who acquired/acquire higher qualification of LLM after joining service also would be eligible for the advance increments with effect from the date of joining service or from the date of implementation of the Government order. The learned Senior Counsel relied on a series of judgments reported in State of W.B. vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar and another : AIR 1952 SC 75 , Thathunni Moopil Nair and others vs. State of Kerala : AIR 1961 SC 552 , Prabodh Verma and others V State of UP and Others: (1984) 4 SCC 251 , Motor General Traders and another vs. State of A.P. and others : 1984 (1) SCC 222 , Raj Pal Sharma and others vs. State of Haryana and others : AIR 1985 SC 1263 , State of U.P. And others vs. Deepak Fertilizers and Petrochemical Corporation Ltd : 2007 (10) SCC 342 , Bharati Telemedia ltd. vs. Union of India : 2016 (1) KLT 312 etc. and argued that the cut off date fixed is arbitrary and the classification of Judicial Officers for the purpose of grant of advance increment despite having the very same qualification is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. vs. Union of India : 2016 (1) KLT 312 etc. and argued that the cut off date fixed is arbitrary and the classification of Judicial Officers for the purpose of grant of advance increment despite having the very same qualification is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The judgment in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s.Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. : 1992 (4) SCC 363 , State of Punjab vs. Baldev Singh : 1999 (6) SCC 172 , Ambica Quarry Works vs. State of Gujarat and others : 1987 (1) SCC 213 and Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd and others : 2003 (2) SCC 111 were relied on in support of the contention that each case has to be decided on its own facts. 9. It was pointed out that when the 1st writ petition was filed by the Munsiffs filing WP(C) No.34846 of 2008 the petitioners therein had sought for the benefit only with effect from 01.11.1999. However, later when the writ petition was allowed and the writ appeal was dismissed Government themselves sought to extend the benefit to those who were in service from 01.07.1996 onwards. Similarly in the case of Dr. Kauser Edappagat-the petitioner in WP(C) No.23252 of 2016, direction sought was only to grant the benefit to all the District Judges with effect from the date of Ext.P8 order viz. 22.11.2013. Therefore it was argued that the judgment therein cannot be understood to have denied the benefit of increments with effect from 01.07.1996 the date from which the Report of Justice Shetty Commission was implemented. 10. On the other hand, Smt. M.R. Sreeletha, the learned Special Government Pleader, referring to each of the paragraphs in Chapter 8 of Justice Shetty Commission Report, argued that recommendation to grant advance increments to those having Post Graduation in Law in paragraph 8.48 comes under Chapter 8 of the Report, which deals with 'Recruitment to the Cadre of Civil Judges (Junior Division)-cum-Magistrates First Class'. Pointing out that Chapter 8 and para 8.48 dealt with only the Judicial Officers in Junior Division and that District Judges are dealt with in Chapter 10, which does not contain any such recommendation, it was argued that the recommendation in Justice Shetty Commission Report for granting advance increments for having Post Graduation in Law is confined to Judicial Officers in the cadre of Junior Division like Munsiff-Magistrates and not to the District Judges and therefore petitioner's claim for advance increment as a benefit arising out of implementation of Shetty Commission Report is unsustainable. 11. The question which arises for consideration is whether the recommendation in paragraph 8.48 of the Shetty Commission Report envisages the benefit of advance increments to all the Judicial Officers in the entry cadre including District Judges. A perusal of the Report of Shetty Commission Report shows that Chapter 8 of the Report dealt with recruitment to the cadre of Civil Judges (Junior Division-cum Magistrates First Class). This chapter deals with the Recruitment Rules of various States to the cadre of Civil Judges Junior Division cum Magistrates which includes qualification, method of appointment, etc. The additional benefit for higher qualification is dealt with from paragraph 8.46 to 8.49. In paragraph 8.46 the Commission found that in Delhi three advance increments were allowed for candidates having higher qualification than prescribed minimum qualification observing that there is no other State providing additional benefit to a candidate selected for Civil Judges (Jr. Division) possessing higher qualification. In paragraph 8.48 it was recommended : “if selected candidates are having a higher qualification like Post Graduation in Law we recommend that three advance increments be given as it is allowed by the Delhi Administration. It is an acknowledged fact that Post Graduation is a difficult course and it is better to reward such candidates.” 12. At the same time in paragraph 8.49 it was decided that no bonus should be given to those having more experience than the minimum prescribed as was being given in the State of Rajasthan. Chapter 9 dealt with Civil Judges (Senior Division). It was recommended that the posts of Civil Judges (Senior Division) should be constituted purely as promotional cadre. Chapter 10 deals with direct recruitment to the cadre of District Judges. Chapter 9 dealt with Civil Judges (Senior Division). It was recommended that the posts of Civil Judges (Senior Division) should be constituted purely as promotional cadre. Chapter 10 deals with direct recruitment to the cadre of District Judges. In Chapter 9 or 10 there is no recommendation to grant incentives to Civil Judges (Senior Division) or the District Judges, for having higher qualification. There is no recommendation to grant incentives to all the Judicial Officers also. 13. Therefore I am of the view that recommendation in paragraph 8.48 of the report is not intended to District judges. Therefore the contention that grant of 3 advance increments to the District Judges having Post Graduation in Law is a benefit arising out of the recommendation of either Justice Shetty Commission Report or that it is a benefit to be granted in implementation of the judgment in All India Judges'(3) Case : (2002)4 SCC 247 is unsustainable. In that judgment the apex court has ordered that in case any clarification is necessary in respect of any matter arising out of Ext.P1 judgment, it shall be sought only from the Supreme Court and that the proceedings if any for implementation of the directions given in the judgment shall be filed only before the apex court. Therefore it was open to the petitioner to move the Supreme Court with respect to the claim for advance increments. 14. From the judgment dated 01.12.2014 in WP(C) No.19 of 2012 between Bhartkumar Shantilal Thakkar and State of Gujarat & Another, relied on by the learned Senior Counsel, it is seen that the petitioner therein was a Judicial Officer who had acquired Post Graduation in Law prior to his joining judicial service and he had filed the writ petition seeking directions to implement paragraph 8.48 of Justice Shetty Commission Report. The post held by the petitioner therein is not clear from the judgment. During the pendency of the writ petition the State of Gujarat issued resolution dated 14.06.2012 to grant three advance increments to the Judicial Officers of the Subordinate Judiciary having higher qualification like Post Graduation in Law, M.Phil, Ph.D etc. at the time of joining on or after 01.11.1999. The resolution dated 14.06.2012 provided that the Principal District Judges of concerned District where such officers were working were to verify and refix the pay of the officers concerned. at the time of joining on or after 01.11.1999. The resolution dated 14.06.2012 provided that the Principal District Judges of concerned District where such officers were working were to verify and refix the pay of the officers concerned. From the judgment it is seen that the High Court had proposed to add Rule 7A in the Rules to the effect that “a candidate selected for the post of Civil Judge who possesses higher qualification in Law such as LLM and M.Phil in Law, Ph.D in Law shall be entitled to get three additional increments. Xxxx” Later Government informed the High Court that an amendment would not be necessary if the recommendation to grant three advance increments to those with higher qualification with effect from 01.11.1999 was incorporated as addendum to Government resolution dated 16.03.2007. The apex court found that there was no rationale in limiting the benefits to those who acquired higher qualification in Law on or after 01.11.1999 and ordered that the benefits shall be granted to all the Judicial Officers who possessed higher qualification in Law on or before 01.11.1999. From the proposed Rule 7A, it is seen that the beneficiaries of the order were only the Civil Judges though the resolution refers to judicial officers only. It is not clear from the judgment or the resolution of the Gujarat Government as to whether the advance increments have been extended to all the Judicial Officers i.e. Civil Judges Junior as well as Senior branch/Judicial Service/Higher Judicial Service. 15. It is seen that the judicial officers of the Gujarat State are governed by Gujarat State Judicial Service Rules, 2005. This service consists of the cadre of District Judge, Senior Civil judge and Civil Judge. Civil Judges form the entry category and are to be appointed by recruitment through a competitive examination conducted by the High Court. Senior Civil Judges are appointed by promotion from among Civil Judges. Therefore I am of the view that the judgment of the Gujarat High Court would not be of any help to the petitioner. 16. The judgment dated 03.05.2017 in Service Bench No.1496 of 2015 and connected cases, relied on by the learned Senior Counsel is with respect to denial of the benefit of advance increments to those judicial officers who acquired qualification after joining service. Therefore it is not relevant for the present case. 17. 16. The judgment dated 03.05.2017 in Service Bench No.1496 of 2015 and connected cases, relied on by the learned Senior Counsel is with respect to denial of the benefit of advance increments to those judicial officers who acquired qualification after joining service. Therefore it is not relevant for the present case. 17. The further contention is with respect to the cut off date fixed. It is settled law that whenever a new benefit is introduced it is open to the Government to fix a date so as to grant the benefit with effect from the date of the order or any particular date. When there is no recommendation there is no liability on the Government to implement the Shetty Commission Report as claimed by the petitioner. The next question which arises for consideration is whether the cut off date is arbitrary. 18. The contention of the petitioner is that there is a sub-classification among District Judges having Post Graduation in law, who were appointed before and after 22.11.2013. However that sub-classification no longer exists after Ext.P15 order issued on 17.11.2017. As per Ext.P15 order all the District Judges who were in service as on 22.11.2013, the date of Ext.P8 order, when the benefit was extended to District Judges, are made eligible for advance increments with prospective effect from 22.11.2013. Thus the classification is between those District Judges with Post Graduation in Law who were in service as on 22.11.2013 and those who were not in service as on that day. 19. I shall now examine whether such a cut off date is arbitrary and whether the judgments relied on by the learned Senior Counsel apply to the present case. 20. The judgment of the Constitution Bench in State of W.B. Vs. Anwar Ali Khan and another, AIR 1952 SC 75 was with respect to the constitution of Special Courts under the Special Court's Act. It was held that the power given to the State Government to direct any case to be tried by Special Courts was arbitrary and Section 5 of the Act to the extent it did not specify the class of cases or offences or any criteria for classification was arbitrary and offended the guarantee of equality before law secured under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Learned Senior Counsel relied on paragraph 55 of the judgment, where it was held that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes those that are grouped together and not in others who are left out; there should be a nexus with the object sought to be achieved; Article 14 forbids class legislation in the sense of making improper discrimination, by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred or liability proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary. 21. The judgment in Thathunni Moopil Nair and others V State of Kerala, 1961 KLT SC 11: AIR 1961 SC 552 , was in respect of Land Tax Act, 1955 (TC) and the absence of any procedure to be followed in assessment, the absence of a provision for appeal; the absence of any provision laying down any principle or policy for guidance of exercise of discretion were found to be defective and hence it was held that if the Act infringes the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it has to be struck down as unconstitutional. It would also strike down the Act if no guidelines are provided to exercise the discretion by Government in the matter of selection or classification. 22. In Prabodh Verma and Others vs. State of U.P. and others, (1984) 4 SCC 251 , the apex court was considering the validity of ordinances relating to absorption of the Reserve Pool Teachers of UP High Schools and intermediate Colleges. After reiterating the principles underlying in Article 14 and the conditions to be satisfied for a classification to be valid, viz. it must be found on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and that the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation, the apex court found that the classification of reserve pool teachers as a separate class distinct from other teachers fulfilled the conditions for a valid classification. 23. 23. The judgment in Motor General Traders' case (supra), the validity of a provision in the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control and Eviction) Act of Andhra Pradesh which provided for exemption to buildings constructed after 26.08.1957 was under challenge. The apex court found that such a provision was no longer required by lapse of time. It was found that after all these years there was no reason for not bringing those landlords on par with other landlords who are subjected to restrictions under the Act in the matter of eviction of tenants. 24. In Rajpal Sharma's case (supra) the persons who were released from military service on compassionate grounds were singled out from enjoying the benefit of the rules viz. Punjab Government (National Emergency) Concession Rules, 1965. Those rules provided for reckoning the military service for the purpose of increments, seniority, etc. The apex court found that all the persons were ex-military personnel; they were released from military service; therefore they constitute only one class and therefore certain persons cannot be singled out for differential treatment. It was found that there was no reasonable classification between persons who were released on compassionate grounds and those who were released on other grounds and therefore the petitioners therein were deprived of equal opportunity. The amendment brought about excluding those released on compassionate grounds was held violative of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 25. In the judgment in Tata Sky Ltd v. Union of India, 2016 (1) KLT 312 , the constitutional validity of the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, was under challenge, to the extent it relates to levy of luxury tax on direct to Home Service. The classification on the basis of technology used was held to be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was held that DTH cannot be classified separately to the exclusion of other cable operators, for the purpose of levy of luxury tax, merely on the basis of the technology involved. 26. I am of the opinion that none of the aforesaid judgments relied on by the learned Senior Counsel apply to the factual circumstances arising in the present case. There cannot be a dispute over the proposition that there should be a rationale behind the classification and that it should have reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 26. I am of the opinion that none of the aforesaid judgments relied on by the learned Senior Counsel apply to the factual circumstances arising in the present case. There cannot be a dispute over the proposition that there should be a rationale behind the classification and that it should have reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved. As far as the present case is concerned, advance increments are granted as per Ext.P8 order as modified in Ext.15 order to the District Judges having LLM, who were in service on 22.11.2013, the date on which Government issued Ext.P8 order, with effect from 22.11.2013. Those who were already left the service as on that date, either by retirement or elevation or otherwise are left out from the class. A classification of District Judges on such ground cannot be said to be invalid or invidious or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 27. It is well settled, that whenever Government introduces a new benefit, it would be open to Government to fix a cut off date. Even in the case of pensioners, such classification is upheld. It is relevant to note the following judgments where cut off date was upheld. 28. In State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, (1990) 3 SCC 368 it was held that the choice of date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the same unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. 29. In All India Reserve Bank Retired Officers Assn. v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 664, the Bank employees who retired from service between January 1, 1986 and November 1, 1990 could opt for the benefit of a new pension scheme introduced with effect from November 1, 1990, which was applicable to all those who were in service as on 01.11.1990. Those who retired from service before 01.01.1986 challenged the same alleging unreasonable classification. Observing that even in D.S. Nakara's case the apex court has drawn a distinction between liberalization of an existing scheme and introduction of a new scheme, it was found that the cut off date satisfied all the tests for a valid classification. 30. Those who retired from service before 01.01.1986 challenged the same alleging unreasonable classification. Observing that even in D.S. Nakara's case the apex court has drawn a distinction between liberalization of an existing scheme and introduction of a new scheme, it was found that the cut off date satisfied all the tests for a valid classification. 30. In State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal, (2005) 6SCC 754, the apex court was considering a series of cases where employees retired from the State/Central Government challenged the cut off date alleging that grant of revised ceiling on gratuity only to those who retired or died on or after 01.04.1995, was discriminatory and arbitrary as all retirees/dead persons form a homogeneous class and any discrimination or distinction between retirees/dead persons prior to 01.04.1995 and those who retired/died on or after 01.04.1995 had no rational basis, relying on the judgment in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India: AIR 1983 SC 130 . One among the writ petitions was filed by a Judge of the Bombay High Court who retired on 10.11.1994 claiming gratuity in accordance with OM dated 14.07.1995, challenging the cut off date 01.04.1995. The apex court held that financial and economic implications are very relevant and germane for any policy decision touching the administration of the Government, at the Central or at the State level and that cut off date fixed on the ground of financial constraints was valid and not arbitrary, irrational or had no rational basis and it does not offend Article 14. The argument on behalf of the employees against the cut off date was repelled observing that a decision of the Government to limit the benefits only to employees, who retired or died on or after 01.04.1995, after calculating the financial implications thereon, cannot be either irrational or arbitrary. 31. In State of Bihar v. Bihar Pensioners Samaj, (2006) 5 SCC 65 , the apex court upheld the cut off date fixed for granting arrears of Dearness Allowance i.e. 01.07.1989, in the case of those who retired between 01.01.1986 and 28.02.1989. The rules revising death-cum-retirement gratuity was not extended to those retired/died in harness between 01.01.1986 and 28.02.1989 and even the only benefit of revision in dearness allowance was granted only from 01.07.1989, in their case. The rules revising death-cum-retirement gratuity was not extended to those retired/died in harness between 01.01.1986 and 28.02.1989 and even the only benefit of revision in dearness allowance was granted only from 01.07.1989, in their case. Following the judgment in Amar Nath Goyal's case, it was held that denial of arrears of dearness allowance from 01.01.1986 to 28.02.1989 on the ground of financial burden cannot be held to be an arbitrary ground or irrational consideration. Hence, the argument based on Article 14 of the Constitution must fail. 32. In Govt. of A.P. vs. N. Subbarayudu, (2008) 14 SCC 702 , the challenge against the cut off date fixed while introducing pension to the Lecturers in Private-aided Colleges from 01.11.1992, while reducing their age of superannuation from 60 years to 58 years, was repelled. It was held that fixing of cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the Court should not normally interfere with it unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. 33. In Sudhir Kumar Consul v. Allahabad Bank, (2011) 3 SCC 486 , which also pertains to the question of fixing of cut-off date for granting retirement benefits, the apex court reiterated the proposition that fixing of the cut-off date for granting retirement benefits such as gratuity or pension under the different schemes incorporated in the subordinate legislation, thereby, creating two distinct and separate classes of employees is well within the ambit of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was held that the differential treatment of two sets of officers appointed prior to the notified date would not offend Article 14 of the Constitution. The cut-off date may be justified on the ground that additional outlay as involved or the fact that under the terms of appointment, the employee was not entitled to the benefit of pension or retirement. 34. In Orissa Power Transmission Corpn. Ltd. v. Khageswar Sundaray, (2011) 8 SCC 269 , the cut off date fixed for granting advance increments to those employees who became graduates/passed accounts examination before 30.06.1971 was upheld, observing that it was well within the powers of employer to decide the cut-off date and that the decision of OSEB could not be held to be arbitrary only because the reason for the decision was not stated in the proceedings of the meeting of the OSEB in which the decision was taken. 35. In Mineral Exploration Corpn. Ltd. v. Arvind Kumar Dixit, (2015) 2 SCC 535 , the denial of the benefit of wage revision to those who retired before 01.04.2003 as well as implementation of wage revision with effect from 01.04.2006 was upheld, taking notice of the financial implications, following the judgment in Amarnath Goyal's case (supra). 36. Though the learned Senior Counsel relied on various judgments pointing out that classification of District Judges who were in service as on 22.11.2013 and those were not in service as on that day despite the fact that all of them were having Post Graduate Degree in Law is arbitrary, which would be in violation of Article 14, I am of the view that the Government is free to fix a particular date while introducing a new benefit. Therefore Ext.P15 order to the extent it extends the benefit of advance increments only with effect from 22.11.2013 and to those who were in service on 22.11.2013 cannot be said to be arbitrary. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.