JUDGMENT : Md. Mumtaz Khan, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant assailing the judgment and order of conviction dated May 3, 2008 and sentence dated May 5, 2008 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Fast Track Court, Paschim Medinipore in Sessions Trial Case No. XVII of May, 1993. By virtue of the impugned judgment, appellant was convicted for commission of the offences punishable under Sections 379/376 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as the IPC) and was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for four months, for the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC and was also sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two months for the offence under Section 379 IPC with a direction that both the offences shall run concurrently with usual set off under Section 428 of the Criminal Procedure Code ( hereinafter in short Cr. P.C.). Appellant was further directed to pay a compensation of Rs. 25,000/- to the victim/de-facto complainant within a stipulated period and in default of making payment de-facto complainant was given liberty to realize the amount as per provisions of law. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is as follows: 3. On August 22, 1992 in the morning the P.W.4 as per instruction of her husband went to her father's house at Kharkusma village to bring a sum of rupees five hundred. At about 4 p.m. in the evening while she was returning back with money and her minor child in her arms she noticed the appellant was following her. When she reached near the jungle, appellant stopped her and snatched the girl from her arms and threw the child on the road and forcibly lifted her and took inside the jungle, took away her money and by putting her on the ground forcibly raped her. She could not shout as the appellant had stuffed cloth in her mouth. At that time at some distance away on the road on seeing two people coming on a cycle appellant fled away in the jungle. She took her daughter in her arms and asked for help from those two people. She could not shout as the appellant had stuffed cloth in her mouth. At that time at some distance away on the road on seeing two people coming on a cycle appellant fled away in the jungle. She took her daughter in her arms and asked for help from those two people. She, thereafter, returned back and narrated the entire incident to her family members and also reported the incident at the P.S. 4. On the basis of the verbal complaint of PW4 which was reduced into writing by Officer-in-Charge, Garhbeta, he started Garhbeta Police Station case no. 92 dated August 22, 1992 against the appellant under Sections 376/ 379 IPC and took up the investigation of the case. Thereafter, on completion of investigation he submitted charge sheet against the appellant under Section 376/379 IPC. 5. On September 16, 2006, charge under Sections 376/379 IPC was framed against the appellant and on his pleading not-guilty, trial commenced. 6. Prosecution in order to prove the case, examined 4 witnesses and also produced and proved the FIR, medical report and the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and thereafter on completion of trial after examination of the appellant under Section 313 Cr. P.C. passed the impugned Judgment. 7. Mr. P.S. Bhattacharya learned Advocate appearing for the appellant submitted that the impugned judgment and the order are not sustainable in law as neither the doctor who examined the victim nor the investigating officer who investigated the case was examined by the prosecution, evidence of victim is not substantiated by any independent witness or medical evidence and there was also no evidence to substantiate the allegation of offence under section 379 IPC. According to Mr. Bhattacharya prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the appellant. He further submitted that the learned trial judge was not justified in imposing the severest punishment of life provided under Section 376 IPC and that the appellant is not in a position to pay the amount of compensation as directed by the learned Court below and the State may be directed to pay the compensation to the victim. 8. Mr. He further submitted that the learned trial judge was not justified in imposing the severest punishment of life provided under Section 376 IPC and that the appellant is not in a position to pay the amount of compensation as directed by the learned Court below and the State may be directed to pay the compensation to the victim. 8. Mr. Ranabir Roy Chowdhury, learned Advocate appearing for the State submitted that the victim is an illiterate lady and her evidence was recorded after 16 years of the incident and even after such long period she vividly narrated the incident which also found corroboration from her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr. P.C. He also submitted that the victim was a married lady and was carrying for six months. She was examined by the doctor after 3 days of incident and as such there was no scope of detection of any such injury on her private parts. He further submitted that delay in trial has occasioned due to absconsion of the appellant and the I.O. could not be examined as being dead and doctor was not found. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, medical report as also the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164 Cr. P.C. were exhibited in presence of the appellant without any objection and the same cannot be challenged now by the appellant. According to Mr. Roy Chowdhury, prosecution has been able to prove the charges against the appellant beyond all doubt. 9. We have considered the submissions of the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties and have given our thoughtful consideration to the materials on record including the evidence and documents to consider the propriety of the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Court below. 10. P.W.4 is the victim lady who deposed before the Court on March 7, 2008. She is an illiterate lady who deposed after 16 years of the incident. On perusal of the evidence of PW 4, we find that she has corroborated the FIR. She specifically stated on oath that on the relevant date she had been to her father's house at her husband's request to bring cash of Rs. 500/- and after taking money from her father while she was returning back on foot with her baby in her lap then at around 3.00-3.30 p.m she noticed that appellant was following her. She specifically stated on oath that on the relevant date she had been to her father's house at her husband's request to bring cash of Rs. 500/- and after taking money from her father while she was returning back on foot with her baby in her lap then at around 3.00-3.30 p.m she noticed that appellant was following her. When she reached near the jungle, appellant suddenly caught hold of her to which she resisted but the appellant forcibly lifted her after throwing her child on the ground and took her inside the jungle and forcibly committed rape and took away her cash. On seeing two persons coming by a cycle appellant leaving her fled away therefrom. She then lifted her child, stopped those men and narrated the incident to them. One of them named Anisur Chowdhury (PW 3) then sent information to her father and also to her husband. Her husband came and she narrated the incident to him. She also narrated the incident to the police and thereafter, police on her identification arrested the appellant. Her statement was recorded at the P.S. by Daraga Babu and she put her LTI thereon after it was read over to her. She also made statements before the Magistrate under section 164 Cr.P.C. (Ext.1) and put her LTI thereon. She was also medically examined by the doctor. She identified the appellant in course of her examination before court. She was cross-examined by the defence at length but in spite of lengthy cross-examination defence failed to impeach her credibility. The above evidence of P.W.4 also found corroboration from her statements recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C (Ext.1). She is an illiterate, married village woman having no enmity with the appellant and her evidence was recorded after 16 years of the incident and even after such long period she vividly narrated the incident. Her evidence appears to be trustworthy and reliable. 11. Pw 1 is the father of the victim. He too has deposed that on the relevant date his daughter (PW 4) came to his house and asked him to give her Rs. 500/-. Accordingly, he gave her Rs. 500/- and thereafter she went away from his house along with her baby on the lap. While she was proceeding through the jungle accused/appellant followed her from behind and suddenly caught-hold of her and forcibly took her inside the jungle and raped her. 500/-. Accordingly, he gave her Rs. 500/- and thereafter she went away from his house along with her baby on the lap. While she was proceeding through the jungle accused/appellant followed her from behind and suddenly caught-hold of her and forcibly took her inside the jungle and raped her. After that his daughter came out crying from inside the jungle and met PW3 to whom she narrated the entire incident and then P.W.3 informed him. He also came to know about the incident from his daughter (P.W.4). Police was informed. His daughter also went to the Police Station and lodged the complaint. He identified the appellant in course of his examination before Court. He was also cross examined by the defence but nothing came out to the contrary which could render his evidence disbelievable. On the other hand during cross-examination he clearly stated that in the morning at about 09-9.30 a.m. his daughter came to his house and the incident took place at about 03.00-3.30 p.m and he came to know about the incident at about 06.00 p.m. He, however, admitted that he was not aware about theft of Rs. 500/- by the accused/appellant from his daughter. 12. Pw 2 is the husband of the victim. He also deposed that on the relevant date he sent his wife (P.W. 4) to her father's house (P.W.1) to bring Rs. 500/- and at about 3.30. p.m. while his wife was returning with the money and the minor child in her lap and when she reached near the jungle of Anandanagar, then appellant caught hold of her and after throwing the baby dragged his wife inside the jungle and forcibly committed rape on her. His wife then took help of one person for coming to his house and then she narrated the entire incident to him. After getting that information he along with his wife went to the Police Station and lodged the complaint. He too was cross-examined by the defence but his evidence remained unshaken. During cross examination he clearly stated that he heard the incident from his wife and that on that day at about 7.00 a.m. he sent his wife to her father's house and he came to know about the incident after 3.30 p.m. from his wife. He too was cross-examined by the defence but his evidence remained unshaken. During cross examination he clearly stated that he heard the incident from his wife and that on that day at about 7.00 a.m. he sent his wife to her father's house and he came to know about the incident after 3.30 p.m. from his wife. He also specifically stated that his wife narrated the incident to him and her appearance was rough and her saya and blouse were torn at some places. Thus, from the above we find that evidence of P.W1, P.W.2 and P.W.4 is consistent with what has been stated by P.W.1 in the very first information report and during oath before court. PW 3 was declared hostile by the prosecution as he did not support the prosecution case but that itself will not render the evidence of the victim disbelievable. I.O. could not be examined by the prosecution being dead and the delay in the trial has occasioned due to long absconsion of the appellant. 13. Evidence on record including the medical report (Ext.2) shows that the victim was carrying for 6 months. No such marks of violence or evidence of rape was detected by the doctor during examination. The victim being married lady and examined by the doctor after three days of the incident, there was little scope of detection of any injury whatsoever. Moreover, prosecution evidence could not be disbelieved merely because no injury on the person of the victim or on her private parts was found or that doctor was not examined. It is well settled principles of law that conviction can be founded on the testimony of the prosecutrix alone unless there are compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. The evidence of victim lady was clear and cogent which also found corroboration from her statements recorded by the Magistrate under section 164 Cr.P.C. as also from the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 to whom she narrated the facts immediate after the incident. The mere fact that they are related to each other can not be the ground to discard their evidence. Victim being a married woman and there was no evidence of any animosity with the appellant, possibility of falsely implicating the appellant, as pleaded, does not appear to be tenable. The mere fact that they are related to each other can not be the ground to discard their evidence. Victim being a married woman and there was no evidence of any animosity with the appellant, possibility of falsely implicating the appellant, as pleaded, does not appear to be tenable. Nothing has been brought on record to disbelieve the statement of the victim in the matter of commission of rape on her. Accordingly, we accept the findings of the learned trial judge with regard to the guilt of the appellant in commission of the offence of rape. 14. But with regard to the allegation of commission of theft, we find that the oral testimony of the victim do not find corroboration either from her husband or from her father or from her statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. The intention of the appellant, as evident from the evidence on record, was to commit rape finding the victim alone in the jungle area and not to commit any theft or extortion. Even no such recovery was made from the possession of the appellant though apprehended by police immediate after the occurrence. In view of the above, it is very difficult to believe that a person having intention to commit rape would engage himself to commit any theft. Under the circumstances learned Court below was not justified in holding the appellant guilty of offence u/s 379 I.P.C. accordingly, we set aside the conviction of the appellant under section 379 IPC. 15. Learned trial judge sentenced the appellant to suffer imprisonment for life, the severest punishment provided under section 376 IPC by taking the plea that communal tension had started in the locality as the victim was a Muslim lady but no such evidence was brought on record to that effect. It seems that learned trial Judge in imposing severest punishment took into consideration extraneous factors beyond the record. One may argue that victim was pregnant at the relevant period but there was no evidence on record to show that the appellant had the knowledge of the same. Nothing was brought against the past antecedents of the appellant. It seems that learned trial Judge in imposing severest punishment took into consideration extraneous factors beyond the record. One may argue that victim was pregnant at the relevant period but there was no evidence on record to show that the appellant had the knowledge of the same. Nothing was brought against the past antecedents of the appellant. We find from the record that appellant whose involvement was found in the commission of the offence under section 376 IPC is in custody for more than 10 years and nothing was brought on record to show that he is an habitual offender and/or that it was not his first offence. 16. Having considered the above circumstances, we modify the sentence of imprisonment for life to imprisonment for 10 years keeping the fine amount and default clause, in case of non payment of fine, as also the amount of compensation as awarded against the appellant unaltered. 17. If the appellant has undergone substantive sentence of imprisonment for ten years as modified hereinabove as also the imprisonment of four months in default of payment of fine, he shall be set at liberty forthwith unless his detention is required in any other case. The period of detention of the appellant undergone during the investigation, inquiry or trial be set off against the period of substantive sentence of imprisonment stated herein above, in accordance with the provision of Section 428, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 18. This appeal is thus partly allowed by setting aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 379 IPC and with partial alteration of the order of sentence of appellant for the offence under section 376 IPC, as indicated herein-above. 19. Copy of this judgment along with the lower court records be sent down to the trial court immediately by special Messenger for information and taking necessary action.