JUDGMENT : A very small issue; but in my view interpretatively decisive, has been thrown up in this Writ Petition: Is the wife of a deceased nephew of a senior citizen obligated, under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, to maintain the senior citizen after the death of her husband solely because the senior citizen had, during the life time of the nephew, gifted certain properties to him with the reciprocal covenant to maintain her. The petitioner says, she is neither a “relative” of the senior citizen nor liable to maintain her and I will proceed to answer these contentions presently, after I record the most essential facts. 2. The petitioner assails Exts.P2 and P4 orders, issued by the Maintenance Tribunal and by the Appellate Tribunal respectively, constituted under the provisions of Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as Act for short), as per which she has been ordered to offer residence to the senior citizen-the 3rd respondent herein, in her home, which house had been earlier gifted by the 3rd respondent to the now deceased petitioner’s husband. 3. The petitioner’s foundational contentions in law, impelled to impugn the above orders, is that she is not a “relative”, statutorily obligated to take care of the senior citizen she being only the wife of the nephew of the senior citizen; however, then expressly admitting that the house she is now residing in was gifted by the 3rd respondent-senior citizen to her husband with the covenant that he will take care of her. 4. To get a grip of the controversy in this case, a few facts will first have to be seen. 5. Compendiously stated, the 3rd respondent herein, who is an unmarried senior citizen, stated to be now living in a state of penury without anyone to take care of her, approached the Maintenance Tribunal by preferring Ext.P1 application, where under she prayed that a gift deed executed by her in favour of the petitioner’s husband in the year 1992, a copy of which is appended to this Writ Petition as Ext.P5, be set aside under the ambit of S.23(1) of the Act, asserting that she has no other place to reside in and no one else to be in charge of her care. 6. 6. The pleadings on record would show that the petitioner herein is the wife of the nephew of the 3rd respondent-senior citizen and that the latter had executed the aforementioned Ext.P5 gift deed in favour of the petitioner’s now deceased husband, with a specific covenant therein that he will take care of her during her life time. The petitioner’s husband, however, died subsequently in the year 2008, leaving the property covered by Ext.P5 as also his ancestral property, to the petitioner. The singular allegation made by the senior citizen against the petitioner is that she was thereafter, driven out by the petitioner from the house gifted by her to the petitioner’s husband and that even though she was, under the orders of the Maintenance Tribunal, taken back to the said house, she fell ill and had to be admitted to a hospital by concerned neighbours. She says that she is presently forced to live like a refugee in the house of a relative, who is under no legal or statutory duty to take care of her. 7. I notice from Ext.P2 that the Maintenance Tribunal has correctly found that the prayer to have the document set aside cannot be acceded to because, the said document has been executed by the senior citizen prior to the coming into force of the Act. The Tribunal, however, found the senior citizen to be completely helpless, being without any support financially or physically, and therefore, concluded that she is entitled to reside in the house now in the ownership and possession of the petitioner, since this house had been earlier gifted by her to her nephew, the petitioner’s now deceased husband, with a specific covenant that he will take care of her during her life time. It is this order, that has been challenged by the petitioner in this Writ Petition. 8. I see from the pleadings on record that Ext.P2 order was first challenged by the petitioner before the Statutory Appellate Authority, namely the 1st respondent herein; but that this challenge was rejected by the said Authority through Ext.P4 order, holding that an appeal can be preferred under the provisions of S.16 of the Act only by a senior citizen or by parents and not anyone else. The petitioner, consequently challenges Ext.P4 also, in addition to Ext.P2, as being illegal and unlawful. 9. I have heard Sri. The petitioner, consequently challenges Ext.P4 also, in addition to Ext.P2, as being illegal and unlawful. 9. I have heard Sri. R.T. Pradeep, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner; Sri. Nikhil Sankar, the learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent/senior citizen and the learned Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1, 2 and 4. 10. What has been presented before me in the factual scenario of this case is the sad plight of an old, hapless lady of about 85 years, living like a refugee in a house over which she has no control or ownership and at the mercy of certain well meaning relatives; but who have no statutory or legal obligation to take care of her. Even though the petitioner concedes that the 3rd respondent has no one else who can be construed to have the statutory duty to maintain her and further that had her husband, the nephew of the 3rd respondent, been alive, certainly no defence could have been available to him to deny maintenance or protection to the 3rd respondent, particularly since, admittedly, he had enjoyed the benefit of Ext.P5 sale deed, she asserts that no such obligation would bind her after her husband’s death. 11. The constitutive question, therefore, is whether the death of the nephew of the senior citizen who enjoyed the gift of her property, would rob her of her right to be maintained and protected by his wife, who has inherited the property, for the reason that she is not a ‘relative’ of the senior citizen as defined by the Act. In fact, this is the primary submission made before me by Sri. R.T. Pradeep, the learned counsel for the petitioner, who asserts that the petitioner cannot be construed to be a ‘relative’ under the provisions of the Act and he asserts, therefore, that the senior citizen should find other methods of residence and maintenance, rather than proceeding against his client further. However, in the same breath, he concedes that the gift of property made by the senior citizen in favour of his client’s husband was with a covenant that he will take care of and maintain her during her life time. 12. However, in the same breath, he concedes that the gift of property made by the senior citizen in favour of his client’s husband was with a covenant that he will take care of and maintain her during her life time. 12. In the backdrop of the afore assertions and admissions, I will proceed to survey the provisions of the Act to decide if the petitioner’s contentions, that she cannot be construed to be a “relative” of the senior citizen and, therefore, without the obligations to maintain her, can obtain legal support. 13. The word ‘maintenance’ has been defined under S.2(b) of the Act as under: “maintenance” includes provision for food, clothing, residence and medical attendance and treatment; 14. Thereafter, the definition of the word ‘relative’ has been given in S.2(g), which is extracted below: “relative” means any legal heir of the childless senior citizen who is not a minor and is in possession of or would inherit his property after his death; 15. After defining the afore two words, S.4(4), which appears in Chapter II of the Act under the head ‘Maintenance of Parents and Senior Citizens’, obligates a relative to maintain a senior citizen by stipulating as under: Any person being a relative of a senior citizen and having sufficient means shall maintain such senior citizen provided he is in possession of the property of such senior citizen or he would inherit the property of such senior citizen; 16. A conjoint reading of these provisions would luculently show that the concept of ‘maintenance’ is not merely offering money to a senior citizen but that it is to provide for food, clothing, residence, medical attendance and treatment. Hence, the directions of the Maintenance Tribunal to the petitioner to offer residence to the third respondent in the house in question would certainly come within the umbra of this Section. Thus, the consequent attendant question is if the petitioner is burdened by the statutory obligation to maintain the senior citizen and the answer to this becomes easy when the afore-extracted Sections 2(g) and 4(4) are read together. 17. As is limpid from these Sections, a person would be construed to be a relative of a childless senior citizen, if such person is in possession or would inherit his/her property. 17. As is limpid from these Sections, a person would be construed to be a relative of a childless senior citizen, if such person is in possession or would inherit his/her property. In this case, it is conceded that the petitioner is in possession of the third respondent’s property, which was gifted by her to her nephew, who is none other than the petitioner’s husband. 18. The fact that the petitioner is thus in possession of the property being conceded, the surviving issue is only whether she would be under the obligation of S.4(4) to maintain the senior citizen. Here again, this Section says that any person being a relative of a senior citizen, who is in possession of the property of such citizen, would be obligated to maintain him/her. 19. As I have said above, since the factum of the petitioner’s possession of the third respondent’s property being conceded and the petitioner expressly admitting that her deceased husband would certainly have been under the legal obligation to maintain the third respondent, had be been alive; the further fact that she inherited the property from her husband would obviously bind her with the concomitant obligation to maintain the third respondent. Any other view on a composite interpretation of the afore-extracted three provisions would render the purpose of the Act otios and would be against the spirit of the legislation, which is intended to provide for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens, which right of theirs are recognized under the Constitution of India. I, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the petitioner, who is the wife of the deceased nephew of the third respondent and who had concededly enjoyed the gift of the property to him by the third respondent, would also be under the same obligation as her deceased husband to provide for the maintenance of the senior citizen after his death, as long as she continues to enjoy the property. 20. The above said, I notice from the impugned orders that even though one of the prayers of the 3rd respondent, to have the document rescinded, has been found to be untenable, singularly because it has been executed before the coming into force of the Act, the Tribunal has thereafter only directed that the 3rd respondent be given residence in the house now in the ownership and possession of the petitioner. Pertinently, the Tribunal has not even ordered any amounts to be paid to the 3rd respondent and indubitably, therefore, the acme reason for the Tribunal in having issued Ext.P2 order is to enable the 3rd respondent to live a life of dignity in the house and in the property which was owned by her earlier, until it was gifted by her to the husband of the petitioner in the year 1992. 21. That apart, going by the statements obtained from the petitioner and the 3rd respondent by the 4th respondent-Police Officer pending this lis, copies of which have been placed on record along with the counter affidavit dated 20.07.2018 filed by the learned Government Pleader, it becomes ineluctable that the stand of the petitioner is that she has no objection in maintaining the 3rd respondent but that she is scared of her and therefore, unable to do so. However, the statement of the 3rd respondent, who is an 85 year old lady, is clearly to the effect that she has no other place to reside in and that she is now living with a relative in a property over which she has no control or ownership and therefore, that she wants to be accommodated in the house earlier gifted by her so as to spend the rest of her life in peace and dignity. 22. Sri. R.T. Pradeep, the learned counsel for the petitioner makes a further startling submission that the 3rd respondent, in fact, does not want to live with the petitioner and that it is therefore, that the petitioner is now unwilling to accommodate her. 23. I am amazed by the submissions made as afore on behalf of the petitioner because nowhere, in the pleadings or records aforementioned, has the 3rd respondent said that she does not want to live with the petitioner; but on the contrary, her consistent affirmation has been that she wants to live in the house and property that was gifted by her to her nephew, the petitioner’s husband, in the year 1992. I can only, therefore, repel these submissions of Sri. R.T. Pradeep as being without rational basis and consequently untenable. 24. I can only, therefore, repel these submissions of Sri. R.T. Pradeep as being without rational basis and consequently untenable. 24. Before I conclude this judgment, I must also place on record that I asked the learned counsel for the petitioner whether his client will be willing to provide monthly maintenance or a lump-sum amount to the 3rd respondent, so that she can be accommodated suitably in another place, if she does not want to accommodate her in her house and that the learned counsel had taken time on 09.10.2018 to respond to this. However, today, Sri. R.T. Pradeep, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that his client is not willing, either to pay monthly maintenance or to pay any amount in lump-sum, since, according to him, his client is a widow without any capacity or means to pay such amounts. However, very interestingly he concedes that the petitioner has been favoured with an award in a land acquisition proceedings, with respect to her deceased husband’s property and that substantial part of the amounts under such awards are still with her. 25. In the afore circumstances, and particularly since I see that the petitioner’s only defence to the directions of the Maintenance Tribunal is that the 3rd respondent is unwilling to stay with her; which assertion is, without doubt, factually unsubstantiated or admitted, I see no reason to entertain this Writ Petition or to grant any of the reliefs as have been prayed for. 26. I consequently, dismiss this Writ Petition and direct the 4th respondent-Station House Officer, Kanjiramkulam Police Station, Thiruvananthapuram, to escort the 3rd respondent to the house of the petitioner in terms of the directions in Ext.P2 order and to ensure that she is able to comfortably reside in the house in question along with the petitioner. 27. In view of the apparent friction between the petitioner and the 3rd respondent, I further direct the 4th respondent Officer to keep a constant vigil and watch over the property in question, to ensure that the lives of both the petitioner and the 3rd respondent are sufficiently protected and that the 3rd respondent is put to no inconvenience, on account of her residence in the said property. 28. 28. The 4th respondent shall escort the 3rd respondent to the house of the petitioner within a period of seven days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and all necessary measures and steps will be taken by him to ensure that her residence in the property is without any untoward event. This Writ Petition is thus disposed of.