JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. Appellant-plaintiff, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘plaintiff’), claiming itself to be Hindu Religious Institution, filed a suit for possession on the basis of title, averring therein that it is a registered society established with the sole purpose of imparting education in Hindu religion. Plaintiff further averred that property comprising Khata Khatauni No.125/158, Khasra Nos.368, 369, 370, 371, 801/372, 802/372 and 373, measuring 535.05 square meters, situate in Mohal Paddal, Mandi Town is a part and parcel of plaintiff institution and was never separately acquired property of Shri Devi Nand, who had expired on 9.1.1999. Plaintiff further averred that property shown in the name of Sri Dev Ashram under the management of Shri Devi Nand Brahamchari is a part and parcel of the plaintiff’s institution and at no point of time it was separately acquired property of Shri Devi Nand. Plaintiff further alleged that Devi Nand, who died on 9.1.1999, had executed a Will of suit property in favour of defendant No.1 on 7.7.1989, on the basis of which mutation was attested in favour of defendant No.1. Plaintiff also laid challenge to aforesaid Will alleging that Devi Nand had no right to execute the Will of the suit property as he was not owner in possession of the suit property; rather he was simply a manager of plaintiff’s institution. Plaintiff, while claiming that defendants No.2 to 4 are in wrongful possession of the suit property, claimed for possession by way of suit, referred hereinabove. 2. Defendant No.1 refuted the aforesaid claim, as set up in the plaint, on the ground of limitation and jurisdiction. Defendant No.1 categorically stated that Devi Nand was exclusive owner in possession of the property in question as it was constructed by him of his own money and not as a Manager of the property. Defendant No.1 further averred that the suit property was owned and possessed by Devi Nand and he had every right to execute the Will qua the same. Defendant No.1 further stated in written statement that defendants No.2 to 4 are the tenants in the suit property. Defendants No.3 and 4 in their written statement also not admitted the title of the plaintiff and claimed that earlier they were tenants under Devi Nand and now under defendant No.1. In the aforesaid background, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit. 3. Defendants No.3 and 4 in their written statement also not admitted the title of the plaintiff and claimed that earlier they were tenants under Devi Nand and now under defendant No.1. In the aforesaid background, the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit. 3. By way of replication, the plaintiff, while denying the allegations made in the written statement(s) reaffirmed the averments made in the plaint and controverted the contrary averments made in the written statements. 4. On the pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues for determination:- “1. Whether the plaintiff is owner of the property in dispute as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the Will dated 7.7.1989 is void document, as alleged? OPP. 3. Whether the plaintiff has got no right, title and interest in the suit property, as alleged? OPD. 4. Whether the plaintiff has no locus-standi to file the present suit, as alleged? OPD. 5. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is not within limitation, as alleged? OPD. 6. Whether the suit of the plaintiff has not been properly valued for the purposes of jurisdiction and court fees. If so what is correct valuation? OPD. 7. Relief.” 5. Learned trial Court, on the basis of evidence adduced on record by respective parties, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with judgment dated 15.12.1999 passed by learned trial Court in Civil Suit No.89/91, plaintiff preferred an appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘CPC’) in the Court of learned District Judge, Mandi, which came to be registered as Civil Appeal No.25 of 2000/44 of 2003. However, fact remains that the same was also dismissed, as a consequence of which, judgment of trial Court dated 15.12.1999 came to be upheld. In the aforesaid background, plaintiff has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to decree its suit after setting aside the judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below. 6. This Court vide order dated 19.04.2006, admitted the appeal on the following substantial questions of law:- “1. Whether the Courts below have misread the evidence to come to the conclusion that deceased Devi Nand was the owner of the suit property? 2. Whether the Courts below have erred in holding that the plaintiff does not have the locus standi to file the suit?.” 7. Whether the Courts below have misread the evidence to come to the conclusion that deceased Devi Nand was the owner of the suit property? 2. Whether the Courts below have erred in holding that the plaintiff does not have the locus standi to file the suit?.” 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case. 8. Keeping in view the contents and text of substantial questions of law, reproduced hereinabove, this Court intends to take both the substantial questions of law together as they are interconnected. 9. Having carefully perused/examined the evidence, be it ocular or documentary, led on record by the respective parties, this Court is not persuaded to agree with the contention raised by Mr.G.R. Palsra, learned counsel representing the appellant, that Courts below have misread the evidence while arriving at the conclusion that deceased Devi Nand was the owner of the suit property. Similarly, this Court, having carefully perused the material led on record by the plaintiff, finds no error in the findings recorded by the Court below that the plaintiff does not have the locus standi to file the suit. Close scrutiny of evidence available on record clearly suggests that both the Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and, as such, there appears to be no force on the plea of Mr.G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the plaintiff that evidence led on record by the plaintiff has not been appreciated in its right perspective. 10. In nutshell, case of the plaintiff is that the suit property is owned and possessed by the plaintiff-institution and late Shri Devi Nand, who was acting as its manager, had no authority, whatsoever, to bequeath the same in favour of defendant No.1. On the other hand, the case of defendant No.1 is that Devi Nand was exclusive owner in possession of the suit property as he had raised construction on the land by spending his own money. Mr.Palsra, while making this Court to travel through documentary evidence led on record i.e. Exts.PK, PL, PM and PO, strenuously argued that the suit property is part of Geeta Bhawan, which also owns Gopal Dev Ashram (subsequently, which was wrongly recorded as Dev Ashram) and Devi Nand was only its Manager. Mr.Palsra, while making this Court to travel through documentary evidence led on record i.e. Exts.PK, PL, PM and PO, strenuously argued that the suit property is part of Geeta Bhawan, which also owns Gopal Dev Ashram (subsequently, which was wrongly recorded as Dev Ashram) and Devi Nand was only its Manager. Bare perusal of aforesaid documents nowhere suggests that Dev Ashram of Brahmchari Devi Nand was part and parcel of Geeta Bhawan and Dev Ashram and Gopal Dev Ashram relate to the same property. Certainly, perusal of Exts.PM, PN and PO suggests that late Brahmchari Devi Nand, while making communication qua the property in question, repeatedly claimed himself to be Manager/Sanchalak of the property, but, that is not sufficient to conclude that Dev Ashram is owned by Geeta Bhawan. Ex.PM, i.e. letter alleged to have been written by Devi Nand Brahmachari to the Executive Committee of Geeta Bhawan, nowhere suggests that he had been looking after the suit property of Geeta Bhawan. Similarly, perusal of Ex.PO, i.e. a letter written by Jamna Mal etc. to the Governor of Himachal Pradesh, nowhere suggests that Brahmachari Devi Nand was managing the Gopal Dev Ashram on behalf of Geeta Bhawan. Perusal of aforesaid Ex.PO, further suggests that Gopal Dev Ashram was started in the year 1945, whereas, Brahmchari Devi Nand had started Hindi Pathshala in the year 1940. Close scrutiny of documentary evidence adduced on record by the plaintiff nowhere indicates that the plaintiff is the owner of suit property. 11. Having perused Ex.PJ, there appears to be considerable force in the arguments of Mr.Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned counsel representing the respondents, that land comprised in Khasra Nos.369 and 373 was in illegal possession of Dev Ashram under the control of Brahmachari Devi Nand and subsequently proprietary rights of these Khasra numbers were given to Dev Ashram. 12. Mr.Palsra, while making reference to Exts.PW- 3/1, PW-3/2, PW-3/3 and PW-3/4, strenuously argued that Brahmchari Devi Nand, who by way of Will bequeathed his entire property in favour of defendant No.1, repeatedly claimed himself to be Sanchalak of the property in a suit filed against Gulab Chand and, as such, by no stretch of imagination, he can be termed to be absolute owner of the suit property. 13. 13. Aforesaid arguments raised by learned counsel representing the plaintiff cannot be accepted because admittedly the property named as Dev Asharam being an unanimated body incapable of functioning of its own was required to be represented by some individuals and, as such, Devi Nand Brahmchari, while presenting the suit, claimed himself to be Sanchalak/Manager/Coordinator. His status, as referred in the copies of plaint, application and affidavit of the suit i.e. Exts.PW-3/1, PW-3/2, PW-3/3 and PW-3/4, cannot lead to an inference that property belongs to plaintiff or to any other person and it was not the property established by Devi Nand Brahmchari. 14. Plaintiff, apart from aforesaid documentary evidence, also examined few witnesses. PW-1 Kewal Ram, Pradhan Geeta Bhawan, deposed that Devi Nand was appointed as Caretaker/Sanchalak in or around the year 1950, but he was unable to point out any material placed on record in support of his aforesaid contention. In cross-examination, he categorically admitted that there was a building having slate roof and in this building three rooms having slab were constructed by Devi Nand. When further cross-examined, he admitted that against one Gulab Chand, Devi Nand Brahmchari had filed a suit claiming himself to be Manager/Sanchalak of the property. Interestingly, this witness stated before the trial Court below that property in question was given to plaintiff by Raja of Mandi, but, in this regard, no document i.e. agreement, registered deed or mutation of the same, is led on record. He further stated that part of the suit land was previously owned by one Purshotam, but categorically denied that this land was given to Devi Nand by Purshotam, however, there is no documentary evidence led on record to substantiate ownership, if any, of Purshotam. This witness categorically admitted that since the year 1950, rooms of Dev Ashram have been rented out and Devi Nand used to receive the rent and he appropriated the same for himself. He also stated that new rooms were added by Devi Nand in the year 1984 and at that time neither any objection was raised nor any money was spent by the plaintiff. This witness feigned ignorance with respect to the possession of Devi Nand Brahmchari over Khasra No.373, which was found in his illegal possession. He also stated that new rooms were added by Devi Nand in the year 1984 and at that time neither any objection was raised nor any money was spent by the plaintiff. This witness feigned ignorance with respect to the possession of Devi Nand Brahmchari over Khasra No.373, which was found in his illegal possession. It has also come in the statement of this witness that Gulab Chand, against whom Devi Nand had filed civil litigation, had encroached upon a part of the suit property. 15. Similarly, PW-2 Baldev and PW-3 Tulsi supported the version put forth by PW-1 Kewal Ram that the suit property belongs to the plaintiff but they were unable to state whether Devi Nand constructed house in the year 1950 or whether Devi Nand had taken this property from Purshotam. PW-3 Tulsi Ram gave altogether different version by stating that Devi Nand had taken loan from Jamna. This witness was also unable to tell whether Devi Nand got any land from the Government or he had inducted tenants. Similarly, PW-4 Kameshwar has stated that Devi Nand was Sanchalak of Gopal Ashram, which was constructed from the funds of the plaintiff, but in crossexamination he admitted that the money earned from Gopal Ashram used to be received by Devi Nand, who was made Sanchalak by Indera Ram. 16. Having carefully perused the evidence led on record by the plaintiff, this Court finds no illegality and infirmity in the findings returned by Court below that the plaintiff has been unable to show its title qua the suit property and, as such, is not entitled to relief of possession as claimed in the suit. Copies of Exts.DW-1/B and DW- 1/CA suggest that proprietary rights qua Khasra Nos.369 and 373 were conferred upon Devi Nand. It has specifically come in the statement of defendant Balbir Singh that Devi Nand was having illegal possession over 244.92 square meters of land in Paddal Mohal and, as such, proceedings were initiated against him, in which persons namely; Gulab Chand and Kameshwar Sharma had raised objections, but despite these objections, land was subsequently allotted to Devi Nand vide order dated 18.8.81, Ex.DW-1/B. Devi Nand had deposited a sum of Rs.625.90 paise vide challan Ex.DW- 1/CA. 17. 17. Close scrutiny of evidence, be it ocular or documentary, clearly suggests that suit property was never owned and possessed by the plaintiff, rather it remained under the control of Devi Nand Brahmchari, who not only raised construction on the land beneath suit property rather rented out the same to different tenants, as has been clearly admitted by defendants No.3 and 4 in their written statements. Leaving everything aside, this Court was unable to lay its hand to any documentary evidence led on record by the plaintiff suggestive of the fact that the property was ever owned and possessed by the plaintiff. 18. There is another aspect of the matter that the plaintiff by way of suit in question claimed possession on the basis of title, but, as has been concluded hereinabove, there is no evidence worth the name suggestive of the fact that the plaintiff has title, if any, qua the suit land. Moreover, in the suit, plaintiff has categorically admitted factum with regard to execution of Will, whereby Brahmachari Devi Nand bequeathed his entire property in favour of defendant No.1. There is no specific challenge to aforesaid Will executed by Brahmachari rather plaintiff has only raised the plea that Brahmachari was a Manager/Sanchalak of the property, as such, he had no authority to execute the Will. But, as has been noticed above, it stands duly established on record that Geeta Bhawan and Dev Ashram are both different entities run by the plaintiff and defendant No.1. 19. Mr.Palsra, while specifically referring to Ex.PG, argued that bare perusal of constitution of Geeta Bhawan, Mandi, clearly suggests that there is no difference between Gopal Dev Ashran and Geeta Bhawan. True, it is that perusal of Clause-21 of the constitution Ex.PG suggests that Committee of Geeta Bhawan had agreed to merge Gopal Dev Ashram with Geeta Bhawan, but that may not be sufficient to conclude that by making such entry in constitution, Geeta Bhawan acquired title qua the suit property i.e. Gopal Dev Ashram, which was being maintained and controlled by Brahmachari Devi Nand. 20. 20. Mr.Palsra, while placing reliance upon the judgments titled as: Chuhniya Devi vs. Jindu Ram, 1991(1) Sim.L.C. 223, Malkiyat Singh vs. Ram Dial and Others, 1992(2) Sim.L.C. 323 and Agnigundala Venkata Ranga Rao vs. Indukuru Ramchandra Reddy (Dead) by Legal Representatives and Others, (2017)7 SCC 694 , strenuously argued that presumption of truth is attached to documents, which are 30 years old, as has been provided under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and, as such, Courts below ought not to have ignored Ex.PG i.e. Constitution of Geeta Bhawan, while ascertaining/ determining the title of plaintiff. There cannot be any quarrel with regard to aforesaid proposition of law that presumption of truth is attached to documents, which are 30 years old and Court may presume that that the signature and every other part of such document, is duly executed and attested by a person by whom it purports to be executed and attested. But, in the case at hand, Ex.PG i.e. Constitution of Geeta Bhawan nowhere depicts/proves title of the plaintiff qua the suit property, rather it only defines the Object of the Society and Rules and Regulations governing the affairs of the Society. Though perusal of Clause-21 of aforesaid Constitution suggests that name of Gopal Dev Ashram was resolved to be changed to Geeta Bhawan, but that may not be sufficient to conclude the title qua Gopal Dev Ashram in favour of the plaintiff. 21. Perusal of Ex.D4 further suggests that vide order dated 24.01.1990, Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Tehsil Sadar, District Mandi had attested mutation No.235, on the basis of Will No.137 Ex.D-3 dated 7.7.1989, in favour of defendant. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid mutation attested in favour of defendant, plaintiff Geeta Bhawan filed an appeal in the Court of Collector, SDM, Sadar, Sub Division, Mandi, which came to be decided on 30.11.1995. Collector, Sadar Sub Division Mandi, having perused material made available to him found that mutation No.235 was attested in the presence of Manohar Lal and Ram Lok identified by Hem Raj Sharma, Advocate before the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade and, as such, arrived at the conclusion that Assistant Collector 2nd Grade committed no irregularities while attesting the mutation. Collector, Sadar Sub Division Mandi, having perused material made available to him found that mutation No.235 was attested in the presence of Manohar Lal and Ram Lok identified by Hem Raj Sharma, Advocate before the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade and, as such, arrived at the conclusion that Assistant Collector 2nd Grade committed no irregularities while attesting the mutation. In the aforesaid order passed by the Collector, Sadar, Sub Division Mandi, it has been categorically stated that the claim of the plaintiff does not seems to be genuine and it has no locus standi to agitate against the impugned order dated 24.1.1990 passed by the Assistant Collector 2nd Grade, Sadar, Mandi. Interestingly, this order passed by Collector, Sadar, Sub Division, Mandi never came to be assailed in the superior Court of law and as such it has already attained finality. 22. This Court, after having carefully examined and analyzed the evidence adduced on record by the plaintiff-appellant, sees no force in the aforesaid contentions having been raised/made by learned counsel representing the appellant-plaintiff, rather this Court is of the view that both the Courts below have carefully appreciated/perused the evidence in its right perspective and there is no misreading or misconstruction of evidence, as alleged by the appellant-plaintiff, in the instant proceedings. Since this Court, in process of finding answer to substantial questions of law, had an occasion to peruse pleadings as well as impugned judgments, it really finds it difficult to accept the contention of learned counsel representing the appellant-plaintiff that learned lower appellate Court has failed to discuss the entire evidence of the parties, while upholding the judgment passed by learned trial Court. Perusal of impugned judgment passed by first appellate Court clearly suggests that learned first appellate Court has dealt with each and every aspect of the matter meticulously and has carefully analyzed the evidence led on record by appellant-plaintiff. 23. True, it is, that Court of first appeal must cover all important questions involved in the case and they should not be general and vague. Similarly, it is well settled that when first appellate Court reverses findings of trial Court, it is expected to record findings in clear terms specifically stating therein, in what manner reasoning of trial Court is erroneous. 24. Similarly, it is well settled that when first appellate Court reverses findings of trial Court, it is expected to record findings in clear terms specifically stating therein, in what manner reasoning of trial Court is erroneous. 24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Laliteshwar Prasad Singh vs. S.P. Srivastava, (2017)2 SCC 415 , has held that when appellate Court agrees with the views of the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by trial Court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by trial court would ordinarily suffice. Hon’ble Apex Court has further held that when the first appellate Court reverses the findings of the trial court, it must record the findings in clear terms explaining how the reasoning of the trial court are erroneous. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “14. The points which arise for determination by a court of first appeal must cover all important questions involved in the case and they should not be general and vague. Even though the appellate court would be justified in taking a different view on question of fact that should be done after adverting to the reasons given by the trial judge in arriving at the finding in question. When appellate court agrees with the views of the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by trial court would ordinarily suffice. However, when the first appellate court reverses the findings of the trial court, it must record the findings in clear terms explaining how the reasonings of the trial court are erroneous.” 25. In the case at hand, learned first appellate Court, who concurred with the findings returned by learned trial Court was not expected to reiterate reasons given by trial Court, rather mere expression of general agreement with the reason given by the trial Court was sufficient. In the case at hand, learned first appellate Court, who concurred with the findings returned by learned trial Court was not expected to reiterate reasons given by trial Court, rather mere expression of general agreement with the reason given by the trial Court was sufficient. Moreover, in the instant case, as clearly emerge from the reading of impugned judgment passed by the first appellate Court that it has dealt with each and every issue involved in the case and as such there is no force in the arguments of Mr.G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff, that first appellate Court has failed to discuss the entire evidence of parties as required in terms of law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Harphool Singh (Dead) through his LRs, (2000)5 SCC 652 . 26. Since specific objection with regard to maintainability of present appeal, in view of concurrent findings of fact recorded by Courts below, has been taken by Mr.Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned counsel representing respondent-defendant No.1, this Court deems it necessary to deal with the same. In this regard, this Court deems it proper to take into consideration the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in Laxmidevamma and Others vs. Ranganath and Others, (2015)4 SCC 264 , wherein it has been held as under:- “16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plaintiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for reappreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs’ right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” (p.269) 27. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained.” (p.269) 27. Perusal of the aforesaid judgment suggests that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. This Court, after having taken note of observations made by Hon’ble Apex Court in judgment supra, sees no reason to differ with the argument having been made by Mr.Sanjeev Kuthiala, learned counsel representing respondent-defendant No.1, that in normal circumstance concurrent findings of fact recorded by Courts below should not be interfered with by the High Courts, rather, High Courts, while exercising powers under Section 100 CPC, are restrained from reappreciating the evidence available on record. But, aforesaid judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex Court nowhere suggests that there is complete bar for High Courts to upset the concurrent findings of the Courts below, especially when finding recorded by Courts below appears to be perverse. 28. In addition to Laxmidevamma’s case supra, reliance is also placed upon Damodar Lal vs. Sohan Devi and Others, (2016)3 SCC 78 and Bijender and Another vs. Ramesh Chand and Others, (2016)12 SCC 483. 29. It is well settled by now that a finding of fact itself may give rise to a substantial question of law, inter alia, in the event the findings are based on no evidence and/or while arriving at the said findings, relevant admissible evidence has not been taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence has been taken into consideration or legal principles have not been applied in appreciating the evidence, or when the evidence has been misread. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chandna Impex Private Limited vs. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi, (2011)7 SCC 289 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “14. In Hero Vinoth Vs. Seshammal, (2006)5 SCC 545 , referring to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vs. Century Spg. & Mfg. In Hero Vinoth Vs. Seshammal, (2006)5 SCC 545 , referring to the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Sir Chunilal V. Mehta & Sons Ltd. Vs. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co.Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 , as also a number of other decisions on the point, this Court culled out three principles for determining whether a question of law raised in a case is substantial. One of the principles so summarised, is : (Hero Vinoth case, SCC p.556, para 24) "24.(iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognized exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to ‘decision based on no evidence’, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding". (p.294) 30. Hon’ble Apex Court in D.R. Rathna Murthy vs. Ramappa, (2011)1 SCC 158 , has specifically held that High Court can interfere with the findings of fact even in the second appeal, provided the findings recorded by Courts below are found to be perverse. It has further been held in the case supra that there is no absolute bar on the reappreciation of evidence in those proceedings; however, such a course is permissible in exceptional circumstances. The Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- “9. Undoubtedly, the High Court can interfere with the findings of fact even in the Second Appeal, provided the findings recorded by the courts below are found to be perverse i.e. not being based on the evidence or contrary to the evidence on record or reasoning is based on surmises and misreading of the evidence on record or where the core issue is not decided. There is no absolute bar on the re-appreciation of evidence in those proceedings, however, such a course is permissible in exceptional circumstances. (Vide Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Channabasappa, (2000)6 SCC 120 ; Hafazat Hussain v. Abdul Majeed, (2001) 7 SCC 189 and Bharatha Matha & Anr. There is no absolute bar on the re-appreciation of evidence in those proceedings, however, such a course is permissible in exceptional circumstances. (Vide Rajappa Hanamantha Ranoji v. Mahadev Channabasappa, (2000)6 SCC 120 ; Hafazat Hussain v. Abdul Majeed, (2001) 7 SCC 189 and Bharatha Matha & Anr. v. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010)11 SCC 483 .)” (p.162) 31. Hon’ble Apex Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By LRs., (2001)3 SCC 179 , has held that appellate Court ought not to interfere with the findings of trial Judge on a question of fact unless the latter has overlooked some peculiar feature connected with evidence of a witness or such evidence on balance is sufficiently improbable so as to invite displacement by appellate Court. 32. Careful reading of aforesaid law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court clearly suggests that there is no blanket bar for High Courts to upset the concurrent findings of Courts below, especially when it emerge from the record that (i) the Courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. Hon’ble Apex Court in Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (Dead) through LRs and Others vs. K.V.P. Shastri (Dead) through LRs and Others, (2013)15 SCC 161 , has held as under: “35. The learned counsel for the defendants relied on the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006)5 SCC 545 , wherein the principles relating to Section 100 of the CPC were summarized in para 24, which is extracted below : (SCC pp.555-56) “24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus: (i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact. But the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law. (ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law. (iii) The general rule is that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the courts below. But it is not an absolute rule. Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii) the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. When we refer to “decision based on no evidence”, it not only refers to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to any case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding.” We have to place reliance on the afore-mentioned case to hold that the High Court has framed substantial questions of law as per Section 100 of the CPC, and there is no error in the judgment of the High Court in this regard and therefore, there is no need for this Court to interfere with the same.” (pp.174-175) 33. It is quite evident from the aforesaid exposition of law that even concurrent findings of fact recorded by Courts below can be interfered with/upset by the High Courts, while exercising power under Section 100 CPC, if it is convinced that findings recorded by Courts below are not based upon any evidence and same are perverse. However, in the case at hand, this Court having perused entire record, finds no perversity in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below and as such, there is no scope left for this Court to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact and law recorded by the Courts below. 34. Having perused the material available on record, this Court is in complete agreement with the findings returned by both the Courts below that the plaintiff has not been able to prove his title qua the suit property and definitely suit having been filed by the plaintiff could not be allowed by the Courts below merely on the averments made by the plaintiff that Brahmachari Devi Nand was Manager/ Sanchalak of the property, rather plaintiff ought to have led some cogent and convincing evidence to prove his title qua the suit property. Both the aforesaid substantial questions of law are answered, accordingly. 35. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made hereinabove, impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below are upheld. Hence, the present appeal fails and is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 36. Interim order, if any, is vacated. All the miscellaneous applications are disposed of.