JUDGMENT & ORDER : Ajit Borthakur, J. Heard Mr. D. Das, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners and Mr. D. Saikia, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No. 2. Also heard Mr. B. Gogoi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, Assam, appearing for the respondent No. 1 State. 2. By filing this petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the petitioners have prayed for quashing and setting aside the Complaint Case, being C.R. No. 5304c of 2012, pending in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhubri and all the orders more particularly the order, dated 25.07.2013, passed in the said case and further, the order, dated 18.09.2014, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dhubri in Sessions Case No. 143 of 2014. 3. The petitioners' case, in a nutshell, is that the petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are the sons of petitioner No. 1 and the respondent No. 2's brother Nitin Kumar Agarwala married the daughter of the petitioner No. 1, namely, Seema Agarwala, on 06.05.2006. Out of their wedlock 2 (two) children were born. On 12.04.2012, said Nitin Kumar Agarwala died. On 20.12.2012, the respondent No. 2 filed a Complaint Case, being C.R. Case No. 5304c/2012, in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhubri, alleging, inter-alia, that after death of his brother Nitin Kumar Agarwala, the accused/petitioners herein hatched up a conspiracy to harass him and his family members, on different pretexts. It was alleged that on 26.06.2012, the petitioner No. 1 herein along with his wife visited the house of the witness No. 1, namely, Mahabir Prasad Mukim and took away Seema Agarwala along with her children and ornaments etc. valued at Rs. 9,10,000/- without the knowledge of the said witness No. 1, for which reason, an F.I.R. was lodged with Dhubri P.S., but no action has been so far taken by the police. It was further alleged that on 19.12.2012 at about 8:00 A.M., the accused/petitioners herein along with 3 (three) unidentified persons entered into the house of the complainant/respondent No. 2 herein, while he and the witness No. 1 were talking with the witness No. 4 and witness Nos. It was further alleged that on 19.12.2012 at about 8:00 A.M., the accused/petitioners herein along with 3 (three) unidentified persons entered into the house of the complainant/respondent No. 2 herein, while he and the witness No. 1 were talking with the witness No. 4 and witness Nos. 2 and 3 were working in the house, the accused/petitioner No. 3 herein put a pistol on the head of the witness No. 1 and directed him to withdraw the guardianship petition filed in the court at Dhubri and also the accused/petitioner No. 1 herein took the key of the almirah from the witness No. 1 and took an amount of Rs. 30,000/- from the almirah and the remaining accused/petitioners threatened to kill the complainant/respondent No. 2 and the witnesses, if they raised any hue and cry. Accordingly, the said complaint case was filed alleging commission of the offences, punishable under Sections 120B/323/395/397/307 IPC read with Section 25(1) (a) of the Arms Act. 4. The petitioners have further contended that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhubri having made over the case for disposal, the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dhubri, after making necessary inquiry, by the impugned order, dated 25.07.2013, has taken cognizance of the offences under Sections 120B/395/34 IPC read with Section 25(1) (A) of the Arms Act against the accused/petitioners herein and thereafter, by order, dated 02.05.2014, committed the case to the court of learned Sessions Judge, Dhubri under Section 209 Cr.P.C. Thereafter, on perusal of the materials on record and hearing the learned counsel of both sides, framed charges under Sections 392/506/34 IPC against the petitioners and as the said offences are Magistrate triable, transferred the case for trial to the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhubri vide the impugned order, dated 18.09.2014. 5. Mr. D. Das, learned Senior Counsel for the accused/petitioners submitted that the allegations made in the complaint are out and out false and fabricated with the sole purpose to put the petitioners in unwarranted harassment and it is a clear case of abuse of the process of court in as much as the respondent No. 2's complaint case cannot be taken on its face value. Mr. Das further submitted that taking of cognizance of the offences under Section 202 Cr.P.C. is inconsistent with Sub-Section (a) of Section 202 Cr.P.C. Mr. Mr. Das further submitted that taking of cognizance of the offences under Section 202 Cr.P.C. is inconsistent with Sub-Section (a) of Section 202 Cr.P.C. Mr. Das, learned Senior Counsel, also submitted that the complaint case filed by the respondent No. 2 is a counterblast to the complaints filed by the daughter of the petitioner No. 1 against him, although the false allegations made by the respondent No. 2 discloses cognizable offences, no F.I.R. was lodged with the local Police Station and as such, the complaint case is liable to be quashed along with the impugned orders as prayed for. In support of his argument, Mr. Das relied on the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, (1960) AIR SC 866 and State of Haryana Vs. Bhajanlal & Ors, (1992) Supp1 SCC 335. 6. Per-Contra, Mr. D. Saikia, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2, submitted that the complaint petition, whereupon C.R. Case No. 5304c/2012 was registered which disclosed commission of various penal offences and those were ascertained by the learned Magistrate after making necessary inquiry under Sections 200/202 Cr.P.C. and then on being prima-facie satisfied as to the truthfulness of the allegations, issued summons to the accused/petitioners herein under Section 204 Cr.P.C. Mr. Saikia further submitted that in response to the summons, the accused/petitioners appeared before the learned court of Magistrate and considering the offences exclusively traible by the Court of Sessions Judge, Dhubri, after complying the necessary formalities under Section 208 Cr.P.C. Therefore, Mr. Saikia, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the learned Judicial Magistrate committed no illegality while passing the impugned order, dated 25.07.2013 and so also by the learned Sessions Judge, Dhubri, while framing the charges under Sections 392/506/34 IPC, after due consideration of the materials on the case record and hearing the learned counsel of both the sides and having found the said offences triable by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, transferred the case to the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhubri for trial. In such an equitable backdrop of course of procedure followed by the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge, the complaint case, which prima-facie disclosed of commission of offences, suffers from no procedural defect and therefore, this court may not, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., quash the proceeding. 7. Mr. In such an equitable backdrop of course of procedure followed by the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge, the complaint case, which prima-facie disclosed of commission of offences, suffers from no procedural defect and therefore, this court may not, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., quash the proceeding. 7. Mr. B. Gogoi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent No. 1 State, submitted that as the allegations made in the compliant and the statements of witnesses recorded in support of the same, taken at their face value disclosed prima-facie commission of the alleged offences, under which the learned Sessions Judge framed the charges, the complaint case is not liable to be quashed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and on the other hand, neither the learned Magistrate nor the Sessions Judge committed any procedural lapse. 8. Perusal of the provisions under Sections 200 to 204 Cr.P.C. reveal that on receipt of a complaint filed by private person, the Magistrate is required to apply his judicial mind in order to decide whether to take cognizance or not and once he decides to take cognizance under Section 190 (1)(a) Cr.P.C., he is to examine the complainant and his witnesses, if any under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and after such examination, he may either postpone the issue of process by inquiring into the case himself or directing an investigation to be made by a police officer under Sub-Section (1) of Section 202 Cr.P.C. and if the Magistrate is convinced, after such inquiry, he may issue process under Section 204 Cr.P.C. or dismiss the complaint under Section 203 Cr.P.C. In other words, under Section 200 Cr.P.C., a Magistrate can take cognizance of the offences made out and then has to examine the complainant and his witnesses, if any, to ascertain whether a prima-facie case is made out against the accused to issue process. The Supreme Court examined the scheme of Sections 200 to 204 in Kewal Krishan V. Suraj Bhan, (1980) Supp1 SCC 499 and held: "..At the stage of Sections 203 and 204, Criminal Procedure Code in a case exclusively triable by the Court of Session, all that the Magistrate has to do is to see whether on a cursory perusal of the complaint and the evidence recorded during the preliminary inquiry under Sections 200 and 202, Criminal Procedure Code, there is prima facie evidence in support of the charge leveled against the accused. All that he has to see is whether or not there is "sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. At this stage, the Magistrate is not to weigh the evidence meticulously as if he were the trial court. The standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in scrutinizing the evidence is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges. This Court has held in Ramesh Singh's case that even at the stage of framing charges, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the complainant produces or proposes to adduce at the trial, is not to be meticulously judged. The standard of proof and judgment, which is to be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of framing charges". 9. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Mohinder Singh V. Gulwant Singh, (1992) 2 SCC 213 in the following words: "...The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is extremely restricted only to finding out the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint in order to determine whether process should issue or not under Section 204 of the Code or whether the complaint should be dismissed by resorting to Section 203 of the Code on the footing that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding on the basis of the statements of the complainant and of his witnesses, if any. But the enquiry at that stage does not partake the character of a full dress trial which can only take place after process is issued under Section 204 of the Code calling upon the proposed accused to answer the accusation made against him for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the said accused person. But the enquiry at that stage does not partake the character of a full dress trial which can only take place after process is issued under Section 204 of the Code calling upon the proposed accused to answer the accusation made against him for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the said accused person. Further, the question whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of the enquiry contemplated under Section 202 of the Code. To say in other words, during the course of the enquiry under Section 202 of the Code, the enquiry officer has to satisfy himself simply on the evidence adduced by the prosecution whether prima facie case has been made out so as to put the proposed accused on a regular trial and that no detailed enquiry is called for during the course of such enquiry". 10. At the stage of conducting inquiry, under Section 202 Cr.P.C. the Magistrate is to see only whether cognizance of the offences should be taken or not purely from the point of view of the complaint without adverting to any possible defence that the accused may have. Proviso to Section 202 (2) Cr.P.C. requires the Magistrate if the offence complained of is exclusively triable by the Court of Session, he shall examine all the witnesses mentioned in the complaint. 11. In the instant case, the accused/petitioners admitted that the allegations made in the complaint by the complainant/respondent No. 2, at its face value, disclosed commission of cognizable offences. Perusal of the impugned order, dated 25.07.2013, passed in C.R. Case No. 5304c/2012, reveals that the learned Magistrate, after making necessary inquiry, on being satisfied as to the existence of prima-facie sufficient ground for proceeding, issued summons under Section 204 Cr.P.C. to the accused/petitioners under Sections 120B/395/34 IPC read with Section 25(1) (a) of the Arms Act and the said offences being exclusively traible by the Court of Session committed the case to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Dhubri, who after consideration of the materials on record, having found ground for presuming that the accused/petitioners have committed the offences under Sections 392/506/34 IPC, framed charges accordingly and thereafter, transferred the case to the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhubri for trial, as the said offences are triable by the Court of Judicial Magistrate. 12. 12. In R.P. Kapur Case, the Supreme Court examined the scope of inherent jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in quashing a criminal proceeding and held as herein below extracted: "..It is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Ordinarily criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried under the provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant to interfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. It is not possible, desirable or expedient to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction. However, we may indicate some categories of cases where the inherent jurisdiction can and should be exercised for quashing the proceedings. There may be cases where it may be possible for the High Court to take the view that the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused person may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice. If the criminal proceeding in question is in respect of an offence alleged to have been committed by an accused person and it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding the High Court would be justified in quashing the proceeding on that ground. Absence of the requisite sanction may, for instance, furnish cases under this category. Cases may also arise where the a11egations in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidence arises; it is a matter merely of looking at the complaint or the First Information Report to decide whether the offence alleged is disclosed or not. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In such cases it would be legitimate for the High Court to hold that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the process of the criminal court to be issued against the accused person. A third category of cases in which the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be successfully invoked may also arise. In cases falling under this category the allegations made against the accused person do constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced in support of the case or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with this class of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusation made and cases where there is legal evidence which on its appreciation may or may not support the accusation in question. In exercising its jurisdiction under section 561-A the High Court would not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence in question is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial magistrate, and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the High Court's inherent jurisdiction and contend that on a reasonable appreciation of the evidence the accusation made against the accused would not be sustained. Broadly stated that is the nature and scope of the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 561-A in the matter of quashing criminal proceedings, and that is the effect of the judicial decisions on the point". The sum and substance of the various pronouncements of the Supreme Court established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case, either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 13. The sum and substance of the various pronouncements of the Supreme Court established that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings in a proper case, either to prevent the abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 13. In the leading case of Bhajan Lal, the Supreme Court indicated the illustrative categories, which call for exercise of inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. These are: "(1)where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (2) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code; (3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (4) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code; (5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; (7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge". 14. 14. In the case, in hand, it appears that the allegations made in the complaint and the statements of witnesses in support of the same taken at their face value, as the learned Magistrate found, prima-facie, disclosed the essential ingredients of the offences and accordingly issued process vide the impugned order, dated 25.07.2013, although subsequently, as stated above, the learned Sessions Judge, after re-appreciation of materials on record and hearing the learned counsel of both sides, found prima-facie material to fame charges, by way of modification of the penal offences under which the case was committed to him. Therefore, the complaint proceeding cannot be said to have not based on evidence or material, which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible, in view of the possible defence case which relates to various disputed facts, which can be considered during trial of the case, where the defence can exercise the right to dislodge the complainant's case, by way of cross-examination of his witnesses or adducing evidence in defence. In the result, the petition fails and accordingly stands dismissed.