JUDGMENT : Krishna S. Dixit, J. - This intra court appeal against the order dated 26.10.2017 in W.P. No. 6369/2017 is reportedly time barred by a period of 82 days. Having regard to the circumstances, while ignoring the delay, we have heard the learned counsel for the appellant on merits. 2. Put in brief, the relevant background aspects of the matter are that the appellant, a qualified Electrical Technician and working under a licensed contractor M/s Shanthi Electricals, Udupi, sustained major injury due to electrical shock, while he was attending to some maintenance work of the respondent Corporation under the supervision of the then Assistant Executive Engineer on 17.5.2004 and has allegedly suffered 100% disability of his left hand. The appellant submits that despite making several applications seeking appointment on the grounds of vicarious liability of the employer, he was not extended any appointment but instead received an Official Memorandum from the Labour Officer, Udupi directing him to collect a sum of Rs. 1,54,737/- as compensation deposited by the Contractor. The aforesaid order was affirmed by this Court in M.F.A. No. 521/2007 (WC) by order dated 10.11.2008. 3. Thereafter, the appellant again filed an application under the Workmen Compensation Act for the release of the compensation so granted to him. Further, the appellant even approached the Lokayuktha with a complaint in this behalf i.e., "...for the alleged negligent act amounting to misconduct in directing the complainant to do a particular dangerous work without ensuring that proper safety measures were taken as contemplated under law"; and on investigation, it was found that the injury sustained by the appellant was indeed caused due to the negligent act of the employee of the respondent Corporation and thus, it was directed to initiate disciplinary proceedings as provided under the KCS (CCA) Rules, 1957. Insofar as these facts in the above case, there appears to be no dispute. 4. Having failed in all his attempts to obtain some form of alternative employment with the respondent Corporation, the most recent application being made on 19.10.2016, the appellant approached this Court in W.P. No. 6369/2017 wherein the learned Single Judge, while disposing the petition vide order dated 26.10.2017, has observed: "5. Be that as it may, the issue for consideration in the instant petition is as to whether there is any obligation cast in law on the respondents to provide employment to the petitioner. Be that as it may, the issue for consideration in the instant petition is as to whether there is any obligation cast in law on the respondents to provide employment to the petitioner. Even if all aspects relating to the manner in which the accident has occurred and the injuries suffered by the petitioner which has resulted in permanent disability if any, is taken note, in that regard, it is needless to mention that in law the respondents being the principle employer, would be liable to compensate the employee and recover such amount from the Contractor depending on the contractual relationship between the principle employer and the Contractor. 6. If that be the position in the instant case, the sum of Rs. 1,54,737/- which has been paid to the petitioner by the respondents, no doubt has been recovered from the Contractor. Even if the employee of the respondent is found to be negligent in causing the accident, the same could only become a basis for the petitioner to claim appropriate compensation and not seek for employment with the principle employer in that regard. Therefore, to the extent the representation as made by the petitioner seeking for employment would not arise for consideration by the respondents. However, in the facts and circumstances, if the petitioner in fact has suffered such disability and the earning capacity is reduced by 100% as claimed in the petition and in that light if the amount of compensation which is paid by the respondents is not sufficient or satisfy the requirement of law, it would still be open for the petitioner to approach the competent authority as provided under the Employees' Compensation Act seeking for an appropriate compensation to be determined and be paid in that regard. To such proceedings, in any event, the respondent as principle employer would also be a party along with the Contractor and the petitioner as well." 5. Seeking to question the order aforesaid, the learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant has strenuously argued that the application filed by the appellant, seeking appointment on compassionate ground or any other ground, keeping in view the mandate of the principles underlying Article 21 of the Constitution of India, deserves to be granted, particularly for the reason that it was due to the negligence of the employee of the respondent Corporation that the appellant has suffered 100% disability of his left hand. 6. 6. Having given thoughtful consideration to the submissions made and having examined the records and upon perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge, we are not persuaded to consider interference in this appeal. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the order dated 17.10.2016 passed by this Court in Leesha v. The Secretary, Department of Home Affairs, Govt. of Karnataka in W.P. No. 15990/2015 (GM-RES). On perusal of the said order, noticeable it is that the facts and circumstances of the case were, on material particulars, different from the present case. The learned Single Judge directed that the petitioner's case should be considered as a special case and thus she be provided with a government job on humanitarian ground alongwith compensation as she had been a victim of terrorist attacks due to which, she suffered physical disabilities which prevented her from being eligible to obtain suitable appointment. 8. The order passed in W.P. No.15990/2015 (supra) cannot be considered as laying down the law of universal application for all such cases that the Government or any other institution is liable to provide some form of employment "on humanitarian ground" when one has suffered some form of injury, under the category of "special case". This form of employment would vitiate the basic concepts of providing employment to those individuals who are either qualified and are eligible for such employments and in those cases, where genuine reasons exist for providing employment on compassionate grounds. 9. It remains trite that the provisions for compassionate ground appointment, by their very nature, are in exception to the general procedure prescribed for making appointments; and are required to be applied while keeping in view the fact that by making such appointments, other eligible persons are deprived of their chance to seek employment. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Director of Education (Secondary) v. Pushpendra Kumar: (1998) 5 SCC 192 has pointed out: "The object underlying a provision for grant of compassionate employment is to enable the family of deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis resulting due to death of the bread-earner which has left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. Out of pure humanitarian consideration and having regard to the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be able to make both ends meet, a provision is made for giving gainful appointment to one of the dependent of the deceased who may be eligible for such appointment. Such a provision makes a departure from the general provisions providing for appointment on the post by following a particular procedure. Since such a provision enables appointment being made without following the said procedure, it is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions. An exception cannot subsume the main provision to which it is an exception and thereby nullify the main provision by taking away completely the right conferred by the main provision. Care has, therefore, to be taken that provision for grant of compassionate employment, which is in the nature of an exception to the general provisions, does not unduly interfere with the right of other persons who are eligible for appointment to seek employment against the post which would have been available to them, but for the provision enabling appointment being made on compassionate grounds of the dependent of a deceased employee." 10. In the case of State of Jharkhand v. Shiv Karampal Sahu: (2009) 11 SCC 453 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed: "Appointment on compassionate grounds, it is trite, must be made keeping in view the provisions contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Such schemes cannot be given an expansive meaning as the constitutional scheme envisages that all persons who are entitled to be considered for appointment would be eligible for being considered therefore. Any policy decision for appointment on compassionate grounds must, therefore, receive a strict construction." 11. Further in the case of R.V. Krishnappa v. Karnataka Electricity Board : 1998 (2) KLJ 116, the Division Bench of this Hon'ble Court has laid down certain norms which can be followed while dealing with applications for compassionate appointments: "9. After referring to various pronouncements made by the Apex Court and this Court, it can be concluded that: (1) All appointments in the public service should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications on merit, however, subject to the exceptions carved out in the interest of justice. After referring to various pronouncements made by the Apex Court and this Court, it can be concluded that: (1) All appointments in the public service should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications on merit, however, subject to the exceptions carved out in the interest of justice. (2) One of such exceptions may be the appointment on compassionate grounds as a measure of sympathy, as pity or mercy or sorrow for the suffering of another. (3) Such appointment should be made with the object to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. Such an appointment is not intended to give a member of the family a job in lieu of the post held by the deceased. (4) Compassionate appointments have to be made strictly in accordance with the rules applicable, policy decision of the employer or the Government instructions issued in that behalf; (5) In the absence of statutory rules, policy or the order regarding compassionate appointments, the concerned authorities are required to ascertain by holding appropriate summary enquiry, the position of the family keeping in view the financial position of the dependents of the deceased employee. Under such circumstances the compassionate appointment could not be declined merely on the ground that one of the sons of the deceased was already in employment provided it is shown that such employed-son of the deceased was not living jointly with the deceased at the time of his death and was not in any way contributory or sharing to the economic burden of the family, as the dominant object of compassionate appointment is to relieve the family of distress of the sudden financial crisis or destitution; (6) In deciding the financial position and strain on the family, the appropriate authority may take into consideration the monthly income of the dependant members of the family and other monetary benefits conferred upon the family on account of the death of the deceased employee and compassionate employment should not be offered after the financial crisis in the family is over." 12. In the present case, even if it be assumed that the appellant had filed the application within a year of sustaining the injury which left him 100% disabled in his left hand, no vested right could be considered existing by moving of such application. In the present case, even if it be assumed that the appellant had filed the application within a year of sustaining the injury which left him 100% disabled in his left hand, no vested right could be considered existing by moving of such application. The fact of the matter remains that the appellant was not a direct employee of the respondent Corporation but was a contract employee under the main Contractor. The petition praying that he be granted alternative employment in the respondent Corporation on compassionate grounds was filed only in the year 2016. Having regard to the time that had elapsed since after the incident which had occurred on 17.5.2004 and until consideration of the matter in the Court, the learned Single Judge cannot be said to have committed any error in declining to grant the relief as claimed. Rather, the learned Single Judge, after looking into all the facts and circumstances of the case has even observed that the appellant may seek appropriate compensation jointly from the respondents as well as the contractor under whom he was working and also before the competent authority, if such claim made by him is denied by the respondents. 13. From what has been discussed hereinabove, we find no reason to consider interference in this appeal. 14. However, before closing the matter, we are constrained to observe that, the compensation awarded by Labour Officer, Udupi appears to be a meager sum and the apprehension of the appellant that he may not be able to sustain himself and his family cannot be overlooked. In the case at hand, the appellant is a middle-aged man and for no fault of his, has suffered serious injuries which has left him disabled to the extent that he cannot continue to work in the field he is qualified in. It would be pertinent to note that if the incident had not taken place, the appellant would not have lost his hand to the electric shock and would have continued to work and support his family. It would be pertinent to note that if the incident had not taken place, the appellant would not have lost his hand to the electric shock and would have continued to work and support his family. Having said so, this Court is in concurrence with the order passed by the learned Single Judge whereby, the appellant is at liberty to approach the respondent Corporation and the contractor to claim for further compensation as should be provided to him under the law and on failure of the respondent Corporation and the Contractor to comply with the same, the appellant is also at liberty to approach the competent forum for adequate compensation. 15. Subject to the observations and expectations foregoing, this appeal stands dismissed.