ORDER : Chitambaresh, J.(on behalf of Sathish Ninan, J. also) 1. The decision in State of Kerala v. Mohammedali Haji [ 1996 (1) KLT 584 (DB)] is doubted by the learned single Judge which has been endorsed by the Division Bench and hence this reference to the Full Bench. 2.Mohammedali Haji's case (supra) itself came on a reference doubting the correctness of the decision in K.Krishnankutty v. State of Kerala and others [C.R.P.No.1245/1975] rendered by the single Judge. It was held in Krishnankutty's case (supra) that rocky area in a land from which granite stones could be extracted cannot be termed as a 'commercial site' under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 ('the Act'). The definition can be found in Section 2(5) of the Act which is as follows: “(5) 'Commercial site' means any land (not being a kudiyiruppu or a kudikidappu or karaima) which is used principally for the purposes of any trade, commerce, industry, manufacture or business;” (emphasis supplied) The land on which commercial activity is conducted for the purposes of any trade, industry, manufacture etc. is exempted as a 'commercial site' in reckoning the ceiling area under Section 81(1)(q) of the Act. 3. The Act was enacted as part of the agrarian reforms in the State and one of its objects is to fix the ceiling area of the holder and resume possession of the excess lands for distribution to the landless. Yet another object is to prevent fragmentation of the holding evident from Section 81(4) of the Act and the Kerala Land Reforms (Using of Five Percent Plantation Land for Non-plantation Purposes) Rules, 2015. The emphasis of the Act is on the availability of the land on earth for all time to come so that it can be made use of for agricultural production in case of contingency to boost the economy of the State. The intermediaries in the case of tenanted holding are abolished and the benefits extended to the actual tiller of the land to give them an impetus to work more for the betterment of the society. It is with this object in mind has the term 'commercial site' appearing in the Act to be interpreted in the context of exemption from the provisions fixing the ceiling limit. It is with this object in mind has the term 'commercial site' appearing in the Act to be interpreted in the context of exemption from the provisions fixing the ceiling limit. 4.House sites; sites of temples, churches, mosques, cemeteries, burning grounds etc.; sites of building; and commercial sites enjoy exemption under Clauses (m), (o), (p) and (q) of Section 81(1) of the Act. It all denotes the places where houses, temples, churches, mosques, buildings or industrial houses are sited in which case it will not be reckoned for ceiling area. The houses, temples, churches, mosques, buildings or industrial houses are only super structures which if removed will make available the land for agricultural operations. Even the land set apart for an industrial or commercial undertaking at the commencement of the Act will lose exemption if it is not used for the purpose under Section 81(1)(k) of the Act. The idea is that any more of the land shall not be put to use in a manner making the agricultural operations impossible after the commencement of the Act. 5.Using up the land by extracting granite stones from the table of earth does not make the site 'commercial' eligible for exemption from the ceiling area under Section 81(1)(q) read with Section 2(5) of the Act. Mr Justice P.Subramonian Poti (as he then was) observed in Krishnankutty's case (supra) thus: “As defined, it takes in lands which are used principally for the purpose of any trade, commerce, industry, manufacture or business. The nature of the land is indicated by this definition. The fact that in order to remove the product from the land there is some element of commerce or trade taking place in the land does not render it a commercial site. May be that the site is not only significant as one which could be exploited as rocky area but has otherwise commercial or business importance. That would be another thing. The mere fact that operation such as blasting and conversion into metals is being conducted in a rocky area does not render the area a commercial site.” (emphasis supplied) 6. But the Division Bench comprising of Mr Justice P.K.Balasubramanyan and Mr Justice K.A.Abdul Gafoor held in Mohammedali Haji's case (supra) as follows: “Section 2(5), while defining 'commercial site' covers the land used for the purpose of any trade, commerce, industry, manufacture or business. But the Division Bench comprising of Mr Justice P.K.Balasubramanyan and Mr Justice K.A.Abdul Gafoor held in Mohammedali Haji's case (supra) as follows: “Section 2(5), while defining 'commercial site' covers the land used for the purpose of any trade, commerce, industry, manufacture or business. Blasting of rock or cutting laterite block into consumable articles will certainly come within this. The word 'manufacture' is derived out of 'manus' meaning 'hand' and 'facere' means make. So, making of goods by hand or by machinery on a large scale is 'manufacture'. That includes making of goods into any other form for use. Thus blasting of rock for the purpose of making rubbles or metals or cutting of laterite block into stones is a manufacturing operation. In that case, any land meant for such use is a commercial site, as defined in Section 2(5), entitling exemption as provided in Section 81(1)(q) of the Act.” (emphasis supplied) 7. Mr.Bechu Kurian Thomas, Senior Advocate heavily relied on the dictum in Mohammedali Haji's case (supra) whereas Mr. Renjith Thampan, Additional Advocate General and Mr. Harish Vasudevan, Advocate drew support from the dictum in Krishnankutty's case (supra). 8. The internal aid shall be applied first before calling for external aid in the interpretation of a statute and this wholesome principle is relevant to construe the term 'commercial site' appearing in the Act. Renjith Thampan, Additional Advocate General and Mr. Harish Vasudevan, Advocate drew support from the dictum in Krishnankutty's case (supra). 8. The internal aid shall be applied first before calling for external aid in the interpretation of a statute and this wholesome principle is relevant to construe the term 'commercial site' appearing in the Act. Section 81(3) of the Act which enables the Government to grant exemption by notification in Gazette is as follows: “81(3) The Government may, if they are satisfied that is necessary to do so in the public interest- (a) on account of any special use to which any land is put; or (b) on account of any land being bona fide required for the purpose of conversion into plantation or for the extension or preservation of an existing plantation or for any commercial, industrial, educational or charitable purpose, by notification in the Gazette, exempt such land from the provisions of this Chapter, subject to such restrictions and conditions as they may deem fit to impose: Provided that the land referred to in clause (b) shall be used for the purpose for which it is extended within such time as the Government may specify in that behalf; and where the land is not so used within the time specified, the exemption shall cease to be in force.” (emphasis supplied) There is no necessity to empower the Government to grant exemption for any commercial or industrial purpose in public interest when commercial sites are already exempted under Section 81(1)(q) of the Act. The necessary corollary therefore is that the term 'commercial site' as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act read with Section 81(1)(q) of the Act has to be given a narrower meaning only. What is relevant under Section 81(3) of the Act is that there should be public interest as opposed to private interest and the land bona fide required for the purpose intended. 9. We are also unable to agree with the broad proposition of law as held in Mohammedali Haji's case (supra) as it would defeat the very object of the Act which is to conserve the land for distribution to the landless. Otherwise every holder can claim exemption contending that he is removing the entire sub soil which is an industry or is selling the entire block of land itself which is a trade. Otherwise every holder can claim exemption contending that he is removing the entire sub soil which is an industry or is selling the entire block of land itself which is a trade. We may at this juncture quote from State of Gujarat v. Salimbhai Abdulgaffar Shaikh [ (2003) 8 SCC 50 ]: “It is a well settled principle that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. It is also the duty of the court to find out the true intention of the legislature and to ascertain the purpose of the statute and give full meaning to the same. The different provisions in the statute should not be interpreted in the abstract but should be construed keeping in mind the whole enactment and the dominant purpose that it may express.” (emphasis supplied) 10. Heavy reliance is placed on the following passage in The Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat and others [ (1975) 2 SCC 175 ] to contend that 'land' includes the granite stones underneath which can be quarried: “The word 'land' includes not only the face of the earth, but everything under or over it, and has in its legal signification an indefinite extent upward and downward, giving rise to the maxim, cujus est solum ejus est usque and coelum (see p.163, 73 Corpus Juris Secondum). According to Broom's Legal Maxims, 10th Ed, p.259, not only has land in its legal signification an indefinite extent upwards, but in law it extends also downwards, so that whatever is in a direct line between the surface and the centre of the earth by the common law belongs to the owner of the surface (not merely the surface, but all the land down to the centre of the earth and upto the heavens) and hence the word 'land' which is nomen generalissimum, includes, not only the face of the earth, but everything under it or over it.” The above was in the context of taxing provisions under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 which requires a strict interpretation quite unlike an agrarian reform which has to reach the masses. 11. 11. There is an exception to the rule of literal construction where the application of the rule to the words of a statute leads to absurdity or when the statute read as a whole indicates a different meaning. The Supreme Court has in this context observed in Molar Mal v. Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. [ (2000) 4 SCC 285 ] as follows: “We agree with this contention of the landlord that normally the courts will have to follow the rule of literal construction which rule enjoins the court to take the words as used by the legislature and to give it the meaning which naturally implies. But, there is an exception to this rule. That exception comes to play when application of literal construction of the words in the statute leads to absurdity, inconsistency or when the words are used or by reading the statute as a whole, it requires a different meaning.” (emphasis supplied) 12. It is an admitted case that the place where the granite quarry is proposed to be started was only a rocky land amidst plantation at the commencement of the Act exempted under Section 81(1)(e) thereof. Nobody has any case that the piece of land was a 'commercial site' at the commencement of the Act in the sense that any quarrying operations have already begun. It may appear at first blush that any commercial activity subsequently started may also bring the rocky land within the term 'commercial site' as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act. But the Supreme Court has time and again held that a statute should be so construed so as to prevent the mischief and to advance remedy according to the true intention of the law makers. Decisions are legion on this aspect and Sevantilal Maneklal Seth v. C.I.T. [ AIR 1968 SC 697 ] and Girdhari Lal & Sons v. Balbir Nath Mathur [ (1986) 2 SCC 237 ] are a few. The term 'commercial site' has to be so construed to prevent the mischief of any holder of land from claiming any exemption by starting industrial activity consuming the very land. A literal interpretation of the term 'commercial site' as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act will have the deleterious effect of environmental depredation as observed by the referring Judge. 13. A literal interpretation of the term 'commercial site' as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act will have the deleterious effect of environmental depredation as observed by the referring Judge. 13. We are therefore of the view that using up the land by excavating soil or quarrying granite stones therefrom does not make the piece of land a 'commercial site' in order to qualify for exemption from ceiling limit. But any industrial activity existing on the surface of the land like a metal crusher unit or artificial sand manufacturing unit may perhaps qualify for exemption. This is the meaning to be attributed to the term 'commercial site' as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act in deciding the question of exemption under Section 81(1) (q) of the Act. Of course those lands which are set apart for commercial or industrial activity at the time of the commencement of the Act shall be excluded provided it is actually used for the purpose. The same should have been done within a time frame specified by the District Collector under Section 81(1)(k) of the Act which does not apply to the facts of the present case. We however add that any class of land earlier exempted in the ceiling case can be converted into any class of land not liable to be exempted under Explanation II to Section 87 of the Act. The consequence is that the benefit of the exemption would be lost and the extent added to the account of the assessee or the declarant in determination of his ceiling area. That is a matter to be dealt with by the Taluk Land Board with the assessee or the declarant and other interested parties on the party array and we desist from elaborating further. Accordingly we overrule the dictum in Mohammedali Haji's case (supra) and approve the dictum in Krishnankutty's case (supra) on the scheme of the Act consistent with its object. The reference is answered as above. P.B.Suresh Kumar, J. (Dissenting) 1. I have perused the order authored by my learned Brother V. Chitambaresh J. With due respect, I find myself unable to agree with the view taken therein. 2. The reference is answered as above. P.B.Suresh Kumar, J. (Dissenting) 1. I have perused the order authored by my learned Brother V. Chitambaresh J. With due respect, I find myself unable to agree with the view taken therein. 2. As noted in the order, the declaration made by the Division Bench in State of Kerala v. Mohammedali Haji [ 1996(1) KLT 584 (DB)] that the site of a quarry would fall within the definition of 'commercial site' as contained in Section 2(5) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 ('the Act') entitling its holder exemption from the provisions of Chapter III of the Act, has been doubted by the learned Single judge on the ground that quarrying defaces the land and drains it of its essential nature and content and therefore, its site cannot be one intended to be treated as a "commercial site" entitling its holder exemption. It is also observed by the learned Judge in the reference order that as the State faces environmental depredation, putting at peril even the climates of the land, it is only imperative that there be a re-look into the law laid down in Mohammedali Haji (supra). The view aforesaid has been endorsed by my learned Brother V. Chitambaresh J., holding that the idea behind the Act is that no more land shall be put to use in a manner making the agricultural operations impossible and therefore, using up of land for extraction of granite stones which would deface the land itself, does not make the site “commercial”, eligible for exemption from the ceiling provisions under Section 81(1)(q) of the Act. 3. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment of the Division Bench in Mohammedali Haji (supra)read thus: “9. Blasting of the rock and its conversion into rubbles or metals or cutting of laterite stones is certainly not an agricultural operation. The products cannot be consumed by the owner. So, whatever that is received by the owner as a result of the operation is for the purpose of trade. Section 2(5), while defining “commercial site” covers the land used for the purpose of any trade, commerce, industry, manufacture or business. Blasting of rock or cutting laterite block into consumable articles will certainly come within this. The word “manufacture” is derived out of 'manus' meaning 'hand' and 'facere' means make. Section 2(5), while defining “commercial site” covers the land used for the purpose of any trade, commerce, industry, manufacture or business. Blasting of rock or cutting laterite block into consumable articles will certainly come within this. The word “manufacture” is derived out of 'manus' meaning 'hand' and 'facere' means make. So, making of goods by hand or by machinery on a larger scale is 'manufacture'. That includes making of goods into any other form for use. Thus blasting of rock for the purpose of making rubbles or metals or cutting of laterite block into stones is a manufacturing operation. In that case, any land meant for such use is a commercial site, as defined in Section 2(5), entitling exemption as provided in section S.81(1)(q) of the Act. 10. The word 'commercial' also means produced for mass consumption and with profit as a primary aim. Land used as quarry produces rubbles or laterite stones certainly for mass consumption with profit as a primary aim. Therefore, it is a commercial activity and the site used for quarrying is a commercial site entitling the returnee for exemption under Section 81(1)(q) of the Act while computing the ceiling area.” The view taken by the Division Bench in Mohammedali Haji (supra), as discernible from the paragraphs extracted above, is that blasting of rock for the purpose of making rubbles or metals or cutting of laterite block into stones is a manufacturing activity or at any rate, a commercial activity, making the site eligible for exemption from the ceiling provisions under the Act. 4. Had the legislature intended a quarry site to be treated as a “commercial site”, entitling its holder exemption from the ceiling provisions under the Act, is, therefore, the basic question to be answered. On a close reading of the provisions of the Act, in the background of its object and purpose, I am of the view that the question has been rightly answered by the Division Bench in Mohammedali Haji (supra). I shall state hereunder the reasons for the same. 5. The Act is one enacted as part of the agrarian reforms in the State invoking the power under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. I shall state hereunder the reasons for the same. 5. The Act is one enacted as part of the agrarian reforms in the State invoking the power under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. As revealed from the heading of Chapter III of the Act itself, namely “Restriction on ownership and possession of land in excess of ceiling area and disposal of excess lands”, the provisions therein are intended only to impose restrictions on ownership and possession of land in excess of ceiling area and for disposal of excess lands. The key provisions in Chapter III are those contained in Sections 82 and 83 on one hand, laying down the policy that no one shall hold land in excess of the ceiling limit and those contained in Sections 95 and 96 on the other hand, earmarking the excess land for distribution among the landless and small cultivators. The question to be answered is one relating to the ancillary provision contained in Section 81 of the Act, dealing with holdings to which the provisions of Chapter III do not apply. If one looks at the holdings which have been exempted from the provisions of Chapter III as contained in sub-section (1) of Section 81, it could be seen that an element of public interest is involved in exempting each category of lands mentioned in that Section. In other words, there is not much difficulty in holding that the scheme of the Act, especially that of Chapter III, is that the provisions therein are to be given effect to without affecting the public interest intended to be protected by conferring exemption to the various categories of lands mentioned in Section 81. “Commercial site” is one among the categories of lands exempted from the ceiling provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act. “Commercial site” is one among the categories of lands exempted from the ceiling provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act. “Commercial site” is defined in Section 2(5) of the Act thus: “Commercial site” means any land not being a kudiyiruppu or a kudikidappu or karaima which is used principally for the purposes of any trade, commerce, industry manufacture or business;” If the expression “commercial site” is understood in the background of the scheme of the Act, especially that of Chapter III as indicated above, it is clear that the purpose of exemption is to ensure that the implementation of the provisions contained in chapter III of the Act shall not affect trading, commercial, industrial, manufacturing or business activities undertaken making use of the land. It is all the more so, as the emphasis in terms of the definition is on the activities and not on the manner in which the land is made use of for the activity. I am fortified with the above view also for the reason that the legislature has made the expressions relating to exempted lands unambiguous by appropriate explanations wherever required. For example, in the case of cashew estates falling under clause 81(1)(f), it is explained in the Act that cashew estate shall mean any land primarily cultivated with not less than 150 cashew trees per hectare. At the same time, no explanation is given to the expression “commercial site” contained in Section 81(1)(q), indicating thereby that the words used to define the said expression have to be attributed its natural and ordinary meaning. The finespun distinction drawn between activities which deface the land, and which do not deface the land, for defining the true purport of the expression “commercial site”, according to me, is not justified at all in the context, especially since the Act is a legislation falling under Entry 18 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution dealing with the right in or over land, land tenures, transfer and alienation of agricultural land etc. 6. The next aspect to be considered is as to whether quarrying would fall under any of the five categories of activities mentioned in the definition. 6. The next aspect to be considered is as to whether quarrying would fall under any of the five categories of activities mentioned in the definition. Since all the words used in the definition, namely, trade, commerce, industry, manufacture and business are general words, the same are to be attributed their common and ordinary meaning, for statutes are presumed to use words in their popular, rather than their narrowly legal or technical sense, in matters relating to general public. As it is held in Mohammedali Haji (supra) that quarrying involves manufacturing, hairsplitting arguments have been advanced by the counsel who canvassed for the position that site of a quarry would not fall within the definition of “commercial site” to bring home the point that quarrying cannot be brought under the expression "manufacturing". Be that as it may, the word "commerce" is used in the Act to include all activities in connection with trade, commerce, industry, manufacture or business. Black's defines “commercial activity” as an activity conducted to make a profit. Black's defines “business” as a commercial enterprise carried on for profit. There cannot be any dispute to the fact that granite stones are extracted from private quarries mostly as part of business for sale for profit. Of course, in exceptional situations, one may extract granite stones from a quarry for personal consumption as well. As it is a reality that granite stones are extracted from private quarries mostly as part of business for sale for profit, there is no doubt in my mind that quarrying activity would fall within the scope of both commercial and business activities. In other words, the site of a quarry is certainly to be treated as a commercial site, falling within the scope of “commercial site” as defined in Section 2(5) of the Act. 7. Further, it is a fact that quarrying activities were in existence in the State in private lands even before the Act came into force. When the learned Additional Advocate General who canvassed for the position that site of a quarry would not fall within the definition of “commercial site” was asked as to how the quarries existed at the time of commencement of the Act continued their operation after the Act, the answer was that such lands were exempted under Section 81(1)(k) of the Act. Section 81(1)(k) of the Act reads thus: “S.81 Exemptions.--(1) The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to-- x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (k): lands belonging to or held by an industrial or commercial undertaking at the commencement of this Act, and set apart for use for the industrial or commercial purpose of the undertaking: Provided that the exemption under this clause shall cease to apply if such land is not actually used for the purpose for which it has been set apart, within such time as the District Collector may, by notice to the undertaking, specify in that behalf.” In terms of the said provision, lands elonging to or held by an industrial or commercial undertaking at the time of commencement of the Act and set apart for use for the industrial or commercial purpose of the undertaking have been exempted from the ceiling provisions contained in the Act. Section 81(1)(k) does not refer to quarries. It refers only to industrial and commercial undertakings. In other words, the State concedes that for the purpose of permitting the existing quarries to continue, the quarrying activity was understood to have been a commercial activity. Similarly, one of the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel who canvassed for the position that quarrying sites would fall within the ambit of “commercial site” was that if it is held that quarrying sites would not fall within the definition of “commercial site”, all the existing private quarries in the State have to be closed down and in that event, there will be gross shortage for granite stones which would not only affect the developmental activities taking place in the State, but also the life of the common man who needs granite stones for various constructions. This argument was met by the counsel on the other side contending that in such an event, the Government is empowered by Section 81(3) of the Act to exempt quarrying sites from the ceiling provisions under the Act. Section 81(3) of the Act reads thus : “81. This argument was met by the counsel on the other side contending that in such an event, the Government is empowered by Section 81(3) of the Act to exempt quarrying sites from the ceiling provisions under the Act. Section 81(3) of the Act reads thus : “81. Exemptions.— x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x (3) The Government may, if they are satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the public interest-- (a) On account of any special use to which any land is put; or (b) On account of any land being bona fide required for the purpose of conversion into plantation or for the extension or preservation of an existing plantation or for any commercial, industrial, educational or charitable purpose, by notification in the Gazette, exempt such land from the provisions of this Chapter, subject to such restrictions and conditions as they may deem fit to impose: Provided that the land referred to in clause (b) shall be used for the purpose for which it is intended within such time as the Government may specify in that behalf; and, where the land is not so used within the time specified, the exemption shall cease to be in force.” True, the aforesaid provision confers power on the Government under Section 81(3) of the Act for exempting any land for any commercial or industrial purpose from the provisions contained in Chapter III of the Act, if such land is required bonafide for such purposes. But, here again, the expression used is “commercial” or “industrial”. In other words, the expression “commercial”, according to the counsel, has to be understood as one taking within its scope quarrying as well for the purpose of Section 81(3) of the Act. It is presumed that same meaning is intended for the same words used in different parts of the same statute. Similarly, it is trite that when there is doubt about the meaning of a word, the word has to be understood in the sense in which it best harmonizes with the subject of enactment. If quarrying sites are to be treated as commercial sites in the context of Sections 81(1)(k) and 81(3) of the Act, there is no reason why the same shall not be treated as “commercial sites” for the purpose of Section 81(1)(q). 8. If quarrying sites are to be treated as commercial sites in the context of Sections 81(1)(k) and 81(3) of the Act, there is no reason why the same shall not be treated as “commercial sites” for the purpose of Section 81(1)(q). 8. The view that the law laid down in Mohammedali Haji (supra) needs to be re-considered on account of environmental concerns cannot be accepted, as the Act is one enacted as part of the agrarian reforms in the State. For the aforesaid reasons, the reference is answered holding that Mohammedali Haji (supra) has laid down the law on the point correctly. Order of the Court 1. The judgment in State of Kerala v. Mohammedali Haji [ 1996 (1) KLT 584 (DB)] is overruled. 2. The Registry to post the writ petitions for hearing as per roster.