ORDER : The petitioner has called in question the correctness and legality of the order passed by the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Puttur, in C.C.No.430/2010 dated 25.06.2018, whereby the application filed by the respondent herein (hereinafter referred to as ‘complainant’) under Sections 311 and 91 of Cr.P.C, came to be allowed and the case was reopened for the purpose of further examination of PW.1. 2. The essential facts necessary for disposal of this petition are that respondent/complainant initiated proceedings against the petitioner/accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, for dishonour of the cheque for a value of Rs.6 Lakhs. After conclusion of the trial and after hearing the parties, the matter was set down for judgment. At that stage, the trial Court having found that one of the document executed between the parties namely, a sale agreement dated 02.12.2006, was necessary for the fair decision in the case, suo motu directed the complainant to take steps to mark the said document. 3. The said order was challenged by the petitioner in Criminal Petition No.1966/2015 on the ground that the document in question was insufficiently stamped and therefore, the same could not be received in evidence. This Court, by order dated 26.08.2015, in Crl.P.No.1966/2015 allowed the criminal petition and the orders passed by the trial Court dated 13.03.2015 and 24.03.2015 were set aside and the trial Court was directed to consider the matter afresh after giving its audience to both the parties. Accordingly, by the impugned order, the trial Court considered the proposed document namely, the sale agreement dated 02.12.2006 and having come to conclusion that the possession of the subject property was not delivered to the vendee, the stamp duty paid thereon was sufficient and hence, permitted the complainant to re-examine himself and take steps to produce the said agreement in evidence. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order on two grounds. Firstly, he contends that the admissibility of the said document was already considered by the trial Court in the course of recording evidence and trial Court had refused to mark the said documents for insufficient payment of stamp duty. That being the case, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to suo motu ask the complainant to get the said documents produced in evidence. The said direction amounts to review of the earlier order which is not permissible in law. 5. That being the case, the trial Court had no jurisdiction to suo motu ask the complainant to get the said documents produced in evidence. The said direction amounts to review of the earlier order which is not permissible in law. 5. Secondly, he contends that by virtue of Sections 33 and 34 of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short), the document was insufficiently stamped and therefore, the same could not have been produced in evidence without paying the deficit stamp duty as required under the provisions of the Act. Alternatively, he contends that the aforesaid agreement of sale was later cancelled by the parties on 26.12.2009 and an endorsement in that regard was made on the back of the agreement. Therefore, by virtue of Article 5(e)(i) of the Act, the stamp duty payable on conveyance under Article 20 of the Act, ought to have been paid on the cancellation of the agreement. 6. Meeting the above arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the recitals of the agreement on a plain reading reveal that the possession of the property was not delivered to the respondent. Therefore, the trial Court has come to the right conclusion that the agreement was duly stamped and therefore, there is no error or illegality whatsoever in the impugned order. 7. On considering the rival contentions and on going through the provisions of law quoted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I do not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the impugned order. In my view, the course adopted by the learned Magistrate to direct the complainant to take steps to get the aforesaid agreement produced in evidence is in consonance with Section 311 of Cr.P.C, which reads as under: “311. Power to summon material witness, or examine person present.-Any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined; and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and reexamine any such person if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case.” 8. The first part of the above Section 311 of Cr.P.C., gives the discretion to the Court to summon any of the witnesses when an application is sought to be filed by either of the parties to recall any one of the witnesses already examined or whose evidence is necessary for disposal of the case but, the second part of the Section casts a duty on the Court to summon or to recall or re-examine any such person, if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the case. This is well explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Raj Deo Sharma (II) vs. State of Bihar reported in (1999) 7 SCC 604 wherein it is held as under: “9. We may observe that the power of the court as envisaged in Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has not been curtailed by this Court. Neither in the decision of the five-Judge Bench in A.R. Antulay case nor in Kartar Singh case such power has been restricted for achieving speedy trial. In other words, even if the prosecution evidence is closed in compliance with the directions contained in the main judgment it is still open to the prosecution to invoke the powers of the court under Section 311 of the Code. We make it clear that if evidence of any witness appears to the court to be essential to the just decision of the case it is the duty of the court to summon and examine or recall and reexamine any such person.” In the case of U.T. of Dadra & Nagar Haveli and anr vs. Fatehsinh Mohansinh Chauhan reported in (2006) 7 SCC 529 , the position of law is further elucidated in paragraph 15 as under: “15. A conspectus of authorities referred to above would show that the principle is well settled that the exercise of power under Section 311 CrPC should be resorted to only with the object of finding out the truth or obtaining proper proof of such facts which lead to a just and correct decision of the case, this being the primary duty of a criminal court. Calling a witness or reexamining a witness already examined for the purpose of finding out the truth in order to enable the court to arrive at a just decision of the case cannot be dubbed as ‘filling in a lacuna in the prosecution case’ unless the facts and circumstances of the case make it apparent that the exercise of power by the court would result in causing serious prejudice to the accused resulting in miscarriage of justice.” 9. In the light of the above principles, first contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Magistrate was not entitled suo motu to direct the complainant to take steps to mark the documents is rejected. 10. The next contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is also liable to be rejected. Even though it is contended that during the course of the evidence, the objection raised by the petitioner regarding the admissibility of the document was upheld by the trial Court, the said order, in my view, does not prohibit the Court to call for any document, at any stage of the proceedings, if the Court finds the said document or evidence is necessary for fair decision in the case. 11. In the instant case, on going through the records, I do not find any such conclusive finding recorded by the trial Court on the issue of non-admissibility of the said sale agreement as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. On the other hand, the material on record clearly indicates that the admissibility of the said document has been considered only under the impugned order and by referring to the recitals of the sale agreement, the trial Court has recorded a categorical finding that under the said sale agreement, the possession of the property was not delivered to the respondent and therefore, it was not required to be stamped as a conveyance. I do not find any error or infirmity in the reasoning of the trial Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any recital in the said agreement wherein the possession has been delivered to the respondent and therefore, the question of paying the stamp duty on the said document as a conveyance does not arise at all. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to point out any recital in the said agreement wherein the possession has been delivered to the respondent and therefore, the question of paying the stamp duty on the said document as a conveyance does not arise at all. 12. The third contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that on account of cancellation of the said agreement, the stamp duty was required to be paid under Article (5)(e)(i) of the Act is totally misplaced. The said Article reads as under: Description of Instrument Proper Stamp Duty “Article 5(e) If relating to sale of immovable property wherein part performance of the contract (i) possession of the property is delivered or is agreed to be delivered without executing the conveyance; Same duty as a conveyance (No.20) on the market value of the property. [Provided that, where a deed of cancellation of earlier agreement is executed by and between the same parties in respect of the same property and if proper stamp duty has been paid on such agreement, then the duty on such ‘deed of cancellation’ shall not exceed rupees five hundred.]” 13. Learned counsel has built up the argument based on the proviso to the said Article. The said proviso would be applicable only where a deed of cancellation of earlier agreement is executed by and between the same parties in respect of the said property. In the instant case, admittedly, no deed of cancellation of the earlier agreement is executed. According to the petitioner, an endorsement was made on the back of the agreement effecting cancellation of the agreement. Therefore, proviso to Article 5(e)(i) of the Act does not get attracted to the facts of the case. 14. Thus, on over all consideration of the contentions raised by the petitioner, I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order. On the other hand, in view of the proviso to the Article 34 of the Act, in my view, the question of payment of the stamp duty on the document tendered in a criminal case was not required to be gone into by the trial Court as the said document was sought for by the Court only with a view to render a fair decision in the said case. In view of the proviso, the trial Court ought to have received the said document in evidence without embarking upon the issue of stamp duty. In any case, the Court below having rightly decided on the admissibility of the document and payment of stamp duty thereon, based on the purport of the agreement of sale in the light of the provisions of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957, I do not find any error in the impugned order warranting interference under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The petition therefore fails and is accordingly dismissed. It is made clear that in the event the document in question is admitted in evidence, adequate opportunity shall be provided to the petitioner to cross examine the witness through whom the said document is admitted in evidence.