JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. The manner, modus and approach to the appointment to the posts of Special Public Prosecutors (SPP) under the Protection of Children From Sexual Offences Act, 2012 ('the POCSO' Act) has been called into focus by the appellants and the petitioners in the above two appeals and writ petitions. 2. The proximal and immediate cause for the appellants/petitioners to approach this Court appears to be the issuance of an order bearing No.G.O.(Rt) No.2117/2017/Home dated 24.06.2017 by the Government of Kerala relating to the appointment of SPPs in the thirteen Special Courts constituted for each district in Kerala, except Ernakulam under the POCSO Act. This order is available on record as Exhibit P7 in the above writ petitions and as Exhibit R1(c) in W.A.No.2385/2018. 3. Through this order, the Government took a decision to make appointment to the posts of SPPs adopting the procedure under Section 24(4)of the Code of Criminal Procedure as also the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) and conduct of Cases Rules ('the KGLO Rules' for brevity). On a reading of this order, it becomes discernible that the Government is under the impression that since no Rules for the appointment of SPPs in the Special Courts under the POCSO Act have yet been framed, such appointments will be better done as per Section 24(4)of the Cr.P.C. 4. The primary challenge by the appellants/petitioners, who are all aspirants to the posts of SPPs in the various Special Courts, is that the said appointment ought to be done exclusively under the procedural provisions of Section 32 of the POCSO Act and that for such reason, Section 24(4)of the Cr.P.C. cannot be attracted or adopted. 5. In effect, the appellants/petitioners singularly contend that the prescription under Section 32 of the POCSO Act is independent of Section 24(4) of the Cr.P.C. and that the procedure for appointment as SPPs can be done only as per the mandate of the POCSO Act independent of the provisions under the Cr.P.C. 6. The point for decision is certainly short but its legal import is deep, thus meriting incisive examination. 7. The point for decision is certainly short but its legal import is deep, thus meriting incisive examination. 7. In formal terms, the primary question is whether the SPPs under the POCSO Act are to be appointed as per a self-contained procedure available under that Act, if any, divorced from the mandate of Section 24(4) of Cr.P.C. All other contentions in these cases are corollary to this and they would, therefore, obtain answers being modulated by our view on this one issue. 8. We have heard Sri.S.Sreekumar, Sri.Bechu Kurian Thomas and Sri.Ramesh Chander, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Sri.P.Martin Jose, Sri.Paul Jacob, Smt.K.A.Sanjeetha, appearing for the appellants/petitioners, the learned Advocate General appearing for the official respondents, Sri.Grashious Kuriakose, the learned Senior Counsel, Sri.Rakesh Roshan, Sri.Siju Kamalasanan, Sri.T.K.Biju and Sri.M.Gopikrishnan Nambiar, learned counsel appearing for the party respondents. 9. The hypostasis of the assertions-in-law of the appellants/petitioners being built on Section 32 of the POCSO Act and since the provisions of that Section becomes fundamental for our evaluation, we quote it as under: “32. Special Public Prosecutors.-(1) The State Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint a Special Public Prosecutor for every Special Court for conducting cases only under the provisions of this Act. (2) A person shall be eligible to be appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor under sub-section (1) only if he had been in practice for not less than seven years as an advocate. (3) Every person appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor under this section shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor within the meaning of clause(u)of section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) and provision of that Code shall have effect accordingly.” 10. As seen above, the appellants/petitioners contend that the appointment of SPPs under the POCSO Act will have to be made exclusively under the provisions of the said Act and not by relying on Section 24(4)of the Cr.P.C. In furtherance of this contention they assert that since the appointment of SPPs is to be done only under Section 32 of the POCSO Act, such appointment can be done only after the Rules governing such appointment are framed under the Act by the Central Government. 11. 11. According to the appellants/petitioners, since Section 32 empowers the State Government only to appoint SPPs under the Act, the procedure for such appointment will have to abide by the Rules to be made by the Central Government under the POCSO Act. They, therefore, contend that the procedure now adopted by the Government of Kerala in falling back on Section 24(4)of the Cr.P.C., as regards as the procedure to appoint SPPs under the POCSO Act is illegal and impermissible and they predicate that until the Rules are framed under the POCSO Act, no appointment to the posts of SPPs be allowed to be made. 12. To answer this contention, one will have to certainly have a glance at the provisions of the POCSO Act relating to framing of Rules. These provisions are contained in Section 45 of the Act, which, for ease of reference, is extracted as under: “45. Power to make rules.-(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act.” 13. Sri.S.Sreekumar, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants in W.A.No.2385/2017 began his submissions by asserting that the Government of Kerala cannot be permitted to make appointment to the posts of SPPs under the POCSO Act, except otherwise in the manner stipulated under Section 32 of the said Act. He says that the POCSO Act, being an independent one, intended for a specific purpose, the importing of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. into it cannot be legally apposite. He then goes to say that since no Rules have yet been framed by the Central Government invoking their power under Section 45(1) as extracted above, the Government of Kerala cannot be allowed to make appointment to the posts of SPPs until such Rules are framed. He points out that the appellants have, therefore, made two prayers in the writ petition, from which the writ appeal arises, namely, toissue a writ of mandamus and compelthe Union of India to frame Rules under Section 45(1) of the POCSO Act prescribing the procedure for appointment of SPPs under Section 32 of the POCSO Act and for a declaration that the present procedure adopted by the Government of Kerala for preparing thelist of advocates for appointment to the posts of SPPsis arbitrary,illegal and violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India. He says that as a concomitant adjuvant to these issues, the appellants have also sought that the appointment to the posts of SPPs be allowed to be done by the Government of Kerala only after the Rules are framed by the Central Government. 14. Sri.Bechu Kurian Thomas, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners in the two writ petitions, thereafter made submissions in consonance with the contentions raised by Sri.S.Sreekumar, the learned Senior Counsel and says that there is an additional relief that has been prayed for by the writ petitioners, namely that they be not terminated as SPPs till valid and legal appointments are made as per the provisions of the POCSO Act. 15. We notice that these submissions have been made by the learned Senior Counsel because concededly, the writ petitioners were originally appointed as Additional Public Prosecutors under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. and that when Special Courts were constituted on 05.11.2015, by designating the I Additional District Court in each district as the Special Court, they were given the charge of SPPs under the POCSO Act, by order dated 13.01.2016. 16. It transpires that subsequently, the Government of Kerala issued an order dated 30.05.2016 deciding to terminate the services of all the existing APPs and to appoint new persons in such posts. The writ petitioners along with certain others, apprehending termination, had approached this Court by filing W.P.(C)No.21469/2016 praying that they be not terminated as the SPPs under the POCSO Act. A learned Judge of this Court had considered the said writ petition and delivered a judgment dated 26.09.2016, a copy of which available as Exhibit P2 in W.P.(C)No. 10367/2018 and as Exhibit P3in W.P.(C)No.7692/2018, holding that in view of an earlier judgment of a Division Bench of this Court, which was authored by one among us (PRRM (J), reported as Vinod v. State of Kerala ( 2016 (3) KLT 920 ), it is within the discretion and authority of the Government of Kerala to choose to terminate the services of APPs appointed under the Cr.P.C. and therefore, that the petitioners cannot seek to continue in such posts, if the Government chooses to terminate them. However, as regards the additional charge of SPPs under the POCSO Act that was being held by the petitioners, the learned Single Judge took the view that even if they are terminated as APPs under the Cr.P.C., they would still continue as SPPs under the POCSO Act. 17. This judgment, however, was challenged by the State of Kerala by filing W.A.No.2264/2016, which culminated in a judgment of a Division Bench, headed by the Hon'ble Chief Justice, dated 01.12.2016, a copy of which is available as Exhibit P3in W.P.(C)No.10367/2018 and as Exhibit P4 in W.P.(C)No.7692/2018, where under the judgment of the learned Single Judge was reversed and it was held that' since the respondents are already working as Government Advocates and Additional Public Prosecutors at the time of issuance of Exhibits P2 and P3 notifications, entrusting them additional duties of Special Public prosecut or under the POCSO Act runs contrary to subsection (1) of Section 32 and hence, the appointments pursuant to Exhibits P2 and P3 are illegal. Since the appointment of respondents are illegal perse, they can not hold on to the post in as much as they don't have right to continue in the said post. In all fairness, the State Government ought to have made separate appointments of the persons to work as Special Public Prosecutors under the POCSO Act, as mandated under sub section (1) of Section 32'. After holding so, the Division Bench directed the Government to make appointments to the posts of SPPs under the POCSO Act and permitted the writ petitioners to continue as SPPs only until such time as fresh appointments are made to the said posts by the Government. 18. In the factual background as afore, it becomes perspicuous that the contention of the writ petitions in W.P.(C) Nos.10367/2018 and 7692/2018, that the present procedure adopted by the Government of Kerala, namely in adopting the procedure under Section 24(4)of the Cr.P.C. to appoint SPPs under the POCSO Act, is illegal and therefore, that they are entitled to continue as SPPs until valid appointments are made under the POCSO Act, which they assert can be done only after the Rules are framed by the Central Government invoking Section 45(1) of the POCSO Act extracted above, is also intended to allow them to obtain the benefit of continuing in such posts under the mandate of the judgment of the Division Bench in W.A.No.2264/2016. 19. 19. Sri.Ramesh Chander, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants in W.A.No.947/2018, adopts the same contentions of other two learned Senior Counsel, but adds that in the case of the appellant in this appeal, she has an additional contention that even if Section 24(4) of the Cr.P.C. could be followed, the appointment of the additional third respondent as SPP of the Special Court in Idukki is egregiously wrong because the appellant has better credentials than her. 20. On hearing the afore submissions of the three learned Senior Counsel, we see that the following broad issues are impelled for our consideration.: (a) Is framing of Rules under the POCSO Act for appointment to the posts of SPPs imperatively essential for Section 32 of the said Act to operate and whether in the absence of such Rules, no appointment to the posts of SPPs can be made under the mandate of that Section? (b) Since Section 32 of the POCSO Act does not prescribe any procedure for appointment of SPPs but only provides that the State Government shall appoint SPPs for every Special Court, what is the best alternative for identifying and selecting qualified and competent advocates for such purpose. (c) Whatever be the nature of the process to be adopted for the appointment of SPPs, should it not answer the inviolable prescriptions of being merit based, transparent, fair, objective and equitable. (d) Is the process presently followed by the Government of Kerala, adopting the manner of appointment as provided under Section 24(4) of the Cr.P.C. and under the KGLO Rules been done fairly, legally and equitably. 21. Apropos the question of framing of Rules, the provisions that come to play under the POCSO Act are contained in Section 45 extracted above. As is clear from the said Section, the power to make rules under the POCSO Act is vested only with the Central Government and the investiture of such power has been made to carry out the purposes of the Act. As is indubitable from sub-section (2)of Section 45, the Central Government has been given the power for framing of the Rules with respect to the matters referred to in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) therein. As is indubitable from sub-section (2)of Section 45, the Central Government has been given the power for framing of the Rules with respect to the matters referred to in sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) therein. It is luculent from these provisions that the manner and method of appointment to the posts of SPPs is not one of the enumerated matters under Section 45(2)and we, therefore, cannot fathen the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants/petitioners that under this Section the Central Government is obligated to make Rules stipulating such procedure. 22. We are cognizant that the submissions of Sri.S.Sreekumar and Sri.Bechu Kurian Thomas, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants/petitioners, are that under sub-section (2) of Section 45, the specifically enumerated matters are only in addition to the general power to make Rules by the Central Government. In other words, the learned Senior Counsel asserts that the Central Government has the power to frame Rules even on matters which are not specifically itemered under subsection (2) of Section 45. We have no reason to find against this contention of the learned Senior Counsel because, we have no doubt that the Central government can, if they want, make Rules for any other purposes which are not listed under sub-section (2) of Section 45. The real question is not whether the Central Government can but if they should. This is important because if there is a statutory obligation on the Central Government to make Rules for the purpose of appointment to the post of SPPs, thenit would certainly be available to this Court to direct them to do so. Needless to say, if there is no such obligation, then no such directions can be issued by us. 23. On a reading of Section 45 afore-extracted, it does not require much of an expatiation to understand that it does not statutorily burden the Central Government to make Rules except for the matters itemised under sub-section (2) and it thereafter vests a general power with them to make Rules, if they so require. In other words, except for the matters specified under sub-section (2) of Section 45, the Statute makes in no compulsion of any kind on the Central Government to make Rules and leaves it to its discretion to do so, if it is so necessary. 24. In other words, except for the matters specified under sub-section (2) of Section 45, the Statute makes in no compulsion of any kind on the Central Government to make Rules and leaves it to its discretion to do so, if it is so necessary. 24. In that perspective, it becomes obvious that it would not be possible for this Court to accept the submissions of the learned Senior counsel and to direct the Central Government to frame Rules to modulate the appointment of SPPs under the POCSO Act. 25. When our view as afore was expressed, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the parties asserted that this is not the manner in which even the Government of Kerala has understood the provisions. They point out that even in the Government Order dated 24.06.2017, referred to earlier, they have decided to go on with the appointment of SPPs under the POCSO Act by adopting the provisions under Section 24(4) of the Cr.P.C., because the State Government has not yet framed any Rules for such purpose. We are afraid that we cannot attach any gravitas to this submission because what is important is not the manner in which the Government of Kerala has understood the provisions but its real forensic import. It is obvious from the Government Order dated 24.06.2017 that the Government of Kerala has misdirected itself to think that the power to frame Rules is vested in them when, in fact, the afore-extracted Section 45(1) of the POCSO Act invests this power exclusively with the Central Government. 26. Further, the impression of the Government of Kerala that such Rules are necessary for appointment of the SPPs under the POCSO Act does not alter the position of law and does not make it incumbent upon the Government of India to frame Rules for such purpose. This is more so because, among the enumerated categories of purposes for which Rules are to be framed under Section 45(2) of the POCSO Act, the appointment of SPPs is not included. This is more so because, among the enumerated categories of purposes for which Rules are to be framed under Section 45(2) of the POCSO Act, the appointment of SPPs is not included. As is indubitable the refrom, the specific purposes, as particularised therein, for framing Rules are with respect to the prescriptions of qualifications and experience and the fees payable to a Translator, an Interpreter, a Special Educator or a Person familiar with communication with children, for provisions relating to care and protection and medical treatment of a child, for payment of compensation under Section 33(8) of the Act and the manner of periodic monitoring of the provisions of the Act under Section 44(1). 27. Going by the these itemised categories, it is evident that the procedure for appointment of SPPs is not one among them and does not have, in its character or class, any similarity with these. Therefore, under the principles of nociturasociis, a term in the Statute will be known by its association with other terms or to say differently, it will be defined by its associates. The fact that Section 45(2) has omitted the procedure for appointment of SPPs from its compelling ambit would irrefragibly demonstrate that the framing of Rules for such purposeis not a mandatory function of the Central Government under the POCSO Act. 28. Lest we be mistaken, this is not to say that the Government of India cannot frame Rules for this or for any other purpose, but only that it is not be justified for this Court to order framing of any such Rules. 29. Our opinion in this regard is fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Orissa State (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Board v. M/s Orient Paper Mills and Anr. (JT (2003) 3 SC 74), wherein the Hon'ble Court has held that even if the provisions of a Statute provide an action to be taken as may be prescribed, the fact that the Rules for such purpose is not framed would not disable the authority under it from acting. The view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is available in paragraphs 13 and 15 of the said judgment and the relevant portions of the same are as below: “13. Thus, in case manner is not prescribed under the rules, there is no obligation or requirement to follow any, except Whatever the provision itself provides viz. The view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is available in paragraphs 13 and 15 of the said judgment and the relevant portions of the same are as below: “13. Thus, in case manner is not prescribed under the rules, there is no obligation or requirement to follow any, except Whatever the provision itself provides viz. Section 19 in the instant case which is also complete in itself even without any manner being prescribed as indicated shortly before to read the provision omitting this part “in such manner as may be prescribed”. Merely by absence of rules, the State would not be divested of its powers to notify in Official Gazette any area declaringit to be air pollution controlarea. 15. It is thus clear from the decision referred to in the preceding paragraph that the power which vests in an authority would not cease to exist simply for the reason that the rules have not been framed or the manner of exercise of the power has not been prescribed.” 30. Since we thus concluded that framing of Rules for the purpose of appointment of SPPs under Section 32 is not a mandatory requirement cast upon the Central Government and since the said Section does not prescribe a particular procedure for such appointment, a coetaneous question arises as to what is the best form of process that can be adopted by a Government in making such appointment. 31. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has, in several cases, considered this issue and has declaratively held that every such process has to be merit based, with the primary purpose of selecting and appointing the best that is available. In State of U.P. and Another v. Johri Mal ( (2004) 4 SCC 714 ), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs 43, 44 and 74, identified the principles governing such selection as under: “43. The State, however, while appointing a counsel must take into account the following fundamental principle which are required to be observed that good and competent lawyers are required to be appointed for. (i) good administration of justice;(ii)to fulfil its duty to uphold the rule of law;(iii),its accountability to the public; and(iv) expenditure from the tax payers' money. 44. Only when good and competent counsel are appointed by the State, the public interest would be safeguarded. (i) good administration of justice;(ii)to fulfil its duty to uphold the rule of law;(iii),its accountability to the public; and(iv) expenditure from the tax payers' money. 44. Only when good and competent counsel are appointed by the State, the public interest would be safeguarded. The State while appointing the public prosecutors must bear in mind that for the purpose of upholding the rule of law, good administration of justice is imperative which in turn would have a direct impact on sustenance of democracy. No appointment of Public Prosecutors or District Counsel should, thus, be made either for pursuing a political purpose or for giving some undue advantage to a section of the people. Retention of its counsel by the State must be weighed on the scale of public interest. The State should replace and efficient, honest and competent lawyer, inter alia, when it is in a position to appoint a more competent lawyer. In such an event, even a good performance by a lawyer may not be of much importance. 74. The Government Counsel, thus, must have character, competence, sufficient experience as also standing at the Bar. The need for employing meritorious and competent persons to keep the standard of the high officers cannot be minimised. The holders of the post have a public duty to perform public elementis, thus, involved therein.” Thereafter, their Lordships went on to say that appointment of Public Prosecutors, as long as the procedure under the Cr.P.C. is followed and a reasonable or fair method is adopted, will not be normally interfered with by courts. After analysing the views of the court in several other judgments and particularly in Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of U.P. ( (1991) 1 SCC 212 ), Mukul Dalal v. Union of India ((1998) 3 SCC 144) and Mundrika Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar ( (1979) 4 SCC 701 ), their Lordships have concluded as under: “85. The age-old tradition on the part of the State in appointing the District Government Counsel on the basis of the recommendations of the District Collector in consultation with the District Judge is based on certain principles. Whereas the District Judge is supposed too know the merit, competence and capability of the lawyers concerned for discharging their duties, the district magistrate is supposed to know their conduct outside the court vis-a vis the victims of offences, public officers, witnesses, etc. Whereas the District Judge is supposed too know the merit, competence and capability of the lawyers concerned for discharging their duties, the district magistrate is supposed to know their conduct outside the court vis-a vis the victims of offences, public officers, witnesses, etc. the District Magistrate is also supposed to know about the conduct of the Government Counsel as also their integrity. 87. The State should bear in mind the dicta of this court in Mundrika Prasad Singh as regards the necessity to consult the district Judge. While making appointments of District Government Counsel, therefore, the State should give primacy to the opinion of the district Judge. Such a course of action would demonstrate fairness and reasonableness of action and, furthermore, to a large extent the action of the State would not be dubbed as politically motivated or otherwise arbitrary.” 32. These views of the Hon'ble Supreme Court with respect to the absolute requirement of an effective consultation with the District Judge to assess the merits of a Prosecutor found imprimatur in a subsequent judgment in State of Punjab and Another v. Brijeshwar Singh Chahal and Another ( (2016) 6 SCC 1 ). Interestingly, this judgment has been cited by both sides to assert that only the best from the field of choice be selected and appointed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Brijeshwar Singh (supra) spoke extensively of the need for a fair, non-arbitrary and transparent method of selection, without political considerations and held that there must be proper checks in the matter of appointment of Prosecutors so that they can be efficient in their functioning, objective and independent of the police and the executive. Their Lordships reiterated that consultation with the Sessions Judge, who would have the best opportunity to assess the merit, experience and good character of a candidate, is the most requisite and that any amendment which deletes a provision relating to consultation with a District Judge will violate Article 14 of the Constitution, since it would amount to giving a licence for arbitrary appointments. Their Lordships, thereafter, made certain definitive declarations, as are available in paragraph 46 of the said judgment, which read as under: “Consultation with the Sessions Judge for a Public Prosecutor in the district judiciary and with the High Court for one in the High Court is statutorily prescribed because of the importance of the appointment and the significance of the opinion of the courts where the appointee has to work, as to his or her capacity and professional ability. The statute does not admit of an appointment in disregard of the requirement of consultation. The Law Commission has, therefore, rightly held the consultative process to be a check on the power of appointment which cannot be left unregulated or uncontrolled, lest a person not suited or competent enough gets appointed to the position for other reasons or considerations. Consultation, in that sense, lends reassurance as to the professional ability and suitability of the appointee. The Commission has on that premise placed question mark on the validity of State amendment that deletes from Section 24 of the Criminal Procedure Code the need for consultation with the Sessions Judge or the High Court.” 33. After declaring as above, their Lordships then settled the best mechanism for consideration of merits for appointment of Prosecutors, in paragraphs 49 and 50 of the said judgment, which reads as under: “49. The question is what should be the mechanism for such consideration. There are in that regard two major aspects that need to be kept in mind. 49.1. The first is the need for assessment and requirement of the State Governments having regard to the workload in different courts. As noticed earlier, appointments appear to have been made without any realistic assessment of the need for State Counsel leads to situations that have been adversely commented upon by CAG in his report to which we have made a reference in the earlier part of this judgment. The problem gets compounded by those in power adding to the strength of Government Advocates not because they are required but because such appointments serve the object of appeasement or private benevolence shown to those who qualify for the same. CAG has in that view rightly observed that there ought to be a proper assessment of the need before such appointments are made. 49.2. CAG has in that view rightly observed that there ought to be a proper assessment of the need before such appointments are made. 49.2. The second aspect is about the process of selection and assessment of merit of the candidates by a credible process. This process can be primarily left to the State Government who can appoint a Committee of officers to carry out the same. It will be useful if the Committee of officers has the Secretary to Government, Law Department, who is generally a judicial officer on deputation with the Government as its Member-Secretary. The Committee can even invite applications from eligible candidates for different positions. The conditions of eligibility for appointment can be left to the Government or the Committee depending upon threw nature and the extent of work which the appointees may be effected to handle. The process and selection of appointment would be fair and reasonable, transparent and credible if the Government or the Committee as the case may be also stipulates the norms for assessment of merit and suitability. 50. The third stage of the process of selection and appointment shall in the absence of any statutory provisions regulating such appointments involve consultation with the District and Session Judge if the appointment is at the district level and the High Court if the appointment is for cases conducted before the High Court. It would, in our opinion, be appropriate and in keeping with demands of transparency, objectivity and fairness if after assessment and finalisation of the selection process a panel is sent to the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned for his views on the subject. The Chief Justice could constitute a committee of Judges to review the names recommended for appointment and offer his views in regard to professional competence and suitability of candidates for such appointments. Appointments made after such a consultative process would inspire confidence and prevent any arbitrariness. The same procedure could be followed where candidates are granted extension in their terms of appointment in which case the Committee appointed by the Government and that constituted by the Chief Justice could also look in to the performance of the candidates during the period they have worked as State Counsel.” 34. The same procedure could be followed where candidates are granted extension in their terms of appointment in which case the Committee appointed by the Government and that constituted by the Chief Justice could also look in to the performance of the candidates during the period they have worked as State Counsel.” 34. The inviolable requisite for a real and effective consultation with the District and Sessions Judge, in the case of appointment of Prosecutors, was considered and affirmatively stated by a Division Bench of this Court in Vinod (supra). In this judgment, the Bench declared that consultation with the District and Sessions Judge is not an empty formality and that the statutory mandate requires effective and real consultation. On the pointed question as to 'the list prepared by the District Collector' and 'the panel chosen by the District Judge' from it, the Bench has answered it in paragraph 43 of the judgment as under: “From the above, it is quite obvious that there is much difference in the terms 'list' and 'panel'. In the first place, as mentioned already, the 'list' is only a collection of names by the District Collector, who has to satisfy the requirements and on finalising the process in consultation with the District and Session Judge, it becomes a 'panel', where the names of the persons who are specifically disapproved by the District and Sessions Judge are never to be included. The safeguard mentioned in sub-clause (c), that such 'panel' shall not contain the name of anybody who was not there in the 'list' prepared by the District Collector under sub-clause (a) is intended only to see that nobody form outside who has not undergone the scrutiny under the magnifying glass used by the District and Sessions Judge does secure a place in the 'panel' to be prepared by the District Collector. This is only to assert the distinct role of the District and Sessions Judge to play in the preparation of 'panel' with reference too the different traits and to ensure that no undesired element does get a chance to be enlisted in the 'panel,' to be forwarded to the Government, making it open for the Government to appoint appropriate/competent persons from such 'panel'. The difference between the two terms 'list' and 'panel' a sit appears under the different clauses of the above Rule, the sanctity attached to the same, the circumstances in connection with the preparation of such 'list' and 'panel' were not seen pointed out before the Division Bench while considering Omankuttan's case and as a natural consequence, the same was not adverted to by the Bench as well.” 35. All the afore judgments would take it beyond doubt that the courts have always found appointment of Public Prosecutors made contrary or in dissonance with the views of the District Judge to be illegal and unconstitutional. In fact, in paragraph 50 of the judgment in Brijeshwar Singh (supra), which has been extracted above, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have said that even in the absence of statutory provisions regulating such appointment, it should involve consultation with the District and Sessions Judge so that the demands of transparency, objectivity and fairness in assessment of merit can be guaranteed. 36. That said, as far as the present cases are concerned, the Government of Kerala have though it fit to make appointments to the posts of SPPs adopting the procedure under Section 24(4) of the Cr.P.C. and following the KGLO Rules. Under Section 24(4) of the Cr.P.C. the appointment of a Prosecutor has to be made in the following manner: “24(4) The District Magistrate shall, in consultation with the Sessions Judge, prepare a panel of names of persons, who are, in his opinion fit to be appointed as Public Prosecutors or Additional Public Prosecutors for the district.” The KGLO Rules, in turn, adopts the prescriptions of Section 24(4) of the Cr.P.C. and stipulates the method for appointment of Government Law Officers at the District Court, Additional District Courts and Sub Centres in Rule 8 of the Rules and prescribes the procedure for it as under: “Method of appointment of Government Law Officers at District court. Additional district Court and Sub Court Centres:-(1). A Government Law Officer at a District Court Centre. Additional District Court Centre or Sub court Centre shall be appointed by the Government from a panel of names of advocates furnished by the District Collector concerned: Provided that the Government shall try to give adequate representation to members of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe Communities in the matter of appointment of Government Law Officers. Additional District Court Centre or Sub court Centre shall be appointed by the Government from a panel of names of advocates furnished by the District Collector concerned: Provided that the Government shall try to give adequate representation to members of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe Communities in the matter of appointment of Government Law Officers. (2) The District Collector shall, while preparing the panel, bear in mind the following:- (i) a person included in the panel shall have at least seven years practice as an Advocate: (ii) the panel shall be prepared in consultation with the District and Session Judge and only those persons who, having regard to their qualifications, experience, integrity, reliability, reputation and character and antecedents, are in the opinion of the District Collector, fit to be appointed, shall be included therein: (iii) the character and antecedents in all persons included in the panel shall be got verified through the concerned Superintendent of police. Provided that if members from the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe Community are qualified to be appointed as Government Law Officer the panel shall contain at least the name of one member from such community.” 37. A reading of Section 24(3) along with Rule 8 of the KGLO Rules, would persuade us substantially to an opinion that if its provisions are scrupulously followed, it would achieve the objectives declared in the afore judgments in the matter of appointment of persons as Prosecutors to various courts. This is because, as per a conjoint operation of these provisions, the District Collector of a particular district will have to first collate a list of aspirants, verify the character and antecedents of all such persons through the concerned Superintendent of Police and then forward such list to the District Judge concerned for his/her assessment of professional merit, capacity and competence of each other. The District Judge, in turn, is enjoined to make his assessment of each of the candidates from the touch-stone of qualifications, experience, integrity, reliability, reputation and character of each of such candidates and he has to make his opinion as to the eligibility of such persons to be appointed as a Prosecutor. We are certain in our mind that these provisions, fully, if not, substantially, are in conformity with the declarations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and of this Court as afore and a selection made through that process should normally be beyond controversy. 38. We are certain in our mind that these provisions, fully, if not, substantially, are in conformity with the declarations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and of this Court as afore and a selection made through that process should normally be beyond controversy. 38. That said, the further question is whether the procedure under Section 24(4) of the Cr.P.C., along with that of the KGLO Rules, can be safely adopted in the case of appointment of SPPs under the POCSO Act. An answer to this would inexorably depend on the assessment of the nature of that office and the duties attached to it. 39. Even when we hold that the provisions of Section 24 Cr.P.C. read with the relevant ones in the KGLO Rules would be the most suitable procedure to be followed for appointment of Public Prosecutors to the various Courts, at least in the available circumstances as of date, we will still have to examine whether these provisions can be safely adopted for the purpose of appointment of SPPs under the POCSO Act. We are drawn to this consideration because all the three Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellants/petitioners, contend that the role of a Special Public Prosecutor in the Special Courts, constituted under the POCSO Act, is completely different in its nature of duties and character from that of a Prosecutor in the other Courts. According to them, the POCSO Act is a special act, intended to protect children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography and therefore, that the SPPs require certain special skills and enhanced sensitivity in dealing with such issues. 40. An evaluation of these submissions can be made by us only after we scan the POCSO Act to verify its statutory scheme, under which the Special Prosecutors are to professionally perform. For this purpose, we will have to examine certain specific Sections of the POCSO Act, to which we will advert presently. 41. Under the definition clause contained in Section 2(1)(m) of the Act, 'Special Public Prosecutor” 'means a Public Prosecutor appointed under Section 32 of the Act. For this purpose, we will have to examine certain specific Sections of the POCSO Act, to which we will advert presently. 41. Under the definition clause contained in Section 2(1)(m) of the Act, 'Special Public Prosecutor” 'means a Public Prosecutor appointed under Section 32 of the Act. Therefore, under Section 2(2) of the Act, it is mandated that the words and expressions used in the POCSO Act and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and the Information Technology Act, 2000 shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in the said Codes or the Acts. It is virtually a conceded position on all sides that the word Public Prosecutor has not been specifically defined under the POCSO Act. However, as seen above, the post 'Special Public Prosecutor' has been defined under Section 2(1)(m) to mean a Public Prosecutor. Normally, therefore, going by Section 2(2), it can only lead to an undisputed conclusion that the word Public Prosecutor used in Section 2(1)(m) will derive its meaning from the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words, a reading Section 2(1)(m), along with Section 2(2) of the POCSO Act, would leave little doubt that a Special Public Prosecutor means a Public Prosecutor as defined under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 42. However, we do not propose to jump into a final conclusion merely by this. We feel that it will be better for us to look at the other provisions of the Act also before we arrive at a final conclusion. 43. Under Section 31 of the POCSO Act, the following is specifically mandated: “31.Application of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to proceedings before a Special Court.-Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974)(including the provisions as to bail and bonds) shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Court and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions and the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Court, shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor.” 44. After saying as above, Section 32(3), which has already been extracted afore goes on to provide that “every person appointed as a Special Public Prosecutor shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor within the meaning of Clause (u) of Section 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the provision of that Code shall have effect accordingly. 45. Turning to Section 2(u) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a Public Prosecutor has been defined as under: 46. On a composite reading of all the afore provisions, it becomes fortified that a Special Public Prosecutor under the POCSO Act is effectively a Public Prosecutor for all purposes and intents and that such office will stand regulated by the procedural and jurisdictional mandate of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 47. That apart, Section 33(9) of the POCSO Act makes it explicit that: “Public Prosecutor” means any person appointed under Section 24, and includes any person acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor.” “A Special Court shall, for the purpose of the trial of any offence under this Act, have all the powers of a Court of Session and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of Session, and as far as may be, in accordance with the procedure specified in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for trial before a Court of Session.” 48. Therefore, on a associative examination of all the aforesaid provisions, we are of the view that it becomes safe for this Court to conclude that the duties and responsibilities assigned to a Special Public Prosecutor would be essentially and fundamentally analogous to those which are vested and entrusted to a Pubic Prosecutor appointed under the provisions of Section 24 of the Cr.P.C. 49. When that be so, it becomes inescapable that the process and method for appointment of a Public Prosecutor would also be the best suited for the appointment of a Public Prosecutors under the POCSO Act, at least until such time as the Central Government makes independent Rules under Section 45(1)of the POCSO Act,if they are so desirous. 50. When that be so, it becomes inescapable that the process and method for appointment of a Public Prosecutor would also be the best suited for the appointment of a Public Prosecutors under the POCSO Act, at least until such time as the Central Government makes independent Rules under Section 45(1)of the POCSO Act,if they are so desirous. 50. Coming to the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that the nature of duties of Special Public Prosecutor under the POCSO Act is completely different from that of the Prosecutors appointed under the Cr.P.C., we are afraid that we cannot accede to it, since the provisions of the POCSO Act makes no such distinction discernible. In fact, what we see from the POCSO Act is that a higher level of responsibility is cast upon the Special Courts in dealing with the cases under it, but it does not, in any manner, stipulate that the Special Public Prosecutors are required to be equipped with any additional or greater expertise or competence than a Public Prosecutor under the Cr.P.C. This becomes clear when one surveys some of the provisions of Section 33 of the POCSO Act, particularly sub clauses (1) to (7) thereof, which, for a complete reading, is extracted as follows: “33.Procedure and powers of Special Court.-(1) A Special Court may take cognizance of any offence, without the accused being committed to it for trial, upon receiving a compliant of facts which constitute such offence, or upon a police report of such facts. (2) The Special Public Prosecutor or as the case may be, the counsel appearing for the accused shall, while recording the examination-in-chief, cross-examination or re-examination of the child, communicate the questions to be put to the child to the Special Court which shall in turn put those questions to the child. (3) The Special Court may, if it considers necessary, permit frequent breaks for the child during the trial. (4) The Special Court shall create a child-friendly atmosphere by allowing a family member, a guardian, a friend or a relative in whom the child has trust or confidence to be present in the court. (5) The Special Court shall ensure that the child is not called repeatedly to testify in the court. (4) The Special Court shall create a child-friendly atmosphere by allowing a family member, a guardian, a friend or a relative in whom the child has trust or confidence to be present in the court. (5) The Special Court shall ensure that the child is not called repeatedly to testify in the court. (6) The Special Court shall not permit aggressive questioning or character assassination of the child and ensure that dignity of the child is maintained at all times during the trial. (7) The Special Court shall ensure that the identity of the child is not disclosed at any time during the course of investigation or trial: Provided that for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Special Court may permit such disclosure, if in its opinion such disclosureis in the interest of the child.” 51. When one reads the afore provisions, it cannot but establish that the responsibility of a Special Court in dealing with the cases under the POCSO Act is distinct and greater than a Magistrate's Court or a Court of Sessions. In fact, even though the Special Courts are so designated from among District and Sessions Courts, Section 33(1) afore makes it a Court of first instance, without the requirement for a committal proceedings, which makes this responsibility on the presiding Judge far greater. 52. However, these provisions do not indicate that the Special Public Prosecutors are statutorily required to equip themselves with a greater expertise than a Prosecutor under Section 24 Cr.P.C. and this becomes clear because, going by Section 33(2) afore, even the Special Public Prosecutor cannot, during trial, communicate directly with the child, but can only place the questions before the Special Court, which in turn, is authorised to put those questions with the child. In that scenario, we are unable to accept the contentions of the learned Senior Counsel that a Special Public Prosecutor is a 'specialised' Prosecutor and that they are required to be identified and selected through a process different to that which is applicable for the selection and appointment of a Public Prosecutor under the Cr.P.C. 53. That finally brings us to the final question whether the Government of Kerala has, in these cases, followed the procedure under Section 24(4) of the Cr.P.C. and the KGLO Rules faithfully and implicitly. 54. That finally brings us to the final question whether the Government of Kerala has, in these cases, followed the procedure under Section 24(4) of the Cr.P.C. and the KGLO Rules faithfully and implicitly. 54. As we have seen above, the most imperative sine qua non for a fair and transparent appointment as Public Prosecutors is an effective consultation by the District Collector with the concerned jurisdictional District Judge in the preparation of a panel of candidates suitable for such appointment. As we have seen above, the Hon'ble Supreme Court as restated and reiterated this fundamental pre-requisite in all judgments afore-noticed and if any process has been adopted defacto in dissonance to this requirement, then the same will certainly fall foul of legal requirements. 55. When these matters were considered by another Bench of this Court on 11.06.2018 with, the obvious intention of assessing the procedure followed, an order was issued directing the Government of Kerala to make available the files with respect to the appointment of SPPs in the thirteen districts in Kerala. These files were handed over across the Bar by the learned Advocate General for our scrutiny on 12.09.2018 and we had then reserved these cases for judgment. However, when we examined the files, we found certain specific issues quad hoc some of the appointees and we, therefore, listed these cases for being 'spoken to' on 17.09.2018 and directed the official respondents herein to explain how at least four of the appointees, namely Sri.G.Subothran, Smt.Sindhu.M.G., Smt.Aisha P.Jamal and Sri.Pushkaran.M.N., who are arrayed as additional respondents 8, 14, 16 and 11 in W.A.No.2385/2017, have been appointed to Kollam, Wayanad, Malappuram and Kottayam Special Courts respectively. We had directed so, since we noticed that: (a) In the case of Sri.G.Subothran, the District Judge, Kollam, while preparing the panel, has opined that he did not have the opportunity of assessing his merit or competence, even though the District Judge found two other names, namely Sri.P.K.Ravindran and Sri.Joly Alex to be' good'. (b) As far as Smt.Sindhu.M.G. is concerned, the final panel prepared by the District Collector, Wayanad, clearly shows that she is arrayed as an accused in C.C.No.643/2015 on the files of Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-I, Sulthan Bathery in relation to Crime No.517/2017 of Ambalavayal Police Station and stood as an accused for offences under Sections 143, 147, 283 and 14 of the Indian Penal Code. However, this information was, at no point of time, brought to the notice of the District Judge, Wayanad. (c) As regards Smt.Aisha P.Jamal, she seems to be the youngest in terms of practice in the list prepared by the District Collector and she has herself declared that she has only seven years and seven months of practice, which is a mere seven months more than the essential qualification under Section 32 of the POCSO Act. Even though her name was found suitable by the District Judge, along with various others, we were concerned because the other persons found suitable by the District Judge are seen to be having practice between 15-23 years. Therefore, in the absence of any specificin put as to an exceptional ability, we were anxious that she has been appointed in preference to the various others with much larger amount of practice and who have been found also suitable for appointment by the District Judge. (d) With respect to Sri.Pushkaran.M.N., appointed to the Kottayam Special Court, we did not find any adverse factors against him but only that he appeared to be still working as Additional Government Pleader in Kottayam, even though there is no specific bar either in the applicable Statutes in the appointment of an SPP from among the serving Government Pleaders. However, we still asked the learned Advocate General to explain if there was any particular reason that guided the Government to appoint this individual, even though he appeared to be still functioning as a Government Pleader. 56. In response to the afore order, an affidavit sworn to by the Additional Secretary to Government, Home Department dated 03.10.2008, on behalf of the State of Kerala, has been placed on record. The constitutive assertions in the counter affidavit, with respect to the law involved, is that unless the District Judge disapproves a particular name from the list of candidates sent to him by the District Collector, the Government would be entitled to appoint any one of them from the panel subsequently prepared, based on their trust and confidence in the person sought to be appointed. 57. 57. It is further stated in the affidavit that as per Rule 8 of the KGLO Rules, the list of the advocates is to be first prepared by the District collector and that such list is then forwarded to the District Judge for his remarks, based on which the District Collector will then prepare a panel. It is then averred that going by the said Rule, the character and antecedents of persons are to be only then verified through the police authorities and therefore, that such verification of antecedents and character willarise only if a person is included in the panel and not when the list is sent for the remarks of the District Judge. 58. As to the role of the District Judge, the State of Kerala relies on the decision reported in Francis Jude Netto v. State of Kerala ( 2007 (4) KLT 210 ) to reiterate that unless the name of a lawyer is specifically disapproved by the District Judge, the State would be entitled to appoint anybody from the panel prepared thereafter. They reiterate that the words 'specifically disapproved' is extremely vital, since, according to them, as has been held in Francis Jude Netto (supra) the District Judge is not expected to go and collect materials to find out specifically the reason for disapproval but that he may otherwise gather inputs of the candidates as to his legal acumen, character and integrity based on the experience, reliability and antecedents from such sources as he may deem fit. 59. We notice that the afore legal assertions have been made by the State of Keralain their affidavit, particularly to support the appointment of the afore-mentioned three candidates, namely Sri.G.Subothran, Smt.Sindhu.M.G. and Smt.Aisha P.Jamal, who are arrayed as additional respondents 8, 14 and 16 in W.A.No.2385/2017, because as we have already noticed above, in the case of Sri.G.Subothran, the remark of the District was that he did not have the opportunity to assess his merits or competence, while in the case of Smt.Sindhu.M.G., the District Judge has found her to be eligible along with others, but the files reveal that the factum of a criminal case having been registered against her was not informed to the District Judge. As far as Smt.Aisha P.Jamal is concerned, even though we had asked the respondents to inform this Court the specific reason why she was favoured over much more experienced persons and even though she had only seven years and seven months of practice as an advocate, the affidavit says that since there were no adverse remarks against her, the number of years of practice at the Bar is not a relevant consideration. According to them, the relevant considerations are trust and confidence of the Government in the candidate to be appointed. 60. The learned Advocate General made submissions on the same lines as the counter affidavit and therefore, we proceed to assess whether the stand of the Government would obtain forensic sustenance. 61. We are cognizant that the afore stand taken by the State is on account of the manner in which Rule 8(2) of the KGLO Rules are worded. Since the manner of the Rule has great bearing in the assessment of these contentions, we deem it appropriate to extract the same as under: “(2) the District Collector shall, while preparing the panel, bear in mind the following:- (i) a person included in the panel shall have at least seven years practice as an Advocate: (ii) the panel shall be prepared in consultation with th District and Sessions Judge and only those persons who, having regard to their qualifications, experience, integrity, reliability, reputation and character and antecedents, are in the opinion of the District collector, fit to be appointed, shall be included therein: (iii) the character and antecedents in all persons included in the panel shall be got verified through the concerned Superintendent of Police.” 62. As is limpid from the afore-extracted Rule, the panel of advocates will have to be prepared by the District Collector in consultation with the District Judge and only those who are found fit to be appointed from the touchstone of qualifications, experience, integrity, reliability, reputation, character and antecedents shall be included in the panel. After stipulating so, clause (iii) thereafter provides that the character and antecedents of the candidates in the panel shall be got verified through the concerned Superintendent of Police. 63. After stipulating so, clause (iii) thereafter provides that the character and antecedents of the candidates in the panel shall be got verified through the concerned Superintendent of Police. 63. We notice that it is because the prescription of verification of character and antecedents through the Superintendent of Police being included in clause (iii)of Rule 8(2)that the State now takes the stand that such verification need be done only after the panel is first prepared in consultation with the District Judge, as per clause (ii) of Rule 8(2). It is in this singular manner that the State attempts to support the appointment of the aforementioned three persons because, according to them, the concerned District Judges found nothing adverse against them. 64. When we examine these submissions from the touchstone of the purpose of these provisions, it becomes irrefragible that when the District Judge is consulted, he must be made available with all inputs with respect to the character and antecedents of the persons included in the list by the District Collector, since Rule 8(2)(ii) makes it clear that such consultation must be with respect to the qualifications, experience, integrity, reliability, reputation, character and antecedents. We cannot, therefore, countenance the stand of the State that the inputs regarding the character and antecedents do not require to be placed before the District Judge and that, the verification of such factors are to be done only after the panel of advocates is prepared. If we are to accept this contention, the whole purpose of the process will be lost and to even suggest that while the District Judge is consulted, the inputs regarding the character and antecedents do not require to be given to him would render the entire process otiose. 65. The case of Smt.Sindhu.M.G. itself would illustrate this point because the files reveal that the District Judge had forwarded the list to the District Collector containing all the names, including that of Smt.Sindhu.M.G. on 26.07.2017 and that the District Judge had returned the files with his remarks on 18.08.2017. However, the report of character and antecedents of the various candidates in the list was obtained by the District Collector from the Superintendent of Police only on 06.10.2017, wherein it was clearly mentioned that Smt.Sindhu.M.G. is involved in a criminal case. However, the report of character and antecedents of the various candidates in the list was obtained by the District Collector from the Superintendent of Police only on 06.10.2017, wherein it was clearly mentioned that Smt.Sindhu.M.G. is involved in a criminal case. However, this fact was never brought to the notice of the District Judge and the State has chosen to disregard this information and to appoint Smt.Sindhu.M.G. Had this information been given to the District Judge, we do not know if he would have entered a different remark with respect to her contrary to the one now made by him and we are certainly of the firm view that this information is also a vital one which, if had been given to the District Judge, may have made him opine differently. 66. When we say this, we are certainly aware that Smt.Sindhu.M.G. has filed a counter affidavit in the matter, wherein she avers that the criminal case against her was registered under Sections 143, 147, 283 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, along with thirty one members of the Sulthan Bathery Bar Association, for having conducted a collective march to the Ambalavayal Police Station. She says that she pleaded guilty in this case and that she was imposed with the punishment of fine of Rs.200/-and therefore, that then there was no impediment in her being appointed as the SPP of the POCSO Special Court in Wayanad. Even though we notice these averments in the counter affidavit, it is clear that she further concedes that she pleaded guilty and accepted the punishment on 07.02.2018 and that she was appointed as the SPP on 16.02.2018. Therefore, it is clear that Smt.Sindhu.M.G. has suffered punishment under Section 283 IPC and that even though it may not attract any moral turpitude, we are of the certain opinion that the information regarding the pendency of a criminal case against her should have been made available to the District Judge because, at the time when he was consulted, she was accused No.9 in the said crime. 67. As regards Sri.G.Subothran is concerned, he has filed a counter affidavit, wherein he admits that the District Judge has stated that he could not assess his merits. 67. As regards Sri.G.Subothran is concerned, he has filed a counter affidavit, wherein he admits that the District Judge has stated that he could not assess his merits. He has explained in the affidavit that he is a lawyer with more than twenty six years standing at the Bar and that he has practised both civil and criminal law during this period. He asserts that he has conducted trial of around 250 cases before the Magistrate's Court, Karunagappilly and the Assistant Sessions Court, Karunagappilly and that at the time of his appointment as SPP of the POSCO Special Court, Kollam, he was holding vakalath atleast in seventy criminal cases in Karunagappilly alone. He has produced on record the list of cases handled by him as Exhibit R8(b), along with W.A.No.2385/2017. He further states that he has also conducted cases before the Sessions Court, Kollam in association with another lawyer and that he is a member of the Kollam Bar Association as well as of the Karunagappilly Bar Association. He says that event he is fully eligible and qualified to be appointed as SPP, he fails to comprehend how the District Judge has said that he could not assess his merits and, according to him, this could only be because the District Judge had not taken the effort of obtaining information from the centres where he was practising. He states affirmatively that he is confident that had the District Judge done so, he would have found him fully eligible and qualified. 68. Finally, in the case of Smt.Aisha P.Jamal, as we have already said above, she has a mere seven years and seven months experience, slightly more than the minimum required for appointment as a SPP under the POCSO Act and even the affidavit of the Government does not say how they have found her to be preferentially more suitable to others, with concededly far greater experience, to be appointed as a SPP. The State does not say that she has exemplary achievements or that her competence is greater than the others in the panel. This is pertinent because, we had, by order dated 17.09.2018, clearly asked the State why she was chosen in preference to the others since we see no record of exceptional merit to her credit entitling her to be appointed as SPP. 69. This is pertinent because, we had, by order dated 17.09.2018, clearly asked the State why she was chosen in preference to the others since we see no record of exceptional merit to her credit entitling her to be appointed as SPP. 69. As far as Sri.Pushkaran is concerned, our suspicion was that he was functioning as an APP in the Sessions Court, Kottayam even after he was appointed as the SPP under the POCSO Act. The suspicion was fortified because certain documents were placed on record by the petitioner in W.P.(C) No.7692/2018, being court orders, wherein his name features as the APP even in cases that were heard and disposed of after 01.03.2018, when he was appointed as the SPP of the POCSO Special Court. We, therefore, sought for a report from the District and Sessions Judge, Kottayam in this regard and the learned Judge has, in her communication to this Court dated 17.10.2018, categorically recorded that Sri.Pushkaran had not appeared as an APP after 01.03.2018, when he was appointed as the SPP and that the orders of the court issued subsequent to that date continued to show his name only because of the earlier memos filed by him in the cases while he was functioning as the APP. 70. In the conspectus of the afore narration of the factual circumstances, we have no doubt in our mind that the consultation with the District Judge, as required under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure as wellas the KGLO Rules, can be effective only if the said Judge is given all the relevant inputs, including that of character and antecedents by the concerned District Collector. This is because, when the District Judge arrives at a conclusion regarding the eligibility of a candidate, the factum of negative inputs, if any, regarding character and antecedents would certainly be one of the factors that would influence his objective assessment. 71. In the case at hand, as far as Sri.G.Subothran is concerned, the District Judge says that he had no opportunity to assess his merit but he has recorded at least two others in the list to be 'good', which is to say, competent in all respects to be appointed as the SPP. However, the State still chose to appoint Sri.G.Subothran. We cannot certainly approve this. 72. However, the State still chose to appoint Sri.G.Subothran. We cannot certainly approve this. 72. Similarly, in the case of Smt.Sindhu.M.G., even though the District Collector had information that there was a criminal case against her, which information was obtained after the District Judge had made his remarks, he chose not to send it to the District Judge for a fresh assessment of her eligibility, but kept such information in the files for over 1½ years and then the State thereafter appointed her merely a few days after she pleaded guilty of the charges levelled against her. This again is extremely confutative and completely improper and impermissible. We fail to understand why and how this information was kept away from the District Judge and why the District Collector did not bringit to his notice as soon as it was received. The only explanation given by the State in the counter affidavit is that, going by Rule 8(2) of the KGLO Rules, a report of character and antecedents of a candidate need be obtained only after the consultation with the District Judge is complete and that such information need not be then given to him. We strongly disapprove this course adopted by the concerned authorities and we are persuaded to a firm opinion that this has been done with questionable reasons, particularly when this was not the manner in which the District Collectors of the other districts had acted. The files show that the lists given to the concerned District Judges by the other District Collectors contain a report of the character and antecedents of each candidate, but it was not so in the case of the list relating to Wayanad District, making it certainly mysterious, to say the least. 73. As far as Smt.Aisha P.Jamal is concerned, in the absence of information that we had sought for, as to her exceptional merit, we cannot approve her candidature without further assessment. 74. However, as regards Sri.Pushkaran is concerned, we do not think any further enquiry is necessary at our hands. 75. Once we hold as above, we would have, in normal circumstances, ordered the immediate removal of Sri.G.Subothran, Smt.Sindhu.M.G. and Smt.Aisha P.Jamal, who are additional respondent Nos.8, 14 and 16in W.A.No.2385/2017 and to appoint more suitable people in their place. 74. However, as regards Sri.Pushkaran is concerned, we do not think any further enquiry is necessary at our hands. 75. Once we hold as above, we would have, in normal circumstances, ordered the immediate removal of Sri.G.Subothran, Smt.Sindhu.M.G. and Smt.Aisha P.Jamal, who are additional respondent Nos.8, 14 and 16in W.A.No.2385/2017 and to appoint more suitable people in their place. However, we notice that these three persons were appointed on 26.02.2018 and that they have been functioning as SPPs of the concerned POCSO Courts for the last more than 1½ years. We are, therefore, persuaded to take a slightly different course than ordering them to be summarily removed, by allowing the concerned District Judges to make a re-assessment of their merits on the basis of all relevant inputs, including the report of character and antecedents and then to decide whether they would be entitled to continue any further. If the assessment by the concerned District Judges on their merit, ability, character and antecedents are found to be apposite, they can continue, failing which the State will be enjoined to remove all of them or any of them and to appoint more suitable persons from the panel of candidates earlier prepared in consultation with the District Judges. In the afore circumstances and in summation of our observations above, we dismiss all these appeals and writ petitions, except to the extent of appointment of Sri.G.Subothran, Smt.Sindhu.M.G. and Smt.Aisha P.Jamal, the additional respondent Nos.8, 14 and 16 in W.A.No.2385/2017 and we direct the District Collectors of Kollam, Wayanad and Malappuram to send all the relevant files with respect to these three candidates to the concerned District Judges for fresh assessment and if, after such assessment, they are found not fit to continue as SPPs, then the concerned District Collectors will be enjoined to place it before the competent authority of the State of Kerala, who will thereafter issue orders removing the afore three persons or any of them so found unfit and the State will be then obligated to appoint other suitable persons from the panel prepared by the District Collectors. The District Collectors shall initiate the exercise as afore ordered and will forward the files to the concerned District Judges within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The District Collectors shall initiate the exercise as afore ordered and will forward the files to the concerned District Judges within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. The respective District Judges will then complete the assessment of the aforementioned persons as expeditiously as possible but not later than two weeks thereafter and forward his/her remarks to the District Collector. If any one of the respondents in question is found unfit, the respective District Collector will have to initiate process for their removal and appointment of fresh persons within a period of one week thereafter. The State shall, thereupon, issue orders for removal of the present incumbent and will appoint another suitable person from the panel not later than two weeks from the date on which its competent authorities receive the files from the District Collectors. We direct the concerned District Collectors and the competent authority of the State of Kerala to treat these directions as being peremptory in nature and to comply with the directions herein without any default. The files made available to this Court by the learned Advocate General will be returned by the Registry to the Office of the Advocate General upon proper receipt.