JUDGMENT : This second appeal by the plaintiffs is directed against the judgment and decree dated 17.06.2006 passed by the learned District Judge, Karimganj in Title Appeal No. 92/2002, whereby the learned appellate court allowing the appeal filed by the defendant, dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. 2. The facts leading to the present second appeal may be stated thus 3. The plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration of right, title and interest and recovery of possession and permanent injunction. The case of the plaintiffs was that the land covered by Old Khatian No. 353 and Settlement Survey No. 270, New patta No. 184 belonged to plaintiffs No. 1 and Khurshid Ali Choudhury. The share of Khurshid Ali Choudhury was purchased by plaintiffs No. 2 by registered deed in the year 1968 and thus, the plaintiffs No. 1 & 2 were the owner and land holder of the suit land and they were possessing the suit land. The proforma defendant No. 6 was a tenant under the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs No. 1 allowed the proforma defendant No. 6 to occupy 5 Justy of land temporarily as a license. The defendant No. 3 and other people of Namasudra community established an M.E. School. The temporary house of the said school was demolished due to flood in the year 1993 and the defendant No. 3 along with other people of Namasudra community requested the plaintiffs to allow them to construct a temporary house for the school on a high land preferably in Dag No. 270 and accordingly, the plaintiffs allowed them to construct a kacha temporary house for the school on 1½ powa of land on the condition, that within 31.12.1994, the school house should be removed from there. However, subsequently, the plaintiffs came to know that the defendant No. 3 along with others conspired to construct a pucca house on the said land of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also came to know that in connivance with the defendant No. 4, the defendants were manipulating the land record and as such, the plaintiffs terminated the license in favour of the defendants and instituted the suit for declaration of right title and of other consequential reliefs. 4. The pleaded case of the defendant No. 3 was that, Girindra Namasudra gifted two katha of land from the dag No.125, 126 & 270 in favour of the school. 4. The pleaded case of the defendant No. 3 was that, Girindra Namasudra gifted two katha of land from the dag No.125, 126 & 270 in favour of the school. The defendants No. 5 & 6 stated in their written statement that the land covered by Dag No. 269 & 271 was permanently settled estate and included in Taluk No. 15359/23 and Khurshid Ali Choudhury was the owner of the said land. The father of the defendant No. 6 Suraj Namasudra was occupying the land covered by Dag No. 269 & 271 as service tenant under the mirashdar and Girindra Namasudra was occupying the land covered by Dag No. 270 as service tenant under the said Mirashdar. After abolition of Jamindari system and acquisition of the land by Government in 1964, the service tenant, namely Girindra Namasudra and Suraj Namasudra acquired the right of land holder in respect of the suit land under the State and Girindra Namasudra gifted the suit land of Dag No. 270 in favour of the school. It is also stated that the plaintiffs have no right, title over the suit land, after abolition of jamindari system as, all the right and title of the zamindars stood vested in State Govt. and the Mirash right of the landlord were extinguished. On the basis of the above pleadings, learned Munsiff framed the following issues: (1) Is there any cause of action for the suit? (2) Is the suit maintainable in its present form? (3) Is the suit is bad for defect of parties? (4) Are the plaintiffs entitled to get the decree as prayed for (5) To what relief/reliefs, if any are the plaintiffs entitled to? Additional issue (6) Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation? (7) Whether plaintiffs have any right, title and interest over the suit land? 5. Both the parties adduced evidence, oral as well as documentary, and after hearing both the sides, learned Munsiff by judgment and decree dated 17.06.2006 decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs. 6. Aggrieved, the defendant preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the leaned Munsiff and the learned appellate court by the impugned judgment and decree dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs by allowing the appeal filed by the defendant/respondent. 7. 6. Aggrieved, the defendant preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the leaned Munsiff and the learned appellate court by the impugned judgment and decree dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs by allowing the appeal filed by the defendant/respondent. 7. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the appellate court, the plaintiffs preferred the second appeal, which was admitted to be heard on the following substantial questions of law. (1) “Whether the learned first appellate court erred in law in reversing the decree passed by the learned trial Court of the face of existence of the name of the appellants in the final Khatian, i.e. Exb-‘A’? (2) Whether the learned appellate court mis-interpreted and mis-applied Exhibits-6 and 9 and erroneously reversed the decree?” 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that Khurshid Ali Choudhury was the owner of the suit land and on death of Khurshid Ali Choudhury the suit land was inherited by his son Khaliluddin Choudhury, who, by executing a registered sale deed on 16.04.1968, sold the suit land to plaintiffs No.2 Safia Khanam Choudhury and as such, the plaintiffs have right title and interest over the suit land and the title of the plaintiffs were established by Exhibit-9, the sale deed executed by Khaliluddin Choudhury, son of Khurshid Ali Choudhury. Girindra Namasudra did not have any right over the land, and as such, he could not have transferred the suit land in favour of the School, submits learned counsel for the respondent. The plaintiffs further rely on Exhibit-6 Katcha Patta pertaining to old Khatian No.353, issued in favour of Khurshid Ali Choudhury and other in the year 1983. Further contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellate Court failed to appreciate the Exhibit-9 sale deed as well as Exhibit-6 Katcha Patta and dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs basing on the working khatian, where Girindra Namasudra was shown as ‘jot’ dakhaldar, without taking into consideration the final Khatian, Exhibit-B, where Khurshid Ali Choudhury was shown as Mirashdar of the suit land and Girindra Namasudra was shown as ‘dakhaldaar’. 9. The contention of learned senior counsel Mr. 9. The contention of learned senior counsel Mr. N Dhar for the respondent, was that the suit land was initially zamindari land and Girindra Namasudra was service tenant under Khurshid Ali Choudhury and after abolition of the zamindari system in the year 1964, Girindra Namasudra became the holder of the land by virtue of sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Assam State Acquisition Zamindaris Act, 1951, and said Girindra Namasudra gifted the suit land in favour of the School. Mr. Dhar further submitted that the right of the zamindar or mirashdar having stood vested with the state by operation of Section 4 of the Assam State Acquisition of Zaminders Act, Khurshid Ali Choudhury no longer remained the owner of the suit land. 10. It is admitted position that original dag of the suit land was 270 which was included in Taluk No.15359/23, Jahangir Kha Taluk. Therefore, admittedly, the suit land was part of zamindari land over which Khurshid Ali Choudhury had mirash right. From Exhibit-9 sale deed, being the basis of the title of the plaintiffs, it also transpires that the son of Khurshid Ali Choudhury claimed to have inherited the mirash right over the suit land from his father. 11. As per section 4 of the Assam State Acquisition Zamindari Act, 1951, all rights and interest of the proprietor or the tenure-holder named in the said notification in the estate or the tenure, including his interest in land with its sub-soil and mines and minerals in forest and fisheries etc stood vested absolutely in the state. Therefore, when the suit land was admittedly a zamindari land, of which Khurshid Ali Choudhury was the mirashdar, son of Khurshid Ali Choudhury could not have inherited the mirash right of his father, as, such right already stood vested in the state by virtue of Section 4(1) of the Assam State Acquisition of Zammindari Act, 1951. When the son of Khurshid Ali Choudhury could not have inherited the mirash right over the suit land, invariably no title could be conveyed by Exhibit-9. Though it is the specific case of the defendant, that the suit land was an agricultural land and no evidence could be brought on record to show that the suit land did not fall within the categories of land, proprietal right over which was vested with the state. Though it is the specific case of the defendant, that the suit land was an agricultural land and no evidence could be brought on record to show that the suit land did not fall within the categories of land, proprietal right over which was vested with the state. In fact, the plaintiffs admitted in the plaint that the suit land was agricultural land. Exhibit-B on which both the plaintiffs and defendant sought to rely, also shows that though in column-20 Khurshid Ali Choudhury was shown as mirashdaar, in column-20, Girindra Namasudra was shown as dakhaldaar of the said land. In column-2 of the Exhibit-B State of Assam is shown as the owner. Therefore, even Exhibit-B column-II, clearly demonstrates that in respect of the said land covered by Khatian No.353, of which Khurshid Ali Choudhury was the mirashdar, the State of Assam was shown as the owner. Exhibit-B pertaining to Taluk No.15359/23 of Jahangir Kha Taluk clearly shows that Khurshid Ali Choudhury was the mirashdar of the land covered by khatian No.353 and Taluk No.15359/23 Jahangir Kha Taluk which vested with the state. Therefore, by operation of Section 4(1) of Assam State Acquisition Zamindaris Act, Khurshid Ali Choudhury no longer remained proprietor or mirashdar in respect of the suit land. Necessarily son of Khurshid Ali Choudhury also could not inherit the mirash right over the suit land as claimed in Exhibit-9, the sale deed executed in the year 1985. On the other hand, Exhibit-A working khatian and Exhibit-B final Khatian show Girindra Namasudra was a tenant under Khurshid Ali Choudhury in respect of the suit land. 12. The above documentary evidence, more particularly, Exhibit-A & Exhibit-B clearly substantiated the claim of the defendants, that Girindra Namasudra was tenant under the zamindar Khurshid Ali Choudhury and as such, after the abolition of zamindar by virtue of sub-section (6) of Section 4 of the Assam State Acquisition Zamindaris Act, 1951 Girindra Namasudra got the land holder right over the suit land. It is the case of the defendant, that the suit land covered by Dag No.270 was gifted by Girindra Namasudra to the School and proved by gift deed as Exhibit-C and in fact the said gift deed executed by Girindra Namasudra was not disputed. It is the case of the defendant, that the suit land covered by Dag No.270 was gifted by Girindra Namasudra to the School and proved by gift deed as Exhibit-C and in fact the said gift deed executed by Girindra Namasudra was not disputed. The plaintiffs No.1, as rightly pointed out by the learned appellate court, clearly admitted in his evidence that the suit land of dag No.270 was in possession of Girindra Namasudra, since before the abolition of zaminders and Girindra Namasudra became owner of the land after acquisition of the land by the government by virtue of abolition of zamindari system. It is also admitted by the plaintiffs No.1 that the said land was gifted by Girindra Namasudra in favour of the Jana Kalyan ME School, in a public meeting and the school is running there. 13. The plaintiffs also sought to rely on Exhibit-6 katcha patta issued in favour of Khurshid Ali Choudhury in the year 1983. Regulation 32 of the Assam Land Revenue Regulation, 1886 provides that the settlement officer shall offer settlement of the land to such person, if any, as he finds to be in possession of the estate and to have permanent heritable and transferable right of use and occupancy in the same, or to be in possession as mortgagees of persons, having such a right. If the settlement officer finds no person in possession as aforesaid, it shall be in his discretion, subject to such rules, as the State Government may make under Section 12, to offer the settlement to any person he thinks fit. Evidently, Khurshid Ali Choudhury was no longer alive in the year 1983 and, as such, Khurshid Ali Choudhury could not be in possession of the suit land and as such, there could not be any occasion for the settlement officer to offer settlement of the land to Khurshid Ali Choudhury, and in that view of the matter, the Exhibit-6 Katcha Patta sought to be relied by the plaintiffs does not deserve any credibility and in the facts and circumstances as discussed herein before, Exhibit-6 Katcha Patta (draft patta) cannot be considered as conclusive proof of title. 14. Evidently the suit land was zamindari land of which late Khurshid Ali Choudhury was mirashdar under whom Girindra Namasudra was ryot. 14. Evidently the suit land was zamindari land of which late Khurshid Ali Choudhury was mirashdar under whom Girindra Namasudra was ryot. Therefore, all the documentary evidence and the admitted fact that the suit land was zamindari land of Khurshid Ali Choudhury, clearly demonstrates that Khaliuddin Choudhury, son of Khurshid Ali Choudhury could not inherit any mirashi right of his father over the suit land, reason being that such right was already vested with the State before execution of sale deed, Exhibit-9 by Khaliluddin Choudhury in favour of plaintiffs No.2, and as such Exhibit-9 could not convery any title over the suit land. 15. In view of the above evidence and admitted position, learned appellate Court rightly interpreted the documents Exhibit-6 & Exhibit-9 as well as Exhibits-A & B and reversed the judgment and decree passed by learned Munsiff and therefore, both the substantial questions of law are answered in negative and in favor of the defendants/respondent. 16. In view of the answers to the substantial question of law, as above, the present second appeal appears to be devoid of merit and hence dismissed. Parties to bear their own cost. 17. Send down the LCR.