ORDER : 1. The quash petitioner is the accused in C.C. No. 6 of 2018 on the file of the I Additional Special Judge, SPE & ACB cases, Hyderabad. The crime registered is based on source information as Crime No. 28/ACB-CIU-HYD/2011, dated 09.11.2011. The First Information Report (FIR) mentions at Column No. 4 as suo moto registered the complainant/informant as per Column No. 6 is Ch. Sudhakar, Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP), CIU, ACB, Hyderabad. Column No. 12 speaks on receipt of credible information that Sri M. Sarveshwar Reddy, DSP/OSD, aged 51 years of Gachibowli, a native of Wanaparthy Taluq, Mahabubnagar, joined as Sub Inspector of Police on 19.09.1985 and promoted as Inspector of Police on 04.04.1995 and as DSP in 2007, worked as Sub-Inspector of Police at Rayadurgam, Hayathnagar, Malkajgiri and Circle Inspector of Police at Huzurnagar, Narsingi, Uppal, Rajendranagar and as ACP Rajendranagar and presently OSD, Ranga Reddy District, Vikarabad acquired in the period of his service disproportionate assets with details in registration of the crime under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short the Act). 2. The FIR shows the accused officer is in possession of the assets worth Rs. 3,18,61,500/- which are disproportionate to the known sources mentioned and not satisfactorily accounted for. The total worth of the property against his savings of Rs. 37 lakhs shown approximately Rs. 3,55,61,500/- in arriving the same. Having registered the crime on 09.11.2011 by citing as many as 114 witnesses including said Ch. Sudhakar, who conducted the house search in the presence of mediators LWs. 1 and 2 at Venkatadri Apartment of the said accused officer facing accusation on 10.11.2011 and conducted investigation mostly and the others LWs. 110 to 114 are the five more Investigating Officers, who conducted left over the investigation and filed draft final report and ultimately the approved final report. The other persons include the officials and non-officials, the person who registered the crime Ch. Sudhakar, DSP, main Investigating Officer, not separately shown as complainant is LW-1, no doubt. The said proceedings of the police final report, taken cognizance and pending before the learned Special Judge as C.C. No. 6 of 2018 is the present impugnment with several contentions. 3. The other persons include the officials and non-officials, the person who registered the crime Ch. Sudhakar, DSP, main Investigating Officer, not separately shown as complainant is LW-1, no doubt. The said proceedings of the police final report, taken cognizance and pending before the learned Special Judge as C.C. No. 6 of 2018 is the present impugnment with several contentions. 3. In the course of hearing, there are mainly six contentions raised needless to elaborate word to word of the quash petition running in more than 17 paras with 12 pages: First one is want of sanction to the prosecution. Second one is delay in filing of charge sheet by completion of investigation right from the FIR registered on 09.11.2011 till October 9, 2017, for 6 years. Third one is there is no preliminary enquiry though mandatory before registration of the crime to be conducted. Fourth one is there is no authorization to register the crime and to conduct investigation properly and further ground advanced in the course of hearing though not specifically taken is the informant and the Investigating Officer, who conducted the investigation by name Sri Ch. Sudhakar, 1st Investigating Officer of the charge sheet, shall not be one and the same and a prejudice shall be presumed in the absence of contrary thereby the cognizance proceedings no way survive to continue. 4. The counsel for the accused reiterated the same referring to the expressions and also the administrative circulars inter departmental and the provisions with reference to the propositions and repelled the same from the submissions by the learned Special Public Prosecutor for ACB. 5. Heard both sides at length and perused the entire material on record. 6. So far as the sanction concerned, undisputedly, the officer who is facing the accusation while in service from the FIR, dated 09.11.2011, was retired on 31.05.2017 on attaining superannuation. The charge sheet was filed as referred supra on 09.10.2017, about four months later. A perusal of the memo of evidence of 114 witnesses shows the list of witnesses up to LW-48 were examined by end of January, 2012, which is part of the material in the quash petition filed. It is not brought before the Court when the draft charge sheet submitted to the superiors for approval by the second IO, but for the final charge sheet with approval filed on 09.10.2017. It is not brought before the Court when the draft charge sheet submitted to the superiors for approval by the second IO, but for the final charge sheet with approval filed on 09.10.2017. The respondent/Investigating Agency also not produced before the Court as to before his retirement from the investigation completed and draft charge sheet filed whether any approval obtained. It requires further probe of the facts thereby Court cannot readily quash the proceedings as to sanction is required or not, leave about the fact that by the time charge sheet filed is no longer a public servant within the meaning of Section 19 of the Act and if at all any case to be made out is only during trial by bringing on record any material as to the investigating agency intentionally only waited till his retirement and filed charge sheet, for such basis not made out for readily quash the proceedings on that count. 7. So far as the ground No. 2 regarding the delay in completion of the investigation concerned, no doubt, the internal guidelines and the Memorandum No. 700/SC.D/88-4 General Administration (SC. D) Department, dated 13.02.1989, regarding expedite investigation of ACB cases from the guidelines mentioned in trap cases investigation must be completed within three months and in disproportionate assets cases within six months and with outer limit of three months. It is only an internal guideline and thereby basing on that itself the proceedings cannot be quashed even though the internal administrative circular speaks of the investigation must be completed maximum within nine months from the date of registration of the crime. 8. In fact, so far as the delay in the investigation caused any prejudice and liable to be quashed therefrom concerned, the fair trial includes not only trial, but also right from registration of the crime and the investigation and right to speedy justice is one of the fundamental rights of the accused and the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in P. Ramachandra Rao vs. State of Karnataka, 2002 Cri. L.J. 2547 (Seven Judge Bench) reviewing the entire case law as to the speedy trial, categorically observed that the enacting bars of limitation entitling termination of trial or proceeding by judicial verdict is uncalled for and impermissible and tantamounts to judicial legislation as laid down by the earlier Constitution Bench expression of the Apex Court in A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak, 1992 AIR SCW 1872 and it is observed that each case depends upon own facts to be appreciated with reference to the facts as to there was intentional or inordinate unjust delay in the investigation and in trial respectively at each stage accused got the right of speedy investigation and speedy trial, as the case may be. 9. Coming to the expression placed reliance of the Apex Court by the accused in this regard is State of A.P. vs. P.V. Pavithran, AIR 1990 SC 1266 , it was observed that F.I.R. and consequential proceedings quashed by the High Court and 50 days thereafter Government accorded sanction for prosecution and in the circumstances the order of the High Court should not be interfered there, there was delay in considering the same with reference to the peculiar facts of the case, however, observed that no general or wide proposition of law can be formulated that wherever there is inordinate delay on the part of the investigating agency such delay ipso facto would provide ground for quashing the FIR or proceedings arising therefrom. On facts, the crime was registered from the report on 07.03.1984 for the alleged corruption allegations while functioning as Commissioner of Police and Vice Chairman of the APHB during 1978-82 and for the disproportionate assets above the known sources and accused moved the quash petition which is before the Government sanction, dated 16.09.1988, from the investigation completed in 1987 and report sent to Government for sanction in 1987 and in the state appeal against the quashing of the proceedings by the High Court, what the Apex Court observed is there is no denying the fact that a lethargic and lackadaisical manner of investigation over a prolonged period makes an accused in a criminal proceeding to live every moment under extreme emotional and mental stress and strain and to remain always under a fear psychosis. Therefore, it is imperative that if investigation of a criminal proceeding staggers on with tardy pace due to the indolence or inefficiency of the investigating agency causing unreasonable and substantial delay resulting in grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused, the Court as the protector of the right and personal liberty of the citizen will step in and resort to the drastic remedy of quashing further proceedings in such investigation. However, where there are offences of grave magnitude such as diabolical crimes of conspiracy or clandestine crimes committed by members of the underworld with their tentacles spread over various parts of the country or even abroad, nature of such offences would necessarily involve considerable time for unearthing the crimes and bringing the culprits to book and not possible, therefore to formulate inflexible guidelines or rigid principles of uniform application for speedy investigation or to stipulate any arbitrary period of limitation within which investigation in a criminal case should be completed. Each case depends on various factors including whether such delay was unreasonably long or caused deliberately or intentionally to hamper the defence of the accused or whether such delay was inevitable in the nature of things or-whether it was due to the dilatory tactics adopted by the accused and in addition Court has to consider whether delay on the part of the investigating agency caused grave prejudice or disadvantage to the accused on the facts and deprived of a fair trial by such delay or protracted investigation and these factors necessarily vary from case to case to assess. 10. Thus as observed supra, whether the delay caused prejudice to the accused and there was intentional inordinate delay and waited till retirement is a matter to be considered during trial, from further facts and not possible to quash even from this expression, leave about the other two Judge Bench expression of the Apex Court placed reliance of Biswanath Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, 1994 Cri. L.J. 242, for no more to discuss as it referred the Constitution Bench expression of A.R. Antulay and that is also referred and discussed in P. Ramachandra Rao supra in saying each case depends upon own facts to appreciate as observed earlier. 11. L.J. 242, for no more to discuss as it referred the Constitution Bench expression of A.R. Antulay and that is also referred and discussed in P. Ramachandra Rao supra in saying each case depends upon own facts to appreciate as observed earlier. 11. Coming to the expression in Vakil Prasad Singh vs. State of Bihar, (2009) 3 SCC 355 of the two Judge-Bench, which is subsequent to the expression of the Constitution Bench of 7 Judges in P. Ramachandra Rao supra, it is observed that speedy investigation and trial both are enshrined in Cr.P.C. and deprivation of life and liberty except according to procedure established by law occurring in Article 21 of the Constitution of India requires reiteration for the procedure should be reasonable and fair and just and in the facts where Court comes to any conclusion of the right of speedy trial has been infringed, the charges or the conviction may be quashed unless Court feels that having regard to the nature of the offence and other relevant circumstances quashing of proceedings may not be in the interests of justice. This expression very categorically observed that while recognizing the qualified fundamental right of the accused the main consideration before the Court is to sub serve the ends of justice and to prevent any abuse of process and delay itself is not a ground much less to claim as a fundamental right though speedy trial and fair trial are the required components to be balanced. It is categorically observed that the said qualified right of speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and its protection to be considered by Courts extend to all criminal prosecutions, not only to actual proceedings in Court but includes within its sweep the preceding police investigation as well. It is categorically observed that the said qualified right of speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and its protection to be considered by Courts extend to all criminal prosecutions, not only to actual proceedings in Court but includes within its sweep the preceding police investigation as well. In fact, the expression of the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay of 1992 and the subsequent Seven Judge Bench expression in P. Ramachandra Rao supra were also considered, however on facts in quashing the proceedings it is observed that the crime registered was in the year 1981 and the learned Magistrate taken cognizance from the police final report in December 1982 and nothing substantial happened till 1987, but for dismissal of the prosecution reinvestigation application in 1983 that was when moved, the High Court has allowed and pursuant to the order of the High Court in December 1990 further investigation completed and learned Magistrate taken cognizance and the accused moved for quashing the proceedings in 1998 and it was while pending fresh charge sheet filed on 01.07.2007. It is by taking consideration of these facts of there is an investigation delay of 17 years although for practically no fault of the accused the proceedings were quashed. It is ultimately at para 30 observed of the period taken for investigation right from 1990 to 2017, for 17 years, clearly violates the constitutional guarantee of a speedy investigation and trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and further continuation of proceedings pending before the learned Special Judge no way warranted even the allegations are serious in nature. It is not a case on hand for the reason the investigation delay if at all is only 6 years from registration of the crime in November 2011 to filing of the charge sheet in October 2017, that too the witnesses cited are more than 100 in number as referred supra in relation to the several disproportionate assets of the accused officer. Relying on this decision the proceedings cannot automatically be liable to be quashed. 12. Even coming to the recent past expression of the Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in this regard i.e. in Sirajul and Others vs. State of U.P. and Another, (2015) 9 SCC 201 , it is observed that quashment on the delay not automatic but for depending upon facts of each case. 12. Even coming to the recent past expression of the Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in this regard i.e. in Sirajul and Others vs. State of U.P. and Another, (2015) 9 SCC 201 , it is observed that quashment on the delay not automatic but for depending upon facts of each case. There were case and cross-case. There was no asking of both cases to be tried together. In one case, there was acquittal after commencement of trial, it went for 10 years, the complainant did not even bother to seek simultaneous trial from 1995 to 2005, for the incident taken place in the year February 1992 and it is observed, the conduct of the complainant certainly be taken into consideration of the impugned complaint filed 16 years after the incident and 13 ½ years after incident in the other case, it is therefrom, the proceedings were quashed. Here, it is not the case on hand even. Thus, the time taken from registration of FIR till completion of the charge sheet and taking of cognizance of six years in the present facts by itself not a ground to quash. 13. Coming to the preliminary enquiry, which is mandatory and non-conducting of preliminary enquiry from the source information in registration of the crime concerned, no doubt, as referred supra from the F.I.R. it is not mentioned as source information but from para 4 of the FIR dated 09.11.2011 as suo moto and not based on any oral or written information and the complainant/informant at column No. 6 mentioned as Ch. Sudhakar, DSP, CIU, ACB. What all mentioned is at para 12 as on receipt of credible information. There is no mention of any GD entry made as per column No. 3 clause No. (c) which is though mandatory even for the source information if at all. Here, the crux is whether any preliminary enquiry as to the authenticity of the source information in registration of crime is essential and if so whether with any GD entry any preliminary enquiry conducted and if not directly whether the registration of the crime without such preliminary enquiry sustainable. Here, the crux is whether any preliminary enquiry as to the authenticity of the source information in registration of crime is essential and if so whether with any GD entry any preliminary enquiry conducted and if not directly whether the registration of the crime without such preliminary enquiry sustainable. Though the expression of the Apex Court Two-Judge Bench placed reliance by the counsel for the accused in P. Sirajuddin vs. State of Madras, 1970 (1) SCC 595 speaks of particularly from para 17 that the allegations about dishonesty of a person of the appellant's rank brought to the notice of the Chief Minister it was his duty to direct an enquiry into the matter and the Chief Minister, thereby, directed the same, the High Court rightly held by not accepting the contention of the Chief Minister moved to take initiative at the instance of a person who was going to benefit by the retirement of the appellant, from what High Court held rightly of relationship between the said person and the Chief Minister, in any, was so distant and could not possible to have such influence. There must be some suitable preliminary enquiry into the allegations by a responsible person before a public servant, whatever be his status, is publicly charged with acts of dishonesty which amount to serious misdemeanour or misconduct of the type alleged. In fact, the expression speaks the requirement, but not stated as mandatory in all cases, though prudence requires if at all. 14. No doubt, the recent two-Judge Bench expression of the Apex court State by Lokayuktha Police vs. H. Srinivas, 2018 Law Suit (SC) 527 observed at para-15 referring to P. Sirajuddin (supra) that Section 154 of the Code postulates the mandatory registration of FIRs on receipt of all cognizable offences, yet, there may be instances where preliminary inquiry may be required owing to the change in genesis and novelty of crimes with the passage of time, particularly in medical negligence case on the part of doctors. It is nowhere stated either there from or from paras 18 and 20 of the expression in H. Srinivas (supra) of it is mandatory to conduct a preliminary enquiry on any information in making out a cognizable offence leave about the guidelines of the Apex Court in Lalitha Kumari (supra) are clear of not mandatory but directory depending upon the facts of each case. 15. 15. The purpose of preliminary enquiry, in fact, is for authenticity from the catena expressions as to the correctness or sustainability of the allegation and not otherwise. In fact, the Constitution Bench expression of the Apex Court in Lalita Kumari vs. Government of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 , though it is subsequent to the registration of the FIR as laid down the guidelines in para 120 also by referring to P. Srirajuddin supra among several other including Tapan Kumar Singh of 2003, where it was in its reference observed preliminary enquiry prior to registration of FIR arises only on the ground that the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence and if after investigation the information given is found to be false there is always option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false FIR, where it discloses a cognizable offence, registration of FIR is mandatory as per the Code, though it is in doubt or not disclosing a cognizable offence. It is observed, if the information given clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there is no other option but to register FIR; other considerations are not relevant at the time of registration of the FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether the information is genuine, whether the information is credible etc. as those are the issues that have to be verified during investigation of the FIR and not at the stage of registration of the FIR, but for to verify whether the information given ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence or not. 15(a) Among the guidelines coming to 120.6, it is stated that as to what type and in which cases preliminary enquiry is to be conducted will be depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which preliminary enquiry may be made are as under: (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes. (b) Commercial offences (c) Medical negligence cases (d) Corruption cases (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/latches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over three months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay and the aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary enquiry. 16. (b) Commercial offences (c) Medical negligence cases (d) Corruption cases (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/latches in initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over three months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay and the aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all conditions which may warrant preliminary enquiry. 16. It is stated while ensuring and protecting rights of the accused and the complainant, a preliminary enquiry should be made time-bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days. The fact of such delay and causes of it must be reflected in the General Diary entry. 17. Thus, the preliminary enquiry is not a hard and past rule in all cases but for depending upon facts and circumstances, that too when there is no cogent material of prima facie makes out a case for a cognizable offence where by making GD entry within one week for the authenticity and verification a preliminary enquiry to be conducted including in corruption cases. The non-conducting of preliminary enquiry in this case by itself, thereby, cannot be held fatal to the very sustainability of the FIR and final report therefrom. 18. Now coming to the authorization given for conducting the investigation in the case is not by competent person concerned, it is by proceedings, dated 09.11.2011, No. 28/RCA- JD-CIU/2011 of Sri K. Sampath Kumar, signed as Joint Director (CIU & SES), ACB, AP, Hyderabad, addressed to the person who registered the crime that is Ch. Sudhakar, DSP, CIU supra, with reference to Section 17 and 18 of the Act, mentioned that from the subject report of M. Sarveshwar Reddy, OSD, R/o Venkatadri Apartments, has acquired and in possession of assets disproportionate to the known sources of his income, which is an offence under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Act, by referring 'I' to mean said K. Sampath Kumar under the powers vested in him under Section 17 of the Act authorized Sri Ch. Sudhakar, DSP, to register a case against Sri M. Sarveshwar Reddy, to conduct investigation and submit report at an early date and by virtue of the powers vested in him, that is, Sri K. Sampath Kumar, who, by the proceedings, under Section 18 of the Act, authorizes said Ch. Sudhakar, DSP, to register a case against Sri M. Sarveshwar Reddy, to conduct investigation and submit report at an early date and by virtue of the powers vested in him, that is, Sri K. Sampath Kumar, who, by the proceedings, under Section 18 of the Act, authorizes said Ch. Sudhakar, DSP, to inspect the premises, bankers books of the Accused Officer or any other person concerned with the affairs of the Accused Officer and take or cause to be taken certified copies of the relevant entries therefrom for the purpose of investigation. Here, the impugnment is said K. Sampath Kumar to exercise the powers under Sections 17 and 18 of the Act, is not authorized officer for pretending as authorized officer. 19. Section 17 of the Act speaks notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no police officer below the rank, in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, of an Inspector of Police; in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and in any other metropolitan area notified as such under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act, of an Assistant Commissioner of Police; elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer, of equivalent rank, shall investigate any offence punishable under the Act without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make any arrest therefore without a warrant. The proviso speaks if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorized by the State Government in this behalf by general or special order, he may also investigate any such offence if the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or makes arrest therefore without a warrant; provided further that an offence referred to in section 13(1)(b) shall not be investigated without the order of a Police Officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police. Thus, so far as the offence under Section 13(i)(e) r/w 13(2) of the Act concerned, there is no such prohibition. There is a clear prohibition without such authorization from officer of a rank of a Superintendent of Police or above. Thus, so far as the offence under Section 13(i)(e) r/w 13(2) of the Act concerned, there is no such prohibition. There is a clear prohibition without such authorization from officer of a rank of a Superintendent of Police or above. Here, the said Joint Director (CIU & SES) Sri K. Sampath Kumar is the officer of the cadre of Superintendent of Police and above is the crux. The proceedings dated 30.05.2008 in C. No. 21/A2/2008 issued by Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, referring to G.O. Rt. No. 3168 dated 24.05.2008 that is the re-employment of Sri K. Sampath Kumar, Joint Director SP (NC), A.C.B. Hyderabad, who was going to retire by 31.05.2008 AN is re-employed as Officer on Special Duty for a period of one year w.e.f. 01.06.2008 on payment of Last Pay Drawn minus Pension as per the orders issued in G.O. Ms. No. 145, Finance and Planning (PSC) Department, dated 15.10.2000. Accordingly, Sri K. Sampath Kumar, Joint Director (retired), Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad is re-employed as Officer on Special Duty for a period of one year w.e.f. 01.06.2008 in A.C.B. Head Office, Hyderabad. It is, no doubt, a proceeding and now coming to his re-employment in G.O. Rt. No. 3168 dated 24.05.2008 concerned, it speaks from para-2 in four paras of the G.O. that the Government, after careful examination of the proposal of Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau hereby order for reemployment of Sri K. Sampath Kumar, SP (Non-cadre), (Joint Director in Anti Corruption Bureau) after his retirement on superannuation as Officer on Special Duty for a period of one year from 01.06.2008 in terms of re-employment as issued in Government memo 1st read above, dated 23.06.1994 and reference No. 3 is the letter of Director General which speaks he informed that said Sri K. Sampath Kumar is due to retire by 31.05.2008 and from the vacancy position in the category of Superintendents of Police in the Anti Corruption Bureau, and the difficulty in getting suitable officers as Joint Director in the Bureau, wishes to utilize his services after his retirement in the interest of administration keeping in view of his rich experience in investigation of Anti Corruption Bureau cases and good track record. Hence, to consider for his re-employment being Joint Director as Officer on Special Duty in Anti Corruption Bureau for one year. Hence, to consider for his re-employment being Joint Director as Officer on Special Duty in Anti Corruption Bureau for one year. The same was, no doubt, subsequently extended including as on the date the crime registered and permission accorded. The G.O. speaks about his re-employment as Officer on Special Duty initially for one year and extended time to time and the proceedings of the Director General, dated 30.05.2008 shows that he was placed as Officer on Special Duty being retired Joint Director in ordering Ms. Charu Sinha, IPS, Joint Director (City), Hyderabad, to handover the charge of the posts of Joint Director (CIU & SES) and Joint Director (Admin.), ACB, Hyderabad on special duty. 20. Coming to the expression placed reliance by the learned counsel for the petitioner of the two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Union Public Service Commission vs. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela, 2006 (2) SCC 482 , it is observed that for statutory rules not permitting to extend the age of superannuation without compliance of Article 16 of the Constitution of India, a person, who was appointed for a short period of six months or till availability of a regular selectee, whichever earlier is practically on contract basis not a Government servant and not entitled to relaxation under the statutory provision the age of him to consider as regular employee. At paras 19 and 20 of the judgment, it is observed that referring to Articles 319, 320 of the Constitution of India and the earlier expressions in Roshan Lal Tandon vs. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1889 , referring to Salmond and Williams on Contracts, Dinesh Chandra Sangma vs. State of Assam, 1977 (4) SCC 441 , particularly in Roshan Lal (supra) observed the nature of right possessed by a government servant and also his status after his appointment to a post under the Government was considered by a Constitution Bench in Roshan Lal (supra) and it was held as under: "6...........It is true that the origin of Government service is contractual. There is an offer and acceptance in every case. But once appointed to his post or office the Government servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the Government. There is an offer and acceptance in every case. But once appointed to his post or office the Government servant acquires a status and his rights and obligations are no longer determined by consent of both parties, but by statute or statutory rules which may be framed and altered unilaterally by the Government. In other words, the legal position of a Government servant is more one of status than of contract. The hall-mark of status is the attachment to a legal relationship of rights and duties imposed by the public law and not by mere agreement of the parties. The emolument of the Government servant and his terms of service are governed by statute or statutory rules which may be unilaterally altered by the Government without the consent of the employee. It is true that Article 311 imposes constitutional restrictions upon the power of removal granted to the President and the Governor under Article 310. But it is obvious that the relationship between the Government and its servant is not like an ordinary contract of service between a master and servant. The legal relationship is something entirely different, something in the nature of status. It is much more than a purely contractual relationship voluntarily entered into between the parties. The duties of status are fixed by the law and in the enforcement of these duties society has an interest. In the language of jurisprudence status is a condition of membership of a group of which powers and duties are exclusively determined by law and not by agreement between the parties concerned. The matter is clearly stated by Salmond and Williams on Contracts as follows: "So we may find both contractual and status-obligations produced by the same transaction. The one transaction may result in the creation not only of obligations defined by the parties and so pertaining to the sphere of contract but also and concurrently of obligation defined by the law itself, and so pertaining to the sphere of status. A contract of service between employer and employee, while for the most part pertaining exclusively to the sphere of contract, pertains also to that of status so far as the law itself has seen fit to attach to this relation compulsory incidents, such as liability to pay compensation for accidents. A contract of service between employer and employee, while for the most part pertaining exclusively to the sphere of contract, pertains also to that of status so far as the law itself has seen fit to attach to this relation compulsory incidents, such as liability to pay compensation for accidents. The extent to which the law is content to leave matters within the domain of contract to be determined by the exercise of the autonomous authority of the parties themselves, or thinks fit to bring the matter within the sphere of status by authoritatively determining for itself the contents of the relationship, is a matter depending on considerations of public policy. In such contracts as those of service the tendency in modern times is to withdraw the matter more and more from the domain of contract into that of status." (Salmond and Williams on Contracts, 2nd edition p.12)." 20(a) There from observed at para-19 that therefore, follows that employment under the Government is a matter of status and not a contract even though the acquisition of such a status preceded by a contract, namely, an offer of appointment is accepted by the employee. The rights and obligations are not determined by the contact of the two parties but by statutory rules framed by Government in exercise of power conferred by Article 309 of the Constitution of India and the service rules can be unilaterally altered by the rule-making authority, namely, the Government. There is no dispute that 1st respondent was engaged or hired on contract to work as Drugs Inspector for a period of six months from the date of joining till a candidate selected by UPSC joined on regular basis, whichever was earlier. The contract further stipulated that even if a regularly selected candidate did not join, 1st respondent shall stand relieved on the expiry of six months where the appointment is purely ad hoc is a contractual and by efflux of time appointment comes to an end, the person holding such post can have no right to continue in the post. At para-24 it is observed that the 1st respondent cannot be said to be a Government servant as he was working on contract basis. Therefore, he was not eligible for any relaxation in upper age limit. 21. At para-24 it is observed that the 1st respondent cannot be said to be a Government servant as he was working on contract basis. Therefore, he was not eligible for any relaxation in upper age limit. 21. Here, from this, to decide how far applicable to the facts, the principle laid down is once the statutory rule referring to Articles 307 to 311 of the Constitution of India prescribed the outer age for superannuation of a Government servant, there is no provision to consider as government servant by subsequent reappointment but for it is only purely contractual for not governed by any statutory rules his appointment refers to G.O. Rt. No. 3168 of 2008 and refers to Government memo No. 21016-A/270/PSC/94, Finance and Planning (FW-PSC) Department, dated 23.06.1994, which is reference No. (1) of the three references. The Government memo whether got a statutory force to consider as regular employee is the issue. There is no statutory rule relaxing the age. The very order speaks not age relaxation but reemployment. Once it is reemployment, it is a contractual employment. Once it is a contractual employment, it cannot be directly be governed as Superintendent of Police on regulation basis. That is the spirit of what is Section 17, second proviso of the Act says the authorization to be given is by the Officer of the cadre of Superintendent of Police or above a person reemployed on contract, person cannot be considered as regular Superintendent of Police, merely because he was entrusted with the said functions by the Director General by the proceedings referred supra. 22. Once such is the case, though there is no prohibition for registration of the crime for a cognizable offence, there is a prohibition for the investigation as Section 17 proviso (1) referred supra speaks of bar to the investigation and not to the registration of crime. Once such is the case, crime registered under source of information cannot be attacked but for the investigation. 23. The next point to be answered is whether the person, who registered the crime by name Ch. Sudhakar pursuant to the said proceedings referred supra of Sri K. Sampath Kumar, Officer on Special Duty, is the complainant or informant and there is a bar for his investigation and there is a presumed prejudice to the accused there from. 23. The next point to be answered is whether the person, who registered the crime by name Ch. Sudhakar pursuant to the said proceedings referred supra of Sri K. Sampath Kumar, Officer on Special Duty, is the complainant or informant and there is a bar for his investigation and there is a presumed prejudice to the accused there from. Though it is for the purpose of the case, requires to be answered academically, in view of the observation supra of the investigation goes from the post registration of the crime for no valid authorization by a competent person as contemplated by Section 17 of the Act requires to be discussed. No doubt, in relation to the said Ch. Sudhakar, investigating officer, who registered a disproportionate assets case on source information under the Act from the sanction accorded by said Sri K. Sampath Kumar, in one of the decisions referred by both parties of a Single Judge of this Court in V. Suryanarayana vs. State, 2014 (2) ALD (Crl.) 617, at paras 10 and 11 it is observed that the case was registered on source of information which is evident from column No. 6 of FIR by said Ch. Sudhakar and it is a suo motu action on the part of him, who investigated the case where he acted on source information and thereby, the contention that he is the complainant and investigating officer and proceeding thereby liable to be quashed cannot be accepted. No doubt, complainant is one who got either personal knowledge or self same knowledge. As referred supra in the FIR at column No. 4 mentioned as suo motu and in para-12 as on credible information, which are not reconciling as to it is on source information or suo motu. If it is a source of information, there must be a G.D. entry atleast. That is not there as referred supra from FIR. Though, person, who furnished the information need not be disclosed including from the protection in investigation available under Section 173(6) Cr.P.C. of information discloses of name, identity and address even of a witness at least registering of information required in a G.D. entry to be made. That is not made admittedly in the case on hand thereby. Though in similar issue, there was an observation of the learned Single Judge of this Court, the facts as referred supra for the case on hand differ. 24. That is not made admittedly in the case on hand thereby. Though in similar issue, there was an observation of the learned Single Judge of this Court, the facts as referred supra for the case on hand differ. 24. One of the decisions placed reliance by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that of Single Judge expression of Madras High Court in S. Murali Mohan S. Srikala vs. State by Inspector of Police, 2017 Law Suit (Mad) 2724, represented by the Inspector of Police in a CBI case where it was observed that the information received on 20.12.2016 at 11.00 a.m. and case registered on the same day within half an hour of registration at 11.30 a.m. FIR dispatched to the court concerned and it shows the manual of CBI not followed. Here, it is not a CBI Case. Leave about manual is an administrative instruction itself has no statutory force but for in the absence of showing prejudice caused there from affected case of quash is made during trial and not a ground to quash there from as already referred supra in this regard. 25. Now coming to the next contention to be clarified as to the investigating officer and the person, who registered the crime from information as informant shall not be one and the same. Here, as discussed supra, it is mentioned as suo motu registration of FIR but for at para-12 mentioned as on credible information for which as referred supra, no G.D. entry as contemplated by para-3(c) of printed format of FIR and the complainant/informant at para-6 mentioned as Ch. Sudhakar, Deputy Commissioner of Police is nothing but in position of the complainant. 26. What is the contention of the learned Standing Counsel for ACB is that there is no any written complaint nor any record showing any complaint given by him in registration of the case thereby it cannot be considered that he is the complainant. His very registration of the FIR is nothing but a complaint and for that matter, a written complaint need not be, even from the wording of Sections 154 to 156 even oral information is there, it has to be reduced to writing in registration of the crime. His very registration of the FIR is nothing but a complaint and for that matter, a written complaint need not be, even from the wording of Sections 154 to 156 even oral information is there, it has to be reduced to writing in registration of the crime. It is, he, who is designated as informant and who mentioned as suo motu and it is his duty if at all to put a written report for what he mentioned in the FIR even so far as FIR at column No. 10 mentioned as credible information thereby the contention cannot automatically be taken into consideration of he is not the complainant and further there is no necessity even to call for the original record to arrive the conclusion. 27. In Mohanlal vs. State of Punjab, 2018 AIR SC 3853, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court cleared the cloud by referring to several expressions including the one in Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela (supra) saying it is per se presumed causing of prejudice from the informant and the investigating officer one and the same. No doubt, the facts are in relation to a case under Narcotic Drugs. However the cases referred not confined to Narcotic Drugs including Anti-Corruption. Also referred to State Rep. by Inspector of Police, Tiruchirapalli vs. V. Jayapaul, 2004 (5) SCC 223 , it is concluded after elaborate discussion referring to the several expressions particularly in para-25 last four lines that it is therefore held that a fair investigation, which is but the very foundation of fair trial, necessarily postulates that the informant and the investigator must not be the same person. Justice must not only be done, but must appear to be done also. Any possibility of bias or a predetermined conclusion has to be excluded. This requirement is all the more imperative in laws carrying a reverse burden of proof. 28. In the case on hand, Section 20 of the Act gives a presumption only for the offence punishable under Section 7 or 11 of the Act, where, accusation is made against the public servant of the presumption is he accepted the undue advantage and the Court shall presume unless contrary is proved by him. However, it is not applicable to Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. However, it is not applicable to Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. However, the fact remains what is concluded by the three-Judge Bench expression is fair investigation, which is but the very foundation of fair trial, necessarily postulates that the informant and the investigator must not be the same person. 29. No doubt, a Single-Judge expression of the Karnataka High Court in K.V. Raghu Ram vs. State by Lokayukta Police, 2016 Cri. L.J. 2523 the High Court learned Single Judge for want of proper authorization under Section 17 of the Act quashed the investigation of the crime registered under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. It does not mean once no authorization required the FIR also shall go out. Even if at all on the facts the learned Judge came to the conclusion that is not laying down any principle the very wording of Section 17 proviso cannot be ignored so to say. 30. Having regard to the above, though it is not only on ground on which the investigation cannot be with all certainty to be set aside but for to exercise the discretion if any by left open the defence to face during trial including on prejudice portion if at all to be made out. Hence, rather than quashing, left over the same as part of the defence to meet. 31. In the instant case, as concluded supra, the person who accorded permission under Section 17 of the Act is not competent to accord permission for the investigation, which goes to the root of the matter that requires to scrap the investigation by reverting the clock back to give proper according of permission to another officer other than the said Sri K. Sampath Kumar who registered the crime by the competent officer of the Superintendent of Police or above cadre of the Anti-Corruption Bureau to conduct fresh investigation and for that whatever the material earlier investigating officer conducted can be referred and can be relied, which is not a bar. 32. With the above observations, the Criminal Petition is allowed in part. 33. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.