JUDGMENT : Devan Ramachandran, J. 1. This appeal, arising from a writ petition filed with non-specific pleadings and seeking baffling reliefs, has confounded us in no small a measure. 2. To record epigrammatically, from among the maze of pleadings and materials on record, the petitioner contends that 'the collegium system', as enlivened by the various judgments of the Supreme Court, is illegal; that the judgments of the Supreme Court in, what is now known as the Second and Third Judges cases, do not lay down the law correctly, thus being unworthy of being followed as precedents; that the 'basic structure' theory, as postulated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, is a 'myth' and finally that the expansion in the concepts of locus standi and Public Interest Litigation, made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court over the years, is now being put to misuse. 3. Amazed as we are seeing the pleadings on record and the submissions made before us on the above lines, we proceed to indite this judgment within the parameters of law and judicial discipline, as we are enjoined to. 4. The appellants, who are the writ petitioners, say in their pleadings that their proximate cause and constitutive reason for approaching this Court in these proceedings is because they have gathered information that respondents 6 to 10, who are practising Advocates of this Court, have been recommended by the Collegium of Judges for being elevated as Judges of the High Court of Kerala. The petitioners appear to be challenging these recommendations and they say that the writ petition, from which this appeal arises, has been instituted “for the enforcement of their fundamental and legal rights” (sic). 5. The writ petition was considered by a learned Judge of this Court and a detailed judgment delivered, however, dismissing it holding, inter alia, these issues to be not justiciable, and the appellants have impugned the said judgment in this appeal asserting that the learned Single Judge “has missed the obvious, to put it in the most polite way”(sic) and therefore, that the judgment is liable to be vacated, thus granting the reliefs prayed for by them in the writ petition. 6. 6. Before we go any forward and with a view to explain why we made the prefatory observations afore, we deem it idoneous to extract the prayers sought for by the petitioners in the writ petition as under: “Declare that the reported decision of the collegium of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala, recommending the elevation of the respondents 6 to 10 as the judges of hon'ble High Court of Kerala is Null and Void being vitiated by extraneous and irrelevant considerations, namely kinship, and affinity, the respondents being the kith and kin of the former judges of the Court, so too of the Advocate General, rather than on merits; (ii) Declare that Union of India and the Collegium of the Supreme Court of India is bound to enforce the policy of 1/3rd Judges of the High Courts to be from other high courts and the initial appointment to be a High Court other than that of the parent high court of the appointee concerned; (iii) To declare that the interest of transparency and fairness requires that the vacancies in the august office of the judge of the High Court of Kerala and for that matter of every High Court in this country is liable to be notified, inviting applications from all eligible candidates, so too the recommendations and references from all stake holders and that an open and transparent selection and appointment be made, rendering any failure thereof to render the selection and appointment void-ab-initio; (iv) To issue a writ of prohibition restraining and prohibiting the Union of India, so too the Collegium of the Supreme Court of India from acting upon the recommendations of the Collegium of the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala in so far as the elevation of respondents 6 to 10 are concerned and further to direct the Collegium to make a fresh recommendations where the ordinary lawyers who have no “godfathers” too are considered. (v) Such other reliefs which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.” 7. The appellants have, of course, sought the above reliefs singularly claiming that the recommendations made by the Collegium of this Court “infringe their fundamental and legal rights”(sic). (v) Such other reliefs which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the interest of justice.” 7. The appellants have, of course, sought the above reliefs singularly claiming that the recommendations made by the Collegium of this Court “infringe their fundamental and legal rights”(sic). These claims appear to be founded on the assertion of the 1st appellant that he is an Advocate on the rolls of the Bar Council of Kerala; but no such claim is made by the 2nd petitioner, who describes himself as a “common man” (sic). Apart from the fact that we fail to understand how these recommendations if any, would impact the fundamental and legal rights of the 2nd petitioner, who is concedely not an Advocate, we are also amazed as to how the 1st appellant can claim this, when the pleadings on record are conspicuously silent as to when he enrolled as an Advocate; as to the number of years he has practised as an Advocate and as to his eligibility to be even considered for being appointed as a Judge, since he unequivocally states that he is desirous of being so elevated. 8. On this short ground alone, the writ petition deserved to have been dismissed, since the most essential foundational averments and pleadings, to even engage the scrutiny of this Court, are lacking; and this is more so because even when submissions were made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants/writ petitioners, these vital information were never disclosed. 9. Nevertheless this, since we see that the learned Single Judge still considered the various contentions impelled by the appellants/writ petitioners on its merits, we will indite our opinion in these issues albeit pithly, as under. 10. First, a quick glance through the pleadings in the writ petition is necessary and we must say, it makes a rather astonishing reading. The first 11 paragraphs of the writ petition contain a virtual lecture on the concepts of locus standi and Public Interest Litigation; and how, according to the petitioners, these have been misused. Paragraph 12 of the writ petition ineffably criticizes the designation of Advocates as senior counsel and alleges that this creates inequity in “the balance of power among the Advocates”(sic) as a class. Paragraph 12 of the writ petition ineffably criticizes the designation of Advocates as senior counsel and alleges that this creates inequity in “the balance of power among the Advocates”(sic) as a class. Though we cannot comprehend why these assertions are made in the context of the reliefs sought, paragraphs 13 to 15 of the writ petition further declare that the “common man's sons and daughters are not represented in the superior courts”(sic) and that “appointments are made from dynasties”(sic). 11. However, the further averments in paragraphs 16 to 26 of the writ petition are what that really takes the cake because, even though no citations are provided, the petitioners assert that the “2nd Judges case”, the “3rd Judges case” and the “NJAC case” do not lay down correct law and therefore, that this Court declare them as being per incuriam. 12. Bewildered as we are by all these, the appellants then say in paragraphs 27 to 31 of the writ petition that respondents 6 to 10, though expressly conceded to be eligible for being appointed as Judges, should not be considered because they are related to certain Judges, former Judges and the Advocate General. 13. After making these aspersions, in the final paragraph of the writ petition the petitioners abruptly accuse that the recommendation allegedly made by the Collegium of this Court with respect to respondents 6 to 10 is “discriminatory against ordinary lawyers because it was done without notifying the vacancies and calling for applications from all the eligible and/or without seeking reference from all the stake holders”(sic). 14. The grounds urged in the writ petition are no different since they merely reproduce the contents of the statements of facts afore seen. 15. Now coming to the averments in the memorandum of this writ appeal, they are no less confusing. In paragraph 3 thereof, it is explicitly conceded that respondents 6 to 10 are eligible and deserving of being elevated as Judges. However, in paragraph 5 again there is a reference to them being “kith and kin” of Judges, former Judges and Advocate General and the appellants say that the “Bar is surprised at these recommendations” (sic). In paragraph 3 thereof, it is explicitly conceded that respondents 6 to 10 are eligible and deserving of being elevated as Judges. However, in paragraph 5 again there is a reference to them being “kith and kin” of Judges, former Judges and Advocate General and the appellants say that the “Bar is surprised at these recommendations” (sic). Incredibly, thereafter, the appellants predicate, referring to the judgment in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 and to Keshvanandha Bharathi v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 that the doctrine of basic structure evolved by these judgments is a “myth” and that these judgments have created a “new jurisprudence unknown to the common law anywhere in the world, cutting the very first principle of jurisprudence - right, remedy and the forum” (sic). The appellants then go on to make a lecture on the principles of locus standi and Public Interest Litigation, as they have done in the writ petition and again contended that the “1st judges case”, “2nd Judge's case” and the “3rd Judge's case” do not lay down law correctly and that it is not binding on this Court, thus exhorting us to declare these judgments as being per incuriam and consequently the “collegium system” to be illegal. 16. 16. We do not think it requires detail explanation to outright reject the appellants' assertions and contentions as being nothing more than irrational, incongruous and bordering on facetiousness because, the provisions of Part V and VI of the Constitution of India, relating to the Union and State Judiciaries, including subordinate courts, have been incisively interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on not less than six occasions through Constitution Benches as under: (i) Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831 rendered by a 7 Judge Bench; (ii) Union of India v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth (1977) 4 SCC 193 - rendered by 5 Judge Bench; (iii) S.P. Gupta v. Union of India 1981 Supp SCC 87 - rendered by a 7 Judge Bench (the 1st Judge's case; (iv) Supreme Court Advocates-on-record Association v. Union of India (1993) 4 SCC 441 rendered by a 9 Judge Bench (the 2nd Judge's case); (v) Special Reference No.1 of 1998, In re, (1998) 7 SCC 739 - rendered by a 9 Judge Bench (the 3rd Judge's case] and (vi) Supreme Court Advocates-on-record Association and another v. Union of India (2016) 5 SCC 1 - rendered by a 5 Judge Bench (now commonly known as 4th Judges case.) 17. When the law has been so explicitly declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, we fail to understand how the writ petitioners could arrogate to themselves the locus or competence to make assertions and seek reliefs contrary to the afore judgments before this Court and we see that their ingenious effort, as has been vehemently argued by their counsel, Sri. Mathews J Nedumpara, is to plead that these judgments are all per incuriam and therefore, that they be declared so by this Court. 18. We are rather perturbed to hear Sri.Mathews Nedumpara as afore, who contends with great amount of vehemence that there is no ratio decidenti in any of the afore judgments and therefore, that they are not binding on this Court. We are completely clueless, as to how such contentions are argued before us and on what basis they are even impelled. 19. We are completely clueless, as to how such contentions are argued before us and on what basis they are even impelled. 19. That being said, as regards respondents 6 to 10, as we have already seen above, the appellants expressly admit that they are all eligible and suitable but they still say that the “reported recommendations”(sic) ought not have been made because the Collegium of this Court did not invite applications from all eligible advocates as if it is any other public office. There is, of course, a veiled insinuation against the afore respondents that they are “kith and kin” of Judges and of the Advocate General; but even so, they do not say that the said respondents are not eligible or suitable for being considered. The attempt of the appellants, therefore, is obviously to cast aspersions on the Collegium of Judges, but without in any manner substantiating it and thereby espousing their agenda of attempting an impossible declaration through this Court, that all the afore judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are per incuriam. 20. For the afore reasons, we were strongly, persuaded initially, particularly because the 1st appellant claims to be an Advocate of this Court, to impose exemplary costs on the appellants in having approached this Court asserting eligibility to be appointed as a Judge of a High Court, without even disclosing the rudimentary details as to when he was enrolled or his standing at the Bar, so as to act as a deterrent against such speculative litigations in future. However, we refrain from doing so after much contemplation as to the consequences it may visit the professional career of the 1st appellant. In summation, we, dismiss this appeal, confirming the judgment impugned herein