JUDGMENT : K. SURENDRA MOHAN, J. 1. The petitioner is the Principal of a Self Financing College. This writ petition is filed challenging Ext.P7, an order dated 18.6.2018 passed by the first respondent, the Admission Supervisory Committee for Professional Colleges. As per the impugned order, the first respondent has directed the petitioner herein to return to the third respondent an amount of Rs.2 Lakhs paid by her as fees for the entire course. A further direction has been issued to the second respondent to return to her an amount of Rs.10,000/- within a period of ten days. The order happened to be passed in the following circumstances: The third respondent was an applicant for admission to the B. Tech course during the year 2014-2015. She had indicated the institutions of her preference in her application submitted to the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. The second respondent, Commissioner for Entrance Examinations allotted her to the petitioner College. She was allotted to the same College during the first, second and third rounds of allotment and therefore she joined the College and paid the fees payable for the first year. Thereafter, she found that a student having a lower rank was allotted to the Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Technology, Kottayam, an institution that was preferred by the third respondent as her fourth option. Since she was not granted her fourth option while the same was granted to a candidate of a lower rank, the aggrieved third respondent challenged the same before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 20769 of 2014. This Court found her claim to be justified and therefore, an interim order was passed on 14.8.2014 directing her to be admitted to the said College. The said interim order extracted in Ext.P7 reads as follows: “In view of the fact that there is one seat in 4th respondent college, petitioner shall be admitted to the 4th respondent college for B. Tech in Civil Engineering. It is open for the 3rd respondent to fill the above seat through management quota, if the seats as such are filled, the amount collected from the petitioner shall be refunded to the petitioner. 3rd Respondent is directed to release the certificates to the petitioner in terms of Clause 19 of the Government Order produced as Ext.R3(a) by 3rd respondent.” Pursuant to the above interim order, the third respondent was admitted to the Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Technology. 3rd Respondent is directed to release the certificates to the petitioner in terms of Clause 19 of the Government Order produced as Ext.R3(a) by 3rd respondent.” Pursuant to the above interim order, the third respondent was admitted to the Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Technology. Thereupon, she requested for return of her certificates for joining the Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Technology. At that time, she was compelled to pay a sum of Rs.94,175/- towards liquidated damages. Later on, she filed a complaint before the first respondent on 10.11.2017 seeking the issue of a direction to the petitioner to refund an amount of Rs. 2,00,000/- collected from her along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of remittance and also for a direction to the second respondent to return the amount of Rs.10,000/- to her with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of remittance. She also sought for the recovery of Rs.1,00,000/- towards compensation for the hardships and mental agony suffered by her due to the illegal acts of the respondents. 2. The petitioner objected to the complaint pointing out that she had filed W.P.(C) No. 20769 of 2014 before this Court earlier and had also approached the Lok Ayuktha in C.C. No. 428 of 2015 and also the Permanent Lok Adalath. Therefore, it was contended that, the complaint was not maintainable. Since the third respondent had left the College after the cut off date that was stipulated, it was contended that she was liable to pay liquidated damages as per Clause 12.2.4 of the Prospectus. It was also contended that, under the provisions of the Consensual Agreement between the Self Financing Engineering College Management Association and the Government and the Government Order issued on the basis of the said agreement, the College was entitled to collect liquidated damages. It was contended that, the seat had remained vacant and no student was admitted to the said seat. The College therefore sought for the dismissal of the complaint. 3. The first respondent considered the respective contentions, found that the allotment of the third respondent to the petitioner college was due to an error committed by the second respondent, which was rectified by the order of this Court. Therefore, there was no fault on the part of the third respondent. 3. The first respondent considered the respective contentions, found that the allotment of the third respondent to the petitioner college was due to an error committed by the second respondent, which was rectified by the order of this Court. Therefore, there was no fault on the part of the third respondent. The first respondent further found that the interim order in W.P.(C) No. 20769 of 2014 was passed by this Court on 14.8.2014, and the last date upto which admissions could have been made by the College in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Parshvanath Charitable Trust v. AICTE was 16.8.2014. Therefore, there was sufficient time for the petitioner to have admitted another student to the seat that fell vacant consequent to the implementation of the interim order passed by this Court. Since this Court had not adjudicated a claim for liquidated damages in the said proceedings, it was found that the said interim order did not bar the complaint of the third respondent. For the above reasons, the claim of the third respondent has been allowed by the first respondent. It is aggrieved by Ext.P7 that, the petitioner is before us. 4. According to the Senior Counsel Shri. Kurian George Kannanthanam, the interim order passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No. 20769 of 2014 was obtained at the instance of the third respondent student, to which the second respondent as well as the petitioner were parties. The said interim order stipulates that it shall be open for the College “to fill the above seat through the Management Quota, if the seats as such are filled, the amount collected from the petitioner shall be refunded to the petitioner.” The third respondent was the petitioner in the said writ petition. Therefore, it is contended that, the amount collected from her has been ordered to be refunded only “if the seats as such are filled.” It therefore follows that, since the seat had not been filled, the amount collected from her need not be refunded. The said interim order binds the third respondent and therefore, she was not entitled to claim refund of the fees paid by her. The learned Senior Counsel further points out that the writ petition itself had been finally disposed of by Ext. P3 judgment making the interim order absolute and leaving the issues in the writ petition open. The said interim order binds the third respondent and therefore, she was not entitled to claim refund of the fees paid by her. The learned Senior Counsel further points out that the writ petition itself had been finally disposed of by Ext. P3 judgment making the interim order absolute and leaving the issues in the writ petition open. Since the interim order had been made absolute by this Court, it is pointed out that the third respondent cannot wriggle out of the rigor of the condition subject to which alone she was granted admission by this Court. 5. Another contention put forward is that, the fees, for the return of which she has made a claim was paid in the year 2014. However, she had preferred a complaint for return of the fees only on 10.11.2017 after the lapse of three years and therefore the claim is time barred. 6. The learned Senior Counsel also places reliance on clause 19 of Ext.P2, the Government Order issued in terms of the Consensual Agreement entered into between the Government and the Self Financing College, which provides that if a student discontinues his/her studies for any reason at any time after 25th of July, 2014, the educational agency shall be entitled to collect the tuition fee for the entire course. In view of the above clause also, it is contended that the student was not entitled to claim refund of the fees paid by her. Since the first respondent has not considered any of the above contentions in the proper perspective, it is contended that, the impugned order requires to be interfered with and set aside. 7. Adv. Mary Benjamin who appears for the first respondent responds to the above contentions pointing out that, Clause 19 of Ext.P2 Government Order has referred to the last date for admission during that year which was initially 25th of July, 2014. Subsequently, the same was extended upto 15.8.2014. 15.8.2014 being a holiday, the last date during the said year was 16.8.2014. In the present case, the interim order of this Court was passed on 14.8.2014, the College therefore had sufficient time to fill up the vacant seat by admitting a person in the management quota. It is therefore contended that, Clause 19 does not apply to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the interim order of this Court was passed on 14.8.2014, the College therefore had sufficient time to fill up the vacant seat by admitting a person in the management quota. It is therefore contended that, Clause 19 does not apply to the facts of the present case. We have also heard the learned Special Government Pleader who appears for the second respondent. 8. This writ petition comes up before us for admission. We have considered the contentions advanced before us anxiously. The facts are not in dispute. The third respondent, who had indicated the Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Science and Technology as the institution of her fourth preference, was not allotted to the said institution, while a candidate with a lower ranking was allotted to the said College by the second respondent. In the case of the third respondent, during the first, second and third rounds of allotments, she was consistently allotted to the petitioner college which was only her 10th option. Since there was no change in the institution to which she was allotted even in the third round of allotment, she joined the petitioner college and paid her first year fees. It was thereafter that, she had approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 20769 of 2014 challenging the action of the second respondent. This Court found her claim to be justified. It was also noticed that one seat was vacant in the Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Science and Technology. Therefore, she was directed to be admitted to the said College for B.Tech Civil Engineering. The interim order also provided that the petitioner could fill up the resultant vacant seat by admitting candidates through the Management quota. The interim order goes on to say that, if the seat as such is filled, the amount collected from the student shall be refunded to the student. The fact remains that, as a condition for the return of her certificates, the petitioner insisted on payment of the tuition fee for the entire course, which she paid. It was thereafter that, she submitted a complaint before the second respondent claiming return of the fee paid by her. In the above circumstances, it has to be examined whether the petitioner has the right to appropriate the fees paid, as liquidated damages. 9. It was thereafter that, she submitted a complaint before the second respondent claiming return of the fee paid by her. In the above circumstances, it has to be examined whether the petitioner has the right to appropriate the fees paid, as liquidated damages. 9. The first contention put forward is that, the interim order of this Court, passed at the instance of none other than the third respondent has ordered return of the fee, only if the seat was filled. In the present case, since the seat remained unfilled, there is no necessity for return of the fees paid. It is contended that, the third respondent is bound by the said condition which disentitles her from claiming the fees paid, since the seat has remained unfilled. 10. In the above context, it is necessary to notice that what this Court has ordered is only that the Management was entitled to fill up the seat by admitting a student from the Management Quota which was not otherwise permissible since the allotment was to be made by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations and in the event of the seat being filled up through management quota, what has been ordered is that the amount collected from the third respondent shall be refunded. This Court has not said anything about the situation where the seat would remain unfilled. No such situation was in the contemplation of this Court while passing the interim order. We are not prepared to presume that this Court had intended the converse also while passing the interim order on 14.8.2014. Since this Court was only permitting the college to fill up the resultant vacant seat by admitting a student from the management quota, the said contention cannot be accepted to deny to the third respondent the fees that was paid by her as stated above. 11. The interim order further directs that the certificates of the third respondent shall be released 'in terms of Clause 19 of the Government Order' which is Ext.P2 herein. In view of the above, it is contended that, Clause 19 entitles the petitioner College to collect the tuition fee for the entire course as liquidated damages in every case where the student leaves a particular College. In view of the above contention, it is necessary to examine the scope of Clause 19 of Ext.P2. Clause 19 of Ext.P2 is extracted hereunder for convenience of reference. In view of the above contention, it is necessary to examine the scope of Clause 19 of Ext.P2. Clause 19 of Ext.P2 is extracted hereunder for convenience of reference. “19. The Educational Agency can retain the Tuition Fee remitted by the student, in the event a student admitted under the Management quota or Government quota discontinues his/her studies for any reason at any time after the 25th day of July 2014. The Educational Agency shall also be entitled to collect the tuition fee of the entire course. However, in the event of the seat so falling vacant being filled up by a new candidate, the tuition fee collected as per this clause shall be refunded. The documents pertaining to such student shall be released only on payment of the above amount. The candidates will not have to make any payment, as stated above, if such candidate is forced to leave the college on the grounds of ragging or serious illness as certified by a medical board which prevents the student from continuing with his or her studies in the college. In the case of students joining AFMC/NDA/Naval Academy/Defence Institutions also will not have to make such payment but subject to the final outcome of the W.P.(C) No. 645/2014 pending before the Hon'ble High Court of Kerala.” A perusal of Clause 19 shows that it is intended to make a student liable for leaving a course or course of study after taking admission. Any such conduct on the part of a student would result in that seat remaining vacant for the entire duration of the course for the reason that the College would not be able to admit another student to the vacant seat, the last date for admission having expired. Therefore, the wording of the said clause has to be understood as casting a liability on a student who discontinues his/her studies for any reason after the cut off date. In the present case, the student has not discontinued her studies on her own. In the present case, she was allotted to the petitioner College by the second respondent by mistake, with which action, this Court had interfered and corrected. Therefore, in the present case, the student had left the College on the basis of the interim order passed by this Court. In the present case, she was allotted to the petitioner College by the second respondent by mistake, with which action, this Court had interfered and corrected. Therefore, in the present case, the student had left the College on the basis of the interim order passed by this Court. In such cases where an erroneous allotment is corrected by the court or other authority consequent to which, a student leaves the course, Clause No. 19 has no application. Therefore, in such an event, the College also cannot collect liquidated damages. We further notice that, as per Clause 4 of Ext.P2, the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations is the authority to allot students to each College. After the final allotment to be made by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations, the seats remaining unfilled are to revert to the management for allotment through management quota. In the present case, since there was no overt act on the part of the student in the matter of either taking admission at the petitioner college or in the matter of leaving the college, it is held that Clause 19 has no application. We further notice that, as per Ext.P3 judgment, W.P.(C) No. 20769 of 2014 was disposed of making the interim order dated 14.8.2014 absolute. This Court has further made it clear that the issues in the writ petition were left open. Therefore, we are not satisfied that the rights of the third respondent was in any way curtailed by either the interim order dated 14.8.2014 or the final judgment in the said writ petition, Ext.P3. 12. Another contention that is put forward is that, the claim for the amount made by the third respondent was time barred. We notice that time bar provided by the Limitation Act is applicable only to courts and not to complaints that are to be made before the first respondent. In the present case, the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations committed an error in the matter of making allotments. The third respondent was a victim of the said error. This Court interfered to set right matters by granting an interim order directing her to be admitted to the college indicated by her as a higher option. Therefore, there is no justification for penalizing the third respondent by asking her to pay liquidated damages to the petitioner for the mistake committed by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. This Court interfered to set right matters by granting an interim order directing her to be admitted to the college indicated by her as a higher option. Therefore, there is no justification for penalizing the third respondent by asking her to pay liquidated damages to the petitioner for the mistake committed by the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations. As rightly found by the first respondent, the interim order of this Court was dated 14.8.2014, The last date for admission for the said year was 16.8.2014. Therefore, there was sufficient time for the petitioner to admit another student to the seat that fell vacant. For the foregoing reasons, we find no grounds to admit this writ petition or to grant any of the reliefs claimed. The writ petition is therefore dismissed.