JUDGMENT C.L. SONI, J. 1. Arguments were heard for final disposal of the appeal with consent of learned advocates appearing for the parties. 2. The appeal is filed under Order XLIII of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ("the Code") by original defendant Nos.16, 17 and 18 of civil suit No.1378 of 2016 against the order dated 20.12.2017 passed by learned Chamber, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad below application Exh.7 with notice of motion Exh.6 in above referred suit. 3. The respondents no.1 to 3 are the original plaintiffs. The respondent no.1 is the husband of the respondent no.2 and father of the respondent no.3. Following prayers are made in paragraph no.34 of the plaint: "(A) May be pleased to declare Late SHRI KAILASHCHANDRA RAMKUMAR TIBREWALA to be an owner of suit property no.1 to 23 and also declare that plaintiff no. 1 has 1/4th or 1/5th share in the said suit property no.1 to 23 and further be pleased to declare the plaintiff no.1 to be an absolute owner of his share in suit property no.1 to 23. OR May be pleased to declare that plaintiff no.1 and defendant no.1 to 3 have equal share in the suit property no.1 to 23. (B) May be pleased to pass an order of partition of the suit property no. 1 to 23 and also pass an order of part with the exclusive possession of 1.4th or 1/5th portion of suit property no. 1 to 23 in favour of Plaintiff no.1. (C) May be pleased to direct the defendants to produce the resolutions, accounts abstracts and bank statements i.e. Profit & Loss, income tax returns, Charge, lien and documentary records, loan, Mortgage etc. of suit property no. 1 to 18 in this court. (D) May be pleased to appoint a Receiver to take over the charge of the suit property no. 1 to 18 for better and transparent administration of the business of suit property no.1 to 18 as well as to produce true and correct account and records of suit property no.1 to 18 before this Hon'ble Court. (D) May be pleased to appoint a Receiver to take over the charge of the suit property no. 1 to 18 for better and transparent administration of the business of suit property no.1 to 18 as well as to produce true and correct account and records of suit property no.1 to 18 before this Hon'ble Court. (E) May be pleased to direct the defendant no.16 to 19 to produce the account i.e. Profit & Loss, Charge, lien, loan, Mortgage, business transaction of purchase of raw material, equipments, machineries and sale of ready material including Chalan, Invoices, Bill of lading, "C" form, ledger, statement of banks account, expenses, each and every books of accounts and records etc. This Hon'ble Court may also be pleased to direct the defendant no.16 to 19 to produce agreement, permissions etc. regarding overseas business. (F) May be pleased to grant permanent injunction against the defendants from Selling, Transferring, Leasing, Licensing, mortgaging, Disposing, Dissolving or in any way dealing with the joint family business and properties and to restrain them to part with or alienate with the possession to any persons in suit property no.1 to 23. (G) May be pleased to pass an order of attachment before judgment of the suit property no. 1 to 18 property and direct the court receiver to take charge of the undivided family businesses, movable/immovable properties/assets. (H) May be pleased to appoint a Court Commissioner and direct him to prepare an inventory of all movable/immovable property and other valuable created from the joint family funds as per the schedule. (I) May be pleased to grant any other and further relief as may be deem fit and necessary in the interest of law, justice and equity." 4. The above reliefs prayed are in connection with the different properties as described in the plaint. Learned advocate Mr.Parikh appearing for the appellants has declared at the outset that the appellants restrict their challenge to the impugned order only for the property No.17. As stated in para-11 of the plaint, the property No.17 is the plot No.4, GIDC, Kathwada, ad-measuring 8307.86 Sqmts purchased by the appellant no.1 in the year 2004. 5. Learned advocate Mr.Parikh appearing for the appellants has declared at the outset that the appellants restrict their challenge to the impugned order only for the property No.17. As stated in para-11 of the plaint, the property No.17 is the plot No.4, GIDC, Kathwada, ad-measuring 8307.86 Sqmts purchased by the appellant no.1 in the year 2004. 5. Learned Judge has partly allowed the application Exh.7 with notice of motion Exh.6 and passed following interim order: "Defendant Nos.1 to 15 are hereby restrained to maintain status-quo qua the possession and title of the properties bearing Nos.3, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 17 and 19 to 23 shown in the plaint till the final disposal of this suit. However, in respect of the other properties, which are the partnership firms and the Companies wherein the plaintiffs and their family members are partners and/or Directors, one-fifth share of the plaintiffs shall stand protected. However, if the said assets of the partnership firm and/or the Companies are required to be mortgaged or transferred, then the same can be done only with the prior permission of this Court." 6. Learned advocate Mr.Parikh appearing for the appellants submitted that even as per the case of the plaintiffs, the property No.17 was purchased by the appellant no.1 company in the year 2004 and such property was neither brought in the company from family business nor was transferred from the partnership firms. Mr.Parikh submitted that with other defendants, the plaintiffs are also the shareholders in the company. Mr.Parikh submitted that the property No.17 has been mortgaged as security with the Bank against the loan from the Bank, however on account of the default made by the appellant No.1 - company in repayment of the loan to the bank, the bank has taken measures under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002, (SARFAESI Act) and under such measures, the bank has taken over the possession of the property No.17 from the appellant No.1 - company and had also put it to auction, however, the auction remained unsuccessful, but the property has been in possession of the Bank. Mr.Parikh submitted that the properties of the partnership firm and of the company cannot be subjected to partition as the rights of the partners and the shareholders are governed by the provisions of Partnership Act and the companies Act respectively. Mr. Mr.Parikh submitted that the properties of the partnership firm and of the company cannot be subjected to partition as the rights of the partners and the shareholders are governed by the provisions of Partnership Act and the companies Act respectively. Mr. Parikh submitted that one Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was executed providing for sharing the joint family properties amongst family members, however, the plaintiffs after getting some benefits as per the MOU filed the present suit. Mr.Parikh submitted that learned Judge has though recorded that the plaintiffs have failed to, prima facie, establish that the business of the partnership firm as well as of the companies are joint family business and that the partnership firms and the companies cannot be restrained qua their properties, however interim injunction is also issued for property no.17. Mr. Parikh submitted that the property no.17 is not nucleus for the plaintiffs to claim partition and therefore no injunction could have been granted against property no.17. He, therefore, urged to quash and set aside the impugned order for the property No.17. 7. Learned advocate Ms.Brahmbhatt appearing for the respondent no.1 to 3 (to be referred as plaintiffs) submitted that the appellants companies came to be incorporated on expansion of the family business and the suit properties including property No.17 were purchased from income of the family business. She submitted that in the business of partnership firms and of the companies, all family members of the family of Shri Kailashchandra Ramkumar Tibrewala, are involved and, in fact, more than 87% shareholding in the appellants companies is of Tibrewala's family. Ms.Brahmbhatt submitted that the appellant No.1 Company was originally a partnership firm which was later on converted into the private company and then further converted into public company and thus it is nothing but a glorified partnership firm made of family members of Tebrewala family. Ms.Brahmbhatt submitted that since all the suit properties were purchased from the income of the family business, the plaintiffs have undivided share in the suit properties and for such undivided share in the suit properties, the plaintiffs are entitled to claim partition of their share even if some of such properties now stand in the name of appellants companies. Ms.Brahmbhatt submitted that since all the suit properties were purchased from the income of the family business, the plaintiffs have undivided share in the suit properties and for such undivided share in the suit properties, the plaintiffs are entitled to claim partition of their share even if some of such properties now stand in the name of appellants companies. Ms.Brahmbhatt submitted that family business since expanded in the partnership which on further expansion converted into private and public companies, the properties in the name of the appellants companies would retain the status as joint family properties. Ms.Brahmbhatt submitted that the present appeal is filed by the appellants with only intention to grab the sale proceeds of the properties stand in the name of the companies. She submitted that the appellants have already disposed of one property of the company in defiance of the interim order made by the Court and therefore, the impugned order may not be interfered at the instance of the appellants. Ms.Brahmbhatt submitted that since defendants failed to act as per the MOU and removed the plaintiff no.1 as the director of the appellant no.1 company, the plaintiffs are entitled to ask for partitioning their share from the suit properties. Ms.Brahmbhatt has taken the Court to the averments made in the connected applications to press for her submissions that all the suit properties are joint family properties and the corporate veil is required to be lifted to find that the suit properties were purchased out of the income of the family business wherein the plaintiffs have undivided share for which the suit for partition is very much maintainable and, therefore, the court may not interfere with the impugned order. 8. The Court, having heard learned advocates, finds that after the appeal from order was filed in the month of January, 2018, the appellants and all other defendants have jointly filed Civil Application No.2 of 2018 in the appeal from order praying to modify the impugned order for the suit property No.17 so as to realize the sale proceeds of such property to pay the outstanding dues of the Indian Overseas Bank. As stated in the application, the property no.17 has been mortgaged with Bank before institution of the suit for various credit facilities extended by the Bank from 18.05.2007 and in possession of the Bank and was put to e-auction to realize its dues of Rs. As stated in the application, the property no.17 has been mortgaged with Bank before institution of the suit for various credit facilities extended by the Bank from 18.05.2007 and in possession of the Bank and was put to e-auction to realize its dues of Rs. 6,58,48,711/- but the auction failed. It is further stated that as per the valuation done, the value of the property no.17 is Rs. 17 lac and it can fetch better price if allowed to be sold by the appellants, which will be in the interest of the plaintiffs and the defendants and that the appellants will abide by any condition that may be imposed by the court if they are allowed to sell the property. 9. The main premise on which the suit for declaration, partition with possession and the permanent injunction is filed by the respondents no.1 to 3 appears to be that late Shri Kailashchandra Ramkumar Tibrewala, who was the father of the plaintiff No.1 and defendant Nos.1 to 3 and the husband of the defendant No.4, started trading business in partnership and controlled the business and then expanded the business, where family members joined in the business and further expanded into partnership firms and the companies including appellant companies. In paragraph No.11 of the plaint, following averments are made for the property No. 16 and 17: "(11) In the year 2004, a new firm by name 'Naval Pen Company Pvt Ltd.' i.e. defendant no.18 was started in the family business. (The said company is called 'Suit Property No.16' hereunder in this suit.) Thereafter in the said year, defendant no.16, Naval Technoplast Industries Limited had purchased property bearing Plot no. 4 at GIDC, Kathwada, admeasuring 8307.86 sq. mtrs. And the possession was taken over from GIDC on dated: 18/11/2004. (The said plot no.4 is called 'Suit Property No.17' hereunder in this suit.)" 10. For the suit property No.17, the defendants have stated in para-2 t and bb of their written statement cum reply as under: "t. With respect to contents of paragraph no. 1, the same are not true and hence, denied. It is not true that Naval Pen Company Pvt. Ltd. was a part of the purported family business as claimed or at all. The same has been established from funds of various shareholders including the plaintiffs. 1, the same are not true and hence, denied. It is not true that Naval Pen Company Pvt. Ltd. was a part of the purported family business as claimed or at all. The same has been established from funds of various shareholders including the plaintiffs. Hence, the same is a completely independent entity having no connection with any other business or businesses in, which the plaintiffs or defendants are involved. Naval Pen Company Pvt. Ltd. commenced its operation from a meager initial capital of Rs. 1,00,000.00/- (Rupees One Lac) that was brought in by the shareholders. Naval Pen Company Pvt. Ltd. has not acquired any immovable asset and/or property and at present the company is completely non-operational. It is true that Naval Technoplast industries Ltd purchased an immovable property bearing plot no.4, for a sale consideration of Rs. 66.99 Lacs (Rupees Sixty Six Lac Ninety Nine Thousand). The initial payment of Rs. 20.10 Lacs (Rupees Twenty Lacs Ten Thousand) was made by company and by the shareholders in their respective capacity from their independent sources of income. For making payment towards the balance sum of Rs. 46.89 Lacs (Rupees Forty Six Lacs Eighty Nine thousand), a loan was raised from GIDC. GIDC permitted the Company to make payment in installments in ten years. The factory or shed over the aforesaid plot was constructed by procuring a loan of around Rs. 2.00 crore from the Indian Overseas bank." "bb. with respect to contents of paragraph no. 14, the same are not true and hence, denied. The fact that loans have been procured by Naval Technoplast Industries Ltd is a matter of record and hence, does not require the defendants to respond to the same in detail. The said loans have been procured after the execution of the MoU whereby the plaintiffs retired from the aforementioned company and even addressed letter/s to various financial institutions seeking to cancel the guarantees as provided by them. It is not true that the plaintiffs are burdened with the liability to make repayment towards the same as claimed or at all. Loan to the tune of Rs. 2.73 Cr. Was procured from one IDBI Bank Ltd. During such period, plaintiffs were neither made the applicant not the guarantor towards such loan. Moreover, at his request, plaintiff no. 1 has been relived as a guarantor of the loans procured by the company after execution of MoU." 11. Loan to the tune of Rs. 2.73 Cr. Was procured from one IDBI Bank Ltd. During such period, plaintiffs were neither made the applicant not the guarantor towards such loan. Moreover, at his request, plaintiff no. 1 has been relived as a guarantor of the loans procured by the company after execution of MoU." 11. It could not be disputed by learned advocate Ms. Brahmbhatt that the measures under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act after the issuance of the notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act have been taken for recovery of loan by the Bank, and as part of such measures, the possession of the suit property No.17 was taken and it was put to auction but the auction was not successful. Thus, the suit property No.17 has been in possession of the Bank. 12. Learned Judge has observed in the order that the plaintiffs have failed to, prima facie, establish that the businesses of the partnership firm as well as that of the companies are joint family businesses. Learned Judge has also observed that the assets and liabilities of the partnership firm as well as that of the companies and the properties purchased by the firms and/or by the company and the loan taken by them are to run their businesses and, therefore, they cannot be restrained. However, while granting injunction by impugned order, learned Judge has also included the property no.17 with other suit properties and also ordered to seek the prior permission of the Court, if the assets of the partnership firms and companies are required to be mortgaged or transferred. 13. Learned advocate Ms.Brahmbhatt has relied on decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Babu lal & Others Vs. Vijay Solvex Ltd. & Others, (2014) 9 SCALE 222 in support of her submission that the suit for partition is maintainable against the company. In the said case, learned trial Judge had issued injunction not to sell, transfer the immovable properties which belonged to the company/partnership firm. Vijay Solvex Ltd. & Others, (2014) 9 SCALE 222 in support of her submission that the suit for partition is maintainable against the company. In the said case, learned trial Judge had issued injunction not to sell, transfer the immovable properties which belonged to the company/partnership firm. Such injunction order was challenged in the High Court and the High Court interfered with the order of learned trial Judge inter alia on the reasoning that the companies, which were incorporated under the Companies Act, having perpetual seal and separate entity could not be the assets of the individuals and the company could not be divided by metes and bounds by way of partition as prayed for in the suit. However, the High Court gave some finding on issues concerning maintainability of the suit, misjoinder of parties, cause of action for filing of the suit etc. Such order of the High Court was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that while dealing with the matter for vacation of the interim injunction, it was not open to the High Court to give finding on main issue relating to the maintainability of suit and, therefore, the Hon'ble Supreme Court remanded the matter to the High Court for its fresh disposal after hearing of the parties as recorded in paragraph Nos.7 and 8 of its judgment, which read as under: "[7] We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. In the present case, the parties have raised similar pleas which were taken before the High Court. However, we are of the opinion that while dealing with a matter relating to vacation of order of temporary injunction, it was not open for the High court to give a finding on the main issue relating to maintainability of the suit and the family settlement reached between the parties. [8] In view of the finding aforesaid, we are inclined to interfere with the judgment and order dated 14th March, 2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Civil Misc. Appeal No.2218 of 2011 etc. We, accordingly, set aside the impugned judgment and remit back the matter to the High Court for its fresh disposal after hearing the parties." 14. Appeal No.2218 of 2011 etc. We, accordingly, set aside the impugned judgment and remit back the matter to the High Court for its fresh disposal after hearing the parties." 14. The Court finds that the reliance placed by learned advocate Ms.Brahmbhatt on above judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court will be of no help to the plaintiffs as this court is not to decide at this stage the issue as to the maintainability of the suit. 15. Learned advocate Ms.Brahmbhatt however submitted that the property No.17 was purchased by the income of the family business. The Court finds from the averments made in paragraph No.11 of the plaint that no such assertion is made by the plaintiffs. However, even if the appellant no.1 Company owes its existence as a result of expansion of family business, the fact remains that after purchase of property No.17 by the appellant no.1 Company, the appellant no.1 Company is its owner and will continue to be so till it is sold or transferred either on winding up or dissolution of the company or otherwise. The plaintiffs are stated to be the shareholders of the appellant No.1 Company with the other defendants who are stated to have much higher shareholding. The shareholders have no individual right to the properties of the Company but their rights as shareholders stand governed by the Companies Act. They stand separate and independent to the Company which is legal entity. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the property No.17 which was mortgaged prior to filing of the suit is now in possession of the Bank pursuant to the action taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act and was, in fact, put to auction by the Bank. As per section 13 (4) (a) taking of possession of secured assets as one of the measures includes right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realizing the secured assets and the remedy available to the aggrieved party is to file application under section 17 of the SRFAESI ACT. As per sub-section 6 of section 13, any transfer of secured assets shall vest in the transferee all rights in or in relation to the secured assets transferred as if the transfer is made by the owner of secured assets. 16. In the case of Jagdish Singh Vs. As per sub-section 6 of section 13, any transfer of secured assets shall vest in the transferee all rights in or in relation to the secured assets transferred as if the transfer is made by the owner of secured assets. 16. In the case of Jagdish Singh Vs. Heeralal and Others, (2014) 1 SCC 479 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held and observed in para-13 to 26 as under: 13. We find that the Bank had advanced loans on the strength of the abovementioned documents which stood in the names of Respondent Nos.6 to 9. Due to non-repayment of the loan amount, the Bank can always proceed against the secured assets. 14. Security interest, within the meaning of Section 2(zf) has been created in respect of the above mentioned properties which are secured assets within the meaning of Section 2(zc), in favour of the secured creditor (the bank) within the meaning of Section 2(zd). On failure to re- pay, the bank, secured creditor can always enforce its security interest over the secured assets. 15. "Secured asset" is defined under Section 2(zc) of the Securitisation Act to mean the property on which security interest is created. Section 13(1) of the Securitisation Act states that "13. Enforcement of security interest.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 69 or 69A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of the court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of the Act." In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability, the bank can take the measures provided in Section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act for recovery of the loan amount. 16. The "measures" available for enforcement of security interest is dealt with in the following provision: "13. 16. The "measures" available for enforcement of security interest is dealt with in the following provision: "13. Enforcement of security interest - (1) to (3) * * * (4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the period specified in sub-section (2), the secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt, namely- (a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset; (b) take over the management of the business of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured asset: Provided that the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale shall be exercised only where the substantial part of the business of the borrower is held as security for the debt: Provided further that where the management of whole of the business or part of the business is severable, the secured creditor shall take over the management of such business of the borrower which is relatable to the security or the debt; (c) appoint any person (hereafter referred to as the manager), to manage the secured assets the possession of which has been taken over by the secured creditor; (d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so much of the money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt." 17. Section 17 of the Securitisation Act confers a right of appeal to any person, including the borrower, if that person is aggrieved by any of the "measures" referred to in subsection (4) of Section 13 taken by the Secured Creditor. The operative portion of Section 17 is extracted herein-below for ready reference: "17. Section 17 of the Securitisation Act confers a right of appeal to any person, including the borrower, if that person is aggrieved by any of the "measures" referred to in subsection (4) of Section 13 taken by the Secured Creditor. The operative portion of Section 17 is extracted herein-below for ready reference: "17. Right to appeal.- (1) Any person (including borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor or his authorised officer under this Chapter, may make an application along with such fee, as may be prescribed to the Debts Recovery Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter within forty-five days from the date on which such measure had been taken: Provided that different fees may be prescribed for making the application by the borrower and the person other than the borrower. Explanation.- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the communication of the reasons to the borrower by the secured creditor for not having accepted his representation or objection or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of communication of reasons to the borrower shall not entitle the person (including borrower) to make an application to the Debts Recovery Tribunal under sub-section. (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (2) The Debts Recovery Tribunal shall consider whether any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security are in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder. (3) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that any of the measures referred to in sub- section (4) of Section 13, taken by the secured creditor are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, and require restoration of the management of the secured assets to the borrower or restoration of possession of the secured assets to the borrower, it may by order, declare the recourse to any one or more measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 taken by the secured assets as invalid and restore the possession of the secured assets to the borrower or restore the management of the secured assets to the borrower, as the case may be, and pass such order as it may consider appropriate and necessary in relation to any of the recourse taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13. (4) If, the Debts Recovery Tribunal declares the recourse taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13, is in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor shall be entitled to take recourse to one or more of the measures specified under sub-section (4) of Section 13 to recover his secured debt. (5) Any application made under subsection (1) shall be dealt with by the Debts Recovery Tribunal as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within sixty days from the date of such application: Provided that the Debts Recovery Tribunal may, from time to time, extend the said period for reasons to be recorded in writing, so, however, that the total period of pendency of the application with the Debts Recovery Tribunal, shall not exceed four months from the date of making of such application made under sub-section (1). (6) If the application is not disposed of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal within the period of four months as specified in sub-section (5), any party to the application may make an application, in such form as may be prescribed, to the Appellate Tribunal for directing the Debts Recovery Tribunal for expeditious disposal of the application pending before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal may, on such application, make an order for expeditious disposal of the pending application by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. (7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the Debts Recovery Tribunal shall, as far as may be, dispose of application in accordance with the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993) and the rules made thereunder." 18. Any person aggrieved by any order made by the DRT under Section 17 may also prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 18 of the Act. 19. The expression 'any person' used in Section 17 is of wide import and takes within its fold not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by action taken under Section 13(4) of the Securitisation Act. Reference may be made to the Judgment of this Court in Satyavati Tondon's case. 20. Therefore, the expression 'any person' referred to in Section 17 would take in the plaintiffs in the suit as well. Therefore, irrespective of the question whether the civil suit is maintainable or not, under the Securitisation Act itself, a remedy is provided to such persons so that they can invoke the provisions of Section 17 of the Securitisation Act, in case the bank (secured creditor) adopt any measure including the sale of the secured assets, on which the plaintiffs claim interest. 21. Section 34 of the Securitisation Act ousts the civil court jurisdiction. For easy reference, we may extract Section 34 of the Securitisation Act, which is as follow: "34. 21. Section 34 of the Securitisation Act ousts the civil court jurisdiction. For easy reference, we may extract Section 34 of the Securitisation Act, which is as follow: "34. Civil Court not to have jurisdiction - No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993)." 22. The scope of Section 34 came up for consideration before this Court in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. and this court held as follow: (SCC p. 349, para 50) "50. It has also been submitted that an appeal is entertainable before the Debts Recovery Tribunal only after such measures as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 13 are taken and Section 34 bars to entertain any proceeding in respect of a matter which the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine. Thus before any action or measure is taken under sub- section (4) of Section 13, it is submitted by Mr Salve, one of the counsel for the respondents that there would be no bar to approach the civil court. Therefore, it cannot be said that no remedy is available to the borrowers. We, however, find that this contention as advanced by Shri Salve is not correct. A full reading of Section 34 shows that the jurisdiction of the civil court is barred in respect of matters which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine in respect of any action taken "or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred under this Act". That is to say, the prohibition covers even matters which can be taken cognizance of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal though no measure in that direction has so far been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13. It is further to be noted that the bar of jurisdiction is in respect of a proceeding which matter may be taken to the Tribunal. It is further to be noted that the bar of jurisdiction is in respect of a proceeding which matter may be taken to the Tribunal. Therefore, any matter in respect of which an action may be taken even later on, the civil court shall have no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding thereof. The bar of civil court thus applies to all such matters which may be taken cognizance of by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, apart from those matters in which measures have already been taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13." 23. Section 13, as already indicated, deals with the enforcement of the security interest without the intervention of the court or tribunal but in accordance with the provisions of the Securitisation Act. 24. Statutory interest is being created in favour of the secured creditor on the secured assets and when the secured creditor proposes to proceed against the secured assets, sub-section (4) of Section 13 envisages various measures to secure the borrower's debt. One of the measures provided by the statute is to take possession of secured assets of the borrowers, including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or realizing the secured assets. Any person aggrieved by any of the "measures" referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 has got a statutory right of appeal to the DRT under Section 17. The opening portion of Section 34 clearly states that no civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding "in respect of any matter" which a DRT or an Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under the Securitisation Act to determine. The expression "in respect of any matter" referred to in Section 34 would take in the "measures" provided under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act. Consequently if any aggrieved person has got any grievance against any "measures" taken by the borrower under sub-section (4) of Section 13, the remedy open to him is to approach the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal and not the civil court. Civil Court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of those matters which fall under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act because those matters fell within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal. Civil Court in such circumstances has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceedings in respect of those matters which fall under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act because those matters fell within the jurisdiction of the DRT and the Appellate Tribunal. Further, Section 35 says, the Securitisation Act overrides other laws, if they are inconsistent with the provisions of that Act, which takes in Section 9 CPC as well. 25. We are of the view that the civil court jurisdiction is completely barred, so far as the "measure" taken by a secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act, against which an aggrieved person has a right of appeal before the DRT or the Appellate Tribunal. to determine as to whether there has been any illegality in the "measures" taken. The bank, in the instant case, has proceeded only against secured assets of the borrowers on which no rights of Respondent Nos.6 to 8 have been crystalised, before creating security interest in respect of the secured assets. 26. In such circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court was in error in holding that only civil court has jurisdiction to examine as to whether the "measures" taken by the secured creditor under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Securitisation Act were legal or not. In such circumstances, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Court is set aside. There shall be no order as to costs." 17. The Court finds that when the property No.17 is not in possession of the appellant No.1 and is being put to auction by the bank to realize its dues, the injunction against the property No.17 should not continue. There shall be no order as to costs." 17. The Court finds that when the property No.17 is not in possession of the appellant No.1 and is being put to auction by the bank to realize its dues, the injunction against the property No.17 should not continue. Section 13(7) of the SARFAESI Act provides as under: "Where any action has been taken against a borrower under the provisions of sub-section (4), all costs, charges and expenses which, in the opinion of the secured creditor, have been properly incurred by him or any expenses incidental thereto, shall be recoverable from the borrower and the money which is received by the secured creditor shall, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, be held by him in trust, to be applied, firstly, in payment of such costs, charges and expenses and secondly, in discharge of the dues of the secured creditor and the residue of the money so received shall be paid to the person entitled thereto in accordance with his rights and interests." 18. The Bank or financial institution, which has created security interest in any property, is entitled to enforce its security interest for recovery of its dues without intervention of the Court and the Bank or financial institution after applying the sale proceeds first to charges and expenses and receiving the due amount will make available the residue money for the persons entitled thereto in accordance with his right and interest. In the context of above provisions of SARFAESI ACT, the plaintiffs may find their remedies before appropriate forum or may resort to other remedy as available in law. 19. The contention that corporate veil is required to be lifted does not require consideration at this stage, as presently, for property no.17, it is the Bank which has exercised powers under section 13(4) of the SARFAESI ACT. 20. In light of above and in the facts of the case, the Court finds that so far as the property No.17 is concerned, impugned order needs to be interfered with. 21. In view of above, the impugned order to the extent interim injunction is issued against property No.17 is quashed and set aside. The appeal is thus, finally disposed of. Since the appeal is disposed of, no order is required to be made on merits in connected applications. Therefore, the civil applications are disposed of as not surviving. 22. 21. In view of above, the impugned order to the extent interim injunction is issued against property No.17 is quashed and set aside. The appeal is thus, finally disposed of. Since the appeal is disposed of, no order is required to be made on merits in connected applications. Therefore, the civil applications are disposed of as not surviving. 22. At this stage, learned advocate Ms.Brahmbhatt requests to stay the present order for six weeks. Such request is refused in the facts of the case.