ORDER : Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent-Railway. 2. The instant appeal is arising out of the judgment dated 03.02.2015 passed in Case No. OA (IIU)/RNC/2010/0017 by the Member (Technical), Railway Claims Tribunal, Ranchi Bench wherein claim petition filed by the claimant/appellant has been rejected. 3. The claim petition has been filed by the claimant/appellant stating therein that her son namely Raja Choudhary was travelling from Muri to Tatanagar by Hatia-Jammutavi Express on 02.06.2009 and when he was boarding the moving train, accidentally he fell down which resulted in amputation of his left leg. He was referred to RIMS, Ranchi where he was declared dead. 4. The Claim Tribunal has framed three issued, which reads as under:- “(1) Whether the deceased Raja Choudhary, s/o late Ganaori Choudhary was a bonafide passenger ? (2) Whether any untoward incident as defined under Section 123 (c) (2) of the Railways Act, 1989 occurred to Raja Choudhary, s/o late Ganaori Choudhary while trying to board Hatia-Jammutavi Express on 02.6.2009 ? (3) Whether the Applicant is entitled for the compensation as claimed and other relief, if any ?” 5. So far as issue no. 1 regarding bonafide passenger is concerned, Railway Claim Tribunal has recorded the finding that no ticket was found from the body of the deceased, but witness AW(2) and in the final report, it has been mentioned that deceased has boarded the train after purchasing the ticket. 6. For verifying the information recorded by the Railway Police as well as witness of the claimant, a report was called for from the police officials, who have reported that no ticket has been found from the body of the deceased. 7. From perusal of the inquest report-Ext-R-5, it is evident that nothing has been found from the body of the deceased except cloth which the deceased was wearing. 8. It is relevant to consider herein that as per the statement of the witness, the deceased was having a mobile and purse. 9. It is normal in this country that whenever an accident takes place, nothing is found from the body of the deceased and even not a single paisa. 10. In such a situation, non availability of ticket in the pocket of the deceased, cannot be a ground to refuse the claim by holding that deceased was not a bonafide passenger. 11. It is normal in this country that whenever an accident takes place, nothing is found from the body of the deceased and even not a single paisa. 10. In such a situation, non availability of ticket in the pocket of the deceased, cannot be a ground to refuse the claim by holding that deceased was not a bonafide passenger. 11. Nobody can enter into the railway station or into the train without having a valid ticket as at all entry points, railway has deputed its staffs to check authorized/unauthorized person and even in train, Travelling Ticket Examiner (in short TTE) has been employed to check such person, who does not possess a valid ticket. 12. Thus, if a person is travelling by a train, it is presumed that he/she is travelling with a valid ticket and onus lies upon the railway authority to prove that such person is not having a valid ticket and as such, he/she is not a bonafide passenger. Railway Authority has failed to discharge his duty. Claim Tribunal has proceeded wrongly by considering that onus lies upon the claimant. 13. Further findings recorded on the basis that no ticket was found is also wrong as in the inquest report, nothing has been found from the body of the deceased and this fact has not been considered by the Tribunal. 14. In view of the above discussion, findings recorded by the Claim Tribunal so far as issue no. 1 is concerned is reversed and it is held that deceased was a bonafide passenger. 15. Issue no. 2 has been decided by the Claim Tribunal in favour of the claimant/appellant herein. 16. At this stage, Mr. Abhishek Kumar Dubey, learned counsel for the Railway has challenged the findings recorded by the Tribunal on the basis that since the deceased was trying to enter into the moving train and as such, this incident is not covered under the definition of untoward incident as defined in Section 123 (c) (2) of the Railway Act. 17. Countering the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the Railway, learned counsel for the appellant, by relying upon a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar and Ors. reported in (2008) 9 SCC 527 , has submitted that the present case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment. Relevant paragraph nos. reported in (2008) 9 SCC 527 , has submitted that the present case is squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment. Relevant paragraph nos. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47 and 52 of the judgment rendered in the case of Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar(Supra) is quoted hereinbelow:- “9. In appeal, the Kerala High Court was of the view that the deceased sustained injuries, even according to the respondents, in her anxiety to get into the train which was moving. Hence, the High Court held that the deceased came within the expression “accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers” which is an “untoward incident”, as defined in Section 123(c) of the Railways Act, 1989. 10. We are of the opinion that it will not legally make any difference whether the deceased was actually inside the train when she fell down or whether she was only trying to get into the train when she fell down. In our opinion in either case it amount to an “accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers”. Hence, it is an “untoward incident” as defined in Section 123(c) of the Railways Act. 11. No doubt, it is possible that two interpretations can be given to the expression “accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers”, the first being that it only applies when a person has actually got inside the train and thereafter falls down from the train, while the second being that it includes a situation where a person is trying to board the train and falls down while trying to do so. Since the provision for compensation in the Railways Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, in our opinion, it should receive a liberal and wider interpretation and not a narrow and technical one. Hence, in our opinion the latter of the abovementioned two interpretations i.e. the one which advances the object of the statute and serves its purpose should be preferred vide Kunal Singh v. Union of India (SCC para 9), B.D. Shetty v. Ceat Ltd. (SCC para 12) and Transport Corpn. of India v. ESI Corpn. 12. Hence, in our opinion the latter of the abovementioned two interpretations i.e. the one which advances the object of the statute and serves its purpose should be preferred vide Kunal Singh v. Union of India (SCC para 9), B.D. Shetty v. Ceat Ltd. (SCC para 12) and Transport Corpn. of India v. ESI Corpn. 12. It is well settled that if the words used in a beneficial or welfare statue are capable of two constructions, the one which is more in consonance with the object of the Act and for the benefit of the person for whom the Act was made should be preferred. In other words, beneficial or welfare statutes should be given a liberal and not literal or strict interpretation vide Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (AIR para 7), Jeewanlal Ltd. v. Appellate Authority (AIR para 11), Lalappa Lingappa v. Laxmi Vishnu Textile Mills Ltd. (AIR para 13), S. M. Nilajkar v. Telecom District Manager (SCC para 12). 13. In Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kate this Court observed: (SCC pp. 347-48, paras 41-42) “41. In this connection, we may usefully turn to the decision of this Court in Workmen v. American Express International Banking Corpn. wherein Chinnappa Reddy, J. in para 4 of the Report has made the following observations: (SCC p. 76) ‘4. The principles of statutory construction are well settled. Words occurring in statutes of liberal import such as social welfare legislation and human rights’ legislation are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Lilliputian dimensions. In construing these legislations the imposture of literal construction must be avoided and the prodigality of its misapplication must be recognised and reduced. Judges ought to be more concerned with the “colour”, the “content” and the “context” of such statutes (we have borrowed the words from Lord Wilberforce’s opinion in Prenn v. Simmonds). In the same opinion Lord Wilberforce pointed out that law is not to be left behind in some island of literal interpretation but is to enquire beyond the language, unisolated from the matrix of facts in which they are set; the law is not to be interpreted purely on internal linguistic considerations. In one of the cases cited before us, that is, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court we had occasion to say: (SCC p. 447, para 6) “6. In one of the cases cited before us, that is, Surendra Kumar Verma v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court we had occasion to say: (SCC p. 447, para 6) “6. … Semantic luxuries are misplaced in the interpretation of ‘bread and butter’ statutes. Welfare statutes must, of necessity, receive a broad interpretation. Where legislation is designed to give relief against certain kinds of mischief, the court is not to make inroads by making etymological excursions.”’ 42. Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation, 2nd Edn., has dealt with the Functional Construction Rule in Part XV of his book. The nature of purposive construction is dealt with in Part XX at p. 659 thus: ‘A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by- (a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposive-and-literal construction), or (b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-strained construction).’ At p. 661 of the same book, the author has considered the topic of ‘Purposive Construction’ in contrast with literal construction. The learned author has observed as under: ‘Contrast with literal construction.- Although the term “purposive construction” is not new, its entry into fashion betokens a swing by the appellate courts away from literal construction. Lord Diplock said in 1975 : “If one looks back to the actual decisions of the [House of Lords] on questions of statutory construction over the last 30 years one cannot fail to be struck by the evidence of a trend away from the purely literal towards the purposive construction of statutory provisions.” The matter was summed up by Lord Diplock in this way- … I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it.’” (emphasis supplied) 14. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it.’” (emphasis supplied) 14. In our opinion, if we adopt a restrictive meaning to the expression “accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers” in Section 123(c) of the Railways Act, we will be depriving a large number of railway passengers from getting compensation in railway accidents. It is well known that in our country there are crores of people who travel by railway trains since everybody cannot afford travelling by air or in a private car. By giving a restrictive and narrow meaning to the expression we will be depriving a large number of victims of train accidents (particularly poor and middle class people) from getting compensation under the Railways Act. Hence, in our opinion, the expression “accidental falling of a passenger from a train carrying passengers” includes accidents when a bona fide passenger i.e. a passenger travelling with a valid ticket or pass is trying to enter into a railway train and falls down during the process. In other words, a purposive, and not literal interpretation should be given to the expression. 16. The accident in which Smt Abja died is clearly not covered by the proviso to Section 124-A. The accident did not occur because of any of the reasons mentioned in clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso to Section 124-A. Hence, in our opinion, the present case is clearly covered by the main body of Section 124-A of the Railways Act, and not its proviso. 17. Section 124-A lays down strict liability or no fault liability in case of railway accidents. Hence, if a case comes within the purview of Section 124-A it is wholly irrelevant as to who was at fault. 43. In India, Article 38(1) of the Constitution states “the State shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it may a social order in which justice, social, economic and political, shall inform all the institutions of the national life”. Thus, it is the duty of the State under our Constitution to function as a Welfare State, and look after the welfare of all its citizens. 44. Thus, it is the duty of the State under our Constitution to function as a Welfare State, and look after the welfare of all its citizens. 44. In various social welfare statutes the principle of strict liability has been provided to give insurance to people against death and injuries, irrespective of fault. 45. Thus, Section 3 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 provides for compensation for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, and this compensation is not for negligence on the part of the employer but is a sort of insurance to workmen against certain risks of accidents. 46. Similarly, Section 124-A of the Railways Act, 1989, Sections 140 and 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991, etc. incorporate the principle of strict liability. 47. However, apart from the principle of strict liability in Section 124-A of the Railways Act and other statutes, we can and should develop the law of strict liability dehors statutory provisions in view of the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in M.C. Mehta case. In our opinion, we have to develop new principles for fixing liability in cases like the present one. 52. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that there was no fault on the part of the Railways, or that there was contributory negligence, is based on a total misconception and hence has to be rejected.” 18. Thus, this issue has been set at rest by the Apex Court that a passenger trying to board a moving train at railway station is covered under the definition of untoward accident and accordingly, he/she is entitled for compensation under Section 124(A) of the Railways Act. 19. It is relevant to consider herein that in this part of the country, due to overcrowding in train and also due to short duration of stoppage of train at the railway station, the passengers are in hurry to get down from the train because of the fact that when train comes to the railway station, there are many passengers, i.e. some passengers, who are on the train, are in hurry to get down from the train and some passengers are in hurry to board the train. 20. 20. It is also important to take judicial note of the fact that at many stations, length of platform is short in comparison with the length of train, resulting general boggy of the train not getting the platform and passengers have to take risk to board/alight as they have no option. At many stations, alignment of platform and boggy of the train is also not proper and many times, it happens that passengers get stuck between the platform and boggy of the train. At some stoppage, i.e. halt, no platform is available. Facilities, which are being provided by the railway to its passengers, are not up to the mark. It is further taken note of the fact that overcrowded trains are being given green signal, are running by putting the life of the passengers at risk. 21. In view of the above discussion and the judgment rendered by the Apex Court on this point, this Court holds that the appellant is entitled to get compensation as per the mandate of Section 124 A of the Railways Act. 22. Accordingly, this issue is also settled in favour of the claimant. 23. It has been further argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the order passed by the Apex Court in the case of Rathi Menon Vs. Union of India reported in (2001) 3 SCC 714 , the claimant is entitled for the amount of compensation, which is prevalent today. Para-29 and 30 of the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Rathi Menon (supra) is quoted hereinbelow for better appreciation:- “29. The unjust consequence resulting from the interpretation which the Division Bench placed can be demonstrated in another plane also. If a person who sustained injury in a railway accident or in an untoward incident was disabled from making an application immediately and he makes the application a few years hence, is he to get the compensation in terms of the money value which prevailed on the date of the accident ? Suppose a Tribunal wrongly dismissed a claim after a few years of filing the application and the claimant approaches the High Court in appeal. Suppose a Tribunal wrongly dismissed a claim after a few years of filing the application and the claimant approaches the High Court in appeal. As it happens quite often now, some High Courts could take up such an appeal only after the lapse of many years and if the appeal is decided in favour of the claimant after so many years, what a pity if the amount awarded is only in terms of the figure indicated on the date of the accident. 30. From all these, we are of the definite opinion that the Claims Tribunal must consider what the Rules prescribed at the time of making the order for payment of the compensation.” 24. Thus, the claimant will be entitled for the amount of compensation, which is prevalent today. 25. Accordingly, this Court holds that the claimant is entitled to compensation of Rs. 8,00,000/-(Rupees Eight Lacs) as in terms of Railways Accident and Untoward Incident (Compensation) Amendment Rules, 2016, the statutory amount of compensation has been enhanced from Rs. 4,00,000/- to Rs. 8,00,000/- w.e.f. 01.01.2017. 26. Respondent is directed to pay the compensation amount of Rs. Rs. 8,00,000/- (Rupees Eight Lacs) along with interest @ 7½ % per annum to the claimant from the date of claim application. In terms of above direction, the present Misc. Appeal is allowed.