ORDER 1. In view of the nature of interim order passed by learned Single Judge and the law laid down by Full Bench of this Court in Arvind Kumar Jain and ors. v. State Of Madhya Pradesh and ors. [2007 (3) JLJ 187 )FB)= 2007 (3) MPHT 376 ], and taking into consideration the effect of the impugned order has resulted in status quo ante and prima facie has the trappings of final order, we overrule the objection raised by the office as to the maintainability of the present appeal. 2. With the consent of both the parties, the matter is taken up for hearing. 3. The impugned order emanates from Miscellaneous Petition No. 4391 of 2018, which is directed against the order dated 25.8.2018 passed by State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Gwalior in Revision No. 109 of 2016 whereby, revision preferred by appellant (respondent No. 3) against the grant of regular permit bearing No. S.C.P.-186/2015 issued on 25.11.2015 by Regional Transport Appellate Tribunal Bhopal in favour of respondent No. 3 has been allowed. The Tribunal after dwelling upon the merits of the matter, directed cancellation of regular permit issued in favour of respondent No. 3. The petition is against the said order of cancellation; wherein, by way of interim order, the permit which stood cancelled by the order passed by State Transport Appellate Tribunal, has been revived. The appellant takes exception of the same by present Appeal. 4. It is contended on behalf of the Appellant that revival of Stage Carriage Regular Permit by impugned interim order tantamounts to grant of final relief; as the petitioner in the writ petition is seeking setting aside of the order of the revisional authority and restoration of regular permit. 5. Though, it is submitted on behalf of respondent No.1 that the impugned order does not suffer any illegality. However, we find substantial force in the submissions made on behalf of Appellant that by way of interim order, status quo ante has been brought into existence and that by way of interim order, final relief cannot be granted. We find support in our view from the decision in Meena Chaudhary v. Commissioner of Delhi Police and others [ (2015) 2 SCC 156 ], wherein, it is observed by their Lordships as under : “3. In our view, the present applications are utterly misconceived for more than one reason. We find support in our view from the decision in Meena Chaudhary v. Commissioner of Delhi Police and others [ (2015) 2 SCC 156 ], wherein, it is observed by their Lordships as under : “3. In our view, the present applications are utterly misconceived for more than one reason. Firstly, Prayer (a), which is sought as an interim relief, is the core issue to be determined in the main appeals, which already stands admitted. Therefore, grant of this relief at this juncture would render the main appeals as redundant. Secondly, Prayers (b) and (c) above, both these issues do not arise for consideration in the main appeals. The scope of an interim application cannot be greater in scope than the main appeal. Additionally, over and above the aforee-xtracted reliefs, the appellant has also prayed for certain other directions in her rejoinder-affidavit. Ex facie, the said prayers are also beyond the scope of the main appeals and, therefore, cannot be granted. Accordingly, both the applications being bereft of any merit, are dismissed”. In Secretary, Union Public Service Commission and Another v. S.Krishna Chaitanya [ (2011) 14 SCC 227 ], it is held as under : “30. We may add here that this Court has observed time and again that an interim order should not be of such a nature that by virtue of which a petition or an application, as the case may be, is finally allowed or granted even at an interim stage. We reiterate that normally at an interlocutory stage no such relief should be granted that by virtue of which the final relief, which is asked for and is available at the disposal of the matter is granted. We, however, find that very often courts are becoming more sympathetic to the students and by interim orders the authorities are directed to permit the students to take an examination without ascertaining whether the candidate concerned had a right to take the examination. For any special reason in an exceptional case, if such a direction is given, the court must dispose of the case finally on merits before declaration of the result. In the instant case, we have found that the respondent not only took the preliminary examination but also took the main examination and also appeared for the interview by virtue of interim orders though he had no right to take any of the examinations. In the instant case, we have found that the respondent not only took the preliminary examination but also took the main examination and also appeared for the interview by virtue of interim orders though he had no right to take any of the examinations. In our opinion, grant of such interim orders should be avoided as they not only increase the work of the institution which conducts the examination but also give a false hope to the candidates approaching the Court.” 6. In view whereof, the impugned order dated 11.10.2018 directing stay of order dated 25.8.2018 is setaside. 7. The appeal is disposed of finally in above terms. 8. At this stage, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submits that the writ Court may be directed to decide the matter expeditiously. 9. We take note of the fact from the impugned order that learned Single Judge has already directed the matter to be posted on any Thursday in the month of November 2018 for final hearing. 10. In view whereof, we request the writ Court that as and when, the matter is posted, may be taken up and be decided expeditiously. 11. Learned counsel for the parties undertake that they will not seek any adjournment before the writ Court.