JUDGMENT Sanjay Dwivedi, J. 1. With the request of the parties, matter is heard finally. By the instant petition, the petitioner/Company is challenging the order dated 06.03.2014 (Annexure-P/5) passed by Labour Court No.1, Bhopal in case No.249/2003 (ID Act). 2. Relevant facts for disposal of this case are that respondent No.2 was an employee of M/s Tetragon Chemie Pvt Ltd. and was posted in February, 2000 on the post of the Sales Promotion Officer at Bhopal. Respondent No.1 is an Association of which, respondent No.2 was a Member. The Association is known as 'M.P. Medical and Sales Representatives Association'. Respondent No.2 got transferred w.e.f. 01.04.2003 from Bhopal to Bangalore. As per respondent No.2, from October, 2002 till January, 2003, he was neither paid any salary nor the expenses for which, he made a representation through respondent No.1 to the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Bhopal for appropriate action. In the representation/claim made before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, he has raised a dispute under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') giving reference of Section-10 of the Act alleging that his transfer dated 01.04.2003 has been made with mala fide intention and accordingly, the said order is illegal. As per respondent No.2, he received a show-cause notice dated 02.01.2003 and the same was replied through respondent No.1 but the said reply was not found satisfactory, therefore, on 05.02.2003, an Enquiry Officer was appointed and respondent No.2 was apprised that the charge-sheet has been issued to him ergo, he was not paid salary after October, 2003. 3. The Deputy Labour Commissioner has started proceedings under Section-10 of the Act for considering the case of respondent No.2 and issued notice to the petitioner/Company asking it to participate in the meeting scheduled to be held on 27.02.2003 and as per respondent No.2, after receiving the said notice, impugned order of transfer was issued with the mala fide intention and he got transferred to Bangalore from Bhopal. Respondent No.2 has also contended that the said transfer does fall within the category of illegally changing the service conditions of an employee and accordingly, he sought direction from the Authority that the order of transfer be set aside declaring the same to be mala fide and he be also permitted to work at Bhopal. 4. Respondent No.2 has also contended that the said transfer does fall within the category of illegally changing the service conditions of an employee and accordingly, he sought direction from the Authority that the order of transfer be set aside declaring the same to be mala fide and he be also permitted to work at Bhopal. 4. The petitioner/Company submitted a reply saying that the transfer is an incidence of service and during the course of employment, respondent No.2 can be transferred from one place to another and transferring an employee is a prerogative of the management and in such circumstance, interference by the Labour Court is not permissible. The petitioner/Company has also raised an objection that the dispute in respect to transfer of respondent No.2 does not fall within the definition of "Industrial Disputes" and accordingly, the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such dispute and the order of transfer, therefore, cannot be interfered with. 5. The Labour Court vide impugned award dated 06.03.2014 (Annexure-P/5) after recording evidence has held that the dispute raised by respondent No.2 does fall within the definition of "Industrial Disputes", therefore, it has jurisdiction to entertain such dispute and also held that the order of transfer of respondent No.2 from Bhopal to Bangalore is illegal and unjustified, the same was accordingly, set aside with a direction that respondent No.2 be paid all unpaid salary prior to his transfer and also the expenses which he has made during his service. 6. In the instant petition, the said award of the Labour Court has been assailed by the petitioner/Company. As per the request of the parties, matter is heard finally and Shri Nagrath, learned Senior Advocate at the time of arguments, confined his argument to the extent that the dispute which has been entertained by the Labour Court does not come within the purview of "Industrial Disputes" as respondent No.2 is not a workman and in view of the decision of Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court passed in Writ Appeal No.75/2017 parties being [Novartis India Limited Vs. Vipin Shrivastava & others], any dispute relating to a Medical Representative cannot be entertained by the Labour Court as a Medical Representative does not come within the definition of workman as defined under Section-2(s) of the Act. 7. Learned Senior Counsel has further placed reliance on a decision parties being [Chauharya Tripathi & others Vs. Vipin Shrivastava & others], any dispute relating to a Medical Representative cannot be entertained by the Labour Court as a Medical Representative does not come within the definition of workman as defined under Section-2(s) of the Act. 7. Learned Senior Counsel has further placed reliance on a decision parties being [Chauharya Tripathi & others Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India & others reported in, (2015) 7 SCC 263 ] in which, the Apex Court had held that the Development Officer of the Life Insurance Corporation does not fall within the definition of workman. He further submits that the Apex Court has placed reliance on a case parties being [H.R. Adyanthaya Vs. Sandoz (India) Ltd. reported in, (1994) 5 SCC 737 ] and therefore, the order passed by the Division Bench in the case of Novartis India Limited (supra) also placing reliance in the case of Adyanthaya (supra) has held that the Medical Representative does not fall within the definition of workman. As such, he submits that in view of the decision of Division Bench, the order impugned passed by the Labour Court, Bhopal in this petition, is liable to be set aside. 8. Shri Nagrath, learned Senior Advocate has placed reliance in the case of Novartis India Limited (supra) and said that the contention raised by the petitioner/Company has been answered by the Division Bench and, therefore, he has confined his arguments to that extent not entered into merits of the case. 9. On the other hand, respondent No.2 appearing in person refuted the arguments of learned Senior Advocate and has placed reliance on several decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court so also of the High Courts and contended that the Medical Representative does come within the definition of workman as defined under the Act and, therefore, the order impugned passed by the Labour Court cannot be held illegal on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction. 10. Respondent No.2 has also contended that as per Section-6 (7)(a-b) of The Sales Promotion Employees (Condition of Service) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act, 1976'), it is clearly prescribed that the Sales Promotion Employee is a workman within the meaning of the Act, 1976. 10. Respondent No.2 has also contended that as per Section-6 (7)(a-b) of The Sales Promotion Employees (Condition of Service) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act, 1976'), it is clearly prescribed that the Sales Promotion Employee is a workman within the meaning of the Act, 1976. He has also relied upon the decision of H.R. Adyanthaya (supra) and contended that the Supreme Court has very clearly observed that the Medical Representatives are already covered by the Act, 1976 and, therefore, they are workmen as per Section-2(s) of the Act. He has further relied upon a decision of Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court parties being [R.R. Iyer Vs. R.P.G. Life Sciences Ltd. reported in, 2010 MPLSR 312 (DB)] in which, the Division Bench has observed as under:- "15. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is clear as crystal that the Apex Court was considering the question with regard to definition of the term 'industrial development'. Their Lordships were considering the said question as regards the functional integrity of one establishment, i.e., between the Churchgate Division and the Trombay Factory. In that backdrop it was held, as is evincible from the above quoted paragraphs, that the Churchgate Office used to market and sale of goods so manufactured or processed by that factory and used to disburse the salary and other employment benefits and maintain accounts, etc., of the workmen. On the basis of the aforesaid test of integral parts of manufacturing activities of a factory and the office their Lordships have opined that the integral part of the manufacturing activities of the factory and the term 'factory' could not never have functioned independently without the Churchgate Division being there. It is worth-nothing that the aforesaid pronouncement was in relation to counting of the total number of employees to apply Chapter 5-A by including number of employees employed in the office which was situated outside the factory premises. The Apex Court applying the principles of functional integrity opined that the employees and employer in the office even though not situated in the premises itself yet would be included to the total strength of 100 for the application of Chapter 5-B. In the case at hand, the management has not shown any material to show that in its industrial establishment not more than 100 employees were employed. It is a question of fact and nothing has been brought on record. It is a question of fact and nothing has been brought on record. The learned Counsel appearing for the Management fairly admitted that the original petitioner was in the office where the goods manufactured by the factory were marketed. Be it noted, there is no averment in the writ petition by the management that it has not employed 100 employees and hence, the proviso contained in Chapter-V would have no application. Despite no stand being taken, the learned Single Judge solely relied on the dictionary clause form a different spectrum and allowed the writ petition. In our considered opinion the doctrine of functional integrity has to be applied and the definition of the term 'factory' singularly cannot be interpreted for the purpose of counting the strength of the factory. It would include such persons who are employed in the office situate outside the factory premises and performing such work which has nexus with the factory. Thus, we are unable to concur with the view of the learned Single Judge that prior permission from the appropriate Government was not necessary. Before we part with the case we think it apt to deal with a contention though feebly raised by Mr. Sheel Nagu, learned Counsel for the respondent. It was urged by him that the present appellant being a medical representative cannot be treated as a workman. The said controversy is no more res integra. The Apex Court in Rhone Poulene Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. and others, (2000) 7 SCC 675 , has held that medical representative by virtue of Section 6, sub-section (2) of Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976 is a deemed workman under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He has further relied upon a decision of Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court parties being [M/s Dolphin Laboratories Ltd. Vs. Judge, Labour Court, Udaipur & another reported in, (2001) 90 FLR 257 ] paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said judgment are relevant and being reproduced hereinbelow:- 4. Having given our careful consideration we are unable to sustain the said contention. It is true that in the aforesaid two cases as a matter of fact Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the concerned claimants in the respective cases who were medical representatives as not the workman. Having given our careful consideration we are unable to sustain the said contention. It is true that in the aforesaid two cases as a matter of fact Hon'ble Supreme Court has held the concerned claimants in the respective cases who were medical representatives as not the workman. However, the difference that has been brought about as a matter of law on account of amendments made in Sales Promotion Employees (Condition of Service) Act, 1976 from time to time and the amendment made in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 by amending Act of 1982 under which the amendment in Sections 2(s) and 2(rr) which has come into force w.e.f. 21.8.1984 the medical representatives without the limit of the salary which they draw has been held to be falling in the definition of workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act with effect from the respective amendments. 5. It has been noticed by the Supreme Court that the definition of workman as it stood under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act only an employee discharging the duties of skilled and technical nature and unskilled employees and duties of unskilled nature were included in the definition of workman. A medical representative was held neither a skilled nor a technical employment and, therefore, on the anvil of the definition of workman given in Section 2(s) read with provisions of SPE Act as it stood then held the same not falling within the definition of the workman. Section 6 of the Sales Promotion and Employees Condition of Service Act, 1976 made the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as in force for the time being applicable to the medical representatives by Act No. 48 of 1986 w.e.f. 6.5.1987. Both the Supreme Court decisions referred to above and relied on by the appellant relate to disputes raised prior to amendment in 1987. But with inclusion of category of workman employed to different operational work in Section 2(s) and any commission payable on the promotion of the sales or business or both in definition of wages under Section 2(rr) made the medical representatives as workmen depending on their wages as workmen within the meaning of Section 2(s) upto 6.5.1987 and without the limitation on their wages thereafter the ratio is not applicable to disputes relating lo medical representatives arising thereafter. The court expressed its conclusion in this regard as under:- "In other words, on and from 6.3.1976 the provisions of the ID Act became applicable to the medical representatives depending upon their wages upto 6.5.1987 and without the limitation on their wages thereafter and upon the capacity in which they were employed or engaged." Respondent No.2 has also placed reliance in a decision parties being [Rhone-Poulenc (India) Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. & others reported in, (2000) AIR SC 3182]. Paragraph-5 of the same what has been observed by the Apex Court in the said judgment is as under:- 5. The contention of the learned counsel is that assuming the aforesaid provision is applicable, it still does not extend the deeming fiction to any State enactment including the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act as it is apparent on reading of the section that Sales Promotion Employees, within the meaning of Central enactment of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947) have been treated as 'workman'. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in H.R. Adyanthaya & Ors. v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. & Ors., (1994) 5 SCC 737 . The Bench has held that since the Medical representatives are not workmen within the meaning of the Maharashtra Act, the complaint made to the Industrial Court under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 was not maintainable. The acceptance of the contention of Mr. Reddy that respondent no.3 in view of Sandoz case is not a 'workman' within the meaning of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, however, does not help the appellant in substance as in the present case we propose to adopt the same course as was adopted in Sandoz case by treating the complaint to be an industrial dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in exercise of the powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. More than 12 years have passed since the reference was made to the Industrial Court and in the facts and circumstances of the case, we think it appropriate to adopt the course as was adopted in Sandoz case. Thus, we treat the reference in question to be one under Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. More than 12 years have passed since the reference was made to the Industrial Court and in the facts and circumstances of the case, we think it appropriate to adopt the course as was adopted in Sandoz case. Thus, we treat the reference in question to be one under Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He has further relied upon a decision of Division Bench of Jaipur Bench of Rajasthan High Court parties being [Rajasthan Medical & Sales Representatives Union, Ajmer & another Vs. M/s Industrial Research Institute Private Ltd. & another reported in, (2000) 2 RajLR 214] and also relied upon a decision of Hon'ble Apex Court parties being [SPIC Pharmaceuticals Division Vs. Authority Under Sec.48(1) of A.P. & another reported in, (2007) 2 Supreme 718 ] then he has placed reliance in a case parties being [D.P. Maheshwari Vs. Delhi Administration & others reported in, (1983) 4 SCC 293 ]. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that considering the order of the Labour Court especially paragraph23 of the judgment in which, dealing with the objection regarding maintainability of the Industrial Disputes, the Labour Court relying upon a decision parties being [Germane Remedies Limited vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court No.1, Bhopal & others reported in, (2006) 2 LLJ 8 MP] reproducing paragraph-14 of the said judgment and held that the Labour Court has jurisdiction to entertain the dispute in respect of Medical Representatives as they are workmen as per the definition provided under Section- 2(s) of the Act. Shri Nagrath further submits that since in the latest decision, the Division Bench has held that the case of Germane Remedies Limited (supra) is not a correct law and is overruled, the foundation of the order of Labour Court for entertaining the dispute in respect of respondent No.2 is dislodged and, therefore, only on this count, the order of the Labour Court can be declared illegal and deserves to be set aside. 12. I have heard the arguments advanced by the parties and record perused. 13. Since the petitioner has confined his arguments to the extent that respondent No.2 does not fall within the definition of workman and, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain this dispute and has contended that the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Novartis India Limited (supra) has answered the issue involved in the present case. Since the petitioner has confined his arguments to the extent that respondent No.2 does not fall within the definition of workman and, therefore, the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain this dispute and has contended that the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Novartis India Limited (supra) has answered the issue involved in the present case. Therefore, this Court is also confining itself to the question raised by the petitioner and also examining the decision of Division Bench for the purpose that the issue involved in the present petition has been answered or not. The order of the Labour Court on which, the petitioner/Company has raised this question saying that respondent No.2 was not a workman and, therefore, the dispute relating to his service conditions cannot be entertained by the Labour Court, the Labour Court has answered the said issue in paragraph-23 of the impugned award and relying upon a decision of the Germane Remedies (supra), rejected the contention of the petitioner/Company and entertained the dispute. As per the Division Bench in the case of Novartis India Limited (supra), since the Division Bench has overruled the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Germane Remedies (supra), the basic foundation of the order impugned passed by the Labour Court is dislodged. The Division Bench has considered only question "as to whether the Medical Representative is a workman within the meaning of Section2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and competent to raise the dispute before the Labour Court." Hon'ble Division Bench is also dealing with the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of H.R. Adyanthaya (supra) and finally observed that the Medical Representative is not a workman within the meaning of Section-2(s) of the Act and also Section-2(d) of the Act, 1976. Hon'ble the Division Bench has also considered the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in German Remedies Ltd. (supra) and has observed that the learned Single Judge has misread the judgment in the case of H.R. Adyanthaya (supra) to hold that the Medical Representatives as workmen within the meaning of Section-2(s) of the Act. 14. Hon'ble the Division Bench has also considered the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in German Remedies Ltd. (supra) and has observed that the learned Single Judge has misread the judgment in the case of H.R. Adyanthaya (supra) to hold that the Medical Representatives as workmen within the meaning of Section-2(s) of the Act. 14. Looking to the question answered by the Division Bench, I have no hesitation to say that the issue involved in the present case is squarely covered with the decision of Division Bench in the case of Novartis India Limited (supra), and, therefore, I have also no hesitation to say that the order impugned passed by the Labour Court founding his judgment in the case of German Remedies Ltd. (supra), is not sustainable and deserves to be set aside. Considering the latest legal position in view of the Division Bench decision, I have no other option but to follow the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Novartis India Limited (supra). However, the decision on which respondent No.2 is placing reliance are basically relating to the issue and definition provided under the Act, 1976. The Division Bench of this Court has also considered the same situation and also taken note of the definition provided under the Act, 1976 in paragraphs 8,9, 11 and 15 which are reproduced hereinbelow: 8. On the other hand, on the strength of the order of termination dated 21.12.2013 (Annexure-E, at page 561 of appeal paper book), learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that respondent cannot be said to be engaged in a supervisory capacity so as to be excluded from the definition of "workman" within the meaning of Section 2(d) of the SPE Act or Section 2(s) of the ID Act. The relevant assertion in the letter of termination, referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent, reads as under:- "You have been appointed and are currently working in the Company as a Medical Representative. Your primary duty is to promote sales of company's products for which you are required to visit Doctors, Chemists as well as Stockists. You are aware that your performance and/or productivity levels are measured on this basis. Your primary duty is to promote sales of company's products for which you are required to visit Doctors, Chemists as well as Stockists. You are aware that your performance and/or productivity levels are measured on this basis. Further even while the signing of the settlement dated 24.1.2012, between Novartis India Limited, Pharmaceuticals Division and Novartis Employees Union, the concerned employees and union assured to render complete and wholehearted cooperation so as to improve the competitive status of the company as well as the earning capacity by improving efficiency and productivity. In the said settlement, by way of incentive, a clause was also incorporated that those who achieve growth will be given an incentive. All employees were further given substantial increase in salaries and benefits on the assurance of performance." 9. The respondent has filed additional return before the learned Single Bench wherein the pay slips for the month of December 2012, June, 2013, November, 2013 and December 2013 have been produced. Such pay slips reveal that total earning of the respondent is more than Rs.50,000/- in each month except in the month of November, 2013. The total earnings of the respondent-employee, as per his own showing, are as under:- Relevant Extract of Pay Slips of Respondent No.1 Vipin Shrivastava EMPLOYER : NOVARTIS INDIA LIMITED Sl. No. Month/Year Total Earnings (without deductions) Net Salary (after deductions) 1 December, 2012 Rs.64,612.16 Rs.53,017.16 2 June, 2013 Rs.51,297.85 Rs.43,358.85 3 November, 2013 Rs.34,464.59 Rs.28,409.59 4 December, 2013 Rs.62,608.43 Rs.53,584.43 11.Before we deal with the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be apt to quote the relevant provisions of the ID Act and the SPE Act, which read as under:- "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. 2. Definitions In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, - xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (rr) "wages" means all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a workman in respect of his employment, or of work done in such employment, and includes- (i) such allowances (including dearness allowance) as the workman is for the time being entitled to; (ii) the value of any house accommodation, or of supply of light, water, medical attendance or other amenity or of any service or of any concessional supply of food grains or other articles; (iii) any travelling concession; (iv) any commission payable on the promotion of sales or business or both; but does not include- (a) any bonus; (b) any contribution paid or payable by the employer to any pension fund or provident fund or for the benefit of the workman under any law for the time being in force; (c) any gratuity payable on the termination of his service; xxx xxx xxx (s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person- (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding *(one thousand six hundred rupees) per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature." *Substituted to "ten thousand rupees" by Act 24 of 2010, S.2 (w.e.f. 15.9.2010) **** The Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976. 2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx (d) "sales promotion employees" means any person by whatever name called (including an apprentice) employed or engaged in any establishment for hire or reward to do any work relating to promotion of sales or business, or both, but does not include any such person- (i) who, being employed or engaged in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding sixteen hundred rupees per mensem; or (ii) who is employed or engaged mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity. Explanation. - For the purpose of this clause, the wages per mensem of a person shall be deemed to be the amount equal to thirty times his total wages (whether or not including, or comprising only of, commission) in respect of the continuous period of this service falling within the period of twelve months immediately preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made, divided by the number of days comprising that period of service;" 15. The judgment in H.R. Adyanthaya's case (supra) has come up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Samat Kumar v. M/s Parke Davis India Ltd., (1997) 2 JabLJ 353 wherein the reference to Labour Court was subject matter of challenge on the part of the management. Though the workman was said to be working as Area Sales Manager inmanagerial capacity drawing salary of more than Rs.1,600/-, therefore, he was not a workman but while examining the scope of Adhyanthaya's case (supra), the Court has held that the work of promotion of sales of the product or services of the establishment is distinct from and independent of the types of work covered by the said definition under Section 2(s) of the ID Act. The relevant extract of the Division Bench judgment reads as under:- "10. As against it, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 has placed reliance on a case (Miss A. Sundarambal v. Govt. of Goa, Deman & Diu and others reported in, (1988) 2 MPWN 116 = AIR 1988 SC 1700 ) whereby it was held that teacher employed in a school is not a workman. But, now dispute stands resolved with respect to the cases of Medical Representative as (H.R. Adyanthya etc. etc. v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. etc. etc. of Goa, Deman & Diu and others reported in, (1988) 2 MPWN 116 = AIR 1988 SC 1700 ) whereby it was held that teacher employed in a school is not a workman. But, now dispute stands resolved with respect to the cases of Medical Representative as (H.R. Adyanthya etc. etc. v. Sandoz (India) Ltd. etc. etc. reported in, (1994) AIR SC 2608) whereby it has been held that 'Workman' does not include all employees except those covered by four exceptions in said definition of section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act. Medical Representatives do not perform duties of 'skilled' or 'technical' nature and therefore, they are not 'workmen'. The connotation of word 'skilled' in the context in which it is used, will not include work of a Sales Promotion Employees such as Medical Representative. That word has to be construed ejusdem generis and thus construed, would mean skilled work whether manual or non-manual, which is of a genre of the other types of work mentioned in the definition. The work of promotion of sales of the product or services of the establishment is distinct from and independent of the types of work covered by the said 16 Writ Petition No.1307/2017 definition." After returning such finding it was held that the reference was not maintainable as Medical Representative would not fall within the definition of workman. We are not only bound by the aforesaid judgment but we find the same to be a correct enunciation of law. 15. Thus, in view of the decision of Division Bench, the contention of respondent No.2 that in view of the definition provided under Section-2(d) of the Act, 1976, he has rightly been considered as a workman, is liable to be rejected. However, Shri Nagrath has contended that the definition provided under the Act, 1976 for the Sales Promotion Employees is not conclusive but exclude the employees if they fall within two categories excluded under the definition. If we see the definition provided under Section-2(d) of the Act, 1976, I find force in the contention of Shri Nagrath. However, Shri Nagrath has contended that the definition provided under the Act, 1976 for the Sales Promotion Employees is not conclusive but exclude the employees if they fall within two categories excluded under the definition. If we see the definition provided under Section-2(d) of the Act, 1976, I find force in the contention of Shri Nagrath. The definition is being reproduced hereinbelow:- 2[(d) "sales promotion employee" means any person by whatever name called (including an apprentice) employed or engaged in any establishment for hire or reward to do any work relating to promotion of sales or business, or both, but does not include any such person- (i) who, being employed or engaged in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding sixteen hundred rupees per menses; (ii) who is employed or engaged mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity. Explanation. - For the purpose of this clause, the wages per mensem of a person shall be deemed to be the amount equal to thirty times his total wages (whether or not including, or comprising only of, commission) in respect of the continuous period of his service falling within the period of twelve months immediately preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made, divided by the number of days comprising the period of service;] Admittedly, if we see the order of the Labour Court, in paragraph-17, it is shown that the salary from October, 2002 to May, 2003 was claimed by respondent No.2 and for the period from August, 2002 to May, 2003, he claimed Rs.53,800/- (Rupees Fifty Three Thousand Eight Hundred) towards salary and this fact was not disputed by respondent No.2 as he has not challenged the order of the Labour Court. Thus, it can be adjudged that the salary of respondent No.2 was more than the limit as provided under the definition i.e. Rs.1600/- per month and accordingly, he even does not fall within the definition of the Sales Promotion Employees and, therefore, he is not a workman as per the definition provided under Section-2(s) of the Act. 16. Shri Nagrath further submits that admittedly, respondent No.2 was working as a Sales Promotion Officer and was engaged in a managerial or administrative capacity, therefore, he is under the categories excluded for the definition of workmen provided under Section-2(d) of the Act, 1976. 16. Shri Nagrath further submits that admittedly, respondent No.2 was working as a Sales Promotion Officer and was engaged in a managerial or administrative capacity, therefore, he is under the categories excluded for the definition of workmen provided under Section-2(d) of the Act, 1976. Therefore, I have no hesitation to say that in view of the Division Bench decision of this Court in case of Novartis India Ltd.(supra), the respondent No.2 does not fall within the definition of workman neither as per Section-2(s) of the Act nor as per Section-2(d) of the Act, 1976. 17. Accordingly, the order of the Labour Court is said to be illegal and without jurisdiction, the dispute in relation to service conditions of respondent No.2 does not fall within the definition of "Industrial Disputes" and, accordingly, the order impugned is set aside only on the ground that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute raised by respondent No.2 and, therefore, the order passed by the Labour Court, Bhopal dated 06.03.2014 (Annexure-P/5) is hereby set aside and the petition filed by the petitioner/Company stands allowed. Parties shall bear their own cost.