JUDGMENT : Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel, J. This writ petition has been preferred against the order passed by the Board of Revenue, the first respondent, dated 16th March, 2018, whereby it has condoned the delay in filing the revision by the State of Uttar Pradesh, the third respondent. The Board of Revenue has condoned the delay after hearing both the parties and has fixed the date 17th April, 2018 for hearing. 2. I have heard Sri H.N. Sharma and Sri Qamrul Hasan Siddiqui, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri Manish Goel, learned Additional Advocate General, Sri A.K. Goel and Sri Sanjay Goswami, both learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, for the State respondents. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the revision was filed after a considerable delay and without hearing the petitioner on the point of limitation the Board of Revenue has condoned the delay. He further submits that the interim order has been passed without assigning any reason. 4. I have perused the impugned order, wherein the Board of Revenue has clearly mentioned that on the issue of delay both the parties have been heard and it was satisfied on the sufficient cause shown by the State, hence it has condoned the delay. 5. It is a trite law that condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a discretionary relief. The Supreme Court in a long line of decisions has held that while considering the delay a liberal approach should be adopted by the Court unless it is shown that there was laches on the part of the applicant. In the case of S. Ganesharaju v. Narasamma, (2013) 11 SCC 341 , the Supreme Court has held that the object of the Limitation Act is not to destroy or foreclose the right of the parties. The Supreme Court in Ramji Dass and others v. Mohan Singh, 1978 ARC 496, has held that if preference before the Court is to shut out hearing or to hear the matter on merit, the Courts should always lean in favour of hearing and not in shutting out of hearing. In the revenue matters also, the Court in a large number of cases has taken a view that liberal approach should be adopted. In the revenue matters also, the Court in a large number of cases has taken a view that liberal approach should be adopted. Reference may be made to the judgment of this Court in Ram Deo and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Basti and others, 2004 97 RevDec 211, and also to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, (1987) 2 SCC 107 ; B. Madhuri Goud v. B. Damodar Reddy, (2012) 12 SCC 693; and,Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai-II, Commissionerate, Chennai v. Australian Food India Private Limited, Chennai, (2013) 12 SCC 468 . 6. Moreover, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was not heard on the point of condonation of delay, is incorrect. The revisional court has clearly recorded that on the point of delay both the parties have been heard. 7. In view of the above, I do not find any illegality in the impugned order insofar as the Board of Revenue has condoned the delay. 8. As regards the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that no reason has been assigned by the Board of Revenue while granting the interim order, I find that the said submission merits acceptance. The Supreme Court in the case of Sant Lal Gupta v. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. and others, (2010) LawSuit(SC) 719, following its earlier judgments has held that while granting interim order the Court should always give a brief reason. 9. In the present case, the Board of Revenue has not assigned any reason while granting interim order, hence the matter is remitted to the Board of Revenue, the first respondent, to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. The said exercise be completed within six weeks from the date of communication of this order. Both the parties have agreed that they will not seek unnecessary adjournment before the Board of Revenue. 10. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is disposed of.