Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2018 DIGILAW 940 (GUJ)

Sureshbhai Lakhubhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat

2018-08-01

A.J.SHASTRI

body2018
JUDGMENT : 1. The present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is filed for the purpose of seeking following reliefs : “A. Admit this Special Civil Application. B. Allow this Special Civil Application by issuing a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction and be pleased to quash and set aside on pre-execution stage the order of detention passed by respondent No.2 under the PASA Act. C. This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to direct respondents and/or their agents, servants, persons, employees etc. for not executing the order of detention till the admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition. D. Direct the respondents to produce the order of detention along with the grounds of detention before this Hon’ble Court for kind perusal of the same. E. Grant such other and further reliefs as deemed just and proper by this Hon’ble Court in the interest of justice.” 2. It is the case of the petitioner that petitioner has been wrongly arraigned in the prosecution in series of offence on account of private interse disputes and all these FIRs are substantially arising out of same kind of dispute, for which public at large is not affected and, therefore, apprehending an action of detention, the petitioner has rushed down to this Court by way of present petition. 2.1 This Court on 28.6.2018 was pleased to issue notice making it returnable on 5.7.2018 and thereafter, the pleadings have been completed including the affidavit-in-rejoinder and with this background, the present petition has come up for consideration before this Court at a pre-execution stage. 3. Mr.Pawan Barot, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has vehemently contended that there is no germane material available except mere filing of FIR to pass an order of detention against the petitioner. It has been contended that out of 17 FIRs which have been registered over a period of time right from 1996 to 2018, only upto first 12 FIRs the offence has been registered; one detention order is passed somewhere in the year 2010 and the said detention has already been revoked by the authority. It has been contended that out of 17 FIRs which have been registered over a period of time right from 1996 to 2018, only upto first 12 FIRs the offence has been registered; one detention order is passed somewhere in the year 2010 and the said detention has already been revoked by the authority. It has further been contended that so far as another 3 offences are concerned, the authority has passed an order of externment which also came to be quashed by this Court in a writ petition and decided in favour of the petitioner in the month of March,2018 and with respect to five offences, the complaints which are filed are over the period of 2015 to 2018 and all these offences which are alleged are under the provisions of the IPC and out of these five FIRs which are made the foundation of detention against the petitioner, 3 FIRs are purely related to private dispute and, therefore, the petitioner is apprehending that the authority will pass an order of detention. As a result of that, the petitioner has to approach this Court. It has been contended that number of FIRs are made the yardstick for passing an order of detention. On the contrary, this private dispute for which public at large is not affected, the authority cannot exercise the strigent powers of detention. It has further been contended that last few FIRs which are lodged, narration thereof would clearly indicate that it has nothing to do with public order or danger to the public in any maner. To analyze this, learned advocate for the petitioner has given two lists, by which number of offences against which the petitioner is facing this apprehending action is produced on record. Relying upon those documents, learned advocate for the petitioner has contended that no case is made out of passing an order of detention, in any manner. 3.1 Mr.Pawan Barot, learned advocate for the petitioner, has contended that there are few offended in which even the petition for quashing is submitted before this Court in which protection has been granted by the Court, after hearing the parties at length and, therefore, these offences and the material cannot form the subject matter of passing an order of externment. 3.1 Mr.Pawan Barot, learned advocate for the petitioner, has contended that there are few offended in which even the petition for quashing is submitted before this Court in which protection has been granted by the Court, after hearing the parties at length and, therefore, these offences and the material cannot form the subject matter of passing an order of externment. So much so normally, accordingly to Mr.Barot, learned advocate, in a serious offence anticipatory bail is not being granted by the Court but, here is a case in which in one of the offences being ICR No.27 of 2016 lodged before the Wadaj Police Station, this Court has granted the anticipatory bail vide order dated 18.2.1016 and as such, the material in question which is tried to be relied upon is not so serious which would visit the action of detention. Learned advocate has thereby contended that there is no prima facie apprehension to arrive at a subjective satisfaction that petitioner can be prevented only by way of passing an order of detention. The subjective satisfaction is completely missing and there is non-consideration of relevant material which has been analyzed by Mr. Barot. Hence, the order of detention deserves to be quashed at a pre-execution stage. 3.2 Mr.Pawan Barot, learned advocate, has further drawn the attention of this Court to the affidavit-in-reply which has been filed by respondent No.3 and perusal thereof has indicated that the contentions raised by the petitioner have not been dealt with properly. On the contrary, a reply seems to be casual one which has clearly indicated that extreme step of detention is not possible in the background of this particular circumstance. Learned advocate has further contended that the material which is tried to be relied upon is no longer available in view of the fact that in some of the offences, even quashing petitions have been entertained by this Court by granting the protection and in one offence, even anticipatory bail has also been granted. Had there been any such serious offence, the Hon’ble Court might not have exercised the discretionary jurisdiction. As a result of this, the material relied upon by the authority is not sufficient enough to arrived at a satisfaction of passing an order of detention. Had there been any such serious offence, the Hon’ble Court might not have exercised the discretionary jurisdiction. As a result of this, the material relied upon by the authority is not sufficient enough to arrived at a satisfaction of passing an order of detention. Learned advocate has further stated that apart from the aforesaid serious cases, the family background of the petitioner is also such which would not justify the action of detention against the petitioner. The petitioner is a peace living citizen, aged about 60 years and is not in any way endanger to the society. On the contrary, the petitioner is residing in the area practically for a period of more than 30 years with his family and, therefore, the background of the facts are such which would not warrant the authority to exercise the power of detention. 4. Ms.Snusha Joshi, learned AGP appearing for the respondents, has submitted that detailed contentions have been raised in the affidavit-in-reply and has relied upon to justify the action. For the purpose of perusal of the Court, learned AGP has drawn the attention to the order of detention which has been passed on 16.6.2018 and has submitted that sufficient material is very much available with the authority to pass an order of detention. Learned AGP has further contended that apart from this, what has been relied upon is the suicide note which has been recovered from the spot by the prosecution agency which has been analyzed and relied upon by the authority for passing an order of detention. Learned AGP has further contended that irrespective of this suicide note, there are other offences also considered by the authority and looking to the chronology of FIRs repeatedly lodged against the petitioner, the conclusion with respect to dangerous person is fulfilling the test of satisfaction. As a result of this, no error is committed by the authority in passing an order of detention. Learned AGP has further submitted that object of detention is not punitive but, is preventive. Here is a case in which for the purpose of preventing the petitioner, the action of detention is taken and right from 1996 onwards, repeatedly under one reason or the other, the petitioner arraigned himself in commission of crime which is serious in nature. As a result of this, the authority is left with no other alternate but, to pass an order of detention. As a result of this, the authority is left with no other alternate but, to pass an order of detention. Learned AGP has, therefore, contended that petitioner has been declared as dangerous person and the authority is having cogent material and, therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, detailed examination of this material may not require especially when the petitioner is at pre-execution stage. Learned AGP has further relied upon a decision delivered by the Full Bench of this Court reported in 2015 (2) GLH 128 and by drawing the attention, learned AGP has stated that this is not a fit case in which an order of detention is to be intercepted at pre-execution stage. No doubt, the petition, at this stage, is maintainable as declared by the Full Bench, however, for maintaining the petition at this stage, there must be some distinguishable facts and such exercise will have to be done in exceptional cases and in a routine manner and, therefore, relying upon the observations made by the Full Bench, learned AGP has ultimately opposed the petition and requested the Court to dismiss the petition at this stage of the proceedings. 5. Counter to such proposition canvassed by learned AGP, Mr.Pawan Barot, learned advocate, has, in rejoinder to these submissions, has contended that a reference is made on page63 about the suicide note. But the contents of the said suicide note would clearly indicate that some grievance of the father was related to the year 2005 and there is no live link between the order of detention and the said so called instance of the year 2005 and, there fore, ex-facie abetment cannot be inferred by the authority. Simply because there is an available material in the form of suicide note, order of detention cannot be passed. Learned advocate has further submitted that in this very case, the High Court has even granted the anticipatory bail vide order dated 18.2.2016 and, therefore, this is not sufficient material to proceed against the petitioner by way of passing an order of detention. On the contrary, there is no live link between the said incident and the passing of an order since after almost a period of more than 3 years from 2015, the order is sought to be served upon the petitioner which clearly reflects non-application of mind on the part of the authority. On the contrary, there is no live link between the said incident and the passing of an order since after almost a period of more than 3 years from 2015, the order is sought to be served upon the petitioner which clearly reflects non-application of mind on the part of the authority. Learned advocate has further drawn the attention to one of the decisions dated 19.9.2017 passed in SCA No.14478 of 2017 and has contended that in no case, any justification is available with an order of detention dated 15.6.2018. On the contrary, it cannot be said that petitioner, except an order of detention, is not possible to be prevented. Learned advocate has also contended that number of offences are not material enough and there is no enough material available on record to justify the action of detention. As a result of this, learned advocate for the petitioner has requested the Court to grant the relief as prayed for in the petition. 6. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, prima facie some of the circumstances are not possible to be unnoticed by this Court, particularly when the Court is called upon to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction at pre-execution stage. (1) First of all, the Court would like to consider peripheral limits of jurisdiction while dealing with an issue at pre-execution stage. There was a conflicting view of two Division Benches about maintainability of the writ petition at pre-execution stage. But then thereafter the reference was made of Full Bench’s judgment of this Court and in a group of petitions, the Full Bench of this Court has taken a decision 3.12.2014 that the petition at pre-execution stage is very much maintainable. Under the circumstances, maintainability is the question involved here in the present case on hand. However, few circumstances and the observations which are made are relevant to be noted down. While disposing of the reference, a categorical view is expressed that petition at pre-execution stage is maintainable. However, some self-imposed restrictions have been reminded while disposing of the petition. As a result of this, reference is made to Para.18 which reads as under: 18. However, few circumstances and the observations which are made are relevant to be noted down. While disposing of the reference, a categorical view is expressed that petition at pre-execution stage is maintainable. However, some self-imposed restrictions have been reminded while disposing of the petition. As a result of this, reference is made to Para.18 which reads as under: 18. Hence, the reference can be answered as under: (1) As both the Division Benches of this Court in the case of Manchharam Samaram Meena vs. State of Gujarat (supra) and in the case of Chirag @ Vijay Bhikhubhai Chitrabhuj vs. State of Gujarat (supra) are not on disagreement for the maintainability of the petition for challenging the order of detention under Article 226 of the Constitution at the pre-execution stage, no further view deserves to be expressed. (2) Further, if the order of detention is challenged at pre-execution stage under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court by way of self-imposed restriction may examine as to whether the case is covered by the criteria laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Addl. Secy. To the Govt. of India v. Alka Subhash Gadia (Smt.)(supra) and Deepak Bajaj Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another, reported in (2008) 16 SCC 14 (supra) and thereafter may call for the relevant record from the detaining authority, but such would depend upon sound exercise of judicial discretion of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and it cannot be said that in all cases, it would be obligatory for the High Court to satisfy itself as to whether the detention order is passed in consonance with the scheme of the enactment under which the detention order is passed or whether the detention order suffers from the vice of illegality or not, save and except the criteria as laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Addl. Secy. To the Govt. of India v. Alka Subhash Gadia (Smt.)(supra) and Deepak Bajaj Vs. State of Maharashtra & Another, reported in (2008) 16 SCC 14 (supra). (3) The High Court while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a petition for challenging the order of detention at the pre-execution stage may bear in mind the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra @ Ors. Vs. (3) The High Court while exercising the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a petition for challenging the order of detention at the pre-execution stage may bear in mind the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra @ Ors. Vs. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande (supra) at paragraph 63 relevant of which reads as under: “63. ... As a general rule, an order of detention passed by a Detaining Authority under the relevant ’preventive detention’ law cannot be set aside by a Writ Court at the pre-execution or pre-arrest stage unless the Court is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances specified in Alka Subhash Gadia. The Court must be conscious and mindful of the fact that this is a ’suspicious jurisdiction’ i.e. jurisdiction based on suspicion and an action is taken ’with a view to preventing’ a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to certain activities enumerated in the relevant detention law. Interference by a Court of Law at that stage must be an exception rather than a rule and such an exercise can be undertaken by a Writ Court with extreme care, caution and circumspection. A detenu cannot ordinarily seek a writ of mandamus if he does not surrender and is not served with an order of detention and the grounds in support of such order.” (2) The aforesaid observations made by the Full Bench of this Court would suggest that this calling of relevant record from the detaining authority is no doubt permissible but, the same would depend upon the sound discretion and it cannot be in a routine manner almost in all cases and for that purpose, it is further reiterated that observations made in Para.63 of a decision of the Apex Court in case of State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande reported in (2008) 3 SCC 613 , in which by referring to this, it has been observed by the Apex Court that the Writ Court should exercise the discretion with extreme care, caution and circumspection. A detente cannot ordinarily seek a writ of mandamus if he does not surrender and is not served with an order of detention and the grounds in support of the same. A detente cannot ordinarily seek a writ of mandamus if he does not surrender and is not served with an order of detention and the grounds in support of the same. As a result of this, by taking note of this, the Full Bench of this Court has categorically observed that the writ jurisdiction cannot be exercised in a routine manner at a pre-execution stage. (3) Keeping in view the aforesaid proposition of law laid down, now this Court deals with the contentions which have been raised by learned advocate for the petitioner. First of all, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has tendered a list of offences which are alleged against the petitioner in which the petitioner has been undisputedly arraigned from 1996 till 2018 and the said first list in which there is a reference of 5 FIRs which are made the foundation are enlisted hereinafter : CR No. Police Station Section Date of Incident/FIR Lodged on Role of the petitioner in FIR Remarks/Stage of the case I-73 Of 2018 Vadaj 324, 323, 506(2) and 114 of IPC 5.4.2018 5.4.2018 No role/allegation is attributed against petitioner, merely mentioned of name in column No.7 (dispute of two brother inter say) Granted anticipatory bail by Ld. Sessions Court (CRMA 3226/2018) PAGE NO.23 I-462 of 2017 Amraiwadi 406, 467, 468, 472, 474, 34 and 120B of IPC Since 2011 till date 7.12.2017 Petitioner being brother-in-law of alleged main accused, Rajubhai Rathod, Being guarantor implicated falsely. Granted anti bail by Ld. Sessions Court (CRMA No.7630 of 2017) Protected (No coercive step) by this Hon’ble Court in quashing application CRMA No.31218 of 2017. PAGE 3644 I-103 of 2017 Vadaj 406, 420, 467 468, 471 and 114 of IPC 6.12.2016 7.4.2017 Petitioner being secretary of their society falsely roped in to the alleged offence. (Again the dispute between brother of FIR No.1 Protected (No coercieve step) by this Hon’ble Court in quashing application CRMA No.9702 of 2017. PAGE 3644 I-103 of 2017 Vadaj 406, 420, 467 468, 471 and 114 of IPC 6.12.2016 7.4.2017 Petitioner being secretary of their society falsely roped in to the alleged offence. (Again the dispute between brother of FIR No.1 Protected (No coercieve step) by this Hon’ble Court in quashing application CRMA No.9702 of 2017. PAGE 54 I-115 of 2016 Vadaj 354(A) 506(2) 294(A) and 114 of IPC Before one year till 21.4.16 19.6.16 In a property dispute between father and son, daughter in law, complain ant alleged offence and petitioner is implicated as abettor The dispute is amicably settled and this Hon’ble Court had quashed the impugned complain t. CRMA No.17388 of 2016 PAGE NO.57 I-27 of 2016 Vadaj 306 of IPC 30.12.15 31.1.16 Money lender/Giver committed suicide after 15 years, as the borrower was not returning back the amount. Absolutely absorbed allegation. This Hon’ble Court granted anticipatory bail. CRMA No.3305 of 2015 PAGE NO.70. Yet another list which has been placed on record reflecting 12 offences which reads as under : Sr. No CR No. Police station Section Date of Incident/FIR lodged on Role of the petitioner in FIR 1 II-3196 of 2013 Naranpura 323, 294 (114 IPC Sec. of GP Act 08/06/13 Fight for dog between neighbour 2 II-3221 of 2014 Naranpura 294(B), 506(2) of IPC 01/07/14 Pressurizing for withdraw l of earlier complaint, allegation of threat to life. 3 II-3289 of 2014 Naranpura 323, 427, 114 506(2) of IPC and 135 of GP Act 14.12.2001 For recovery of amount and injuries by the applicants men. 4 I-348 of 2014 Naranpura 143, 144, 506(2) of IPC 135 of GP Act 18.11.2014 For recovery of 2000/- Rs and threat. 5 II-3159 of 2015 Naranpura 323, 506(2), 114 of IPC 03/07/15 Complainant in pressure by applicant eat poisonous chock. Acquitted by ld. Trial court vide judgment dated 4.7.2018 6 II-3019 of 2015 Vadaj 294(B) 506(2) 114 of IPC 11/10/15 Internal dispute between father and son and applicant help the father of vacate the home. 5 II-3159 of 2015 Naranpura 323, 506(2), 114 of IPC 03/07/15 Complainant in pressure by applicant eat poisonous chock. Acquitted by ld. Trial court vide judgment dated 4.7.2018 6 II-3019 of 2015 Vadaj 294(B) 506(2) 114 of IPC 11/10/15 Internal dispute between father and son and applicant help the father of vacate the home. 7 I-437/2009 Naranpura 384, 506(1) and 114 of IPC and u/s.33 and 34 of Money Laundering Act 21.7.09 committed before 2 and half month All these 7 to 10 serial numbers of FIR are filed on behest of police officer 8 I-436/2009 Naranpura 384, 506(1) and 114 of IPC and u/s. 33 and 34 of Money Laundering Act 21.7.09 committed before 2 and half year ...With a view to detain petitioner under PASA. Same date all four complaints were lodged.. 9 I-435/09 Naranpura 384, 506(1) and 114 of IPC and u/s.33 and 34 of Money Laundering Act 21.7.09 committed before 2 and half year ...Applicant was detained under PASA and the PASA Board quashed the said order 10 I-434/09 Naranpura 384, 506(1) and 114 of IPC and u/s 33 and 34 of Money Laundering Act 21.7.09 11 II-3206/06 Naranpura 323, 294(B) 506(2) and 114 of IPC 12 I-27 of 1996 Naranpura 392, 452, 506(2) and 114 of IPC 10.1.1996 which was committed on 19.12.1995. 7. From the aforesaid chronology of entire list, one thing is evident that the petitioner is consistently arraigned himself in commission of crime under one pretext or the other. Almost as many as 17 offences have been registered against the petitioner. No doubt, such offences are dealt with either by this Court or by the court below while granting the petitioner anticipatory bail as well as some protection of not taking coercive step but, said circumstances would not evaporate the number of offences and the activity which over a period of time continued by the petitioner and, therefore, what is prevailing on record is that almost about 17 instances in which the petitioner is attributed to indulge in criminal activity. As a result of this, these are the offences which are sufficient enough to indicate that this activity of commissioning crime by the petitioner is continuing and can be said to be habitual one. As a result of this, these are the offences which are sufficient enough to indicate that this activity of commissioning crime by the petitioner is continuing and can be said to be habitual one. The offences which are narrated are the offences which are not minor offences but, are substantive in nature and, therefore, at this stage of the proceedings when at pre-execution stage, the petitioner has called upon the Court to examine, the narration of these offences are not being undertaken by this Court as it is left it open to the appropriate authority for arriving at a subjective satisfaction. The Court is of the view that these instances are sufficient enough to indicate that the petitioner is consistently and repeatedly arraigning himself in one offence or the other and, therefore, ordinary law appears to have been not able to control the activity of the petitioner. Even the authority has placed on record an order of detention dated 16.6.2018 for perusal of the Court which also indicates that there is some satisfaction which has been arrived at. The suicide note is also taken care of by the authority while coming to the conclusion. May be that the father must have landed money to the extent of Rs.5 lakhs to the petitioner in 2005. However, it appears that the suicide ha taken place in the year 2015 and, therefore, irrespective of actual happening has taken place in the year 2015. Apart from this, the other offences which are relied upon are also of immediate past and as a result of this, this activity of the petitioner cannot be said to be so simple that the petitioner can be ordinarily dealt with by ordinary law and, therefore, subjective satisfaction which has been arrived at prima facie restraining this Court from exercising extraordinary jurisdiction at pre-execution stage. The Court finds no exceptional circumstance sufficient enough to exercise the discretion at this stage of the proceedings. Of-course, the merit of the detention order is not being undertaken by this Court at this stage of the proceedings as at a pre-execution stage, the same will have to be examined by the competent court. Resultantly, no case is made out for exercising the jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings when the petitioner is yet to receive the order of detention with all relevant material. Resultantly, no case is made out for exercising the jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings when the petitioner is yet to receive the order of detention with all relevant material. The Court finds that the petitioner would be having appropriate remedy to deal with merit in accordance with law. As a result of this, the Court is of the considered opinion that these are the materials which have been placed on record, are not such exceptional in nature which would warrant this Court to exercise the jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings. Hence, the petition found to be devoid of merit and the same deserves to be dismissed. 8. While coming to this conclusion, the Court is mindful of the very object of detention which indicates that the detention is not a penal action but is a preventive action to curb a person from committing repeated offence and the chronology of aforesaid FIRs are sufficient enough to arrived at a conclusion that uptill now petitioner has not been able to be prevented and has continued to indulge in criminal activity which ultimately led to an order of detention. As a result of this, at this stage of the proceedings, this is not an extraordinary case in which the Court would like to exercise the equitable jurisdiction and keeping in view the observations made by the Apex Court in case of Iswarlal Mohanlal Thakkar v. Paschim Gujarat Vij Company Ltd. & Anr., reported in (2014) 6 SCC 434 , the Court would not like to entertain the petition. Relevant observations are reproduced hereinafter : “15. We find the judgment and award of the labour court well-reasoned and based on facts and evidence on record. The High Court has erred in its exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to annul the findings of the labour court in its Award as it is well settled law that the High Court cannot exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution as an appellate court or re-appreciate evidence and record its findings on the contentious points. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. Only if there is a serious error of law or the findings recorded suffer from error apparent on record, can the High Court quash the order of a lower court. The Labour Court in the present case has satisfactorily exercised its original jurisdiction and properly appreciated the facts and legal evidence on record and given a well reasoned order and answered the points of dispute in favour of the appellant. The High Court had no reason to interfere with the same as the Award of the labour court was based on sound and cogent reasoning, which has served the ends of justice. 16. It is relevant to mention that in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, with regard to the limitations of the High Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 , it was held in para 49 that- “The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to a minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court.” It was also held that- “High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Art. 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it.” Thus it is clear, that the High Court has to exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution judiciously and to further the ends of justice. 17. In the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation, this Court held that, “20……In view of the above discussion, we hold that the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed serious jurisdictional error and unjustifiably interfered with the award of reinstatement passed by the Labour Court with compensation of Rs.87,582 by entertaining a wholly unfounded plea that the appellant was appointed in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and the Regulation.” 18. The power of judicial review of the High Court has to be alluded to here to decide whether or not the High Court has erred in setting aside the judgment and order of the labour court. In the case of Heinz India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP &Ors.[3], this Court referred to the position held on the power of judicial review in the case of Reid v. Secretary of State for Scotland[4], wherein it is stated that : “68. Judicial review involves a challenge to the legal validity of the decision. It does not allow the court of review to examine the evidence with a view to forming its own view about the substantial merits of the case. It may be that the tribunal whose decision is being challenged has done something which it had no lawful authority to do. It may have abused or misused the authority which it had. It may have departed from the procedures which either by statute or at common law as a matter of fairness it ought to have observed. As regards the decisions itself it may be found to be perverse or irrational or grossly disproportionate to what was required. Or the decision may be found to be erroneous in respect of a legal deficiency, as for example, through the absence of evidence, or of sufficient evidence, to support it, or through account being taken of irrelevant matter, or through a failure for any reason to take account of a relevant matter, or through some misconstruction of the terms of the statutory provision which the decision maker is required to apply. But while the evidence may have to be explored in order to see if the decision is vitiated by such legal deficiencies it is perfectly clear that in case of review, as distinct from an ordinary appeal, the court may not set about forming its own preferred view of evidence.” 9. No doubt, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner has heavily relied upon a decision rendered in SCA No.14478 of 2017, on 19.9.2017 and has tried to convince the Court. But upon perusal of the facts of the said case, this Court is of the view that the background of present fact is so glaring that the activities of the petitioner is continued right from 1996 till 2018 and this circumstance is preventing the Court from exercising the equitable jurisdiction. But upon perusal of the facts of the said case, this Court is of the view that the background of present fact is so glaring that the activities of the petitioner is continued right from 1996 till 2018 and this circumstance is preventing the Court from exercising the equitable jurisdiction. Apart from this, the law of precedent is very much clear decided by catena of decisions that if there is a slight change in the fact or additional fact, it would make a world of difference in applying the precedent. Each case is depending upon its own factual background. As a result of this, comparing this decision with the background of present facts, the Court is of the view that at pre-execution stage, this Court is not inclined to exercise the jurisdiction. Hence, the petition found to be meritless, the same deserves to be dismissed at this stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed with. Notice is discharged. Interim relief, if any, granted earlier stands vacated.