Prakash Jha son of Sri Tejnath Jha v. Classic Multiplex Private Limited
2018-04-27
SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : The petitioners, defendants in the suit, are aggrieved of order dated 07.04.2012 passed in Title Suit No.107 of 2009 by which application dated 27.07.2011 for taking their written statement on record has been declined. 2. Title Suit No.107 of 2009 was instituted by Classic Multiplex Private Limited for a decree for specific performance of agreement dated 13.06.2006 and for a direction to the defendants to hand-over shopping mall and multiplexes to the plaintiff and to allot and transfer the same with car parking/vehicle parking in terms of the agreement dated 13.06.2006. An alternative relief for a decree for Rs.20 lacs with Rs.10 crores damages as stipulated under the agreement dated 13.06.2006 as well as interest on the said amount and mense profit till the date of realization has also been sought, in the event the plaintiff is found not entitled to specific performance of the agreement dated 13.06.2006. The plaintiff has pleaded that the defendant no.1 made a representation that the State Government has agreed to allot and settle 3.12 acres land over which shopping mall, multiplexes, food courts etc. shall be prepared and if the plaintiff invests Rs.20 lacs in one time payment it shall be allotted 10,000 sq. feet of super built-up area. The plaintiff has paid Rs.20 lacs through three demand drafts, all dated 13.06.2006 and an agreement between the parties was executed on the same day, however, sometime in February, 2009 when it came to know that the defendants have selected a new site for the aforesaid project, it sent a notice on 11.02.2009 through its advocate to the defendants. It is pleaded that in reply to the aforesaid notice the defendants have falsely alleged that various meetings were held with the officials of the Government still the plaintiff could not get possession of the land to the defendant no.1, and that the defendants have falsely alleged that the plaintiff itself gave an assurance that it would facilitate grant of necessary consent from the Government for the sub-lease from M/s Tata Steel Limited. 3. The plaint was presented on 20.08.2009 and it was registered on the same day. The defendants appeared in the suit on 22.06.2010 and they were granted time for filing written statement.
3. The plaint was presented on 20.08.2009 and it was registered on the same day. The defendants appeared in the suit on 22.06.2010 and they were granted time for filing written statement. On the next three dates of hearing, that is, on 29.06.2010, 24.07.2010 and 23.08.2010 the defendants were granted further time for filing written statement, however, they did not file their written statement of defence and accordingly on 22.09.2010 they were debarred from filing written statement. It is stated that from 31.01.2011 the defendants stopped appearing in the proceeding of Title Suit No.107 of 2009, and only on 27.07.2011 they filed an application for taking written statement on record and to permit them to contest the suit on merits. This application has been rejected by the trial Judge by the impugned order dated 07.04.2012. 4. Before the trial court both parties referred to and relied on the decision in “Kailash vs. Nanhku & Ors.” reported in (2005) 4 SCC 480 . Observing that the defendants left pairvi and have come after long gap of about one year with a prayer to accept the written statement, the trial Judge has declined to exercise judicial discretion for permitting the defendants to file written statement on the ground that it cannot be invoked merely on wish of a party. 5. Contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that they should have been granted an opportunity to contest the suit on merits, and by not granting such permission to them the trial judge has illegally declined to exercise the powers vested in it which has resulted in miscarriage of justice. The learned counsel for the petitioners has relied on the decisions in “Siddalingayya vs Gurulingappa & Ors” reported in (2017) 9 SCC 447 and “Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. vs. Union of India” reported in (2005) 6 SCC 344 , to contend that the court has wide powers to make such orders as would advance the cause of justice. 6. Mr.
6. Mr. R.R. Mishra, the learned counsel for the respondent referring to paragraph 41 to 46 of the decision in “Kailash” submits that the legislative intent and the mandate under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC must be adhered to by the defendant and departure from the limitation provided under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC can be only under exceptional circumstances; the alleged busy schedule of defendant no.1, preparation of the written statement by the General Manager and delay in filing application dated 27.07.2011 completely rule out any exceptional circumstance for exercise of judicial discretion by the trial Judge to permit the defendants to present their written statement of defence after expiry of the period, even by imposing cost. The learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the decision in “New India Assurance Company Limited vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited” reported in (2015) 16 SCC 20 , to contend that the law laid down in “Kailash” still holds the field and it is only in exceptional circumstance where the Court can exercise its discretion to extend the period for filing written statement beyond the extended period of 90 days. 7. By an order dated 28.11.2017 further proceedings in Title Suit No.107 of 2009 was stayed on the condition that the petitioners shall deposit Rs.50,000/- within one week. Photocopy of the proceedings in Title Suit No.107 of 2009 was also called from the court concerned; such records have been received. This writ petition was filed on 18.02.2013 and the Office Notes reveal that before a Bench-slip for listing of I.A. No.9206 of 2017 was tendered in the Court two Bench-slips were earlier submitted by the petitioners and notings on the case file reveal that the matter was ordered to be listed for hearing on 08.11.2016 and “after Diwali vacation”, however, the writ petition was not listed for hearing. This shows that the petitioners were not negligent atleast in prosecuting the writ petition. 8. Order VIII Rule 1 CPC provides that the defendant shall, within 30 days from the date of service of summons on him, present written statement of his defence. This period of 30 days, however, can be extended but not beyond 90 days (120 days after 2015 Amendments) from the date of service of summons upon the defendants under proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC.
This period of 30 days, however, can be extended but not beyond 90 days (120 days after 2015 Amendments) from the date of service of summons upon the defendants under proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 CPC. After 2002 amendments in the Code of Civil Procedure the debate which had sparked off, whether the provision under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC is mandatory or directory, has been set at rest by the decisions of the Supreme Court including the one in the case of “Kailash”. It has been held that, “no straight jacket formula can be laid down except that the observations of time schedule contemplated by Order VIII Rule 1 CPC shall be the rule and departure therefrom an exception, made for satisfactory reasons only”. The provision under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC has been held directory, and by now it is well-settled that the restriction under Order VIII Rule 1 CPC is binding on the parties but not on the courts. 9. The proceedings in Title Suit No.107 of 2009 would reveal that after the defendants were debarred from filing written statement on 22.09.2010, the suit was posted for hearing under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC for the plaintiff’s evidence. Thereafter, on the next six dates of hearing the plaintiff was granted opportunity to adduce evidence still when it failed to produce its witnesses, by order dated 20.04.2011 last opportunity was granted to the plaintiff to lead evidence. One of the witnesses (PW-1) was examined by the plaintiff on 09.05.2011 and PW-2 was examined on 06.07.2011. On the next date, that is, on 27.07.2011 the defendants filed a petition for taking their written statement on record and to grant them opportunity to contest the suit on merits. It took more than five months for the plaintiff to file its rejoinder to the application dated 27.07.2011 and three months thereafter application dated 27.07.2011 was dismissed by the trial Judge. By the time the defendants had filed their application for taking written statement on record, trial in the suit had not gone too far. The aforesaid delays are not attributable to the defendants. Amendment in Order VIII Rule 1 CPC and other provisions in the Code are no doubt intended at expeditious disposal of the suit, but on expiry of 90 days defendant in every suit cannot be mechanically debarred from filing written statement. 10.
The aforesaid delays are not attributable to the defendants. Amendment in Order VIII Rule 1 CPC and other provisions in the Code are no doubt intended at expeditious disposal of the suit, but on expiry of 90 days defendant in every suit cannot be mechanically debarred from filing written statement. 10. Plea urged by the respondent, that there is no exceptional circumstance, no promptness or urgency shown by the defendants in presenting their written statement of defence, when is examined in the context of the aforesaid facts and the subject matter of Title Suit No.107 of 2009, it is found that the writ petition is not liable to be dismissed on such grounds. The impugned order dated 07.04.2012 does not stand the test of judicial scrutiny in the light of judgments of the Supreme Court. Exceptional circumstance, in my opinion, would not mean extra-ordinary circumstance. The expression exceptional circumstance must be construed in the facts and circumstances of the case. One circumstance indicated in “Kailash” is beyond the control of the party. Plea taken by the defendants, that the defendant no.1 was busy with shooting of the film-Aarakshan, has not been controverted by the plaintiff. This stand of the defendants has also not been disbelieved by the trial Judge. The trial Judge has merely observed that the alleged busy schedule of defendant no.1 is not a ground to exercise judicial discretion for extending the period for filing the written statement. Approach of the trial Judge was apparently erroneous. 11. Subject matter of the suit is specific performance of agreement dated 13.06.2006 and, in the alternative, a prayer has been made for a decree for Rs.20 lacs and damages for Rs.10 crores besides interest, mesne-profit etc. Obviously, the defendants have valuable interest involved in the suit and even if they were negligent, they in the above facts deserve an opportunity to contest the suit on merits. In fact, in my opinion, they have offered a plausible explanation why they could not submit their written statement of defence in time. Normally, parties should be permitted to contest the suit on merits and lead the best evidence during the trial; a technical knock-out should generally be avoided.
In fact, in my opinion, they have offered a plausible explanation why they could not submit their written statement of defence in time. Normally, parties should be permitted to contest the suit on merits and lead the best evidence during the trial; a technical knock-out should generally be avoided. Order dated 22.09.2010, when the defendants were debarred from filing written statement, records that an application was filed by the defendants seeking further time for filing written statement, however, there is no discussion on this application either in order dated 22.09.2010 or in the impugned order. From order dated 07.04.2012 it can be gathered that the defendants have taken a plea that they were arranging documents which were not in their possession. This plea has been disbelieved by the trial Judge on the ground that in a suit for specific performance of an agreement ‘it was not at all required to search for the documents’. This, of course, is an exceptional reason to disbelieve the plea taken by the defendants. Without looking at the written statement and stand of the defendants therein, it cannot be decided that documents are not required for filling the written statement. 12. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, finding serious infirmity in the impugned order dated 07.04.2012 it is set-aside. Order dated 22.09.2010 consequently stands quashed. The defendants shall be permitted to file their written statement within four weeks, however, subject to payment of cost of Rs.2 lacs, which shall be paid to the plaintiff within such time. The deposit of Rs.50,000/- in this Court by the petitioners shall be withdrawn by them. 13. The writ petition is allowed, in the aforesaid terms.