JUDGMENT Anil Kumar Choudhary, J. - Heard the parties. 2. This miscellaneous appeal, by the opposite party No. 3 appellant-Insurance Company, is directed against the judgment and award dated 31.5.2011 passed by the District Judge-cum-Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal, Gumla in Motor M.A.C. Case No. 50 of 2008, whereby the Tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs. 5,33,000/- to the claimants-respondent No. 1 to be paid by the appellant-Insurance Company, for the death of husband of claimant-Muni Devi caused in the motor vehicle accident. 3. The facts, involved in this case, in brief, is that on 11.1.2008 one Chhotu Baraik, who is said to be the Khalasi of one Mahindra Savari Jeep bearing Registration No. JH07B 0862, and other persons were going on in the said Jeep and on the way near Tango Mission School due to rash and negligent driving of the driver at 12:30 p.m. the said vehicle met with an accident by which one passenger of the vehicle died at the spot and the said Chhotu Baraik and other passengers sustained injury and were referred to RIMS, Ranchi for better treatment by the Sadar Hospital, Gumla and on the way Chhotu Baraik succumbed to the injuries he sustained in the said accident. The said Mahindira Jeep was owned by the opposite party No. 1-Manish Kumar and opposite party No. 2-Ram Lakhan Singh was the driver of the said vehicle at the time of the said accident. Opposite party No. 3 of the claim petition is the Insurance Company which insured the vehicle involved in the accident being the Mahindira Jeep. The claimants, who are the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 of this misc. appeal, are the wife, son and daughter respectively of said Chhotu Baraik. Before the Tribunal, opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 filed joint written statement in which they denied that Chhotu Baraik who died in connection with an accident with the vehicle of the opposite party No. 1, was employed by him. They also took the plea that the vehicle was insured with opposite party No. 3 and the opposite party No. 2 was having a valid professional LMV driving licence. Opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 also pleaded that opposite party No. 1 verified the driving licence from the DTO office, Gumla and found the driving licence valid from the DTO office, Gumla. Opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 also pleaded that opposite party No. 1 verified the driving licence from the DTO office, Gumla and found the driving licence valid from the DTO office, Gumla. Opposite party No. 1 also found that the driving licence was renewed by the DTO office, Gumla and opposite party No. 1 before employing opposite party No. 2 verified his skill by taking the driving test by making the opposite party No. 2 drive the said vehicle with him up to 50 km. 4. The opposite party No. 3-Insurance Company apart from usual defence has pleaded that the deceased was not the Khalasi of Mahindra Jeep of opposite party No. 1. The appellant-Insurance Company has pleaded that the driving license of opposite party No. 2 was a fake one because initially the driving license, claimed to be issued by the DTO, Hazaribagh in favour of opposite party No. 2, was never issued and as the subsequent valid renewal license by the DTO office, Gumla could not transform a fake license genuine, hence it was pleaded that in view of the violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy by engaging a driver who was not having the driving license, opposite party No. 1 has violated the condition of the insurance policy. Thus the appellant-Insurance Company pleaded that it is not liable to pay compensation to the claimants. 5. The Tribunal after considering the evidences both oral and documentary on record came to a finding that the deceased Chhotu Baraik, who was the husband of the respondent No. 1, was the Khalasi of the said Mahindra vehicle of opposite party No. 1. The deceased Chhotu Baraik used to earn Rs. 100/- every day as daily wages and Rs. 50/- as Khuraki and he sustained injury because of accident caused due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of Mahindra Jeep while driving the said Jeep and the Tribunal also held that Chhotu Baraik was aged about 30 years at the time of his death. 6. Mr. Alok Lai, learned counsel for the appellant, has assailed the impugned award being contrary to law and evidences available on record. 7. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India in the case of National Insurance Co. 6. Mr. Alok Lai, learned counsel for the appellant, has assailed the impugned award being contrary to law and evidences available on record. 7. In support of his contention, learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut, reported in (2007) 3 SCC 700 : ( AIR 2007 SC 1563 ), wherein the Hon''ble Court in paragraph 38 after analysis of law and referring to the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh and Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 297 ) : (AIR 2004 SC 1513) has held as under:'' 38. In view of the above analysis the following situations emerge: 1. The decision in Swaran Singh''s case (supra) has no application to cases other than third party risks. 2. Where originally the license was a fake one, renewal cannot cure the inherent fatality. 3. In case of third party risks the insurer has to indemnify the amount and if so advised, to recover the same from the insured. 4. The concept of purposive interpretation has no application to cases relatable to Section 149 of the Act.'' ? (Emphasis supplied) 8. Learned counsel has further relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India in the case of New India Assurance Co., Shimla v. Kamla and Ors. etc. etc., reported in ( AIR 2001 SC 1419 ) wherein in paragraph 12 the Hon''ble Court has held as under:'' As a point of law we have no manner of doubt that a fake licence cannot get its forgery outfit stripped off merely on account of some officer renewing the same with or without knowing it to be forged. Section 15 of the Act only empowers any licensing authority to '' renew a driving licence issued under the provisions of this Act with effect from the date of Its expiry.'' ? No licensing authority has the power to renew a fake licence and, therefore, a renewal if at all made cannot transform a fake licence as genuine. Any counterfeit document showing that it contains a purported order of a statutory authority would ever remain counterfeit albeit the fact that other person including some statutory authorities would have acted on the document unwittingly on the assumption that it is genuine.'' ? (Emphasis Supplied) 9. Any counterfeit document showing that it contains a purported order of a statutory authority would ever remain counterfeit albeit the fact that other person including some statutory authorities would have acted on the document unwittingly on the assumption that it is genuine.'' ? (Emphasis Supplied) 9. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the vehicle was being run for reward and the passengers were carried in violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy as the vehicle in question was engaged for carrying the passengers on the basis of fare. 10. In this context, learned counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Kunti Devi & Ors. ( 2009 (1) JCR 556 (Jhr)) : (AIR 2009 Jha 74) wherein the Hon''ble Court after referring to the case of The Oriental Insurance Company Limited v. Meena Variyal and Ors., reported in AIR 2007 SC 1609 , in paragraph 14 has held as under:'' 14. The object of the insistence on insurance under Chapter XI of the Act thus seems to be to compulsorily cover the liability relating to their person or properties of third parties and in respect of employees of the insured employer, the liability that may arise under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 in respect of the driver, the conductor and the one carried in a goods vehicle carrying goods. On this plain understanding of Section 147, we find it difficult to hold that the Insurance Company, in the case on hand, was liable to indemnify the owner, the employer Company, the insured, in respect of the death of one of its employees, who according to the claim, was not the driver. Be it noted that the liability is not one arising under the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923 and it is doubtful, on the case put forward by the claimant, whether the deceased could be understood as a workman coming within the Workmen''s Compensation Act, 1923. Therefore, on a plain reading of Section 147 of the Act, it appears to be clear that the Insurance Company is not liable to indemnify the insured in the case on hand.'' ? 11. Therefore, on a plain reading of Section 147 of the Act, it appears to be clear that the Insurance Company is not liable to indemnify the insured in the case on hand.'' ? 11. Learned counsel has further relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Boppudi Anantha Laxmi and others v. K. Ambica Prasad and another, reported in 2010(3) TAC 579 (AP), wherein in the facts and circumstances of that case where the vehicle, involved in the accident, was under the private car package policy and the premium was paid to cover the liability to public, liability for paid driver and for third party property damage for unlimited account and when no extra premium was paid to cover passengers travelling in vehicle, the Hon''ble Court held that as no extra premium was paid to cover the risk of occupants of the car, hence, the insurer cannot be made liable and only the owner of the motor vehicle is liable to pay compensation. 12. Learned counsel has further relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Calcutta High Court, in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Naba Kumar Mondal and another, reported in 2005 (2) TAC 557 (Cal), wherein in the facts and circumstance of that case it was held that as the offending vehicle was insured as a private vehicle with limited use for personal, domestic, pleasure and own business purposes but since the death of a person was caused during travelling upon payment of fare hence there being breach of specified condition of policy, the Insurance Company cannot be made liable under the policy to indemnify the owner of offending vehicle for payment of compensation. 13. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the aforesaid settled principles of law in the facts of this case, the Insurance Company cannot be made liable under the policy by way of indemnifying the owner of offending vehicle for payment of compensation. 13. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that in view of the aforesaid settled principles of law in the facts of this case, the Insurance Company cannot be made liable under the policy by way of indemnifying the owner of offending vehicle for payment of compensation. Hence, it is submitted that this is a fit case where the appellant-Insurance Company be absolved of its liability to pay compensation by way of indemnifying the owner of the vehicle opposite party No. 1 as awarded by the court below and the owner of the vehicle opposite party No. 1, be made liable to pay the compensation amount and not the appellant - Insurance Company. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5, on the other hand, submits that it is not open for the appellant-Insurance Company to raise the plea of the violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy for the first time in this appellate court because there is absolutely no pleading of the appellant-Insurance Company that there has ever been any violation of the insurance policy in question on account of use of vehicle for commercial purposes or for reward. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 that it being the settled position of law that in absence of the pleading, in a dispute of civil in nature, it is not permissible to raise an issue for the first time at the time of hearing of the appeal hence this contention of the appellant-Insurance Company ought not to be accepted. 15. So far as the contention of the appellant-Insurance Company regarding the licence of opposite party No. 2 being fake is concerned, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 submits that the fact of the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Davinder Singh (supra) and New India Assurance Co., Shimla v. Kamla and Ors. etc. etc. ( AIR 2001 SC 1419 ) (supra) are entirely different from thefacts of this case. 16. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Davinder Singh (supra) and New India Assurance Co., Shimla v. Kamla and Ors. etc. etc. ( AIR 2001 SC 1419 ) (supra) are entirely different from thefacts of this case. 16. Relying upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lehru and others, reported in (2003) 3 SCC 338 : ( AIR 2003 SC 1292 ), it is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of this case the ratio New India Assurance Co., Shimla v. Kamla and Ors. etc. etc. ( AIR 2001 SC 1419 ) (supra) is not applicable as in paragraph 20 of the Lehru (supra), the ratio of Kamla (supra) has been interpreted as under:'' When an owner is hiring a driver he will therefore have to check whether the driver has a driving licence. If the driver, produces a driving licence which on the face of it looks genuine, the owner is not expected to find out whether the licence has in fact been issued by a competent authority or not. The owner would then take the test of the driver. If he finds that the driver is competent to drive the vehicle, he will hire the driver. We find it rather strange that Insurance Companies expect owners to make enquiries with RTOs, which are spread all over the country, whether the driving licence shown to them is valid or not. Thus where the owner has satisfied himself that the driver has a licence and is driving competently there would be no breach of Section 149(2) (a) (ii). The Insurance Company would not then be absolved of liability. If it ultimately turns out that the licence was fake, the insurance company would continue to remain liable unless they prove that the owner/insured was aware or had noticed that the licence was fake and still permitted that person to drive. More importantly, even in such a case the Insurance Company would remain liable to the innocent third party, but it may be able to recover from the insured. This is the law which has been laid down in Skandia, Sohan Lai Passi and Kamla cases. We are in full agreement with the views expressed therein and see no reason to take a different view.'' ? (Emphasis supplied) 17. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. This is the law which has been laid down in Skandia, Sohan Lai Passi and Kamla cases. We are in full agreement with the views expressed therein and see no reason to take a different view.'' ? (Emphasis supplied) 17. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 4 and 5 further relied upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Lal Chand v. Oriental insurance Co. Ltd., reported in 2006 (4) PLJR (SC) 40 : (2006 AIR SCW 4832), wherein in paragraphs 9 to 11 the Hon''ble Court has held as under:'' 9. In the instant case, the owner has not only seen and examined the driving licence produced by the driver but also took the test of the driving of the driver and found that the driver was competent to drive the vehicle and thereafter appointed him as driver of the vehicle in question. Thus, the owner has satisfied himself that the driver has a licence and is driving competently, there would be no breach of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) and the Insurance Company would not then be absolved of its liability. 10. Another decision rendered by a three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh & Ors., reported in (2004) 3 SCC 297 : ( AIR 2004 SC 1531 ), can also be usefully referred to in the present context. This Court in para 110 of this judgment gave the summary of their findings to the various issues as raised in those petitions. We are concerned only with sub-para (iii) of paragraph 110. The said sub-para (iii) reads thus: (iii) The breach of policy condition e.g. Disqualification of the driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in sub-section (l)(a)(ii) of Section 149, has to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards the insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time.'' ? 11. As observed in the above paragraph, the insurer, namely the Insurance Company, has to prove that the insured, namely the owner of the vehicle, was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by a duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant point of time.'' ? (Emphasis supplied) 18. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 also submits that the appellant-insurance Company having not pleaded breach of terms of the insurance policy is not entitled to agitate the said new ground for the first time at the time of hearing of the appeal, the same having not been pleaded in its written statement in the court below. He also submits that the Tribunal having rightly passed the award, this misc. appeal being devoid of any merit be dismissed. 19. In view of the rival submissions made at the bar the points for determination in this appeal are: (i) Whether the tribunal rightly appreciated the evidence in the record? (ii) Whether the appellant Insurance Company is liable to pay the compensation amount in view of the insurance policy, in the facts and circumstances of this case? 20. It is the settled principle of law that in view of the Order 6, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the pleadings shall state and contain, and contain only the facts. 20. It is the settled principle of law that in view of the Order 6, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the pleadings shall state and contain, and contain only the facts. The Hon''ble Privy Council in the case of Gouri Dutt Ganesh Lall Firm v. Madho Prasad and others reported in AIR (30) 1943 Privy Council 147, held that in India as in England, the duty of a pleader is to set out the facts upon which he relies and not the legal inferences to be drawn from them as has been enumerated in Order 6, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is also a settled principle of law that in an appeal the parties cannot urge new facts. The Hon''ble Supreme Court of India in paragraph 10 of its decision in Modern Insulators Ltd. v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (2000) 2 SCC 734 : ( AIR 2000 SC 1014 ) has reiterated the principle in this respect as under: '' 10. We may refer to the next ground on which the appeal has to be allowed. It is a settled position of law that in an appeal the parties cannot urge new facts. From the pleadings of the respondent before the State Commission it is found that the respondent pleaded that the property damaged was not covered under the insurance policy. This plea was given a go-by before the National Commission and a new plea was taken up in the grounds of appeal that the terms and conditions of the insurance policy were violated by the appellant by using used kiln furniture. The National Commission accepted this new ground and allowed the appeal, which in our opinion is not sustainable in law.'' ? (Emphasis supplied) 21. After going through the written statement, filed by the appellant-Insurance Company, I find that the appellant-opposite party No. 3 has not pleaded in its written statement that the vehicle in question was being used for reward and the same violates the terms and conditions of the insurance policy which has been marked as Ext.3 nor in the crossexamination of any of the witnesses of the claimants or opposite party Nos. 1 and 2, opposite party No. 3 has put any questions to suggest that it is the case of the appellant-Insurance Company that the vehicle in question was used for the purpose reward. 22. 1 and 2, opposite party No. 3 has put any questions to suggest that it is the case of the appellant-Insurance Company that the vehicle in question was used for the purpose reward. 22. Learned counsel for the appellant fairly submits that in the written statement it has not been specifically pleaded by opposite party No. 3 that the vehicle in question was used for the purpose of reward and because of that the terms and conditions of the insurance policy has been violated but the learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company submits that in its written statement the appellant-Insurance Company has pleaded the decisions of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 2387/2001 ( AIR 2001 SC 1419 ) along with analogous cases, wherein the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that the insured are bound by the conditions enumerated in the policy and the insurer is not liable to the insured if there is violation of any policy condition and that may be treated as the pleading that the Insurance Company pleaded that there was violation of the terms and conditions of the Insurance policy. 23. In view of this settled principle of law, as has already been discussed herein above, since the law is not to be pleaded and only the facts need be pleaded, the fact of the appellant-Insurance Company having done the act, which is not required in law, certainly cannot substitute, which it is mandated to do in law. If the appellant-Insurance Company wished to take the ground that there was any violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy and on that ground the appellant-Insurance Company has no insurance liability to indemnify the owner of the vehicle of opposite party No. 1, in respect of compensation claim, it was incumbent upon the appellant-Insurance Company to plead so in no uncertain words but having not done so, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant-Insurance Company having not pleaded that the vehicle in question was involved for using reward, at the time of final hearing of the appeal, it is not open for the appellant-Insurance Company to raise the ground by way of argument for the first time. Accordingly, in absence of any pleading, the same is not to be considered at this stage. 24. Accordingly, in absence of any pleading, the same is not to be considered at this stage. 24. So far as the contention of the appellant-Insurance Company regarding fake driving licence of opposite party No. 2 is concerned, after careful reading and going through the evidences on record, I find that it is the pleading of opposite party No. 1 that he engaged the driver after taking the test including the test drive up to 50 km. and he has also verified the genuineness of the driving licence from the DTO office, Gumla and the evidence on record suggests that the driving license of opposite party No. 2 was renewed by the DTO Office, Gumla. So the fact of this case is covered by the judgment of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Lehru and others ( AIR 2003 SC 1292 ) (supra) and Lal Chand v. Oriental insurance Co. Ltd. (2006 AIR SCW 4832) (supra) and this is not a case of fake driving licence simpliciter, where no test drive was taken by the owner of the vehicle before engaging the driver. 25. So far as the judgment in the cases of Boppudi Anantha Laxmi and others v. K. Ambica Prasad and another (supra) and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Naba Kumar Mondal and another (supra) is concerned, in view of the discussions made above there being differences of the facts involved in this case and the facts of those cases this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant-Insurance company will not be absolved from its liability to indemnify the owner of the vehicle under the insurance policy because of the fact that the original driving licence purported to have been issued by the DTO office, Hazaribagh was later on was found to be false. 26. So far as the contention of the appellant-Insurance Company regarding the improper appreciation of the judgment/ award passed by the Tribunal is concerned, the applicant has examined three witnesses besides proving documents which have been marked exhibits. Ext.l being the certified copy of the FIR; Ext.2 is the certified copy of the charge sheet; Ext.3 is the copy of the insurance policy; Ext.4 is the certificate of the registration; Ext.5 is the driving licence of the driver; and Ext.6 is the post-mortem report. The opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 have also proved the documents which are marked as exhibits. The opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 have also proved the documents which are marked as exhibits. Ext.A is the driving licence of the driver; Ext.B is the driving licence renewal register; Ext. D is the driving licence No. 260/01. The Insurance Company-opposite party No. 3 has examined the two witnesses and also proved documents which are marked as exhibits. Ext.C is the copy of driving licence certificate of the driver issued by D.T.P. Hazaribagh; and Ext.E is the certified copy of the driving licence No. 260/01. 27. After going through three oral testimonies of the witnesses, examined on behalf of the claimants, and through the oral testimonies of the two witnesses, examined on behalf of the Opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 as well as the documentary evidences on record, I find that nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination of any of the witnesses of the claimants or the opposite party No. 2 to discard their testimonies nor the appellant- Insurance Company has asked any question to any of the witnesses to suggest that it pleaded that the vehicle in question was used for reward and after going through the evidence both oral and documentary on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is the fit case where the amount of Rs. 5,33,000/- has rightly been awarded by the Tribunal. Hence both the points for determinations are answered in the affirmative. 28. Accordingly, the amount of Rs. 5,33,000/-, awarded vide judgment dated 31.5.2011 by the District Judge-cum-Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal, Gumla in Motor M.A.C. Case No. 50 of 2008, is confirmed and this appeal being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed. 29. The statutory amount, deposited by the appellant-Insurance Company, be released in favour of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 of this appeal forthwith. 30. Let the Lower Court Records be sent back to the Court concerned forthwith, along with a copy of this Judgment.