JUDGMENT : T.S. Sivagnanam, J. 1. Since the issue involved in these writ appeals are identical, we have heard the matter together and they are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The appellant in all the appeals is the Nagercoil Municipality and the respondents are the writ petitioners. The appellant/Nagercoil Municipality has filed these appeals challenging the common order dated 12.10.2017 passed in W.P.(MD)No.13391 to 13397 and 133420 to 13422 of 2017. The said writ petitions were filed by the first respondent in all these appeals, praying for a direction, to the appellant municipality to renew the lease in respect of shops bearing numbers.18, 13,11,12,15,16, 17, 14,19,20 respectively in Christopher Bus Stand, Vadasery, Nagercoil, by extending the benefit of G.O.Ms.No.92, Municipal Administration and Drinking Water Supply Department, dated 03.07.2017 and as per the proceedings of the second respondent herein dated 28.03.2017, at the rates fixed by the second respondent with effect from 01.04.2016. The writ petitions were disposed of by the common order, dated 12.10.2017, by referring the proceedings of the second respondent herein, dated 28.03.2017, which is a proceeding to fix monthly rent at an increased rate upto 100 to 150% over and above the existing rent in respect of the shops leased out to the respondents/writ petitioners. The Court recorded that the writ petitioners are agreeable for the increase as determined by the appellant and since such fixation of enhancement has not been questioned by the lessee, the appellant municipality was directed to accept the same and if the writ petitioners complied with the direction, the municipality was directed not to cause any hindrance to their business activities. The above said common order dated 12.10.2017 is impugned in these appeals. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the writ petitions were disposed of by directing the appellant municipality to accept the fixation of rent as done by the revision committee without considering the decision taken by the appellant municipality to demolish the existing shops, as the shops have become dilapidated and to construct new shops. 4. Further, it is submitted that the appellant municipality, in its resolution, dated 04.07.2018, bearing resolution No.657 has proposed to call for tenders for construction of new shops in the proposed site after demolishing the existing shops. 4. Further, it is submitted that the appellant municipality, in its resolution, dated 04.07.2018, bearing resolution No.657 has proposed to call for tenders for construction of new shops in the proposed site after demolishing the existing shops. Pursuant to the same, one Mr.Vetrivelan was declared as highest tenderer and work order had been issued on 09.09.2016 and at this juncture, the 1st respondent/writ petitioner filed writ petitions with an intention to prevent the appellant municipality from demolishing the shops and putting up new construction. 5. Further it is submitted that the decision taken by the appellant municipality is not only to enhance revenue but also in the interest of public safety, as the buildings are in dilapidated condition. 6. Further, it is submitted that the Writ Court ought to have considered that the writ petitioners' licence expired on 31.03.2016 and after expiry, the writ petitioners have no right to continue in the premises. 7. Further, with regard to the applicability of G.O.Ms.92, it is submitted that the benefit was conferred only for nine years and the writ petitioners have already enjoyed the benefit of G.O.Ms.92 and once again, the same cannot be extended to them. It is submitted that though the licence period is over, because of the order passed by this Court in the writ petitions, they are compelled to collect rents from them without prejudice to their rights and unable to demolish the old construction for putting up new construction. 8. It is submitted that identical contentions as advanced by the writ petitioners were advanced before the Division Bench of this Court, in Writ Appeal (MD) Nos.1058 and 1086 of 2017 “C.Krishna Moorthy and others Vs. The Commissioner, Rajapalayam Municipality, Virudhunagar District”. The Division Bench, by an order dated 09.08.2017, dismissed the writ appeals holding that the appellants do not have any vested right as the period of licence is already over and the rent fixed forms part of an offer, it is for the appellants to accept or leave it, and ultimately, rejected the relief sought for by them. 9. Further, it is submitted that G.O.Ms.No.92 has been challenged before this Court in W.P.(MD)No.3635 of 2008 in which an order of interim stay has been granted which is in force till date. 9. Further, it is submitted that G.O.Ms.No.92 has been challenged before this Court in W.P.(MD)No.3635 of 2008 in which an order of interim stay has been granted which is in force till date. Therefore, the prayer sought by the writ petitioners referring to G.O.Ms.92 is not sustainable in respect of licensees, who are granted licences by the appellant municipality in N.M.C. complex, T.V.M. Road, Vadasery. 10. Further, it is submitted that one of the licensees who was granted lease by the appellant municipality in respect of the Shop No.2, Saraloor Buffalow Market, Nagercoil in Saraloor, Buffalo Market, filed W.P.(MD)No.474 of 2012 to renew the lease in his favour by applying G.O.Ms.No.92 and proceedings of the second respondent therein, dated 28.03.2017. It is submitted that the relief sought for in the writ petition was identical to that of the relief sought for by the 1st respondent in all the writ appeals. The said writ petition was dismissed by order dated 19.01.2018 and no relief was granted to lessees. 11. It is further submitted that the Commissioner of the appellant municipality was taking proactive steps to enhance revenue of the municipality and in the interest of the public and on account of the same, tenders were invited for leasing out immovable properties owned by the appellant municipality. This was resisted by filing a writ petition, designed as a Public Interest Litigation by one M. Deva Raj in W.P.(MD)No.1677 of 2018 on the ground that the Commissioner has not taken any effective and appropriate steps for maintaining the municipality and he is only interested in publicity and not taking any steps for maintaining sanctioned and civic conditions and to transfer the Commissioner of the appellant municipality by considering his representation. The Division Bench by order dated 31.01.2018 dismissed the writ petition with exemplary cost of Rs.25,000/-. 12. It is further submitted that the notification issued by the appellant, dated 02.01.2018 clearly states that the shops in Christopher Bus Stand, Vadasery, Nagercoil, bearing aforementioned shop numbers are not included in the auction notification as they are proposed to be demolished for construction of new shops. 13. It is submitted that the law on the subject has been well settled and in support of such contention reliance was placed on the following decisions of this Court:- (i) In Punjai Puliyampatti Municipality Shopping Complex Lessee Welfare Association Vs. 13. It is submitted that the law on the subject has been well settled and in support of such contention reliance was placed on the following decisions of this Court:- (i) In Punjai Puliyampatti Municipality Shopping Complex Lessee Welfare Association Vs. Commissioner of Municipalites reported in (2016) 3 MLJ 698 . (ii) In P.Muthusamy Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, rep. by its Secretary to Government, Municipal Administration and Water Supply Department, Chennai reported in (2014) 5 MLJ 129 . (iii) In C.Vinoba and others Vs. The Commissioner, Palladam Municipality, Palladam, Tirupur District reported in 2015 (3) CTC 170 . 14. On the above grounds, the learned counsel for the appellant prayed for allowing the appeal and setting aside the order passed in the writ petitions. 15. Mr.S.Subbiah, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr.N.Subramanian, learned counsel for the writ petitioners contended that the appellant has no jurisdiction to bring the shops in auction by refusing to renew lease in the light of the proceedings of the Regional Director of Municipal Administration, the second respondent herein. The said authority was entitled to refix the lease rent in accordance with G.O.Ms.No.92 and proceedings to the said effect having been passed on 28.03.2017, the appellant is bound to accept the enhanced rent fixed by the committee and renew the lease. Therefore, the stand taken by the appellant in the appeals deserved to be rejected. 16. It is further submitted that the writ petitioners are agreeable to pay the revised rent and they have paid the same in advance and therefore, they are entitled to continue beyond 01.04.2018. It is submitted that the writ petitioners are law abiding citizens/tenants who have fulfilled their obligations to the appellant municipality and there are no allegations against them and the appellant municipality is only harassing the writ petitioners/tenants. 17. The learned Senior Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the proceedings of the second respondent herein dated 28.03.2017 and submitted that the appellant municipality is a party to the decision and therefore, the appellant municipality is bound to accept the revision of rent as made by the second respondent. 18. It is further submitted that though the learned counsel for the appellant contended that G.O.Ms.No.92 has been stayed, the second respondent committee has followed the direction issued by the Government and the rent has been refixed. 18. It is further submitted that though the learned counsel for the appellant contended that G.O.Ms.No.92 has been stayed, the second respondent committee has followed the direction issued by the Government and the rent has been refixed. It is further submitted that as of now, the Elected Municipal Council has been dissolved and the affairs of the Council are being managed by the Executive Office. The Commissioner of the appellant municipality played a dual role as he is the Commissioner as well as the Executive Officer and the Executive Officer can at best perform the day to day functions of the municipal council and cannot take a decision to lease immovable properties owned by the municipality, which can be decided only by democratically elected Municipal Council. Thus, it is submitted that the Commissioner cannot play a dual role and the entire proceedings are vitiated. 19. Heard, Mr.P.Athimoolapandiyan, the learned counsel for the appellant and Mr.S.Subbiah, the learned Senior Counsel for Mr.N.Subramanian, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent/writ petitioner in all the writ appeals. 20. The sheet anchor of the arguments of the learned counsel for the first respondent/writ petitioner in all the writ appeals is based on the decision taken by the second respondent, dated 28.03.2017. It is seen that the decision is taken not only in respect of the appellant municipality but also in several other municipalities which come under the jurisdiction of the second respondent. 21. It is no doubt true that in the annexure to the said proceedings dated 28.03.2017, list of shops which are under the control of the respective municipality are mentioned with the shop numbers, name of the lessee/licensee, date of expiry of lease, date of proposed renewal, existing monthly rent, area of the shops, market valuation by the Public Works Department and the proposed enhanced rent and the percentage of increase. 22. Relying upon the proceedings of the second respondent, the learned counsel for the writ petitioners submitted that the appellant cannot refuse to renew the lease. The correctness of the above said submission has to be decided based on the anvil of the law laid down by this Court on the subject issue. 23. In P.Muthusamy case (supra) some what an identical argument was placed by the lessee by referring to G.O.Ms.No.92 and stating that the rent should be refixed in terms of the said Government order. 23. In P.Muthusamy case (supra) some what an identical argument was placed by the lessee by referring to G.O.Ms.No.92 and stating that the rent should be refixed in terms of the said Government order. Rejecting the contention of the lessee, the Division Bench pointed out that what has been granted to the petitioner therein is only a licence to run the shop and merely because the word 'lease' is mentioned, a licence cannot ipso facto, be converted into a lease. Further, it was observed that the object of letting out the shops owned by the municipality is to collect more revenue, so as to implement the welfare measures. 24. In C.Vinoba and others Vs. the Commissioner, Palladam Municipality, the Court rejected the prayer for renewing the licence in favour of the existing licensee who placed reliance on G.O.Ms.No.92. 25. In Punjai Puliyampatti Municipality Shopping Complex Lessee Welfare Association, before the Writ Court, the challenge was to an auction notification and for a direction to follow G.O.Ms.92. The Court, after taking into consideration the law laid down in several decisions including the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram and Shyam Vs. State of Haryanana, (1989) in 3 SCC 267 held that disposal of public property partakes the character of a trust in that in its disposal, there should be nothing hanky panky and it must be done at the best price, so that larger revenue coming into the coffers of the State Administration would serve public purpose. The decision in the case of Punjai Puliyampatti (supra) was confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in (2016) 3 MLJ 698 . 26. Thus, if the submissions of the first respondent/writ petitioner in all the writ appeals, are to be tested by the law laid down by this Court, the only conclusion that can be arrived is to reject the prayer sought for in the writ petitions. As regards the proceedings of the second respondent with regard to the fixation of enhanced lease amount for all the municipal shops within his jurisdiction the same cannot curtail the power of the appellant municipality, more particularly, when they have taken a decision to demolish the existing shops as they are in dilapidated condition and to construct new shops. As regards the proceedings of the second respondent with regard to the fixation of enhanced lease amount for all the municipal shops within his jurisdiction the same cannot curtail the power of the appellant municipality, more particularly, when they have taken a decision to demolish the existing shops as they are in dilapidated condition and to construct new shops. The appellant municipality submitted that already tenders have been called for and the highest bidder has also been awarded a work order but at that juncture, the first respondents filed the writ petitions and the matter has now been dragged on. 27. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent/writ petitioner, placed reliance on the decision in Shanmugam Chettiar Vs. Joint Commissioner-cum-Executive Officer reported in (2015) 5 MLJ 306 and submitted that in the said case, the relief sought by the petitioner therein was granted to the lessee. 28. In our considered view, the facts in Shanmugam Chettiar (supra) was entirely different, wherein the temple took a stand that the lessees, were not in occupation of the premises and the Court found that the lease period was not even fixed and it was stated that it shall commence from the date of the approval by the competent authority and the date of commencement of the lease was left to uncertainty and held that it would amount to putting the cart before horse. Therefore, the said decision is distinguishable on facts. 29. Reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in K.Saravanan Vs. Commissioner, HR & CE, Department reported in (2017) 4 MLJ 79 . The said decision will not render any support to the case of the first respondent/writ petitioner in all the writ appeals, as the facts are entirely different and the dispute was with regard to the measurement of the shop and the rent payable. 30. The elected local bodies were superseded and Special Officers have been appointed under the Tamil Nadu Municipal Laws (Amendment) Act, 3 of 2017. 30. The elected local bodies were superseded and Special Officers have been appointed under the Tamil Nadu Municipal Laws (Amendment) Act, 3 of 2017. The Government appointed Special Officers to exercise the powers and discharge the functions of the village panchayats, panchayat union councils or district panchayats, as the case may be, until the day on which the first meetings of the village panchayats, panchayat union councils or the district panchayats, as the case may be, are held after ordinary elections to said panchayats after the date of commencement of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats (Amendment) Act, 2017. Thus, in view of the said amendment, the Executive Officer or the Special Officer and the concerned local body would be entitled to exercise all powers and discharge all functions as could be done by the concerned local body. Therefore, merely because the Commissioner of the Municipality and the Executive Officer of the municipality are one and the same person can hardly have any impact. As the Executive Officer, the appellant has a duty to protect the interest of the Municipality. 31. The learned Senior Counsel took serious exception to the manner in which, the resolution was passed by the Executive Officer, more particularly, with regard to what has been stated in the resolution and submitted that they are personal opinion of the Executive Officer and no credential should be given to the personal opinion of a Government Servant and that is why the Executive Officer should not be allowed to deal with the rights over the immovable properties of the municipality. We are unable to concede to the said submission as the Executive Officer is entitled to discharge all the functions exercisable by a validly elected municipal council. The Government while bringing out the relevant amendment has not placed any fetters on the exercise of powers of the Executive Officers. In any event, we find that the power exercised by the Executive Officer has resulted in earning of substantial revenue for the appellant municipality. In fact, this was noted by this Court in W.P.(MD)No.474 of 2018 in respect of shop No.2, Saraloor, Buffalow market, Nagercoil, where the writ petitioner therein offered Rs.1,600/- but as per the re-notification by the second respondent, the auction of shops fetched a monthly licence fee of Rs.17,500/-. In fact, this was noted by this Court in W.P.(MD)No.474 of 2018 in respect of shop No.2, Saraloor, Buffalow market, Nagercoil, where the writ petitioner therein offered Rs.1,600/- but as per the re-notification by the second respondent, the auction of shops fetched a monthly licence fee of Rs.17,500/-. The learned counsel for the appellant municipality submitted that such of those licensees, who had offered substantial amount in the tender, all licensees had paid the entire amount apart from the payment of advance of one year lease amount. 32. Thus, for the above reasons, we hold that the action initiated by the appellant municipality taking a decision not to bring the shops for tender/auction and to demolish the dilapidated shops and to construct new shops cannot be faulted nor interfered. 33. We further hold that merely because the second respondent has passed the proceedings on 28.03.2017 purportedly revising the lease rent, such order cannot be an estoppel for the appellant municipality to take appropriate decision, considering the best interest of the municipality. In the instant case, the municipality decided to demolish the shops and to construct new shops to augment revenue and no mala fides have been established by the writ petitioners against such action. The notice which was widely published in the newspaper clearly indicated that the shops occupied by the first respondent/writ petitioners are to be demolished. Thus, the order passed in the writ petitions requires to be interfered. 34. In the result, the writ appeals are allowed and the orders passed in the writ petitions are set aside. Consequently, the writ petitions are dismissed with a direction to the first respondent/writ petitioner in all the writ appeals to vacate and hand over the possession of the shops in question within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, failing which the appellant is entitled to evict them. No costs.