JUDGMENT Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J —The petitioners, who were charged for the commission of offence punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ''IPC'') , by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P., were convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months under Section 120-B IPC, simple imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 1,000/- each under Section 420 IPC and in default of payment of fine, they were directed to undergo simple imprisonment for three months, simple imprisonment for one year and fine of Rs. 1,000/- each under Section 468 IPC and in default of payment of fine to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and simple imprisonment for one year and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- each under Section 471 IPC and in default of payment of fine, they were further directed to undergo simple imprisonment for three months. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. Appeal filed against the said conviction and sentence was also dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge vide judgment dated 27.12.2011 and aggrieved thereby the petitioners have filed the instant revision petition. 3. The case of the prosecution was that on 06.07.1996, the General Manager, District Industrial Centre, Mandi, lodged a complaint that the society known as "Hadimba Hathkarga Udyog Sahkari Sabha, Samiti, Upper Bhamla" was authorized to impart training by the District Industrial Centre and a sum of Rs. 80, 000/- was also sanctioned and same was disbursed in the bank account of H.P. Cooperative Bank, Baldwara. It was also alleged that petitioner No.1 was Secretary and petitioner No.2 was President of the said Society and both the petitioners have withdrawn the amount of Rs. 78, 000/- and thereby committed embezzlement of the amount in question. 4. Upon this, an FIR No. 154/1996, under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC was registered with the concerned Police Station. Apart from the petitioners, four other persons of the Society were arrayed as accused. 5. After completion of the investigation, challen was put in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. 6. 4. Upon this, an FIR No. 154/1996, under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC was registered with the concerned Police Station. Apart from the petitioners, four other persons of the Society were arrayed as accused. 5. After completion of the investigation, challen was put in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sarkaghat, District Mandi, H.P. 6. It is vehemently contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned Courts below have failed to appreciate the material contradictions in the prosecution case and have further ignored the fact that the case had been lodged against the petitioners solely on account of enmity and the entire story had been manipulated. 7. On the other hand, learned Additional Advocate General, would support the judgments as passed by the learned Courts below. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the material placed on the record. 8. The revisionary jurisdiction of this Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C. is extremely limited and this Court would only interfere in case the petitioners have been convicted and sentenced without examining the material placed on record with a view to ascertain that the judgments so rendered by the learned Courts below are not perverse and are based on the correct appreciation of evidence on record. This Court would definitely interfere in case it comes to the conclusion that there is a failure of justice and misuse of judicial mechanism or procedure or where the sentence awarded is not correct. After all, it is the salutary duty of this Court to prevent the abuse of justice or miscarriage of justice or/and correct irregularities, incorrectness committed by the inferior Criminal Court in its judicial process or illegality of sentence or order. This Court has very limited revisionary jurisdiction as held by this Court in Criminal Revision No. 50 of 2011, titled as Rajinder Singh vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, decided on 13.09.2017, wherein the scope of criminal revision has been delineated in the following manner:- "In Amur Chand Agrawal vs. Shanti Bose and another , (1973) AIR(Supreme Court) 799, the Hon''ble Supreme Court has held that the revisional jurisdiction should normally be exercised in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the proceedings or there is a manifest error of point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. In State of Orissa vs. Nakula Sahu , (1979) AIR(Supreme Court) 663, the Hon''ble Supreme Court after placing reliance upon a large number of its earlier judgments including Akalu Aheer vs. Ramdeo Ram , (1973) AIR(Supreme Court) 2145, held that the power, being discretionary, has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or lightly. The Court held that "judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which is informed by tradition methodolised by analogy and discipline by system". In Pathumma and another vs. Muhammad , (1986) AIR(Supreme Court) 1436, the Hon''ble Apex Court observed that High Court "committed an error in making a re-assessment of the evidence" as in its revisional jurisdiction it was "not justified in substituting its own view for that of the learned Magistrate on a question of fact". In Bansi Lal and others vs. Laxman Singh , (1986) AIR(Supreme Court) 1721, the legal position regarding scope of revisional jurisdiction was summed up by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the following terms: "It is only in glaring cases of injustice resulting from some violation of fundamental principles of law by the trial court, that the High Court is empowered to set aside the order of the acquittal and direct a re-trial of the acquitted accused. From the very nature of this power it should be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. The mere circumstance that a finding of fact recorded by the trial court may in the opinion of the High Court be wrong, will not justify the setting aside of the order of acquittal and directing a re-trial of the accused. Even in an appeal, the Appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with an acquittal merely because it was inclined to differ from the findings of fact reached by the trial Court on the appreciation of the evidence. The revisional power of the High Court is much more restricted in its scope." In Ramu @ Ram Kumar vs. Jagannath , (1994) AIR(Supreme Court) 26, Hon''ble Supreme court cautioned the revisional Courts not to lightly exercise the revisional jurisdiction at the behest of a private complainant. In State of Karnataka vs. Appu Balu , (1993) AIR(Supreme Court) 1126 (SC) , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that in exercise of the revisional powers, it is not permissible for the Court to re-appreciate the evidence. In State of Karnataka vs. Appu Balu , (1993) AIR(Supreme Court) 1126 (SC) , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that in exercise of the revisional powers, it is not permissible for the Court to re-appreciate the evidence. In Ramu alias Ram Kumar and others vs. Jagannath , (1994) AIR(Supreme Court) 26, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under: "It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court should not be lightly exercised particularly when it was invoked by a private complaint." In Kaptan Singh and others vs. State of M.P. and another , (1997) AIR(Supreme Court) 2485 (SC) , the Hon''ble Supreme Court considered a large number of its earlier judgments, particularly Chinnaswami vs. State of Andhra Pradesh , (1962) AIR(Supreme Court) 1788 ; Mahendra Pratap vs. Sarju Singh , (1968) AIR(Supreme Court) 707; P.N. G. Raju vs. B.P. Appadu , (1975) AIR(Supreme Court) 1854 and Ayodhya vs. Ram Sumer Singh , (1981) AIR(Supreme Court) 1415 and held that revisional power can be exercised only when "there exists a manifest illegality in the order or there is a grave miscarriage of justice". In State of Kerala vs. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri , (1999) 2 SCC 452 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under: "In Its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice." In State of A.P. vs. Rajagopala Rao , (2000) 10 SCC 338 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court held as under: "The High Court in exercise of its revisional power has upset the concurrent findings of the Courts below without in any way considering the evidence on the record and without indicating as to in what manner the courts below had erred in coming to the conclusion which they had arrived at. The judgment of the High Court contains no reasons whatsoever which would indicate as to why the revision filed by the respondent was allowed. In a sense, it is a non-speaking judgment." 9. It is more than settled that some improvements, contradictions and omissions are bound to occur in every case and until and unless the same are very serious, vital and significant so as to disbelieve and discard the substratum and go to the root of the case, the same probably would have no bearing on the case of the prosecution. However, minor contradictions, consistencies, embellishments and improvements on trivial matters without affecting the core of the prosecution case, should not be made a ground to reject the evidence in its entirety. 10. Adverting to the facts of the case, it would be noticed that the prosecution has examined as many as 27 witnesses. 11. Sh. Satish Kumar, General Manager, District Industrial Centre, Dharamshala, appeared as PW-1 and Smt. Ram Payari appeared as PW-2, who are the key witnesses. 12. Pw-1 stated that "Hadimba Hathkarga Udyog, Sahkari Sabha Samiti" was authorized to train the weavers and under the scheme a sum of Rs. 80, 000/- was deposited in the account towards honorarium and cost of material for providing training to the people. 12. Pw-1 stated that "Hadimba Hathkarga Udyog, Sahkari Sabha Samiti" was authorized to train the weavers and under the scheme a sum of Rs. 80, 000/- was deposited in the account towards honorarium and cost of material for providing training to the people. Neelu Devi (petitioner No.2) was the President of the Society while Mohinder Singh (petitioner No.1) was the Secretary and Meera Devi, Kamla Devi, Vaisa Devi and Satya Devi, were the members. As per resolution of the society, a sum of Rs. 78, 000/- were paid to the trainees. However, when this witness inspected the premises of the Society on 22.05.1996 and enquired from the trainees, then he came to know that neither any training was imparted to them nor any honorarium was disbursed to them. Upon this, he moved an application Ex.PW1/A to the police. He admitted that accused Nos. 3 to 6 were not personally known to him nor they signed in his presence. He also admitted that payment had to be made to the members of the Society and stated that Society had not produced any receipt regarding the payment to the trainees, even though it had been sending resolution every month intimating the authorities that the training process was continued. 13. Now, cursorily, adverting to the statements of other witnesses. PW-2 Ram Payari specifically deposed that no training was imparted to her by the Society. She further deposed that about 3-4 years ago, accused came to her and obtained her signatures. She again reiterated that neither she received any honorarium nor was imparted any training. This witness further claimed that accused Nos. 3 to 6 (who stand acquitted) were not found present in any of the meeting of the Society. 14. Likewise, PW-3 Jai Dei has made similar allegations that the Society had neither imparted any training to her nor she was paid any honorarium of Rs. 2,000/- by the Society. She like PW-2 deposed that petitioner Mohinder Singh obtained her signatures on the pretext that in case she refused to sign, her name would be struck off from the IRDA Scheme. She also exonerated accused Nos.3 to 6. 15. 2,000/- by the Society. She like PW-2 deposed that petitioner Mohinder Singh obtained her signatures on the pretext that in case she refused to sign, her name would be struck off from the IRDA Scheme. She also exonerated accused Nos.3 to 6. 15. To similar effect are the statements of PW-4 Satya Devi, PW-5 Kalawati PW-6 Krishni Devi and PW-7 Savitri Devi, who have deposed on the same lines, as PW-2, by stating that neither training was imparted to them by the Society nor any honorarium was paid to them by it. 16. Pw-8, Lalit Kumar remained associated with the police at the time when documents of the Society were taken into possession. PW-9, Mast Ram was a witness to the memo Ex.PW9/A by virtue of which petitioner Mohinder Singh produced two receipts and one bill. PW-10 Kamlesh, PW-11 Naro Devi, PW-12 Leela Devi and PW-13 Jai Devi, deposed that they never received any training regarding the handlooms. 17. Pw-14, Relu Ram was associated in the investigation of the case and was a witness to the memo vide which records of the Society were taken into possession. PW-15, Piru Ram had handed over the copy of the resolution No.3 to the police. PW-16, Joginder Singh witnessed the memo Ex.PW16/A by virtue of which audit report was taken into possession. 18. Pw-19, Maya Devi deposed on the similar lines like PW-2 and PW-3 by claiming that neither any training was imparted to her nor she signed any resolution. 19. Pw-20, Govind Ram was posted as Naib Tehsildar, Sarkaghat and obtained the signatures of Maya Devi. 20. Pw-21 Subhash Chand, Inspector, Co-operative Society, had witnessed the memo Ex.PW8/D by virtue of which records were taken into possession. PW-22, M.C. Joshi, was the handwriting expert. 21. Pw-24, ASI Karam Chand, registered the FIR on receipt of the complaint Ex.PW1/A. 22. Pw-25, Laxmi Devi deposed on the similar lines, as PW-1 and PW-2. 23. Pw-26, Om Prakash handed over the audit report Ex.P-1 which was taken into possession vide memo Ex.PW16/A. 24. Pw-27, SI Bhed Singh was the Investigating Officer of the case and stated that on 03.02.1998 Mansa Ram Inspector had handed over register Ex.PW8/A, cash book Ex.PW8/B, proceedings book Ex.PW8/C and passbooks Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 and the same were taken into possession vide memo Ex.PW8/D. This is the entire evidence led by the prosecution. 25. Pw-27, SI Bhed Singh was the Investigating Officer of the case and stated that on 03.02.1998 Mansa Ram Inspector had handed over register Ex.PW8/A, cash book Ex.PW8/B, proceedings book Ex.PW8/C and passbooks Ex.P-1 and Ex.P-2 and the same were taken into possession vide memo Ex.PW8/D. This is the entire evidence led by the prosecution. 25. As would be noticed from the statements of PW-2, PW-3, PW-4, PW-5, PW-6, PW-7, PW-10, PW-11, PW-12, PW-13, PW-19 and PW-25, there is overwhelming evidence available on record, which clearly proves beyond reasonable doubt that despite a sum of Rs. 80, 000/- having been transferred in the bank account of the Society, neither the training was imparted nor the honorarium was paid. The passbook of the Society clearly establishes deposits of Rs. 80, 000/- in the Society''s account and as per statement of PW-1, this amount was required to be disbursed amongst the trainees towards honorarium. It has also come on record that the petitioners, who were husband and wife, had hatched a conspiracy and on the basis thereof had withdrawn the amount. Thus, cheating at the instance of petitioners No.1 and 2 stands proved beyond reasonable doubt. The learned Courts below have meticulously analyzed all the facts of the case and the findings so recorded cannot be said to be perverse. 26. From the testimonies of the witnesses, as have been set out above, it would be abundantly clear that all the ingredients of offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 420, 468 and 471 of IPC have been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 27. At this stage, it is vehemently urged by learned counsel for the petitioners that taking into consideration the fact that incident took place as far as back during the year 1995 i.e. nearly 23 years, a lenient view in the matter be taken and they be released on probation. 28. Learned counsel for the petitioners would argue that the petitioners are husband and wife and are nearly 50 years of age and have settled in life and would be stigmatized in case conviction and sentenced is upheld. 29. Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act empowers the Court to release the convict on entering into a bond, with or without sureties, on probation when he/she is found guilty of committing any offences not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. 29. Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act empowers the Court to release the convict on entering into a bond, with or without sureties, on probation when he/she is found guilty of committing any offences not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. Relevant portion of Section 4 is reproduced as under:- "4.Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct.-(1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behavior; Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond." 30. For exercising the power which is discretionary, the Court has to consider various circumstances of the case, like the nature of the offence and the character of the offender. While considering the nature of the offence, the Court must take realistic view of the gravity of the offence, the impact which the offence had on the victim, the benefit available to the accused under this provision is subject to the limitation embodied in the provision as is evident from the use of the word "may" which clearly indicates that the discretion vested with the Courts whether to release the offender in exercise of the power under Sections 3 or 4 of the Act having regard to the nature of the offence and character of the offender and over all circumstances of the case. The powers under Section 4 of the Act vest with the Court when any person is found guilty of the offence committed not punishable with death or imprisonment for life. This power can be exercised by the Courts while finding the person guilty and if the Courts come to a conclusion by considering the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, benefit should be given to the accused. Obviously, this power is not available and can be exercised by the Court even at the appellate stage. 31. Having regard to the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, and having gone through the circumstances emanating from the record and after in depth consideration of the entire matter, I find no legal impediment for considering the case of the petitioners for grant of probation, particularly, in light of the fact that the incident in this case (i) pertains to the year 1995; (ii) the petitioners have already faced the pangs and suffered agony of protracted trial and appeal/revision for the last nearly 23 years. 32. Even the modern trend of penology also leads to the reformation of the offender so as to make him/her useful citizen of the society. No useful purpose is otherwise going to be achieved by again sending the petitioners to jail. 33. Accordingly, let the Probation Officer of the area concerned where the petitioners permanently reside place before this Court his report qua the antecedents of the petitioners on or before next date of hearing. List on 02.07.2018.