JUDGMENT Sandeep Sharma, J —Since All The Above Captioned Appeals Arise Out Of the same award, same are being taken up together, for disposal by way of this common judgment. 2. Instant appeal(s) filed under Section 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act, is directed against the award dated 26.6.2008, passed by learned Commissioner, Workmen Compensation Act, Sub Division, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, Himachal Pradesh, in case No.13 of 2006, whereby compensation amounting to Rs.3, 44, 855/alongwith interest at the rate of 12% after one month from the date of accident till deposit of the entire amount of compensation, came to be awarded in favour of the respondents No.1 to 4 ( for short ''claimants'') . 3. Facts, as emerge from the record are that the claimants on account of death of deceased late Sh. Ranjeet Singh son of Sh. Daya Ram, claimed compensation by way of filing application under Sections 3 and 4 of the Workmen Compensation Act (for short ''Act) , in the Court of learned Commissioner, Workmen Compensation Act, Sub Division, Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, HP. The claimants, who are the legal representative of deceased Ranjeet Singh, alleged that deceased was employed by respondents No.5 and 6 ( hereinafter referred to as the appellantsowners in FAO No. 608 of 2008) as a driver on vehicle bearing registration No. HP23B7503, which was insured with the appellant ( for short ''Insurance Company'') . 4. Unfortunately, illfated bus being driven by the deceased Ranjeet Singh met with an accident on 22.11.2005, as a consequence of which, deceased Ranjeet Singh sustained multiple injuries. He was taken to IGMC, Shimla for treatment, but fact remains that deceased could not survive and ultimately, he passed away on 8.1.2006. The claimants alleged that deceased Ranjeet Singh was employed as a driver by respondents No.5 and 6 ( appellants in FAO No.608 of 2008) on their bus No. HP23B7503 on the monthly salary of Rs.3000/ and Rs.50/, as daily expenses. Deceased Ranjeet Singh was 35 years of age at the time of his death. To substantiate aforesaid facts, claimants also placed on record death certificate of deceased issued by the IGMC, Shimla. 5. Respondents No. 5 and 6 ( appellants in FAO No.608 of 2008) by way of reply though accepted the factum with regard to employment of deceased Sh. Deceased Ranjeet Singh was 35 years of age at the time of his death. To substantiate aforesaid facts, claimants also placed on record death certificate of deceased issued by the IGMC, Shimla. 5. Respondents No. 5 and 6 ( appellants in FAO No.608 of 2008) by way of reply though accepted the factum with regard to employment of deceased Sh. Ranjeet Singh on the bus No. HP23B7503, but claimed that on the date of alleged accident i.e. 22.11.2005, deceased was on leave and he did not suffer any injury on account of accident allegedly took place during his course of employment. Above referred respondents, further claimed that at the time of the accident salary of driver was not Rs. 3000/, rather it was Rs.2000/. 6. AppellantInsurance Company also refuted the aforesaid claim of the claimants and claimed that in the absence of insurance policy, no employer employee relationship between the deceased Sh. Ranjeet Singh and respondents No.5 and 6 ( appellants in FAO No.608 of 2008) stands established and as such, they are not liable to indemnify the insured. AppellantInsurance Company further claimed that owners i.e. respondents No.5 & 6 (appellants in FAO No.608 of 2008) never informed it with regard to the accident and till date no claim whatsoever, has been filed either by the petitioners or by the owners (appellants in FAO No.608 of 2008) of the vehicle. 7. Learned Court Below On The Basis Of The Pleading adduced on record by the respective parties, framed following issues: 1. Whether the deceased died during the course of employment? OPP. 2. Whether the deceased was employed by the respondent No.1?OPP. 3. Whether the vehicle was insured with the respondent No.3? OPR3. 4. Whether the Driver was drawing salary of Rs. 3000/+ Rs.50/ per day as diet money per month? OPP. 5. Whether the driver was holding the valid Driving Licence at the time of the accident? OPR3. 6. Whether the vehicle was having valid fitness certificate and route permit? OPP. 7. Relief: 8. Subsequently, vide award dated 26.6.2008, learned Court below held petitioners entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs. 3,44, 855/on account of death of deceased Ranjeet Singh alongwith interest @ 12% per annum payable after one month from the date of the accident till the deposit of the entire compensation amount. OPP. 7. Relief: 8. Subsequently, vide award dated 26.6.2008, learned Court below held petitioners entitled to compensation to the tune of Rs. 3,44, 855/on account of death of deceased Ranjeet Singh alongwith interest @ 12% per annum payable after one month from the date of the accident till the deposit of the entire compensation amount. Learned Court below also held petitioners entitled to penalty payable by the ownersrespondents No.5 and 6 ( appellants in FAO No.608 of 2008) i.e. 20% of the compensation amount. In the aforesaid background, both the appellantInsurance Company as well as owners of illfated fated bus, have approached this Court by way of above captioned appeals, seeking therein quashment of the impugned award passed by the learned Court below. 9. Mr. B.M. Chauhan And Mr. Pranay Pratap Singh, learned counsel representing the appellants in both the appeals, vehemently argued that impugned award passed by the learned Court below is not sustainable, being contrary to the evidence available on record as well as law on the point and as such, same may be setaside. Mr. B.M. Chauhan and Mr. Pranay Pratap Singh, learned counsel while inviting attention of this Court to the evidence led on record by the respective parties made a serious attempt to persuade this Court to agree with their contentions that there is no convincing evidence led on record by the claimants suggestive of the fact that deceased Ranjeet Singh died on account of the injuries allegedly suffered by him in the illfated accident. Learned counsel further contended that material available on record, clearly suggest that the appellantinsurance company as well as owners (appellant in FAO No.608 of 2008) successfully proved on record that on the date of alleged accident, deceased was on leave and as such, by no stretch of imagination it could be concluded by the learned Court below that he died during the course of employment. Learned counsel further contended that learned Tribunal below while awarding interest wrongly held insurance company liable to pay interest @ 12% per annum payable after one month from the date of accident, whereas it ought to have awarded interest, if any, from the date of award. Mr. Learned counsel further contended that learned Tribunal below while awarding interest wrongly held insurance company liable to pay interest @ 12% per annum payable after one month from the date of accident, whereas it ought to have awarded interest, if any, from the date of award. Mr. Pranay Pratap Singh, learned counsel further contended that learned Court below has wrongly fastened the liability of penalty upon the owners( appellants in FAO No.608 of 2008) , whereas it having arrived at a conclusion that insurance company is liable to indemnify the insured, ought to have saddled insurance company with the penalty and not the owners( appellants in FAO No.608 of 2008) . 10. Having Heard Learned Counsel For The Parties And gone through the record, this Court is not inclined to agree with the aforesaid contention raised by the learned counsel for the parties that the respondents/claimants were not able to prove on record that deceased Sh. Ranjeet Singh died on account of the injuries suffered by him in the alleged accident and injuries caused in the lleged accident is/was the only cause of death of the deceased. Careful perusal of the material available on record, clearly suggest that deceased Ranjeet Singh was in the employment of the ownersrespondents No.5 and 6 ( in FAO No.608 of 2008) and on 22.11.2005 bus bearing registration No. HP23B7503 was being driven by deceased Ranjeet Singh. It further stands proved beyond reasonable doubt that on the aforesaid date i.e. 22.11.2005 illfated bus met with an accident, as a consequence of which, deceased suffered multiple injuries and on this account, he remained under treatment for quite considerable time. 11. As per FIR Ex. C6 placed on record, alleged accident took place on 22.11.2005. Similarly, statements on oath given by PW1 and PW2, which have not been rebutted by the respondents prove beyond reasonable doubt that deceased had received multiple injuries in the alleged accident on 22.11.2005. Careful perusal of the medical bills/prescription slip Ex. C11 to Ex. C28, issued by IGMC, Shimla, clearly suggest that the deceased was admitted in the Hospital on account of the injuries suffered by him in the alleged accident. Careful perusal of the medical bills/prescription slip Ex. C11 to Ex. C28, issued by IGMC, Shimla, clearly suggest that the deceased was admitted in the Hospital on account of the injuries suffered by him in the alleged accident. No doubt, that to have benefit under Section 3 of the Workmen Compensation Act, two conditions are required to be satisfied i.e. that the accident has arisen out of and during the course of employment and there should be some causal connection between the employment and the death, however, in this regard it is not required to be proved that workman died as a result of exceptional work. There is no evidence led on record by the appellant(s) that deceased did not remain under treatment in the Hospital i.e. IGMC, Shimla on account of the injuries suffered by him in the alleged accident till his death i.e.8.1.2006. After having carefully perused the evidence led on record, this Court finds no illegality and infirmity in the findings recorded by the learned Court below that deceased died on account of injuries suffered by him in the alleged accident, which otherwise stand duly proved on record. 12. Another contention put forth by the learned counsel with regard to awarding of interest @ 12% per annum payable after one month from the date of the accident till the deposit of the entire compensation amount also deserve to be rejected out rightly in view of the judgment passed by this Court in New India Assurance Company Limited versus Smt. Bhim Chhring Maghar & others , (2017) LatestHLJ 397 (HP) , wherein it has been categorically held that interest shall be awarded from the date of the accident and not from the date of judgment. It would be profitable to reproduce para No. 4 to 9 of the judgment herein 4. Learned Commissioner below on the basis of the pleadings of parties had framed the following issues: I) What was the monthly wages of the deceased. ii) What was the age of the deceased at the time of death? iii) Whether the deceased was comprehensively with the opposite party? iv) If yes, the amount of compensation to be paid by the respondent No.2. 5. All the issues were answered in favour of the claimantspetitioners and as a result thereof a sum of Rs.2, 58, 336/ awarded as compensation to them. Besides, a sum of Rs. iii) Whether the deceased was comprehensively with the opposite party? iv) If yes, the amount of compensation to be paid by the respondent No.2. 5. All the issues were answered in favour of the claimantspetitioners and as a result thereof a sum of Rs.2, 58, 336/ awarded as compensation to them. Besides, a sum of Rs. 1,52, 313/ was also awarded towards interest on the awarded amount as directed by learned Commissioner below. On failure of the insurer appellant to deposit the awarded amount together with interest within a month from the date of award, to pay the penalty as provided under Section 4A of the Act. 6. This appeal has been admitted on the following substantial questions of law: 1. Whether the ld. Commissioner below has erred in law in fastening the liability of payment of interest upon the appellant from the date of accident. Have not the ld. Commissioner below overlooked the Workmen''s Compensation Insurance Police (law) 1(i) clause wherein the interest and penalty is not covered. 2. Whether the ld. Commissioner has erred in law in directing the appellant to pay penalty as per Section 4A of the Workmen Compensation Act in its failure to deposit the awarded amount within thirty days from the date of announcement of award. 7. On hearing Mr. B.M.Chauhan, Advocate, learned counsel for the insurerappellant and Mr. Bhoop Singh, Advocate on behalf of respondentclaimant No.1 and Mr. Ankur Sood, Advocate, court guardian on behalf of minor respondents No.2 and 3 and on perusal of the entire record, the first substantial question of law not at all arise for determination in this appeal for the reason that the so called terms and conditions of Workmen Compensation Insurance Policy exempting the insurer respondent No.2appellant from its liability to pay the interest on the awarded amount has not been seen in the light of day being not produced in evidence during the course of trial of the claim petition before learned Commissioner below. Therefore, when there is no material available on record, it cannot be said that appellantrespondent No.2 is not liable to pay the interest as awarded by learned Commissioner on the awarded amount. 8. Therefore, when there is no material available on record, it cannot be said that appellantrespondent No.2 is not liable to pay the interest as awarded by learned Commissioner on the awarded amount. 8. If coming to the second substantial question of law the same is covered in favour of the insurerappellant by the judgment of Apex Court, titled Ved Prakash Garg versus Premi Devi and others , (1997) 8 SCC 1 as it has beken held in this judgment that the liability to pay the amount of penalty under Section4a(3) of the Act is that of the insured and not that of the insurer. Therefore, the impugned order qua imposition of penalty though vague and cryptic as the Commissioner below has not determined the percentage and extent of penalty, is not legally sustainable. Even if any penalty was to be imposed in this case, the same should have been imposed upon the insured respondent No.4 and not against the insurerappellant. Therefore, that part of the impugned award is not legally sustainable, hence quashed. 9. In view of the forgoing reasons, this appeal partly succeeds. The impugned award to the extent of holding insurer appellant liable to pay the amount of penalty is quashed and setaside. The same shall stand modified accordingly. The appeal is disposed of. 13. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid exposition of law that interest is payable from the date of the accident and not from the adjudication of the claim and as such, this Court finds no illegality and infirmity in the impugned award. Similarly, other contention put forth by Mr. P.P. Singh, learned counsel for the appellantowners that the Court below ought to have saddled insurance company with the penalty and no penalty could be fastened upon the appellantowners, deserves outright rejection being devoid of merit. This Court in its latest judgment passed by this Court in New India Assurance Company Limited versus Smt. Bhim Chhring Maghar & others , (2017) LatestHLJ 397 (HP) , while relaying upon the judgment passed by Hon''ble Apex Court in, titled Ved Prakash Garg versus Premi Devi and others , (1997) 8 SCC 1 has categorically held that liability to pay penalty under section 4A (3) of the Act is that of the insured and not that of the insurer and as such, findings returned in this regard by the learned Court below deserve to be upheld. It would be profitable to reproduce para 78 of the judgment herein: "7. Learned counsel for the appellantowners of the motor vehicles who were admittedly employers of the deceased workmen contended before us that the view taken by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in the impugned judgments and identical view taken in the decisions of the High Courts referred to earlier exonerating the insurance company of its liability for making good the claim for compensation flowing out of the orders of additional interest and penalty as imposed by the Workmen''s Commissioner under Section 4A(3) of the compensation Act were not justified on the scheme of the Compensation Act read with the Motor Vehicles Act. That on the contrary the decisions of the High Courts representing the contrary view laid down correct law. It was alternatively contended that in any view of the matter at least the middle course adopted by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Radhabehn Vs. Mulji Kanji Dhord , (1994) ACJ 404 (Guj) deserves to be upheld. 8. On the other hand learned counsel for respondentinsurance companies submitted that on the scheme of the Compensation Act and the Motor Vehicles Act the insurance companies would be liable to meet the liability of the insured employerowners of the respective vehicles to the extent of the principal amounts of compensation which were made payable to the claimants by the insured employers by the Workmen''s Commissioner. So far as penalty amounts by way of additional interest and additional compensation as contemplated by Section 4A (3) were concerned they were made payable by the insured employers for their own default and for such default on the part of the insured, the insurance companies would not be liable and consequently they could not be made to reimburse the said amounts to the insured. That such claims would be dehors the contractual liability flowing from the insurance policy as well as it would be against the relevant statutory scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act read with the compensation Act. it was, therefore, contended that the view taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the impugned judgments in favour of the insurance companies and identical view taken by the other High Courts falling in line represented the correct legal position and deserved to be upheld." 14. it was, therefore, contended that the view taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the impugned judgments in favour of the insurance companies and identical view taken by the other High Courts falling in line represented the correct legal position and deserved to be upheld." 14. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove, this Court sees no reasons to interfere in the well reasoned award passed by the learned Court below and as such, same is upheld. Accordingly, present appeal(s) stands disposed of alongwith pending application(s) , if any.