ORDER : RAJESH SHANKAR, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the orders dated 29.9.2015 and 15.9.2015 passed by the respondent No. 3-Enforcement Officer, E.P.F. Organisation, Jamshedpur, whereby the petitioner has been directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 11,55,798/- (Rs. 9,85,072/- under Section 7Q and other outstanding dues of Rs. 1,70,726/-), failing which coercive action under Sections 8B to 8G of Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act, 1952") would be initiated. It has further been prayed for quashing the order dated 25.1.2008 passed by the respondent No. 2-Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Jamshedpur, under Section 7A of the Act, 1952 for determination of dues for the period from October, 2005 to September, 2006 which has been determined as Rs. 1,45,021/- and further ordered to pay interest of Rs. 25,705/- calculated under Section 7Q of the Act as also the appellate order dated 17.8.2011 passed by the Employees' Provident Fund Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "Tribunal"), whereby the order dated 25.1.2008 has been affirmed. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the petitioner is a company running a Rubber Reclaiming Factory registered under the provision of the Act, 1952. A quasi-judicial proceeding under Section 7A of the Act, 1952 was initiated for the period from October, 2005 to September, 2006 and the said proceeding was disposed of vide order dated 25.1.2008/28.1.2008 and pursuant thereto a demand of Rs. 1,45,021/- towards provident fund and allied dues alongwith interest under Section 7Q of the Act, 1952 to the extent of Rs. 25,705/- calculated as on the date of the order was made. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred appeal before the Tribunal and vide order dated 17.8.2011, the order of the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, Jamshedpur was affirmed. The petitioner was issued a notice dated 9.9.2013 for the shortfall in deposit of some of the employees and was directed to deposit immediately. Again, a notice dated 22.11.2013 was issued to the petitioner claiming short deposits for the period up to 2011-12 for Rs. 11,81,417/- and thereafter, the petitioner paid the said demanded amount by way of challan. The petitioner was issued a notice dated 9.9.2013 for the shortfall in deposit of some of the employees and was directed to deposit immediately. Again, a notice dated 22.11.2013 was issued to the petitioner claiming short deposits for the period up to 2011-12 for Rs. 11,81,417/- and thereafter, the petitioner paid the said demanded amount by way of challan. On 3.9.2014, a notice was again issued to the petitioner, whereby the respondents directed the petitioner to deposit damages under Section 14B of the Act, 1952 and penalty and interest on the belated payments were levied to the tune of Rs. 9,85,072/- for the period from 1.4.2010 to 30.11.2013. Finally on 15.9.2015, an order for recovery of the amount of Rs. 11,55,798/- i.e., Rs. 9,85,072/- dues under Section 7Q of the Act, 1952 for the period of July, 2009 to March, 2013 and dues under Section 7A of the Act, 1952 for the period October, 2005 to September, 2006, was passed. Again, an order for recovery dated 29.9.2015 was issued to the petitioner for payment of the aforesaid dues. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that before proceeding for recovery of damages on account of default on the part of the petitioner under Section 14B of the Act, 1952, no proceeding under Section 7A of the Act, 1952 has been initiated for determination of the due amount and thus, on this score alone the impugned order of recovery vitiates. It is further submitted that the provisions of Section 14B of the Act, 1952 do not provide for any belated payment, rather the word used is "default in payment" which is not the case of the petitioner. Though the payments have been made belatedly, yet the penalty and damages under Section 14B of the Act, 1952 is not attracted, as belated payment cannot be termed as default in payment. It is further submitted that before passing the order dated 15.9.2015, neither any show-cause notice was issued nor the order contains any reference of enquiry which ought to have done before passing the said order. It is further submitted that before passing the order dated 15.9.2015, neither any show-cause notice was issued nor the order contains any reference of enquiry which ought to have done before passing the said order. Though the respondent No. 2 while passing the order has admitted that the wages has been earned for extra work done by the workmen after normal working hours, but at the same time the wages earned by the workers during overtime after normal working hours, has been treated as basic wage and has illegally levied the provident fund and allied dues upon it. The learned Appellate Tribunal has dismissed the appeal without considering the fact that the work was done after the normal working hours which could not have been included in the basic wage. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Appellate Tribunal has not taken into consideration that the factory of the petitioner used to run in three shifts and when the regular employees of the next shift were found to be absent, the workmen of the earlier shift were required/requested to work in the next shift in place of such absentee workmen. The earlier shift workmen would be entitled to earn overtime for their extra work. The payment against such extra work has been entered as overtime. Moreover, when a particular mix used to be in process in a particular shift and due to power cut if such mix could not be finished, the workmen of such shift were required to continue to work even in the next shift. It is also submitted that the remuneration paid for additional working hours and payment of overtime allowance cannot be included in the basic wage. 3. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the proceeding under Sections 7A and 14B of the Act, 1952 are the independent of each other and for determining the damages under Section 14B, there is no requirement of a determination under Section 7A of the Act, 1952 which is for the assessment of the EPF contribution and its allied dues payable by the employer. It is further submitted that the petitioner was allowed several opportunities to defend its case, but it did not choose to turn up and as such, an ex parte order was passed. It is further submitted that the petitioner was allowed several opportunities to defend its case, but it did not choose to turn up and as such, an ex parte order was passed. It is further submitted that the contribution for the intervening period was made by the petitioner belatedly after the prescribed date i.e., fifteenth day of the following month which was a default under Section 14B of the Act, 1952 and as such, the petitioner was served a notice for payment of damages and then the impugned order was passed. Thus, the same requires no interference. So far as the proceeding under Section 7A of the Act, 1952 is concerned, the petitioner has claimed that the disputed payment was made as overtime, however, the Appellate Tribunal has rightly rejected the claim of the petitioner by observing that no material was placed on record to prove that the work was done after normal working hours. It has further been observed that no document was placed on record to show that the appellant had taken permission from the competent authority to make such payment. It is also submitted that mere changing of the name of the management does not absolve the liability of the factory which is running in the same premises and carrying on the same activity. 4. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on going through the materials available on record, it appears that the petitioner has challenged the order dated 25.1.2008 passed by the respondent No. 2 under Section 7A of the Act, 1952 and also the appellate order dated 17.8.2011 passed by the Appellate Tribunal, whereby the learned Tribunal has affirmed the order dated 25.1.2008 holding that the payment made by the employer to the workmen though claimed to be overtime is to be treated as basic wage. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the Appellate Tribunal rightly held that the petitioner failed to bring on record sufficient material to show that the work done by the workmen was after their normal working hours and as such, the said payment cannot be termed as an overtime. 5. The burden of proof was on the employer/petitioner to show that any payment has been made by it under the head of overtime. 5. The burden of proof was on the employer/petitioner to show that any payment has been made by it under the head of overtime. However, it failed to discharge the said burden by adducing sufficient materials, both before the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner as well as before the Tribunal as such, the said claim of the petitioner was rightly rejected. The Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner came to a finding that the establishment had regularly paid extra allowance to its employees every month thus such allowance was nothing but the wages earned by the workers for extra work done by them after normal working hours for which the PF and other allied dues are payable. I do not find any infirmity in the order of the Assistant Provident Commissioner. It is the admitted stand of the petitioner that the alleged overtime was being paid to the workmen in regular manner for smooth running of the factory. 6. The petitioner has also challenged the orders dated 29.9.2015 and 15.9.2015, whereby it has been directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 11,55,798/- under Section 14B of the Act, 1952 for delayed payment of the contribution for the period from 1.4.2010 to 30.11.2013. The ground of challenge of the impugned orders is that no determination under Section 7A of the Act, 1952 was made before proceeding under Section 14B of the Act, 1952, thus, the impugned orders vitiate in law. Learned counsel for the petitioner puts strong reliance on a judgment rendered by a Bench of this Court in the case of "M/s. Bharat Rubber Regenerating Co. Ltd., Kolkata vs. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Jamshedpur & Anr." [W.P.(C) No. 5411 of 2007]. I have perused the said judgment. The factual matrix of the said case is different from the case in hand. In the said case, the proceeding under Section 7A was pending for the period of April 2004 to September, 2005 and in the meantime, a proceeding under Section 14B was initiated for the period from March, 2001 to January, 2007 which also covered the period from April 2004 to September, 2005. On the basis of the said factual context, a Bench of this Court held that since the proceeding under Section 7A is still to be determined, recovery for damages under Section 14B of the Act, 1952 is not permissible in law. On the basis of the said factual context, a Bench of this Court held that since the proceeding under Section 7A is still to be determined, recovery for damages under Section 14B of the Act, 1952 is not permissible in law. In the present case, no proceeding under Section 7A of the Act, 1952 was pending against the petitioner for the intervening period i.e., 1.4.2010 to 30.11.2013. Section 7A of the Act, 1952 provides for determination of the dues amount against any establishment, whereas Section 14B of the Act, 1952 deals with the recovery of damages from the employer, if it commits any default. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the dues amount for the said period has already been deposited thus, no default has been committed by the petitioner under Section 14B of the Act, 1952. Admittedly, the petitioner had paid the dues amount belatedly prior to issuance of the show-cause notice under Section 14B of the Act, 1952. A bare reading of the Clause 38 of the Employees' Provident Fund Scheme, 1952 makes it absolutely clear that the employer is under a statutory obligation to deposit the contribution by fifteenth day of subsequent month to the Fund by cheque or bank draft. Thus, the contributions are payable for each month within a fixed period. Proceedings under Section 14-B of the Act, 1952 can be initiated on the occurrence of default. Delayed payment of contribution undoubtedly comes under the ambit of default in payment of contribution by the employer. Rigour, of Section 14-B of the Act, 1952 cannot be avoided merely by contending that the default committed was made good by the time show-cause notice was issued. As per the provisions of the Act, 1952, each time there is delay in making deposit of contribution as required by the Scheme, it amounts to a default at the instance of an employer. Each one of these defaults is liable to be proceeded with under Section 14B of the Act, 1952. It is not a condition precedent to the exercise of powers under Section 14B of the Act, 1952 that any arrears should be outstanding at the time when show-cause notice is issued to the employer. Arrears arise on the very day on which the employer defaults in making payment of contribution. It is not a condition precedent to the exercise of powers under Section 14B of the Act, 1952 that any arrears should be outstanding at the time when show-cause notice is issued to the employer. Arrears arise on the very day on which the employer defaults in making payment of contribution. In case of default having been committed, the power of the Commissioner to proceed under Section 14B of the Act, 1952 comes into play. The said power is not taken away by the mere fact that arrears have since been deposited by the employer. The power of the Commissioner to proceed under Section 14B is co-terminus with the default of the employer. If the argument of the petitioner is accepted, the same would amount to permitting to the employers to defeat the purpose of Section 14B by not depositing the contribution within the prescribed time and utilizing the said fund for their business and still avoiding the penal damages under Section 14B by simply depositing the contribution before the show-cause notice is issued. This would make the provisions of Section 14B of the Act, 1952 as redundant. 7. In the case of "Organo Chemical Industries & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors." reported in (1979) 4 SCC 573 held as under:-- "This is a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by M/s. Organo Chemical Industries, Sonepat directed against an order of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Chandigarh, dated October 12, 1977, by which he imposed a penalty of Rs. 94,996.80 on the petitioners as damages under S. 14B of the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, for delayed remittances of the Employees' Provident Fund, Family Pension Scheme contributions of their employees, including their own contributions, and the administrative charges thereon. Organo Chemical Industries, an 'establishment' within the meaning of Section 1(3) of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to which the Act applies, committed defaults in payments of Provident Fund and Family Pension Scheme dues for the period from March to October 1975 and again for the period from December 1975 to November 1976 to the extent of Rs. 92,687.00 and of administrative charges amounting to Rs. 2,309.80 i.e. Rs. 94,996.80 in all. 92,687.00 and of administrative charges amounting to Rs. 2,309.80 i.e. Rs. 94,996.80 in all. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Chandigarh, accordingly, issued a show cause notice dated June 7, 1977 requiring the petitioners to show cause why damages should not be levied under S. 14B of the Act. The notice was accompanied by a statement showing a break-up of the various amounts in arrears and the extent of delay in respect of each payment and the details of damages proposed to be imposed on the belated payments. The period of delay in payment of the amounts remitted varied from a few months to a year. It was proposed to levy damages at a uniform rate of hundred per cent on each of the amounts in arrears. In response to the notice, the petitioners tried to explain away the delay by alleging that it was due to difficulties beyond their control and, therefore, the payments could not be made in time viz., the facts that there were disputes between the partners of the firm as a result of which, there was a loss of Rs. 1,40,165.15, there was a power cut of 60% by the Haryana Electricity Board w.e.f. May 6, 1974, which compelled the petitioners to purchase a generating set to tide over the difficulties and that the establishment had borrowed huge sums from the Haryana Financial Corporation and in payment of which it had defaulted for want of financial resources etc. It was, accordingly, contended that the default, if any, was not willful as they had no intention to commit a default. The Regional Provident Fund Commissioner after giving to the petitioners the opportunity of a hearing by his reasoned order dated August 16, 1977 considered in detail each of the grounds taken in mitigation of the defaults and came to the conclusion that none of the grounds alleged furnished a legal justification for the delay in making contributions in time. As regards the alleged dispute among the partners leading to a loss of Rs. 1,40,165.15, he observed: "Even if it is assumed that there was a loss as claimed it does not justify the delay in deposit of Provident Fund money which is in unqualified statutory obligation and cannot be allowed to be linked with the financial position of the establishment, over different points of time. 1,40,165.15, he observed: "Even if it is assumed that there was a loss as claimed it does not justify the delay in deposit of Provident Fund money which is in unqualified statutory obligation and cannot be allowed to be linked with the financial position of the establishment, over different points of time. Besides 50% of the contributions deposited late represented the employees' share which had been deducted from the employees' wages and was a trust money with employer for deposit in the statutory fund. The delay in the deposit of this part of the contribution amounted to breach of trust and does not entitle the employer to any consideration for relief." 8. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that delayed remittance of the contribution under Employees' Provident Fund as well as Family Pension Scheme would attract the provision under Section 14B of the Act, 1952. Deposit of Provident Fund amount is an unqualified statutory obligation and the employer cannot escape from the said liability by contending that the delay is not intentional, rather the same is caused due to the situation beyond his control. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I find no merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.