Bhishma Singh Thakur @ Pappu Doctor v. State of M. P.
2018-01-23
SUSHIL KUMAR PALO
body2018
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER 1. Petitioner has filed this application for invoking the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court and to quash the FIR at Crime No. 345/2017 registered at Police Station-Jawar District-Sehore for offence under section 34 (2) of MP Excise Act. 2. The prosecution story, in brief, is that on a tip from the informer to the Police Chowki- Mahtawara Police Station- Jawar that at village Semliwari Nath Mohalla, the accused persons Sanjay Nath and Pooranchandra are selling illicit liquor, on 22.11.2017, the police party intercepted the accused Sanjay Nath and Pooranchandra Nath to their custody. Illicit liquor has been seized under section 34(2) of the MP Excise Act. During the interrogation, the accused persons Sanjay Nath and Pooranchandra Nath informed the police that liquor, which has been seized belonged to Bheeshm Singh Thakur, resident of village Mahtawara, therefore, the police tried to arrest the accused Bheeshm Singh @ Pappu Doctor, but he could not be traced. 3. On behalf of the petitioner, it is submitted that except the memorandum of co-accused Sanjay Nath and Pooranchandra, there is no evidence against the petitioner. The statements of co-accused persons are not admissible. Therefore, applicant seeks quashment of FIR against the petitioner. On behalf of the petitioner, it is further contended that notice has been issued to the applicant on 8.12.2017, directing the applicant to appear and make a statement. 4. Learned Government Advocate for the respondent/State vehemently opposed the submissions and contended that the illicit liquor has been seized from the co-accused persons. The petitioner has been named by the co-accused persons. It is stated that the petitioner has asked them to distribute liquor, therefore, they acted on the direction of the petitioner. The petitioner is liable for having committed offence under section 34 (2) of MP Excise Act. 5. On analyzing the provisions of section 27 of the Evidence Act, it is crystal clear that the evidence of memoranda given by the coaccused persons under section 27 of the Evidence Act to the police can be accepted so far as articles recovered from the accused and for the discovery of the items. Except the above circumstances, no other evidence has been collected in the present case, against the present petitioner. Hence, it is prima-facie indicated that the applicant has conspired or connived with the accused persons and with an intention has committed the crime cannot be presumed. 6.
Except the above circumstances, no other evidence has been collected in the present case, against the present petitioner. Hence, it is prima-facie indicated that the applicant has conspired or connived with the accused persons and with an intention has committed the crime cannot be presumed. 6. In the case of Prakash Singh v. State of MP, [ 1994 (II) MPWN 72 ], a Coordinate Bench of this Court has held that : "The statement admissible under section 27 of the Evidence Act are the statements, which could be used as evidence against the maker and not against any other person. Under section 27 only portions of information given by an accused which are admissible are those which relate distinctly to the facts discovered thereby. Consequently, statements by an accused which do not related to aforesaid facts but involve other accused are inadmissible under section 27 against the later." 7. Similarly, in the case of Raghu Thakur v. State of MP, 2012 (4) MPHT 116, this Court has held that : "6. A plain reading of section 27 of Indian Evidence Act indicates that the statement under section 27 of Indian Evidence Act is an exception to the ban imposed upon the Courts to utilize the confessional statement made under sections 25 and 27 of Indian Evidence Act, so as to protect a person making disclosure from being falsely implicated by the police in whose custody that person remains at the time of making disclosure. The provision of section 27 of Indian Evidence Act further indicates that the facts disclosed under section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act can be used only against the person making disclosure and not against any other person." 8. Except for the aforesaid disclosure by the co-accused persons, there is no evidence against the petitioner available on record, which may establish that illicit liquor belonged to the petitioner. It is also not the case of the prosecution that the vehicle in which, illegal liquor was being transported belongs to the petitioner. The memorandum under section 27 of the Evidence Act is confessional statement to the police, which also is hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act and cannot be accepted as legal evidence against the petitioner in the absence of other incriminating evidence. 9.
The memorandum under section 27 of the Evidence Act is confessional statement to the police, which also is hit by section 25 of the Evidence Act and cannot be accepted as legal evidence against the petitioner in the absence of other incriminating evidence. 9. In the case of R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866 and in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan lal [1992, Supp. (1) SCC 335], it is held that in the following categories of cases, the inherent power can be invoked to quash the criminal proceeding : "(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction ; (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged ; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge." 10. Consequently, the petition is allowed. The FIR at Crime No. 345/2017 is quashed so far as the present petition is concerned. Before parting with the case, it is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion with regard to other accused persons. 11. With the above, this petition is allowed.