JUDGMENT & ORDER : S.G. Shah, J. Heard learned advocate Ms. Aditi Raol with Mr. Shalin N. Mehta for the appellant; whereas learned advocate Mr. Hriday Buch for respondents. Rest of the respondents, though served, have remained absent. 2. Considering the fact that appeal is pending since the year 2011, it certainly requires to be disposed of at the earliest, and, therefore, the matter is taken up for final hearing. 3. The record shows that while admitting the appeal on 15.12.2011, the Coordinate Bench has granted ad-interim relief in terms of para 4(A) of Civil Application whereby pending final hearing and disposal of this First Appeal, the operation, execution and implementation of impugned judgment and award dated 13.9.2011 by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (Aux.), Morvi in MACP No.134/2009 awarding compensation to the tune of Rs. 3,58,000/- with interest to the original claimant is stayed. Therefore also, appeal is required to be decided at the earliest. 4. The sum and substance of the appellant in this appeal is to the effect that Tribunal has erred in fixing their liability and thereby, directing them to indemnify the driver and owner to pay the amount of compensation to the original claimants being legal heirs of the victim when victim was hit by a Rickshaw, which was driven by the driver without holding a valid driving license to drive such transport vehicle. 5. In appeal memo, it is specifically contended by the appellant that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate the distinction between transport vehicles and non-transport vehicles and that Rickshaw involved in the accident being a light carriage vehicle under the category of transport vehicle and that when driver was not holding a valid license to drive such vehicle, it cannot be held responsible to indemnify the owner of the award passed against driver and owner. 6. Thereby, it is contended that there is clear breach of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy and therefore, insurance company cannot be held liable. 7. It is also recorded by the Tribunal in impugned judgment that the driver of the Rickshaw, was not examined and when basic information of accident as well as license is with the driver of the Rickshaw only, in his absence, there cannot be any presumption against him. 8. 7. It is also recorded by the Tribunal in impugned judgment that the driver of the Rickshaw, was not examined and when basic information of accident as well as license is with the driver of the Rickshaw only, in his absence, there cannot be any presumption against him. 8. Therefore, in absence of specific evidence before the Tribunal to conclude that Rickshaw driver does not have the license to drive a transport vehicle, there is no substance in the appeal and plea that they are not liable to indemnify the Rickshaw owner because driver does not have a valid license to drive such vehicle. 9. Recently Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in the case between Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2017) 14 SCC 663 held that separate endorsement to drive transport vehicle is not necessary to confirm the liability of insurance company when driver is holding license to drive particular class of vehicle. Thereby, sum and substance of such judgment is to the effect that if driver is holding license for light motor vehicle, to fasten the liability of insurance company to pay the compensation to the claimant by indemnifying the owner, even if, driver is driving the transport vehicle, an endorsement to that effect i.e. to driver the transport vehicle is not must. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has in categorical terms held that driver holding light motor vehicle license can drive any vehicle of such class of vehicle, including transport vehicle and that no separate endorsement to that effect is required. This judgment is delivered by the larger bench (Three Judges') of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India and therefore, following the principles laid down in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 , unless and until there is judgment of equal Bench or larger Bench, this judgment remains in force and it cannot be ignored by any one. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 , unless and until there is judgment of equal Bench or larger Bench, this judgment remains in force and it cannot be ignored by any one. However, the appellant is relying upon the order dated 3.5.2018 by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Application No.841 of 2018 between M/s. Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Company v. Rambha Devi and others, wherein after referring the conclusion in the case Mukund Dewangan and after recording submissions of appellant in such case, the regular bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken a view that it is appropriate that the submissions which they have noted in such order is to be considered by a larger bench of three Judges and thereby, the matter was directed to be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for appropriate orders. Therefore, only because of such order to refer some issue to the larger bench, all such cases cannot wait for indefinite period, when there is effective judgment in the case of Mukund Dewangan by larger bench. 11. A reference of discussion by full Court in case of Pranay Sethi on the subject is relevant wherein paragraph No.20 reads as under, which confirms that when there is a judgment by bench of three learned judges, the bench of two learned Judges has to refer the matter before it to the bench of three learned Judges if they want to take a different view than the decision by 3 learned Judges in previous case. Paragraph No.20: In the context, we may fruitfully note what has been stated in Pradip Chandra Parija v. Pramod Chandra Patnaik. In the said case, the Constitution Bench was dealing with a situation where the two-Judges Bench disagreeing with the three-Judges Bench decision directed the matter to be placed before a larger Bench of five Judges of this Court. In that scenario, the Constitution Bench stated: (SCC p. 4, para 6) "6... In our view, judicial discipline and propriety demands that a Bench of two learned Judges should follow a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges. In that scenario, the Constitution Bench stated: (SCC p. 4, para 6) "6... In our view, judicial discipline and propriety demands that a Bench of two learned Judges should follow a decision of a Bench of three learned Judges. But if a Bench of two learned Judges concludes that an earlier judgment of three learned Judges is so very incorrect that in no circumstances can it be followed, the proper course for it to adopt is to refer the matter before it to a Bench of three learned Judges setting out, as has been done here, the reasons why it could not be agree with the earlier judgment..." 12. Even otherwise, as I have discussed herein above, in the present case, though plea is taken about not having valid driving license to drive transport vehicle by the driver of the vehicle in question, there is neither pleading nor proof before the Tribunal to prove such contention, more particularly, when driver is never joined as opponent in main petition and when even if witness summons is prayed for, Insurance Company could not examine the driver or no other witness to prove that the driver was not having valid license to drive such vehicle. Therefore, in absence of evidence, there must be a presumption that driver was having a valid license. 13. Thereby, there is no substance in the appeal preferred by the Insurance Company and same needs to be dismissed. However, before putting an end to it, since there is Cross Objection preferred by original claimants, we have to deal with them. In Cross Objection, the claimants have mainly challenged the quantum of compensation, contending that in absence of any evidence in rebuttal and when claimants have not come forward with any exaggeration in disclosing the income of the deceased victim of road accident, Tribunal has unnecessarily considered the income of the deceased victim purely on presumption and that Tribunal has failed to consider the prospective income and to award just and reasonable compensation under different conventional heads. It is submitted that on such different conventional heads, at the relevant time, the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India were to the effect that there would be an aggregate award of Rs. 3,50,000/- on all such conventional heads, when claimants are widow and minors. It is submitted that on such different conventional heads, at the relevant time, the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India were to the effect that there would be an aggregate award of Rs. 3,50,000/- on all such conventional heads, when claimants are widow and minors. It is also contended that when claimants are widow and four children of the deceased, the Tribunal has erred in deducting 1/3rd income of the victim as personal expenses instead of deducting 1/4th as per the decision in the case of Sarla Verma & Ors vs Delhi Transport Corp.& Anr., (2009) ACJ 1298. 14. Therefore, if we peruse the award, it becomes clear that though there is evidence on record that deceased was aged about 42 years and earning Rs. 3,500/-, the Tribunal has instead of adding reasonable amount towards prospective income, reduced the income of the deceased from Rs. 3,500/- to Rs. 3,000/- for calculating the quantum of compensation, and after deducting Rs. 1,000/- i.e. 1/3rd income towards personal expenses and applying 14 as suitable multiplier, awarded Rs. 3,36,000/- towards loss of dependency. To such amount, Tribunal has added only Rs. 22,000/- in aggregate for different conventional heads so as to arrive at total compensation of Rs. 3,58,000/- as awarded by impugned judgment. 15. Therefore, by all means, there is substance in the Cross Objection so as to enhance the amount of compensation, thereby, to modify the award suitably. 16. I have scrutinized the available R & P and considered the rival submissions. It is true that claimants have not exaggerated anything in their claim petition when they have come forward with a case that deceased victim was earning Rs. 3,500/- p.m. by serving in Panjrapole (Cow Shelter Home). Therefore, even if we may not take the salary of the victim as stated by the claimants and even if we consider Rs. 3,000/- as earnings on the date of accident, there is need to add prospective income so as to arrive at average earning capacity of the deceased. Therefore, considering the age of the victim being 42 years at the relevant time, relying upon the decision in the case of Pranay Sethi, 25% of earnings is to be added towards prospective income, thereby, the actual average earning of the deceased would be Rs. 3,750/-. From such amount, if we deduct 1/4th i.e. Rs. Therefore, considering the age of the victim being 42 years at the relevant time, relying upon the decision in the case of Pranay Sethi, 25% of earnings is to be added towards prospective income, thereby, the actual average earning of the deceased would be Rs. 3,750/-. From such amount, if we deduct 1/4th i.e. Rs. 950/- towards personal expenses, since there are five dependents of the deceased, the monthly loss of dependency would be Rs. 2,800/- to such monthly loss, if we apply 14 as suitable multiplier, then, total loss of dependency of the claimants would be Rs. 4,70,400/-. To such amount, now, as per the decision of full Bench in the case of Pranay Sethi , we have to add Rs. 70,000/- in aggregate for different conventional heads. Thereby, total amount of compensation that may be awarded to the claimants would come to Rs. 5,40,000/-. Though original claim is for Rs. 5 Lacs only, considering the decision in Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 274 , it is made clear that irrespective of actual claim by the claimants, the court is empowered to award just and reasonable compensation even if it is more than what is claimed by the claimants. However, since Tribunal has awarded an amount of Rs. 3,58,000/-, now, the claimants are entitled to additional amount of Rs. 1,82,000/- with 9% interest from the date of claim petition till its realisation, though Tribunal has awarded only 7.5% interest on Rs. 3,58,000/-. However, since that amount has been deposited by the Insurance Company as per the directions of this court, there is no need to modify that part of the award. 17. Therefore, the Cross Objection is allowed as prayed for, whereby, now, the impugned award is to be modified accordingly.