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2018 DIGILAW 953 (RAJ)

Durga Ram v. Hukma Ram

2018-04-06

DINESH MEHTA

body2018
JUDGMENT Dinesh Mehta, J. -The present appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred by the appellant-plaintiff questioning the legality of order dated 11.02.2015 passed by learned Additional District & Sessions Judge No.2, Jodhpur Metropolitan, Jodhpur (hereinafter referred to as "Appellate Court"), whereby the appeal (No. 16/2014) filed by the appellant has been dismissed having been filed belatedly. 2. The facts within the precincts of the proposed questions of law, claimed to have arisen in the present appeal, lie in a narrow compass, which are as under:- 3. Plaintiff (the appellant herein) filed a suit for permanent and mandatory injunction against the defendants - respondents, inter alia, praying that the defendants No.1 be restrained from encroaching the land, ad-measuring 4x25 feet, being a public land and at the same time, the plaintiff be permitted to use and enjoy the piece of land, ad-measruing 25x45 feet. 4. The learned Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division) No.6 Jodhpur Metropolitan, Jodhpur (hereinafter referred to as "Trial Court") dealing with the oral and ocular evidence led by the parties, rejected the suit so filed by the appellant with the following observations:- vuqrks"k pwafd fook|d la[;k ,d ,oa nks oknh }kjk okn i= esa pkgs x, vuqrks"k ls lEcfU/kr Fks vkSj O;ogkj izfdz;k lafgrk esa dksbZ Hkh ekeyk r; djrs le; lqLFkkfir fLFkfr gS fd blesa U;k;ky; dks i{kdkjksa }kjk izLrqr fd, x, vf/kopuksa ds leFkZu esa ekSf[kd o izys[kuh; lk{; dh lEHkkO;rk vkSj ckgqY;rk ij fopkj djuk gksxkA bl izdj.k esa oknh us viuh ekSf[kd o izys[kuh; lk{; ls fook|d la[;k ,d nks o rhu dks vius i{k esa lkfcr ugha fd;k gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa oknh }kjk okn i= esa pkgk x;k vuqrks"k iznr fd;k tkuk U;k;ksfpr vkSj fof/klEer ugha gksxkA lkFk gh ;g mfYyf[kr fd;k tkuk Hkh mfpr izrhr gksrk gS fd izfroknh la[;k nks o rhu ds fo:) Hkh nkok [kkfjt fd;k tkuk mfpr izrhr gksrk gS vkSj pwafd ;g Lok;r'kklh ljdkjh laLFkk,a gSa] tks fd vfrdze.k gksus ij fof/kuqlkj vius Lrj ij dk;Zokgh djus ds fy, Lora= gSA vkns'k vr% oknh dk okn ckcr LFkk;h fu"ks/kkKk o vkKkid fu"ks/kkKk fo:) izfroknhx.k vLohdkj dj [kkfjt fd;k tkrk gSA [kpkZ i{kdkjku viuk&viuk ogu djsaxsA rnuqlkj fMdzh ipkZ eqfrZc gksA 5. The appellant - plaintiff despite being aware of rejection of his suit had opted not to challenge the same and he filed an appeal against the judgment and decree aforesaid only after receiving the notice of the appeal, filed by the defendants. As the limitation for filing the appeal had since passed, the appellant filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act inter alia, seeking condonation of delay. 6. As the essence of the issue involved in the present case is, as to whether the appellant was having sufficient reasons for not filing the appeal in time or not; it would not be out of place to reproduce the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the appellant:- izkFkhZ @vihykaV dh vksj ls fuosnu fuEufyf[kr gS fd%& 01& ;g fd izkFkhZ@vihykaV us ,d fnokuh vihy is'k v/khuLFk U;k;ky; tks/kiqj ds vkns'k fu.kZ; ds fo:) is'k dh ftlesa vihykaV dks lQyrk feyus dh iwjh lEHkkouk gSA 02& ;g fd izkFkhZ@vihykaV ljdkjh v/;kid gS] tks tks/kiqj ls nwj gS tks dHkh&dHkkj vius ?kj tks/kiqj esa vkrs gSa] ,oa tc jsLiksMs.V o vihykaV ds e/; tc v/khuLFk U;k;ky; dk vkns'k gqvk rd nksuksa esa vkilh jkthukek gks x;k fd vc mDr nkok dh vihy [kkfjt ugha djsaxs] jsLiksMsUV us pqids&pqids vihy is'k dj nh ,oa tc uksfVl vihykaV ds ikl vk, rc tkudkjh gqbZA bl dkj.k vihy izLrqr djus esa rFkk mlds ikl lEidZ lk/ku ugha gksus ds dkj.k le; ij vius vf/koDrk ls lEidZ ugha dj ldkA 03& ;g fd izkFkhZ 'kgj tks/kiqj ls ckgj gksus ds dkj.k o lEidZ lk/ku u gksus ds dkj.k vius vf/koDrk ls lEidZ ugha dj ldk ftldh ekdwy otg gSA 04& ;g fd izfdz;k dkuwu U;k; fnykus esa lk/kd gS] ck/kd ugha gS fdlh Hkh i{kdkj dks rduhdh vk/kkjksa ij U;k; ls oafpr ugha fd;k tk ldrkA vr% izkFkhZ dks vihy is'k djus esa tks nsjh gqbZ gS mls ekQ Qjek;k tkos o vihy vUnj E;kn 'kqekj dh tkosA fygktk izkFkZuki= is'k dj fuosnu gS fd U;k;fgr esa izkFkhZ }kjk izLrqr vihy dks vUnj E;kn 'kqekj dj vihy is'k djus esa gqbZ nsjh dks d.M+ksu Qjek;k tkosA 7. The said application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the appellant came to be rejected by the Appellate Court summarily, holding that there were no valid reasons or grounds, for which, the delay in filing the appeal deserved to be condoned. 8. It would not be out of place to reproduce the short order dated 11.02.2015 passed by the learned Appellate Court:- 11-02-2015 vihykFkhZ ds fo}ku vf/koDrk mifLFkrA jsLiksaM+sV ds fo}ku vf/koDrk mifLFkrA bl vihy esa vihykFkhZ ds }kjk /kkjk 5 ifjlhek vf/kfu;e dk izkFkZuk i= is'k fd;k ftldk tokc is'k gqvkA tokc dk voyksdu fd;k x;kA /kkjk 5 ifjlhek vf/kfu;e ds rgr tks vk/kkj crk;s x;s gS] tks bl izdkj gS& fd izkFkhZ vihykaV ljdkjh v/;kid gS] tks tks/kiqj ls nwj gS tks dHkh&dHkkj vius ?kj tks/kiqj esa vkrs gS] ,oa tc jsLiksM+sUV o vihykaV ds e/; tc v/khuLFk U;k;ky; dk vkns'k gqvk rc nksuks esa vkilh jkthukek gks x;k fd vc mDr nkok dh vihy ugha djsaxsA jsLiksM+sUV u pqids&pqids vihy is'k dj nh ,oa tc uksfVl vihykV ds ikl vk;s rc tkudkjh gqbZ bl dkj.k vihy izLrqr djus esa rFkk mlds ikl lEidZ lk/ku ugha gksus ds dkj.k le; ij vius vf/koDrk ls lEidZ ugha dj ldkA ;g vihy oLrqr% vkns'k fnuakd 23-04-2014 ds fo:) izLrqr dh xbZ gS ftlds fe;kn izLrqr djus dh 30 fnu gS vkSj ;g fnuakd 27-11-2014 dks izLrqr gqbZ gSA U;k;ky ; dk er gS fd ;g vihy /kkjk 5 ifjlhek vf/kfu;e ds rgr tks vk/kkj crk;s x;s gS os vk/kkj vuqfpr lelkef;d vk/kkj ugha gSA bl vk/kkj ij ifjlhek dks {kek ugha fd;k tk ldrkA vr% vihy fe;kn ckgj gksus ls [kkfjt dh tkrh gSA i =koyh Qsly 'kqekj gksdj nkf[ky n¶rj gksA 9. Mr. M.R. Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the learned Court below has committed a manifest error of law in rejecting appellant's appeal on the ground of delay. He contended that the Courts should be liberal in condoning the delay and the appellant had shown sufficient reasons for which he was unable to file the appeal in time. M.R. Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the learned Court below has committed a manifest error of law in rejecting appellant's appeal on the ground of delay. He contended that the Courts should be liberal in condoning the delay and the appellant had shown sufficient reasons for which he was unable to file the appeal in time. He contended that as clarified in the application, it was in light of the compromise between the parties, the appellant had decided not to prefer an appeal; but when he received the notice of the appeal filed by the respondents - defendants, he was also compelled to file an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. 10. According to him bona fide belief of the appellant that the defendants would not file an appeal, was itself a sufficient reason or explanation for the delay in filing the appeal. 11. When the Court expressed its prima facie opinion that the decision of the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is an appreciation of evidence or facts and exercise of discretion by the Court and it does not give rise to a question of law, much less a substantial question of law; Mr. Choudhary, learned counsel for the appellant responded that the finding of the Court below about not existence of sufficient cause is perverse, for which, his appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure deserves to be allowed. 12. Mr. S.D. Purohit, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand argued that the reasons shown by the appellant, in his application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act are baseless and there was no compromise between the parties, as alleged by the appellant and further that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not depict the reasons or explain the delay, much less explaining day to day delay. At last, he submitted that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be allowed so liberally or as a matter of course. While resting his submissions, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that no substantial question of law is involved in the present case, requiring adjudication by this Court. 13. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and given my thoughtful consideration over the matter. 14. While resting his submissions, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that no substantial question of law is involved in the present case, requiring adjudication by this Court. 13. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and given my thoughtful consideration over the matter. 14. A perusal of the application and contents thereof, as reproduced hereinabove, shows that the lame excuse taken by the appellant that the plaintiff and defendants had arrived at a compromise and decided that they would not file any appeal, is baseless and is not founded on any evidence or material. The reason ascribed by the appellant that despite having agreed not to file an appeal, the defendants had filed an appeal behind his back, is unpalatable, if not preposterous. 15. The other reason given by the appellant that he could not contact his counsel, as he was out of station is also unfounded, inasmuch as the appellant has shown himself to be a resident of 'Bhadwasiya', Jodhpur and has not disclosed, as to how and why he was out of town for such a considerable period, depriving him from contacting his counsel. 16. The averments made in para No.2 & 3 of the application are self contradictory and the appellant has made a failing attempt to fabricate the reasons for condonation of the inordinate delay, which otherwise is unpardonable, due to appellant's own indolent attitude. 17. As an up-shot of discussions aforesaid, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Court below has committed no error of law or facts in rejecting appellant's application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which has no merit. 18. The learned Appellate Court though passed a short order, but merely because of its length, it cannot be said to be an erroneous order. 19. The impugned order dated 11.02.2015, neither calls for any inference nor does it give rise to any substantial question of law, requiring determination by this Court. 20. The appeal is therefore, rejected, however without any order as to costs.