JUDGMENT 1. Challenge is to an order dated 1.9.2016 passed in Writ Petition No. 3268/2004; whereby learned Single Judge dwelling on the issue as to entitlement of an incumbent of the consequential benefit which enures on conversion of punishment of compulsory retirement into reduction of pay to minimum of the scale for five years, held him entitled for the entire salary and consequential benefit of the period during which he under compulsory retirement. 2. There is however delay of 526 days, the condonation whereof has been sought vide I.A.No. 2324/2018 and additional affidavit filed on 17.9.2018. In paragraph 3 of the additional affidavit it is stated on behalf of the appellant : “3. That, present appeal is against order dated 1.9.2016 passed by Hon'ble Writ Court in WPS No. 3268/2004. Petitioner served copy of the order dated 1.9.2016 to Appellant No. 3 with his application dated 14.2.2017. Appellant No. 3 sought legal opinion from office of Advocate General through letter dated 11.5.2017 which was given for filing appeal through letter dated 2.8.2017. Case for sanction of government for filing appeal was submitted through Police Head Quarter and Ministry, Home Department to Law Department. Protracted persuasion for sanction was made through letters dated 23.10.2017, 9.11.2017, 13.12.2017, 16.1.2018 and 28.2.2018. Sanction for filing appeal was granted through order dated 2.4.2018. Officer in Charge was appointed on 16.4.2018 who contacted office of Advocate General, got prepared the appeal and filed the same on 11.5.2018. Copy of this correspondence is being filed with this affidavit as Annexure A (collectively). The delay in filing appeal is due to time consumed in obtaining administrative sanction for filing the appeal. The same deserves to be condoned in the interest of justice.” 3. Though the application for condonation of delay has been opposed at by the respondent by relying on the decision in Gopinath Pillai v. State of Kerala and others [ (2007) 2 SCC 322 ], State of U.P. And another v. Amar nath yadav [ (2014) 2 SCC 422 ], Amalendu Kumar bera and two others v. State of West Bengal [ (2013) 4 SCC 52 ], State of M.P. and another v. Abdul Gani and others [ 2014 (3) MPLJ 265 ] and Pushpalata (Ku.) v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., [ 2012 (1) MPWN 10 ]. True it is, as borne out from the principle of law called out from the decisions relied upon that unless there exist a sufficient cause, the delay, however long or short, it may be cannot be condoned. Thus it is not the time taken in filing the petition, what is relevant is the sufficiency of cause which prevented the petitioner from filing the petition within prescribed period. Present is the case wherein the authority to take decision is not on an individual, but many a steps are required to be taken as is evident from paragraph 3 of the Additional Affidavit quoted supra. 4. In view whereof, we are of the considered opinion that in the fact situation of present case, sufficient cause being made out, the delay deserves to be and is hereby condoned. I.A.No. 2324/2018 stand disposed of. 5. Reverting to merit, the facts reveal that, the respondent, Head Constable, posted at Police Station Kotwali, District Datia, in 2003, was visited with the charge-sheet; following charges were levelled against him : “(I) On 13.12.2003 the petitioner caused obstruction in the proceedings initiated by the Station House Officer for performing the last rites of deceased brother-in-law of the petitioner as well as in the proceedings for lodging First Information Report and used unparliamentary language, therefore, the petitioner is guilty of insubordination. (II) The petitioner without obtaining any permission from the competent authority left the headquarter on 13.12.2003.” 6. The departmental enquiry culminated in order dated 13.12.2004 whereby he was punished with compulsory retirement. The appellant however found the punishment excessive and by order dated 14.3.2005 modified the punishment to that of 'reduction to the minimum of scale for a period of five years with the further order that the period of suspension shall be treated as suspension and the period of compulsory retirement as “no work no pay” '. However, the entire period was treated as service. 7. Respondent filed Writ Petition No. 3268/2004 with the following reliefs : “It is therefore most humbly prayed that this petition may kindly be allowed with costs by issuance of a writ order or direction quashing the order Annexure P-1 dated 13.12.2004 being wholly illegal, without jurisdiction and any other relief in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent which this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the present case may kindly be granted. Further the order Anneuxre P-12 deserves to be modified by reinstating the petitioner with full back wages and all consequential monetary benefits as well as seniority and the difference of salary of the suspension period and till thew32 orders are set aside the petitioner may kindly be directed to be paid all the arrears of salary with held prior to others Annexure P-1 and Annexure P-2 and thereafter till the orders are set aside be ordered to be paid along with interest at the rate of Rs. 12 % per annum.” 8. Learned Single Judge relying on the decision in Union of India and others v. K.V. Jankiraman, [ AIR 1991 SC 2010 ], faulted with the appellate order to the extent of “no work no pay” and directed the appellant herein to accord the benefit of salary as well as consequential benefits. 9. Exception is taken of the order on the contention that the principle of law laid down in Jankiraman (supra), is not attracted in a case wherein an order of removal, dismissal, or compulsory retirement (as in present case) is modified and the incumbent is reinstated in service. It is urged that same is governed by Madhya Pradesh Police Regulation 249 which stipulates that if a police officer who has been suspended is reinstated at the close of the enquiry or trial, the officer who ordered his trial or who passed final orders in the enquiry may grant him for the period of his absence from duty (a) if he is honorably acquitted, full salary and (b) if otherwise, such proportion of sum pay and allowance as the revising or appellate authority may prescribe (Rules 53 and 54 of the Fundamental Rules). 10. It is urged that in the case of Jankiraman (supra), the issue was regarding sealed cover procedure to be adhered where an incumbent within the zone of consideration is facing a departmental enquiry and if exonerated has been held entitled for the actual benefit of the period for which he was kept away from the promotion. 11. We find substantial force in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant, which subdues the stand taken by respondent that the impugned order is impeccable. 12. In Jankiraman (supra), the issue related to “sealed cover procedure” which is adopted when an employee is due for promotion, increment etc. 11. We find substantial force in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant, which subdues the stand taken by respondent that the impugned order is impeccable. 12. In Jankiraman (supra), the issue related to “sealed cover procedure” which is adopted when an employee is due for promotion, increment etc. but disciplinary/criminal proceedings are pending against him at the relevant time and hence, the findings of his entitlement to the benefit are kept in a sealed cover to be opened after the proceedings in question are over. Evidently, the issue as to whether entitlement of an incumbent of the consequential benefit which enures a conversion of punishment to compulsory retirement in reduction of pay, was not the issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 13. Thus the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not dwelling on the issue as in the present case, which is governed by Madhya Pradesh Fundamental Rule 54. Sub-Rule (1) whereof stipulates : “(1) When a Government servant who has been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired is reinstated as a result of appeal review or would have been so re-instated but for his retirement on superannuation, while under suspension or not, the authority competent to order re-instatement shall consider and make a specific order : (a) regarding the pay and allowances to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence from duty including the period of suspension preceeding his dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, and (b) whether or not the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty.” 14. Evident it is from the appellate order that, the appellate authority was exercising the discretion vested in it under Fundamental Rule 54 (1). However, there is a glitch. When the impugned order is tested on the above analysis, it cannot be given stamp of approval. Evident it is from the appellate order that, the appellate authority was exercising the discretion vested in it under Fundamental Rule 54 (1). However, there is a glitch. When the impugned order is tested on the above analysis, it cannot be given stamp of approval. However, even the appellate order to the extent of the direction regarding period of absence during compulsory retirement cannot be approved of when tested on the anvil of sub-rule (4) of Fundamental Rule 54 which stipulates : “(4) In the cases other than those covered by subrule (2) including the cases where the order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service is set aside by the appellate or reviewing authority solely on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of Clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution and no further enquiry is proposed to be held, the Government servant shall subject to the provision of sub-rules (6) and (7), be paid such amount (not being the whole) of the pay and allowances to which he would have been entitled had he not been dismissed, removed or compulsorily retired or suspended prior to such dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement, as the case may be, as the competent authority may determine, after giving notice to the Government servant of the quantum proposed and after considering the representation, if any, submitted by him in that connection within such period which in no case shall exceed sixty days from the date on which the notice has been served as may be specified in the notice : Provided that any payment under this sub-rule to a Government servant {other than a Government servant who is governed by the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (4) of 1936} shall be restricted to a period of three years immediately preceeding the date on which orders for reinstatement of such Government servant are passed by the Appellate Authority or Reviewing Authority, of immediately preceding the date of retirement on superannuation of such Government servant, as the case may be.” 15. No material is commended at to establish that before taking decision as regard to period under consideration an opportunity of hearing was given to the respondent employee as is contemplated under Fundamental Rule 54 (4). 16. No material is commended at to establish that before taking decision as regard to period under consideration an opportunity of hearing was given to the respondent employee as is contemplated under Fundamental Rule 54 (4). 16. Consequently, while setting aside the impugned order dated 1.9.2016 passed in W.P.No. 3268/2004 and the order dated 14.3.2005; whereby, the period of suspension is treated as suspension and period of compulsory retirement as not spent on duty, the matter is remitted to the appellate authority for fresh consideration after affording an opportunity of hearing to the respondent. Let the decision be taken within three months from the date of communication of this order. 17. The appeal is disposed of finally in above terms. No costs.