JUDGMENT AND ORDER : 1. Heard learned advocates for the petitioner and the respondent. 2. In present petition, the petitioner has prayed, inter-alia, that: "6(A) That Your Lordships be pleased to issue an order, direction and/or writ in the nature of certiorari and/or any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing and setting aside the impugned Award dated 5.5.2016, as being illegal, contrary to record and be pleased to direct the respondent to reinstate the petitioner on his original post with continuity of service with full backwages. ALTERNATIVELY (B) Your Lordships be pleased to quash and set aside the aforesaid Award and be pleased to remand back the aforesaid reference to the labour court for fresh adjudication on merit." 3. The petitioner (original claimant before the learned Labour Court at Rajkot) is aggrieved by the award dated 5.5.2016 passed by the learned Labour Court in Reference (LCR) no. 62 of 2011 whereby the learned Labour Court rejected the reference. 4. So far as the factual background is concerned, it has emerged that the petitioner herein raised industrial dispute with the allegation that the opponent employer illegally terminated his service and that, therefore, he should be reinstated in service with all benefits. Appropriate government referred the dispute for adjudication to learned Labour Court at Rajkot vide order dated 7.2.2011. The learned Labour Court registered said dispute as Reference (LCR) No. 62 of 2011. 4.1 Before the learned Labour Court, the claimant filed statement of claim, wherein he alleged, inter alia, that the opponent employer was engaged in the business of publication of books journals and magazines. He alleged that he was engaged by the opponent employer as Business Executive in November 1986 and he worked as such, at New Delhi where he was in-charge of the business and the activity of the opponent employer in Punjab and Delhi. The claimant also alleged that he also looked after the business and activities and interest of the opponent employer in other States as well. According to the claimant, subsequently he was transferred as Manager, to the opponent's branch at Rajkot. The claimant also asserted that in 1997 he was promoted to the post of Divisional Manager and he was transferred and posted at Ahmedabad. The claimant also claimed that in 1998, he was again transferred as Branch Manager to Rajkot and at that time the opponent reduced his salary from Rs. The claimant also asserted that in 1997 he was promoted to the post of Divisional Manager and he was transferred and posted at Ahmedabad. The claimant also claimed that in 1998, he was again transferred as Branch Manager to Rajkot and at that time the opponent reduced his salary from Rs. 15,000/ to Rs. 10,000/- and subsequently in April 2008 on the pretext that the activities in the State are to be wound up and the offices are to be closed down, the opponent terminated his service with effect from 1.4.2008 by oral instructions. With the said allegation, the claimant further alleged that his service came to be terminated on 1.4.2008 without following procedure prescribed by law and in violation of principles of natural justice as well as statutory provisions, i.e. sections 25F, 25FFF, 25G and 25H. He demanded that he should be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits. 4.2 The opponent opposed the reference. In its written statement, the opponent raised preliminary objection against maintainability of the reference on the ground that the claimant was not and cannot be considered 'workman' within the meaning of the term defined under section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and that the dispute raised by him cannot be considered 'industrial dispute' as defined under section 2(k) of the Act and that, therefore, the reference is not maintainable. The opponent submitted, in its written statement, that the claimant was engaged as business executive in 1996 and he was responsible for the Company's activities and its business and he was paid commission on the basis of the development of business by and through him. It was claimed that initially the claimant-petitioner worked at Delhi and thereafter he was shifted to Rajkot and Ahmedabad. The opponent claimed that in May 2000, the claimant was appointed/ promoted as Branch Manager and he worked in that capacity and on that post till 2007-08. The opponent asserted that it had suffered heavy loss and the business in the State was non-remunerative and the company started incurring heavy losses which could not be absorbed and that, therefore, it was decided to discontinue all activities and consequently, the office/establishment came to be closed down and the claimant was discontinued. The opponent employer also claimed in the written statement that the claimant had filed a petition which was dismissed. The opponent employer also claimed in the written statement that the claimant had filed a petition which was dismissed. The opponent employer also claimed that the claimant had not submitted accounts and amounts received by him and that, therefore, the company was compelled to file civil suit (i.e. Civil Suit No. 188 of 2011) for recovering the amounts due and receivable from the claimant. The opponent also asserted before the learned Labour Court that the claimant was already employed in another company at Rajkot as Branch Manager (i.e. in an establishment @ 117, HIG Sarita Vihar, University Road, Rajkot) and that, therefore, he was gainfully employed and earning income / salary while working as Branch Manager with other establishment. With the said ground, the opponent contended hat the reference is not maintainable and should be dismissed. 4.3 After the parties completed their pleadings, learned Labour Court received oral as well as documentary evidence. The deposition of the claimant was recorded at Exh.120. The claimant filed about 91 documents. On behalf of the opponent employer, evidence of one Mr.Sanjay Jain was recorded at Exh.35. The opponent employer placed on record about 11 documents. 4.4 After the parties concluded their evidence, the learned Labour Court heard rival submissions. Upon conclusion of the proceedings, the learned Labour Court considered the material available on record and rival submissions. 5. The learned Labour Court considered primary objection raised by the opponent employer against maintainability of the Reference and treated it as preliminary issue and after hearing the parties the Court reached to the conclusion that the claimant cannot be considered 'workman' and that the dispute raised by him cannot be termed 'industrial dispute' and that, therefore, the reference is not maintainable. 6. Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner assailed the impugned award and submitted that the learned Labour Court committed mistake in holding that the claimant was not a workman and that, therefore, the reference is not maintainable. He submitted that the opponent had merely designated the claimant as Divisional Manager and Branch Manager, however, the nature of duties performed by the claimant were of clerical and that, therefore, the findings of fact and conclusions recorded by the learned Labour Court are incorrect. He submitted that the learned Labour Court committed error in not appreciating the documents available on record and his deposition. He submitted that the learned Labour Court committed error in not appreciating the documents available on record and his deposition. According to learned advocate for the petitioner, the findings of fact recorded by the learned Labour Court are erroneous and that the material available on record as well as the claimant's deposition established that the claimant was engaged in clerical category and he performed duties of clerical nature. Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the learned Labour Court ought to have held that in view of the duties performed by the claimant, he should be considered 'workman'. Mr. Mishra further submitted that having regard to the fact that the claimant had worked for more than 12 months, whereas his service was terminated without following any procedure prescribed under section 25F, the learned Labour Court ought to have allowed the reference with the direction to the opponent to reinstate the claimant. With the said submission, Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the petition may be allowed and the opponent may be directed to reinstate the claimant or the proceedings may be remanded to learned Labour Court so that the evidence which is not considered by the learned Labour Court or which is not properly appreciated, may be considered and fresh decision can be rendered. 7. Learned advocate for the opponent opposed the submission by Mr. Mishra, learned advocate for the petitioner. She submitted that the claimant was engaged as business executive and thereafter he worked with the respondent establishment as Branch Manager. She also submitted that the petitioner's remuneration was about Rs. 15,000/- i.e. more than the pecuniary limit mentioned under the Industrial Disputes Act and that, therefore, by any standard the petitioner cannot be considered 'workman'. She submitted that the reference at the behest of the claimant who cannot be considered 'workman' was not maintainable and therefore, the learned Labour Court decided the said issue as primary objection and on appreciating of the documentary evidence, the learned Labour Court rightly reached to the conclusion that the claimant cannot be considered 'workman' within meaning of the term mentioned under section 2(s) of the Act. She submitted that the learned Labour Court rightly rejected the reference. She submitted that petition deserves to be rejected. 8. I have considered rival submissions and material available on record. She submitted that the learned Labour Court rightly rejected the reference. She submitted that petition deserves to be rejected. 8. I have considered rival submissions and material available on record. I have also considered impugned award and the documents placed on record in present petition. Besides this, after taking into account the preliminary submissions by learned advocates, R&P (vide order dated 23.7.2018) was called for. I have also examined original Record ( & proceedings) of the reference case. 9. At the outset, it would be relevant and appropriate to take into account the definition of the term 'workman' defined under section 2(s) of the Act. The said section 2(s) reads thus: "(s) "workman" means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person - (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 or the Army Act, 1950, or the Navy Act, 1957. (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison. (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity. (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison. (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity. (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercise, either by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature." 9.1 It would also be appropriate to take into account the definition of the term 'industrial dispute' defined under section 2(k) of the Act, which reads thus: "(k) "industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person." 9.2 In light of above quoted provision and in light of the fact that dispute was referred to learned Labour Court by appropriate government and in light of the fact that the reference is adjudicated and decided by learned Labour Court coupled with the fact that the claimant chose the forum and proceeded with the adjudication of dispute before learned Labour Court without raising any objection against the jurisdiction of learned Labour Court to decide the dispute/ reference, it would be appropriate to take into account Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act which under special Court namely Labour Court is created by way of special forum and remedy for adjudication of industrial disputes. The said Section 7 reads thus: "Section 7(1)The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the second schedule and for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act. (2) A Labour Court shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the appropriate Government." 9.3 From the said provision it comes out that Labour Court is conferred with jurisdiction to decide industrial dispute mentioned in 2nd Schedule of the Act. The said 2nd Schedule reads thus: "THE SECOND SCHEDULE (See section 7) MATTERS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF LABOUR COURTS 1. The propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing, orders; 2. The application and interpretation of standing orders; 3. The said 2nd Schedule reads thus: "THE SECOND SCHEDULE (See section 7) MATTERS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF LABOUR COURTS 1. The propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing, orders; 2. The application and interpretation of standing orders; 3. Discharge or dismissal of workmen including reinstatement of, or grant of relief to, workmen wrongfully dismissed. 4. Withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege. 5. Illegality or otherwise of a strike or lockout; 6. All matters other than those specified in the Third Schedule." 9.4 From above quoted provision it becomes clear that subject related to and arising from discharge or dismissal including the dispute demanding reinstatement falls within purview of Labour Court. 10. In this background, it becomes necessary to revert to the provisions under Section 2(k) of the Act, which prescribes the definition of the term "Industrial Dispute" (which is quoted above). 10.1 On plain reading of the said definition it becomes clear that all disputes between two parties cannot be considered as "industrial dispute". A "dispute" will partake character of "industrial dispute" only if (1) it involves a dispute or difference between "employer" and "workman" (u/s 2(s) of the Act) or between employers and employers or between workman and workman and (2) the subject matter of such "dispute" must be "connected" with "employment or non-employment" or the terms of employment or condition of labour. 10.2 Thus, the dispute which is raised by a workman in connection with the matters related to his employment or un-employment or term of employment or condition of service would be considered industrial dispute. Differently put, if a dispute is raised by "non-workman", even if with regard to the subject connected with employment or non-employment of such "non-workman" would not amount to and would not partake character of industrial dispute. 10.3 Under the circumstances, it would become necessary to decide as to whether the person who has raised the dispute can be said to be workman or not. 10.4 For that purpose it would be necessary to revert to the definition of the term workman under Section 2(s) of the Act. 10.5 The said definition is reproduced above. On plain reading of the said definition it comes out that a person who is employed namely in Managerial or administrative capacity cannot be said as workman. 10.4 For that purpose it would be necessary to revert to the definition of the term workman under Section 2(s) of the Act. 10.5 The said definition is reproduced above. On plain reading of the said definition it comes out that a person who is employed namely in Managerial or administrative capacity cannot be said as workman. 10.6 Likewise, a person who is engaged for supervisory work and draws salary exceeding Rs. 1600/- (the limit which was applicable when the service of the claimant came to be terminated in April, 2008, but came to be amended with effect from 15.9.2010 and was enhanced to Rs. 10,000), cannot be termed workman. 11. In present case, it has emerged from the record that the salary of the workman was, undisputedly, Rs. 15000/-. 11.1 Of course he alleged that during last phase of his service when he was transferred back to Rajkot from Ahmedabad his salary was reduced from Rs. 15000/- to Rs. 10,000/-. 11.2 However, even with said salary (i.e. Rs. 10000/-) the claimant- petitioner was drawing salary more than the maximum limit of salary for falling within purview of term "workman" prescribed under the Act. Thus, the petitioner did not fall within the boundary prescribed by the Act and on plain reading of relevant provision it would emerged that (1) the petitioner's salary was more than the limit prescribed under the Act; and (2) as Business Executive and/ or as Branch Manager he was engaged in Managerial or administrative capacity or atleast his duties were of supervisory nature (3) the dispute raised by him, therefore cannot be termed industrial dispute. 12. In this view of the matter, the only question which would survive before learned Labour Court, in light of petitioner's objection, was to examine as to whether the claimant- petitioner work and duties were mainly Managerial or administrative or whether he was employed to do "supervisory work" for wages exceeding Rs. 1600/-. 13. From details discussion in the award it has emerged that the learned Court has discussed, at length, entire documentary and oral evidence, and the Court has also recorded sufficient, satisfactory reasons for its findings which are based on said evidence. 14. 1600/-. 13. From details discussion in the award it has emerged that the learned Court has discussed, at length, entire documentary and oral evidence, and the Court has also recorded sufficient, satisfactory reasons for its findings which are based on said evidence. 14. What emerges from the discussion by the Court can be summarised thus:- (a) In this context, it is relevant to record that the claimant himself, in his statement of claim, asserted that he was engaged in capacity of "Business Executive" and thereafter he was promoted to the post of branch manager. He even admitted said fact during his cross-examination. He also claimed that for some time he was promoted to the post of Divisional manager and transferred to Ahmedabad and then he was again brought to Rajkot as Branch Manager. (b) The said statements and admission by the claimant establish that he was employed in Managerial or administrative capacity or atleast he was engaged for supervisory work and he was drawing wages exceeding the limit prescribed under the Act i.e. Rs. 1600. Thus, prima facie, all ingredients which would take the claimant within purview of the term workman, exist and they emerge from the claimant's own statement of claim and his deposition, more particularly from the nature of his work and duties. (c) In Para-10 of the award, learned Labour Court has taken into account and dealt with the statements/ admission by the workman during his examination-in-chief and cross-examination (in his deposition). (d) From the discussion in the award, more particularly in Para-10 of the award it comes out that the claimant had placed on a record and relied on the document dated 1.5.2000 (Exh-35). (e) On conjoint reading of claimant's deposition and the said document learned Labour Court reached to the findings of fact and learned Labour Court recorded that the claimant, a Branch Manager, was conferred with all authorities and power to take decisions on behalf of Tender World Net (i.e. the opponent). (f) The learned Labour Court, after taking into account Exh-44 and Exh-86 also found that at the office of the establishment where the claimant worked, 6 persons were employed. Out of the said 6 persons, 2 persons were drawing salary and 4 persons were paid commission. (f) The learned Labour Court, after taking into account Exh-44 and Exh-86 also found that at the office of the establishment where the claimant worked, 6 persons were employed. Out of the said 6 persons, 2 persons were drawing salary and 4 persons were paid commission. Thus, atleast 6 persons were working under the claimant and even if the 4 persons who were paid commission are not considered employee, then also 2 persons (employees) were working under direct authority and supervision of present claimant and other 4 persons worked under supervision by the claimant. The said 2 persons were paid Rs. 2250/- and Rs. 1650/- by way of wages whereas the petitioner's salary was shown at Rs. 15,000/- and for some period at Rs. 10,000/-. (g) Besides this, in Para-7 of the award, the learned Labour Court has, on the basis of the claimant's deposition, discussed the nature and scope of the duties and functions performed by the claimant, wherein learned Labour Court has recorded that the principal activity of the petitioner-claimant was development and expansion of business. (h) It also comes out from the record that while he worked as Branch Manager at Rajkot, a Peon, an Office Assistant, and other employee worked under him and he used to instruct and supervise the other employees and he performed supervisory duties on the basis of the Policy and direction from head office. 15. In light of the said admission by the claimant, learned Labour Court reached to the conclusion and recorded findings of fact that the claimant was engaged in Managerial and administrative capacity and in any case he performed duties of supervisory nature and that his salary was Rs. 15000/- and Rs. 10,000/- i.e. more than Rs. 1600/- limit prescribed under the Act and that therefore the claimant cannot be termed workman and he would not fall within purview of Section 2(s) of the Act. 15.1 Learned advocate for the petitioner has failed to point out any material from the record to demonstrate that the said findings of fact by learned Labour Court is contrary to the evidence on record or the said findings are perverse. 15.2 There is nothing on record which would show that the findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court are incorrect or perverse and the said findings and the conclusions should be set-aside. 15.2 There is nothing on record which would show that the findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court are incorrect or perverse and the said findings and the conclusions should be set-aside. 15.3 A document (Exh-32) is found at Page-203 of R&P. From the said document it comes out that the claimant himself, during several press meetings, re-presented the respondent company and he introduced himself as Divisional Manager. 15.4 Even in his visiting card the claimant himself has mentioned and described his post/ designation as Divisional Manager. 15.5 Besides this, certain documents (Certificates) issued by present respondent are also available on the record (R&P) (e.g. Exh-35, Page-206) which is certificate dated 1.5.2000 issued by respondent wherein petitioner is introduced/ certified as Branch Manager. 15.6 Besides this, copies of pay bills are also found from R&P which give out that the claimant was drawing salary of Rs. 15,000/- and Rs. 10,000/-. 16. From the record it has also emerged that the opponent had submitted application dated 1.10.2012 and raised preliminary objection to the effect that relationship of employer and employee did not exist between claimant and that the claimant was engaged in Managerial and Administrative capacity and for supervisory duties with salary more than the prescribed limit and that therefore he cannot be termed workman. 16.1 With the said application, the opponent requested the learned Labour Court to decide the said objection as preliminary issue. 16.2 The learned Labour Court heard the claimant's objection against the said application and vide order dated 15.2.2013 declared that the said objection will be considered as preliminary issue. 16.3 Thereupon the learned Labour Court considered the oral and documentary evidence placed on record, learned Labour Court reached to the findings of fact that the claimant cannot be termed "workman" within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act and that therefore dispute raised by the claimant cannot be termed industrial dispute and consequently reference is not maintainable. 16.4 The learned Labour Court, to support and fortify the said conclusion also relied on the decision in case of Bata (India) Limited and Ors. v. S.K. Chawla, (2005) 3 GLR 2066 . In the said case the claimant worked as shop manager and this Court, having regard to the evidence and the findings of fact recorded by the trial court held that shop manager cannot be considered workman. v. S.K. Chawla, (2005) 3 GLR 2066 . In the said case the claimant worked as shop manager and this Court, having regard to the evidence and the findings of fact recorded by the trial court held that shop manager cannot be considered workman. 16.5 In present case, learned advocate for the petitioner has failed to point out any material from record which would demonstrate that: (a) the petitioner was not performing duties of supervisory nature and/or that (b) he was not engaged in administrative capacity as business executive and thereafter he was not performing duties of managerial and/or administrative nature in his capacity as Branch Manager/Divisional Manager. There is nothing on record, except the unsubstantiated allegation during examination-in-chief to support claimant's statement that he performed duty of clerical nature. On the other hand above mentioned admissions during cross- examination support the findings and conclusions. 17. In this view of the matter, the findings of fact recorded by learned Labour Court cannot be faulted. Even otherwise, when it emerges from the record that the findings of fact recorded by learned Trial Court are based on evidence available on record and that the said findings of fact are not without support of any evidence or that they are perverse, this Court would not sit in appeal over such findings of fact and would not interfere with the findings of fact recorded by learned Labour Court unless it is demonstrated that the said findings of fact are perverse or without support of findings of facts or glaringly and strikingly contrary to the evidence present on record before learned trial Court. 17.1 In this context, profitable reference can be had to the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mastaqim and others, (1984) AIR SC 38 wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that "The supervisory Jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority" and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. In this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Art. 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior Court or Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision." 18. In present case, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate the said aspect. 19. Therefore there is nothing which would convince this Court to hold that that findings of fact recorded by learned Labour Court are contrary to evidence on record or perverse. There is also nothing on record which would convince this Court to take a view different from the view taken by learned Labour Court. 20. Consequently, the petition fails and deserves to be rejected and is accordingly rejected. Notice discharged.