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2018 DIGILAW 959 (KAR)

V. M. Karekar S/o. Sri. Mukunda v. State of Karnataka

2018-09-10

H.B.PRABHAKARA SASTRY

body2018
ORDER : The petitioners herein have filed the present writ petitions for quashing the validity of initiation of the criminal case against them in Crime No.91/2015 dated 13.08.2015 by respondent No.1 – police based upon a complaint dated 12.08.2015 filed by the Assistant Director of Sericulture Government Grainage, Madhugiri. According to the petitioners, the said complaint was based on the instructions/directions dated 04.08.2015 issued by the second respondent i.e., the Commissioner, Department of Sericulture on 08.08.2015 to the Assistant Director of Sericulture. 2. The summary of the complaint averments reveals the allegations that; about 20 persons whose names appear in the complaint dated 12.08.2015 are jointly responsible for not taking into account the seed cocoons that they have taken from the Biovoltine Seed market of different market areas in the stock register maintained at Government Grainage, Madhugiri. It is further alleged that the process of preparation of laying of the silk worm eggs is also not carried forward and as a consequence of which all the 20 accused are jointly responsible for causing loss to the Government to the tune of Rs. 50.51 lakhs. 3. It is the contention as well the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that there are no overt acts attributed against the petitioners in committing the offences under Sections 409 and 420 of Indian Penal Code, 1908. 4. The petitioners in WP Nos.440-441 of 2016 have worked as Sericulture Inspectors under the control of Assistant Director, Sericulture, Government Cocoon Market, Sirsi, Uttar Kannada District who procure the seed cocoons, certify for seed quality and dispose the seed cocoons to the Government Grainage. However, on the basis of the letter dated 07/09.05.2007 of the Deputy Director, Zilla Panchayat, Sirsi, there was a Departmental Enquiry conducted through a retired District Judge. The said Enquiry Officer in his report dated 05.12.2008 opined that the said Inspectors are not responsible for not taking into account of the stock received into the Government Grainage, Madhugiri. On the contrary, the Enquiry Officer observed that one Sri.Krishnappa, an Assistant in Supernumerary post along with the Assistant Director Sri.Sathenahalli are responsible. 5. The said Enquiry Officer in his report dated 05.12.2008 opined that the said Inspectors are not responsible for not taking into account of the stock received into the Government Grainage, Madhugiri. On the contrary, the Enquiry Officer observed that one Sri.Krishnappa, an Assistant in Supernumerary post along with the Assistant Director Sri.Sathenahalli are responsible. 5. It is also the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that with respect to the petitioners in WP No.49160/2015, the said petitioner was not at all working in the Government Grainage, Madhugiri at any point of time during the period from 11.04.2001 to 30.04.2015, as he was working as the Deputy Director in the office of the Directorate during the said period. Therefore, his involvement in the alleged commission of crime cannot be believed. 6. With respect to petitioners in WP Nos.49161-49164 of 2015, it is the argument of learned counsel that they were working as Inspectors under the control of Assistant Director, Sericulture, Belgaum and have procured the cocoons, certified the seed quality and disposed the seed cocoons to Government Grainage, Madhugiri without any hindrance. With respect to the allegations leveled against them, the retired District Judge conducted enquiry and has submitted the report holding that the petitioners are not responsible for the charges. On the contrary, the above said Sri.Krishnappa, an Assistant in supernumerary post along with the Assistant Director Sri.Sathenahalli are responsible. 7. That being the case, when the petitioners are shown to have been proved innocent in the Departmental Enquiry, they cannot be subjected to a criminal investigation. 8. Learned counsel further submitted that the alleged irregularities said to have been taken place about 14 years back during the period between 01.04.2003 to 31.03.2007 and also that they have been exonerated in the Departmental Enquiry, as such, initiating any criminal action against them is an harassment to them, as such, the criminal proceedings initiated against them deserves to be quashed. 9. In his support, he relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P.S.Rajya Vs. State of Bihar reported in (1996) 9 SCC 1 . 10. Learned High Court Government Pleader for the respondents submits that the allegations leveled against the petitioners are already serious in nature. 9. In his support, he relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P.S.Rajya Vs. State of Bihar reported in (1996) 9 SCC 1 . 10. Learned High Court Government Pleader for the respondents submits that the allegations leveled against the petitioners are already serious in nature. Even though the Departmental Enquiry is said to have been shown that the guilt against the present accused are not proved, but for the lack of material to show that they were tried for the very same charges, the same cannot be taken into consideration. He further submitted that an acquittal in the departmental enquiry is not a bar for holding criminal investigation. 11. In his support, he relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of N.C.T. Delhi Vs. Ajay Kumar Tyagi in Crl.A.No.1339/2012 decided on 31.08.2012. 12. In the instant case, the petitioners in WP Nos.440-441 of 2016 and petitioners in WP Nos.49161- 49164 of 2015 who are accused Nos.19, 18, 9, 10 and 11 in Crime No.91/2015 contend that they have been acquitted in Departmental Enquiry said to have been conducted by a retired District Judge. However, with respect to the writ petitioner in WP No.49160/2015 who is accused No.1 in the same crime number, no such Departmental Enquiry was conducted, but, it is his case that he has never been worked in the Government Grainage, madhugiri at the relevant point of time. 13. In P.S. Rajya’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court referring to its previous judgment in the case State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 has reiterated the principles laid down in the Bhajan Lal’s case on the following lines. “P20. 13. In P.S. Rajya’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court referring to its previous judgment in the case State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal reported in 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 has reiterated the principles laid down in the Bhajan Lal’s case on the following lines. “P20. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulate and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirely do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with malafide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengecance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified an embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice”. 14. In the case on hand, the allegations made against the present writ petitioners are shown to be attracting Sections 409 and 420 of IPC. It is alleged that these petitioners joined by the other accused have deceived the Government to the tune of Rs. 50,51,000/- while discharging their official duties. The investigation in the said matters is said to be still pending. The allegations in the FIR constitutes cognizable offences. A reading of the averments at this stage cannot be called as absurd and inherently improbable. It is also not the case of the petitioners that the charges levelled against them are inherently improbable. But, it is a case of the petitioners that the Departmental Enquiry has already been held and the report shows that the present petitioners are innocent of the alleged offences. It is also not the case of the petitioners that the charges levelled against them are inherently improbable. But, it is a case of the petitioners that the Departmental Enquiry has already been held and the report shows that the present petitioners are innocent of the alleged offences. Thus, the facts of the present case, since, does not fall in any one of the principles laid down in the above referred Rajya’s case (supra), the same would not enure to the benefit of the petitioners. 15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Tyagi’s case (supra), in the similar circumstances, where the accused who was an accused of receiving an illegal gratification other than legal remuneration was subjected to a Departmental Enquiry, the Enquiry Officer observed that the evidence on record does not substantiate the charge of demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused and accordingly, recorded the finding that the charge against the accused has not been proved due to lack of evidence on record. However, the criminal action was initiated against the accused/official who challenged the same. 16. The Hon’ble Apex Court after referring the P.S. Rajya’s Case (supra) and also Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) was pleased to opine that the exoneration in the departmental proceeding ipso facto would not result into quashing of the criminal prosecution of the accused. Hon’ble Apex Court further added that however, if the prosecution against the accused is solely based on a finding, that finding is set-aside by the superior authority, the very foundation goes and the prosecution may be quashed, but, that principle will not apply in the case of the departmental proceeding as the criminal trial and the departmental proceeding are held by two different entities. Further they are not in the same hierarchy. 17. In the instant case also, it is not the case of the petitioner that the prosecution against them is solely based on a finding of proceedings and its finding was set-aside by the superior authority in the hierarchy. Here the departmental proceedings and the criminal investigation are being held by two different entities. Further they are not in the same hierarchy. No doubt, the investigation agency during investigation may also notice the Departmental Enquiry and the out come of the same. Here the departmental proceedings and the criminal investigation are being held by two different entities. Further they are not in the same hierarchy. No doubt, the investigation agency during investigation may also notice the Departmental Enquiry and the out come of the same. But, merely because in a Departmental Enquiry, some of the petitioners are said to have been given a clean chit, that itself would not be a ground to quash the criminal investigation which is vague. 18. With respect to the alleged delay in the initiation of criminal proceedings is concerned, according to the petitioners, the alleged criminal act is said to have been occurred during the period between 01.04.2003 to 31.03.3007, whereas, the initiation of the criminal proceedings in the form of lodging an FIR is only on 13.08.2015. Thus, there is a delay of about 8 years in the initiation of criminal proceedings. 19. However, considering the nature of the offences which are cognizable, the mere delay would not be a sufficient ground to quash the FIR, that too, when the investigation is still said to be in progress. As such, I do not find any reason to quash the criminal proceedings said to be pending against the petitioners. Accordingly, the petitions stand dismissed. Considering the fact that the complaint is of the year 2015, the Investigation Officer is directed to complete the investigation at the earliest.