JUDGMENT : Vivek Rusia, J. 1. The appellant (hereinafter referred to as "plaintiff") has filed the present second appeal being aggrieved by judgment and decree dated 2.1.2009 passed by First Civil Judge, Class-I, Garoth, District Ujjain, by which the suit has been dismissed and also against judgment dated 25.4.2017 passed by Additional District Judge, Mandsuar whereby First Appeal has been dismissed. 2. Facts of the case, in short, are as under : The plaintiff filed the suit for declaration, permanent injunction and mandatory injunction in respect of the suit land described in Para 2 of the plaint. As per pleading in the plaint, plaintiff and defendants No. 1 to 3 are residents of Gram Chandwasa. Defendant No. 4 is sister of plaintiff, defendants No. 4 and 5 are real brothers and sisters being son and daughter of Late Manoharlalji. Defendant No. 1 is son of Baijnathji who is real brother of Manoharlal. Defendant No. 2 and 3 are sons of defendant No. 1. Due to non-availability of defendants No. 4 and 5, they were impleaded as formal party and no relief was claimed against them. According to the plaintiffs, the suit land is of joint ownership of plaintiffs and defendants No. 4 and 5. The suit land being a plot was of the ownership of Baijnath and by way of mutual agreement dated 6.9.1995, the suit land came into the share of plaintiffs and defendants No. 4 and 5, for which, Late Baijnath executed a deed in favour of Manoharlal. Manoharlal had expired on 30.12.1988 and Baijnath had expired in the year 1992. The plaintiff has alleged that defendants No. 1 to 3 have started digging over the suit land on 17.11.1996, therefore, cause of action arose in their favour for filing the suit for declaration that plaintiff and defendants No. 4 and 5 are the owners of the suit land and defendants No. 1 to 3 be restrained to interfere into their possession. 3. After notice, defendants No. 1 to 3 filed their written statement and denied the averments made in the plaint by submitting that Baijnath was owner of the suit land and he partitioned the suit land along with other properties between father of plaintiff and defendant No. 1 on 11.5.1977. He did not execute any amended deed dated 6.5.1985 (Ex. P/1). The suit land never came into the share of Manoharlal. 4. He did not execute any amended deed dated 6.5.1985 (Ex. P/1). The suit land never came into the share of Manoharlal. 4. On the basis of pleadings, learned trial Court framed 5 issues for adjudication. 5. Plaintiff No. 1 examined himself as P.W.1; Lalaram as P.W.2, Bherulal as P.W.3 and H.S. Tuteja, Handwriting Expert as P.W.4 and got exhibited as many as 18 documents as Ex. P/1 to P/18. 6. In support of written statement, defendants No. 1 to 3 examined Ashok Kumar Jain, Handwriting Expert as D.W.1; Shivchetan as D.W.2 and got exhibited 53 documents as Ex. D/1 to D/53. 7. After appreciating the evidence which came on record, learned trial Court vide judgment dated 2.1.2009 has dismissed the suit with the finding that the plaintiff has failed to prove the amended deed dated 6.5.1985 executed by Baijnath because he had already partitioned the properties on 11.5.1977 between Manoharlal and Shivchetan and the suit land came into the share of Shivchetan. 8. Being aggrieved by dismissal of the suit, plaintiff preferred first appeal and that too has been dismissed by the appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 25.4.2017, hence this second appeal before this Court. 9. I have heard Shri J.B. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff and Shri Arjun Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the defendants at length and perused the record. 10. Shri Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiff submitted that the Courts below have erred in holding that plaintiff has failed to prove Ex. P/1. The finding of the both the courts below are perverse as the Handwriting Expert has clearly established that Ex. P/1 was signed by Baijnath. Learned courts below have wrongly admitted Ex. P/1 in evidence only for collateral purpose, whereas by the aforesaid amended deed, earlier partition deed was amended and the suit land was given to Manoharlal by Late Baijnath. The plaintiff has proposed following substantial questions of law : A. Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case the decree of lower court could be sustained as it erred in law in holding that Ex. P/1 is not proved by the appellants and further that appellants could not prove that disputed property has fallen in the share of Manoharlal in partition ignoring the admission of D.W. 2 Shivchaitanya who admitted signatures of Manoharlal on Ex. P/1? P/1 is not proved by the appellants and further that appellants could not prove that disputed property has fallen in the share of Manoharlal in partition ignoring the admission of D.W. 2 Shivchaitanya who admitted signatures of Manoharlal on Ex. P/1? B. Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the decree of lower court could be sustained as its judgment is no judgment in the eyes of law as it has not discussed or scanned evidence of the parties? C. Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the decree of lower court could be sustained as it erred in law in misinterpreting document of Ex. P/1 by not treating it to be amended partition deed? D. Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the decree of lower court could be sustained as it erred in law in holding that Ex. P/1 is admitted in evidence only for collateral purpose despite the fact that similar document was admitted in evidence? E. Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case, the decree of learned lower court could be sustained as its findings of learned lower Court are perverse being contrary to law and evidence on record?" 11. On the other hand, Shri Arjun Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents argued in support of the impugned judgment and prayed for dismissal of this appeal. 12. The plaintiff filed the suit claiming title over the suit land by virtue of Ex. P/1, therefore, the burden was on him to prove that despite partition which took place on 11.5.1977, the suit land was given to his father by amended deed dated 6.5.1985. The defendants disputed the signatures of Baijnath on Ex. P/1. Both the parties submitted the report of Handwriting Experts in their favour. Both the reports are contrary to each other, therefore, the learned civil judge himself has examined the report and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to prove the signature of Baijnath over Ex. P/1. Learned trial Court has disbelieved Ex. P/1 on the ground that one suit was filed by Baijnath against Manoharlal and his wife in the year 1986 in which Manoharlal filed the written statement without disclosing Ex. P/1 in his favour, which has rightly created doubt in the mind of the trial Court as well as lower appellate Court. Had this Ex. P/1 on the ground that one suit was filed by Baijnath against Manoharlal and his wife in the year 1986 in which Manoharlal filed the written statement without disclosing Ex. P/1 in his favour, which has rightly created doubt in the mind of the trial Court as well as lower appellate Court. Had this Ex. P/1 was available at that time, Late Manoharlal would have disclosed the same in his written statement in the pending suit. 13. Initially learned trial Court had declined to mark Ex. P/1 in evidence by order dated 20.8.2007 and being aggrieved by the said order, plaintiff filed W.P. No. 4909/2017 before this Court. In the said petition, counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that even if the said partition required compulsory registration, still being an unregistered document, the same can be relied upon by the plaintiff for collateral purposes. The said contention was not opposed by the learned counsel appearing for the defendants and vide order dated 5.10.2007, learned Writ Court has disposed of the writ petition by making it clear that the plaintiff would not be entitled to use Ex. P/1 for any other purpose except for collateral purposes. The defendant was given liberty to raise any objection at the appropriate stage if the plaintiff chooses to rely on the said document for any other purpose other than collateral purpose. Admittedly, Ex. P/1 is an unregistered document; therefore, no right drives in favour of the plaintiff. Learned Writ Court has rightly held that the said document can be relied on only for collateral purposes. Even the plaintiff has failed prove his possession over the suit land, therefore, Ex.P/1 could not be used for collateral purposes by the plaintiff. P.W.1 in Para 21 of his cross-examination has admitted that the suit land came into the share of Shivchetan in the partition took place in the year 1977 and at that time, Late Baijnath used to live with Shivchetan and Shivchetan used to look after his land. His father left Indore in the year 1980-82 and he did not include the name of the mother in the plaint despite the fact that she was alive at the time of filling the suit. In view of the above, I do not find any question of law is involved in this appeal. 14. His father left Indore in the year 1980-82 and he did not include the name of the mother in the plaint despite the fact that she was alive at the time of filling the suit. In view of the above, I do not find any question of law is involved in this appeal. 14. Even otherwise, the apex Court in the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar : (1999) 3 SCC 722 , has held as under: 5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. 6. If the question of law termed as a substantial question stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or by the Supreme Court, its merely wrong application on the facts of the case would not be termed to be a substantial question of law. Where a point of law has not been pleaded or is found to be arising between the parties in the absence of any factual format, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. Where a point of law has not been pleaded or is found to be arising between the parties in the absence of any factual format, a litigant should not be allowed to raise that question as a substantial question of law in second appeal. The mere appreciation of the facts, the documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the contents of the document cannot be held to be raising a substantial question of law. But where it is found that the first appellate court has assumed jurisdiction which did not vest in it, the same can be adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as a substantial question of law. Where the first appellate court is shown to have exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, it cannot be termed to be an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. This Court in Reserve Bank of India v. Ramkrishna Govind Morey [ AIR 1976 SC 830 ] held that whether the trial court should not have exercised its jurisdiction differently is not a question of law justifying interference. 15. In case of Laxmidevamma v. Ranganath : (2015) 4 SCC 264 , again the apex court has held as under: 16. Based on oral and documentary evidence, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact that the plain-tiffs have established their right in A schedule property. In the light of the concurrent findings of fact, no substantial questions of law arose in the High Court and there was no substantial ground for reappreciation of evidence. While so, the High Court proceeded to observe that the first plaintiff has earmarked the A schedule property for road and that she could not have full-fledged right and on that premise proceeded to hold that declaration to the plaintiffs' right cannot be granted. In exercise of jurisdiction under section 100 CPC, concurrent findings of fact cannot be upset by the High Court unless the findings so recorded are shown to be perverse. In our considered view, the High Court did not keep in view that the concurrent findings recorded by the courts below, are based on oral and documentary evidence and the judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. 16. Recently, the Apex Court in case of Adiveppa & Others v. Bhimappa & Others, (2017) 9 SCC 586 has held as under: "17. 16. Recently, the Apex Court in case of Adiveppa & Others v. Bhimappa & Others, (2017) 9 SCC 586 has held as under: "17. Here is a case where two Courts below, on appreciating the entire evidence, have come to a conclusion that the Plaintiffs failed to prove their case in relation to both the suit properties. The concurrent findings of facts recorded by the two Courts, which do not involve any question of law much less substantial question of law, are binding on this Court. 18. It is more so when these findings are neither against the pleadings nor against the evidence and nor contrary to any provision of law. They are also not perverse to the extent that no such findings could ever be recorded by any judicial person. In other words, unless the findings of facts, though concurrent, are found to be extremely perverse so as to affect the judicial conscious of a judge, they would be binding on the Appellate Court." 17. In view of the above, this appeal does not involve any question of law much less substantial question of law and the same is hereby dismissed. 18. No order as to costs.