JUDGMENT : I.P. Mukerji, J. 1. This appeal relates to a deceased employee of Eastern Coalfields Ltd, the second respondent. At a particular point of time when this organization was in need of land they acquired it from land owners, amongst other methods, by entering into contracts with them. The terms and conditions of this contract formed part of the land losers' scheme. Devoid of any complexity the scheme provided for taking over ownership and possession of the land belonging to the land owners by the respondent Coal Company upon payment of monetary compensation. In addition, an heir or more than one heir of the owner's family, depending on the size of the land, were provided employment in the respondent organization. The person or the family whose land was taken was described as the land loser. 2. One such land loser was Arun Kumar Mukherjee, the original appellant/writ petitioner. Reference to the appellant/writ petitioner in this judgment would refer to him. The letter of the second respondent Company signed on 23rd November, 1993 acknowledged that the date of birth of the appellant/writ petitioner recorded in their register was 28th August, 1961. By that letter, the appellant/writ petitioner was appointed as an employee of the second respondent. 3. All went well with the appellant/writ petitioner from the date of his appointment on 23rd November, 1993 till 24th June, 2011. All of a sudden on 24th June, 2011 he was issued a show cause notice by the Manager of Shyamsundarpur Colliery asking for an explanation why disciplinary proceedings should not be taken against him. He was charged with misrepresentation of his age with the added remark that he had been dishonest. 4. The charges against the appellant/writ petitioner were startling. It was said that Milan Kumar Mukherjee, the younger brother of the appellant/writ petitioner joined Eastern Coalfields on 10th September, 1981 declaring his date of birth as 28th August, 1956. The appellant/writ petitioner's date of birth recorded with the organization was 10th August, 1961. Since Milan Kumar Mukerjee was the appellant/writ petitioner's younger brother, the age of the appellant/writ petitioner was much more and was fraudulently declared as 10th August, 1961. The charge-sheet was also issued by the Manager, Shyamsundarpur Colliery. The enquiry was held ex-parte. The appellant/writ petitioner never appeared at any point of time. He only made an undated reply to the charge sheet. The charge-sheet was also issued by the Manager, Shyamsundarpur Colliery. The enquiry was held ex-parte. The appellant/writ petitioner never appeared at any point of time. He only made an undated reply to the charge sheet. This reply is at Page 44 of the paper book. In his reply, the appellant/writ petitioner firmly denied the charges, relying on his school certificate. The whole attempt of Milan Kumar Mukherjee along with the Manager of the coal mine was to victimize the appellant/writ petitioner, he said. 5. The Enquiry Officer, Jayanta Mukherjee on 21st March, 2013 made an enquiry report holding that the charges against the appellant/writ petitioner were proved. On 7th June, 2013 the enquiry report was sent to the appellant/writ petitioner to enable him to give a reply to it. A comment was made in that letter that according to the Officer the findings had been properly arrived at and the enquiry held in accordance with the principles of natural justice and that the appellant/writ petitioner did not take part in it. 6. This letter of 7/8th June, 2013 was treated by the respondent Company as the second show cause notice to enable the appellant/writ petitioner to say something with regard to the major penalty of dismissal from service that was contemplated against him. He did not file any reply to this. 7. In those circumstances, on 7th September, 2013 the General Manager, Bankola area of the respondent Company wrote to the appellant/writ petitioner stating that he had no defence to the charges against him. The appellant/writ petitioner's service was terminated. 8. The appellate authority dismissed his appeal on 5th April, 2014. Mr. Partha Ghosh, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/writ petitioner made a preliminary submission. He said that if the contemplated penalty was major then the full powers to try the disciplinary proceedings including issuance of the show cause notice, termination and removal from service lay with the Chief General Manager/General Manager, according to the applicable rules. 9. He argued that right from the time of initiation of the proceedings by issuance of the show cause notice till the imposition of punishment the proceedings had to be carried out by the General Manager/Chief General Manager. The Manager who issued the show cause notice and conducted the enquiry proceedings was much below in rank to the Chief General Manager/General Manager. 10. To this, Mr. The Manager who issued the show cause notice and conducted the enquiry proceedings was much below in rank to the Chief General Manager/General Manager. 10. To this, Mr. Alok Banerjee, learned Advocate for the respondents replied that the punishment had been imposed by the General Manager. Therefore, there was no violation of any rule. 11. He placed before us an office order dated 17th July, 2000 of the respondent Company. By this document the Chairman cum Managing Director of the Company had delegated some of his essential powers. What is important for the purpose of this case is the power contained in Serial No. A.3 (e) of the said document which relates to the disciplinary actions in respect of the employees for whom the Chairman cum Managing Director was the appointing authority. It is very interesting to note that full powers relating to disciplinary actions resulting in removal, termination etc. of an employee were delegated to the Chief General Manager/General Manager of the area. 12. We have to deal with this preliminary point. 13. In Inspector General of Police and Anr. Vs. Thavasiappan reported in, (1996) 2 SCC 145 , the Supreme Court said that if the rule provided that the disciplinary proceedings had to be conducted by an officer of a particular rank, it sufficed if the punishment was imposed by an officer of that rank irrespective of the fact whether different stages of the proceeding were conducted by an officer below that rank. 14. The charge sheet against the appellant/writ petitioner was issued by the Manager, Shyamsundar Colliery. The Enquiry Officer was Manager (Personnel) IAG, ECL, HQ. His termination of service was made by a letter dated 5/7th September, 2013 by the General Manager. Therefore, this is perfectly in consonance with the delegation of power made by the Chairman and Director of the second respondent on 17th July, 2000, where under the full power to take disciplinary action was vested in the Chief General Manager/ General Manager. What is important is that this kind of conduct of enquiry and taking a decision in the disciplinary proceeding has been approved by the Supreme Court in the above case of Inspector General of Police and Anr. Vs. Thavasiappan reported in, (1996) 2 SCC 145 . 15. The appellant/writ petitioner was dismissed from service on 7th September, 2013. He filed this writ application in or about August 2014. 16. Vs. Thavasiappan reported in, (1996) 2 SCC 145 . 15. The appellant/writ petitioner was dismissed from service on 7th September, 2013. He filed this writ application in or about August 2014. 16. We do not agree that this writ could be said to be barred by delay, as argued by Mr. Banerjee. It was filed within reasonable time. We also do not entertain the argument that natural justice was denied to the appellant/writ petitioner because he did not take part in the proceedings after answering the first show cause notice. 17. The other relevant point taken by Mr. Banerjee for the respondents is accepted by the Court. He said that an employee who obtains employment by fraud is liable to be dismissed citing Union of India & Ors. Vs. C. Devan reported in, (1995) Supp4 SCC 100. 18. Now, I come to the most important part of the disciplinary proceeding. This proceeding appears to be very extraordinary. It is recorded in the findings of the Enquiry Officer that the appellant/writ petitioner's date of birth was 10th August, 1961 and that it had been entered in all the official records of the Company, at the time of his entry into the service. If one takes a look at his appointment letter dated 23rd November, 1993 one will find that his date of birth was recorded as 10th August, 1961 and that in paragraph 12 of that letter it was stated that his age had been determined by the Company's Medical Officer and/or was as per his Matriculation certificate. In paragraph 18 of the writ petition the appellant/writ petitioner has averred that at the time of his employment his age was determined by the Medical Board and that no copy of the report was made available to him. On the basis of the report of this Board, his date of birth was entered in the records of the Company as 10th August, 1961. This was dealt with by the respondents in paragraph 18 of their affidavit-in-opposition by admitting that the age of the appellant/writ petitioner was determined by the Medical Board. 19. Now it so happened that the brother of the appellant/writ petitioner, Milan Kumar Mukherjee also worked with ECL. His relationship with the appellant/writ petitioner was very bad. It also appears that the brother had a great influence on some officers of the respondent employer. 19. Now it so happened that the brother of the appellant/writ petitioner, Milan Kumar Mukherjee also worked with ECL. His relationship with the appellant/writ petitioner was very bad. It also appears that the brother had a great influence on some officers of the respondent employer. He did not want his brother to work in this organization. So he invented a strange method to ruin his career. He wrote to the respondent organization that he was the younger brother of the appellant/writ petitioner. Even a boy in a play school would not have taken his complaint, without any supporting evidence seriously. But the respondent Company took it with great seriousness. They asked the appellant/writ petitioner to show cause why he should not be held to have acted in a fraudulent manner. He was asked to submit a written explanation within 72 hours of the receipt of the letter. The appellant/writ petitioner replied to this show cause notice on 14th July, 2011. He denied the accusation, relying on his School Certificate. It is true that after submission of this reply the appellant/writ petitioner did not take any further part in the proceedings. He did not appear before the Enquiry Officer. No evidence was placed before us by the respondent Company to contradict the date of birth of the appellant/writ petitioner recorded with them. In those circumstances, we find that the appellant/writ petitioner was taken into employment after undergoing an age determination test conducted by the Medical Board and/or on the basis of his School leaving Certificate which certified his date of birth as 10th August, 1961. From 1993 the appellant/writ petitioner undertook nearly 20 years' service. 20. Acting entirely on the frivolous complaint of his so-called brother, Milan, without any evidence the respondent issued a show cause notice to the appellant/writ petitioner. The complainant Milan was not even called to depose. 21. On the basis of this letter alone the Enquiry Officer came to the finding that the appellant/writ petitioner was guilty of suppressing his age and practicing fraud on them. 22. There is no provision in the Service rules of the respondent Company or as a matter of fact any Service rule for raking up an age dispute, with regard to an employee with nearly twenty years' service unless there is a substantial complaint based on reasonable evidence that the age disclosed by the employee was misdeclared. 22. There is no provision in the Service rules of the respondent Company or as a matter of fact any Service rule for raking up an age dispute, with regard to an employee with nearly twenty years' service unless there is a substantial complaint based on reasonable evidence that the age disclosed by the employee was misdeclared. Short of this, the second respondent had no authority to reopen the age issue. It is absolutely crystal clear that this so-called enquiry was absolutely vitiated by malice and consideration of extraneous matters. There was predisposition to punish. In my opinion, the onus was on the respondents to prove that the appellant/writ petitioner was much older than what he declared himself to be. They hopelessly failed in this task. 23. It is very amazing to observe that on the basis of a wild complaint not supported by any kind of evidence the respondent Company has gone to the extent of pronouncing the appellant/writ petitioner guilty of a major offence for which the most major penalty was inflicted. In fact, the appellant/writ petitioner's life was cut short by this most cruel conduct on the part of his employer. He died on 25th April, 2018. He had employment till 2021. 24. Furthermore, in our opinion, even assuming that the appellant/writ petitioner was liable to punishment, the imposition of punishment of termination of service was far too harsh on him than what the circumstances if proved demanded. The appellant/writ petitioner died in 2018, although he had service till 2021. His heirs have been substituted. He cannot be put back into service. The order of termination of the appellant/writ petitioner's services by the second respondent's letter dated 5/7th September, 2013 is set aside. The appellant would be deemed to be in service till his death on 25th April, 2018. We order that the appellant/writ petitioner's widow, one of the substituted appellant/writ petitioners be paid his full salary, allowances, gratuity, provident fund up to the date of his death and all his retiral benefits in full, less any sum received within three months from date. Provided he makes a formal application in this behalf by 31st January 2018, one of the substituted appellants/writ petitioners would also be considered for employment by the second respondent, if eligible under the applicable rules, by a reasoned order to be communicated by 31st March, 2019. 25. The appeal is thus allowed. 26. Provided he makes a formal application in this behalf by 31st January 2018, one of the substituted appellants/writ petitioners would also be considered for employment by the second respondent, if eligible under the applicable rules, by a reasoned order to be communicated by 31st March, 2019. 25. The appeal is thus allowed. 26. The judgment and order dated 14th September, 2017 is set aside. 27. No order as to costs. 28. Certified photocopy of this Judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities.