JUDGMENT : The petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned Ext.P-3 order dated 26.3.2009, whereby her Ext.P-2 application dated February, 2009 filed under Sec. 28A(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, has been rejected on the ground that the same is barred by limitation. 2. The prayers in this Writ Petition (Civil) are as follows: “(i) To issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or direction to the respondents 2 and 4 to restore Ext.P-2 application and consider it on merit. (ii) To issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writs, orders or directions to call for the entire records leading upto Ext.P-3 and quash same and declare the same is illegal and unsustainable. (iii) To issue any other order or direction as this Hon'ble Court deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 3. Heard Smt. Hemalatha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri.Saigi Jacob Palatty, learned Senior Govt. Pleader appearing for the respondents. 4. Seeking better compensatory benefits on the basis of an award passed by the Land Acquisition Reference Court (LAR Court) concerned in respect of third parties, but pertaining to very same notification on the basis of which the petitioner's land has been acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, the petitioner had filed Ext.P-2 application dated Feb. 2009 under Sec. 28A(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, seeking reference as per that provision to the LAR Court, for determination of claim for enhanced compensation as envisaged in that provision. The claim was made by the petitioner as per Ext.P-2 application under Sec. 28A(1) on the basis of Ext.P-1 award dated 30.9.2008, rendered by the LAR Court concerned (Addl. Sub Court, Kollam) in LAR No.12/1996 and 152/196, which according to the petitioner, pertain to the very same notification as the one involved in the acquisition of the petitioner's land as well. A perusal of Ext.P-1 copy of the judgment would reveal that the judgment in question was rendered on 30.9.2008 and the application for grant of certified copy of the same was made by the petitioner as application No.2656 on 6.10.2008. It is further endorsed thereon that since the stamp was not duly produced by the petitioner, the application was rejected. Later the petitioner filed an application for restoration and the same was restored on 21.1.2009. It is further endorsed thereon that since the stamp was not duly produced by the petitioner, the application was rejected. Later the petitioner filed an application for restoration and the same was restored on 21.1.2009. Thereafter, certified copy of the ready on 7.2.2009 and it was notified that the petitioner should appear to receive the certified copy on 11.2.2009 and that the copy was actually delivered to the petitioner on 11.2.2009. The 2nd respondent Land Acquisition Officer has taken the view in the impugned Ext.P-3 order dated 26.3.2009 that since the application for grant of certified copy was though initially filed on 6.10.2008, the same was rejected due to non production of stamp (for not curing the defect) and though application for restoration was filed, the same was restored only on 21.1.2009 and that therefore the application for grant of certified copy made by the petitioner should be deemed to have been made only on 21.1.2009 (date of restoration) for the purpose of computing the period of limitation and since that is the position, Ext.P-2 application is filed only on 12.3.2009, which is obviously barred by limitation. It is not in dispute that the date of filing of the application for grant of certified copy is reckoned as 21.1.2009 (date of restoration of the application and not as 6.10.2008, date of original submission of the application) then certainly Ext.P-2 application dated 12.3.2009 is obviously barred by limitation as the requisite period of 3 months thereof has thus expired. 5. Sec. 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides as follows: “Sec.28A: Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. 5. Sec. 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 provides as follows: “Sec.28A: Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of the award of the Court. (1) Where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, by written application to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded by the Court: Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an application to the Collector shall be made under this subsection, the day on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. (2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard and make an award determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants. (3) Any person who has not accepted the award under subsection (2) may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the provisions of Sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference under Section 18.” 6. Sec.12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 stipulates as follows: “Sec.12: Exclusion of time in legal proceedings (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded. (3). (3). Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed, or where an application is made for leave to appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment shall also be excluded. (4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded. Explanation. -In computing under this section the time requisite for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded.” 7. It has been held by this Court in the case in Thankappan v. Raghavan, reported in 1993 (2) KLT 456 , in para 9 thereof, that the period between the dismissal of a copy application and its restoration can be considered as time requisite for getting a copy within the meaning of Sec.12 of the Limitation Act and when the court grants the request for restoration of the copy application, the original application gets revived and for all purposes the period of limitation has to be computed on the basis of the copies obtained on that application with reference to the date of that copy application. Further this Court has also held in para 10 of that judgment that this does not mean that every request for restoration of a copy application should necessarily be allowed by the court and certified copies and printed copies be granted on the basis of such applications and if a request for restoration is made within the time allowed for filing an appeal, there may not be any difficulty and the opposite party will not be deprived of any rights. But that the position is different in a case where the time to file an appeal has run out by the date of filing the application for restoration and in such cases, the jurisdiction to restore to file an application dismissed for default should be exercised only after notice to the opposite side and the question of condonation has to be dealt with on the application of principles analogous to those on which the application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act will be dealt with. 8. 8. It will be pertinent to refer to paras 9 and 10 of the decision in Thankappan's case supra, which read as follows: “9. I am in respectful agreement with the views of the Madras High Court and the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the decisions cited above. I am therefore of the view that the period between the dismissal of a copy application and its restoration can be considered as time requisite for getting a copy within the meaning of S.12 of the Limitation Act. When the court grants the request for restoration of the copy application the original application gets revived and for all purposes the period of limitation has to be computed on the basis of the copies obtained on that application with reference to the date of that copy application. 10. This does not mean that every request for restoration of a copy application should be allowed by the court and certified copies and printed copies be granted on the basis of such applications. The Madras High Court in Hari Prasad's case (supra) has pointed out that one of the factors that has to be taken note of is whether the restoration will affect the rights of the opposite party. If a request for restoration is made within the time allowed for filing an appeal there may not be any difficulty and the opposite party will not be deprived of any rights. But the position is different in a case where the time to file an appeal has run out by the date of filing the application for restoration. In such cases, as observed by the Madras High Court in Hari Prasad's case the jurisdiction to restore to file an application dismissed for default should be exercised only after notice to the opposite side and the question of condonation has to be dealt with oh the application of principles analogous to those on which the application under S.5 of the Limitation Act will be dealt with.” 9. In the instant case, it can be seen from page 18 of the paper book of the Writ Petition that the application for grant of certified copy of the judgment dated 30.9.2008 was filed by the petitioner on 6.10.2008 as per copy application No.2656. In the instant case, it can be seen from page 18 of the paper book of the Writ Petition that the application for grant of certified copy of the judgment dated 30.9.2008 was filed by the petitioner on 6.10.2008 as per copy application No.2656. Since stamp was not duly produced, the said copy application was rejected as the defect in that regard was not cured and subsequently, on submission of the restoration application, the original application of the certified copy was restored by the court below only on 21.1.2009 and thereafter the copy has been duly notified to be received on 11.2.2009, etc. It can be seen that the period of limitation Sec. 28A(1) application as per the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is 3 months. Though the date of filing of the restoration application is not mentioned it can be seen that the application was restored on 21.1.2009. Therefore, it is clear like the blue sky that that the application for restoration application has been filed well before the expiry of the period of limitation of 3 months as envisaged in para 10 of the judgment of this Court in Thankappan's case supra. Since that is the position, the petitioner can certainly seek the benefit of ratio decidendi laid down by this Court in para 9 of Thankappan's case supra, wherein it has been conclusively held that the period of dismissal of a copy application and its restoration can be considered as time requisite for getting the copy under Sec.12 of the Limitation Act and so when the courts grants the request for restoration of the copy application, the original application will get revived for all purposes of limitation, then the period of limitation has to be computed on the basis of the copy so obtained on that application with reference to the date of that application. Hence the view taken by the 2nd respondent in Ext.P-3 that in view of the restoration application, the date of grant of certified copy could be reckoned only as the date on which application has been restored viz., 21.1.2009, is clearly wrong and untenable. Since that is the position, it has to be taken that in this case, the period of limitation should be reckoned by treating that the date of copy application should be reckoned as the original date of submission of such application, viz., 6.10.2008. Since that is the position, it has to be taken that in this case, the period of limitation should be reckoned by treating that the date of copy application should be reckoned as the original date of submission of such application, viz., 6.10.2008. Since that is the position, obviously, Ext.P2 application filed on 12.3.2009 is thus within the time and the same is not barred by limitation. In that view of the matter, the impugned Ext.P-3 order will stand set aside. The 2nd respondent Land Acquisition Officer is directed to refer the request for reference made by the petitioner in Ext.P-2 application to the LAR court concerned, as conceived in Sec. 28A(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It is ordered that the 2nd respondent LAO will place Ext.P-2 application filed under Sec. 28A(1) before the 4th respondent District Collector, who shall determine the same on merits. The entire process in this regard will be completed by the 4th respondent within a period of 4 months from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Petition (Civil) stands finally disposed of.